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1 INTRODUCTION
There is a wide range of academic literature focussed on the protection against “new” and
“old” social risks in OECD countries that are experiencing an ongoing transition from industrial
to post-industrial societies.(e.g. Bonoli 2006, Häusermann 2006, Esping-Andersen 1999, Pierson
2001, Taylor-Gooby 2006, Tepe/Vanhuysse 2010) Particularly demographic and labour market
changes have been identified to have important implications for the respective welfare states.
Although these changes produced similar “problem pressures” for most of the welfare states in
the industrialised world(e.g.  Zutavern/Kohli  2010: 179),  they have not always  led to similar
social policy responses. In this context, the politics of welfare state adaptation have become a
field of strong interest for political science.
Academic interest in welfare states outside the OECD has recently become stronger since the
social consequences of neoliberal adjustment have become evident in most of those countries.
More  and  more  literature  analyses  the  politics  of  social  expenditure  and/or   welfare  (state)
regimes  in  Latin  American,  Asian  or  African  countries.(e.g.  Haggard/Kaufman  2008,
Gough/Wood 2008, Barrientos 2008/2009, Draibe/Riesco 2007b) The Argentinean welfare state,
as one of the early developers in Latin America, has thereby received considerable attention from
scholars in and outside Argentina.
Commonly shared findings of these studies are that until the mid 1970s Argentina’s welfare
state regime has been very similar to those of continental Europe, taking into consideration the
central role of obligatory social insurance schemes financed through payroll taxes divided by
employers  and  employees  in  health  and  pension  arrangements,  low  female  labour  market
participation and extensive labour market regulation. 
Despite  these  similarities,  studies  analysing  social  expenditure  pointed  out  that  the
Argentinean  social  expenditure  has  always  been  below  OECD  average1 and  most  of  the
corporative welfare state regimes of continental Europe, both in relation to the GDP and per
capita.(see e.g. Haggard/Kaufman 2008, Barbeito 1998, Vargas de Flood 2006, Siegel 2007)
Another important difference to most of the continental European “conservative/corporatist”
welfare  state  regimes  was  the  absence  of  an  unemployment  insurance,  as  well  as  the
1 Most continental European countries have higher social expenditure than the OECD average. Gross public social
expenditure(includes  obligatory private  social  expenditure)  in  2001:  OECD 22 Average:  22.5  % of  the  GDP ;
France: 28.5 % ; Germany: 27.4 ; Austria: 26.0 % ; Switzerland: 26.4 % ; Italy: 24.4 %(Siegel 2007: 298),  EU-15:
27.1 %, EU- 25: 26.8 %(Heitzmann/Österle 2008: 49). The Argentinean social expenditure in 2001 in comparison
was 21.8 % of the GDP.(Vargas de Flood 2005: 189)
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extraordinarily high fragmentation and the relatively low benefits of social policy programmes
for those who had not contributed to the social insurances.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 179, Lo
Vuolo  1998b:  240)  Therefore,  informal  work(especially  not  registered  employment)  and
unemployment  virtually  meant  exclusion  from public  social  protection.  However,  registered
employment was dominant in the Argentinean labour market and seemed to be on the increase
until the mid 1970s, so that also social insurance coverage was extending to ever bigger parts of
the society.(Isuani 2010: 104/105)
With the military dictatorship from 1976 to 1983 this trend experienced a turnaround.  The
first wave of neoliberal inspired reforms implied a paradigm shift from the development strategy
of import substitution industrialization(ISI) to world market integration, which induced a process
of rapid de-industrialisation and profound changes on the labour market. 
Although the successive social policy reforms did not keep up with the profoundness that
characterised  the  changes  in  economic  policies,  Argentina’s  welfare  state  outcomes  have
changed profoundly.
The main reason for this can rather be found in the changed labour market functioning than in
a dismantling of the existing welfare state arrangements. While social expenditure has increased
as a proportion of the GDP since the abandonment of the ISI development model, the new labour
market  setting produced high unemployment  rates,  considerably lower average  wages,  much
bigger  wage  inequalities  and  growing  informal  employment,  which  ultimately  extended
importantly the problem of exclusion from social protection.
Revisions of the economic policy in the aftermath of the prolonged crisis between 1998 and
2002 have created more favourable labour market conditions for the weaker sectors of society, if
we compare them to the 1990s. Nevertheless, the problems of enormous income inequalities and
high  rates  of  informal  employment  persist.  Ultimately,  also  some  limited  progress  towards
expanding  the  coverage  of  social  protection  arrangements  for  unemployed  and  precarious
workers has been reached, but the main features of the old social security arrangements show
strong  rigidity.  Exclusion  from  social  protection  continues  to  be  a  core  problem.  Social
protection against income insufficiency due to unemployment or precarious employment remains
still  weak,  both  in  terms  of  coverage  and  quality2.  High  income  inequalities  translate  into
unequal benefits for those who work in the formal labour market. 
2 The benefits of nearly all social programmes for unemployed or precarious workers do not even cover the basic
alimentary needs of the recipients.  Furthermore, it is mostly not possible to receive more than one benefit at the
same  time. 
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On the basis of what has been said before, the central question that motivated this text is: Why
has  the  Argentine  welfare  state,  which  virtually  continues  to  be  adequate  for  conditions  of
permanent full employment and relatively high wages, not been adapted to the necessities that
emerge  from the new functioning of  the labour  market  since  the end of  import  substitution
industrialisation? 
There  has  neither  been  an  adequate  process  of  welfare  state  upgrading,  in  the  sense  of
introducing new programmes that  would protect  against  social  risks  like unemployment  and
precarious employment, which became mass phenomena during the last decades, nor has there
been a consistent trend towards adapting existing social security systems, like pension and health
insurance,  towards  the  new realities  of  the  Argentine  society.  So,  for  example,  increasingly
unstable work histories translated in many cases into the inability to cope with the required years
of contribution to receive a pension. Another example constitutes the increased inequality in the
access to health care, which results from a highly fragmented system that rather exacerbates the
consequences of rising income inequalities than countervailing them. 
Definitions of the welfare state are numerous and differ with regard to which public policies
are considered pertinent to it. Although the author of this text shares a rather broad definition of
the welfare state,  which includes a wide range of public policies aimed at protecting against
social risks and promoting wealth, this text will focus, partly due to operational reasons, on four
central social risks: old-age, health, unemployment and income insufficiency(poor families and
working poor). 
In the first chapter of this text I will use empiric evidence to substantiate my argument that
social policy in Argentina since the mid 1970s has not responded adequately to the profound
changes that hit the underlying society. For this purpose, an overview of the profound changes
that have occurred in the Argentinean labour market and in the socioeconomic composition of
the society will  be given.  Hence,  I  will  compare  these changes  with the main social  policy
reforms between 1975 and 2010 and the evolution of social expenditure. As will be seen, these
reforms did not keep up with the intensity of societal change, or as Aldo Isuani(2010: 113) puts
it, “the welfare state adjusted in a way that did not modify the ‘basic nature’ that characterised it
prior to these social  transformations“.  On the contrary,  several  reforms of the social security
systems,  especially those implemented during the military dictatorship(1976 - 1983) and the
1990s, further deteriorated the welfare state's capacity to guarantee social protection against the
basic social  risks.  This  chapter  will  also serve to identify the main patterns  of  social  policy
reform during the last 35 years,  which will then form the foundations for the analysis of the
politics behind welfare state adaptation failure.
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Explaining why welfare state adaptation largely failed in Argentina, which will be the purpose
of the main part of this text, deserves some special effort for several reasons. 
First  of  all,  the  inadequacy  of  social  policy  responses  enabled  a  virtually  undamped
transmission of the long term labour market deterioration,  and the reiterated economic crises,
into  a  long  and  steep  rise  in  poverty  and  indigence  rates3.(Beccaria  2007,
Beccaria/Groisman/Maurizio  2009)  While  in  the  mid  1970s  around  five  percent  of  the
Argentineans were living below the poverty line, it were around half of the population in the
aftermath of the economic crises that hit Argentina between 1998 and 20024.(Vargas de Flood
2006: 201, Beccaria 2007: 556) Nearly 20 % of the households5 were considered indigent, which
means  that  their  household  income was not  even  sufficient  to  satisfy their  basic  alimentary
needs.(INDEC database) In 2009, after seven years of strong economic growth, still around 23 %
of the population lived in poor households.(See figure 1) 
The introduction of new social policy programmes and/or the expansion and adaptation of
3 In Argentina poverty and indigence are measured in absolute terms. Households whose incomes are below the
poverty line are not able to satisfy their basic needs, while those whose incomes are below the indigence line cannot
even satisfy their basic alimentary needs.
4 Years 2002 and 2003.
5 The indigence rate measured in persons is even a few percentage points higher due to the bigger average size of
poor and indigent households.
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Source: Gasparini/Cruces (2010: 5)
Figure 1: Percentage of the population living in a poor household
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Agglomeration of Buenos Aires Argentina
The introduction of new social policy programmes and/or the expansion and adaptation of
existing programmes towards the new constellation of social  risks can mitigate,  theoretically
even reverse,  the socioeconomic consequences  of  the deterioration of  the labour market.  An
interesting study of Tony Atkinson(1998: 12) shows that the rise in unemployment rates in many
European countries between the mid/late 1970s and early 1990s did not in all cases result in
increases  in  the  respective  poverty  rates.  Contrariwise,  his  comparison  shows  that  despite
significant increases in unemployment rates, poverty rates fell in Denmark, Finland and Italy,
and remained stable in France.
Elaborated by the author. Sources: For European countries: Atkinson 19986: 12, for Argentina: SEDLAC database
for relative poverty, INDEC database for unemployment and absolute poverty
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Original sources for European countries used by Atkinson: 
Changes in poverty: Denmark: Nordisk Ministerråd (1996), Figur 1, page 35, persons aged 18-75, EU scale, 50%
median;  Finland: Nordisk Ministerråd (1996), Tabell 1, page 67, equivalence scale square root of household size,
50% median; France: EBF figure from Synthèses (1996), page 57 (corrected incomes), ERF figure from Synthèses
(1995),  page  56,  EU  scale,  households,  50%  median;  Germany  (West):  Becker  (1997),  Tabelle  3  for  EVS
estimates,  Hauser (1997), Tabelle 3 for GSOEP estimates,  EU scale, persons, 50% mean;  Ireland:  Callan  et al
(1996),  Table  4.13,  EU  scale,  persons,  50%  mean;  Italy: Commissione  di  indagine  sulla  povertà  e
sull’emarginazione  (1996),  Tav.  1,  page  15,  and  (1996a),  Tav.1,  page  7,  Commissione  equivalence  scale,
households, 50% mean;  Sweden :  Nordisk Ministerråd (1996), Figur 2, page 152, EU scale, persons, 50% mean;
United  Kingdom:  Department  of  Social  Security  (1992),  (1993),  (1994),  (1995),  and  (1996),  Table  F1,  DSS
equivalence scale, persons, 50% mean. Change in unemployment (1974-79) to (1990-93) for total labour force from
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Figure 2: Changes in poverty and increases in unemployment in 
eight European countries and Argentina: late 1970s to early 1990s
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As can be seen in figure 1, Argentina experienced an extraordinarily strong increase in the
incidence  of  poverty  in  the  mentioned  period.  This  increase  exceeds  strongly  the  rise  of
unemployment  when  poverty  is  measured  in  absolute  terms,  as  usually  done in  developing
countries. Certainly, the steep rise of poverty rates in Argentina during the period has to be put in
the context  of  a  crises  ridden  economy.  As  Luis  Beccaria, Fernando Groisman and Roxana
Maurizio(2009:  11  -  38)  show,  the deep  labour  market  crisis  did not  only cause  increasing
unemployment rates but also falling wages in the Argentinean case, especially for low skilled
workers. Although the falling behind of unskilled workers’ incomes has been observed in several
European countries as well(e.g. in the United Kingdom: Hills 1998: 37), the evolution of income
distribution  followed  a  quite  different  pattern  in  Argentina.  Firstly,  wage  decreases  in  the
European countries in figure 2, where they occurred, have been much more moderate than in
Argentina.  Secondly,  in  those  European  countries  where  relative  poverty  increased,  median
incomes rose during the mentioned period, while the incomes of the poorest parts  of society
stagnated or even decreased. In the Argentinean case, changes in the income distribution started
from a  higher  level  of  inequality  and  changed  in  a  way in  which  also  the  median  income
decreased significantly. Therefore, measuring the increase in poverty in relation to the median
income does hardly capture adequately the rise in the incidence of poverty in Argentina. For this
reason,  figure  2  includes  the  percentage  point  increase  of  the  absolute  poverty  rate  for  the
Argentinean  case.  Taking  the  wage  evolution  into  consideration,  it  can  be  said,  that  the
deterioration of the labour market was extraordinarily strong in Argentina. Anyhow, figure 2 also
shows that the Argentinean welfare state was far less effective in countervailing the social effects
of unemployment and precarious employment than for example those of Denmark, France or
Finland. Furthermore, income maintenance programmes in some European countries indirectly
OECD (1995), Table 2.15.
Sources used by the author for Argentina: 
Relative poverty:  Database SEDLAC, 50 % median income, the average of the years 1974 and 1980 (data for the
years in between is not available) is compared to the average of 1991 – 1994. The SEDLAC database elaborated the
number on the basis of the Permanent Household Survey(EPH) conducted by the National Statistical Institute of
Argentina (INDEC). 
Absolute  Poverty:  Database  INDEC,  Poverty  line  =  sufficient  income  to  satisfy  the  basic  needs(defined  by
INDEC), the average of the years 1974  and 1980 (data for the years in between is not available) is compared to the
average of 1991 – 1994. 
Unemployment: Database INDEC, the average of the years 1974 - 1980 is compared to the average of 1991 – 1994,
elaborated the basis of the EPH.
The EPH has been conducted in the Greater Buenos Aires agglomeration in the years 1974, 1980, and 1991; and in
the 15 biggest agglomerations between 1992 and 1994. 
15
define a kind of minimum wage. In this sense, the absence of similar programmes in Argentina
not only enabled the undamped transmission of increasing unemployment into rising poverty
rates, but it also allowed wages for weaker sectors to drop below the absolute poverty line.  
Explaining why welfare state adaptation has failed in Argentina also deserves some special
interest  for  academic  and  theoretical  reasons.  Political  and  social  scientists  have  developed,
mostly  based  on  empirical  evidence  in  form  of  international  comparisons,  a  multitude  of
approaches towards explaining welfare state reform. These approaches often differ with regard to
the factors considered the decisive determinants of social policy. To a certain extent, it depends
on the construction of the comparison, for example the selection of welfare states that are to be
compared, the period of time, and the chosen dependent variable7, which factors are ultimately
considered most important for explaining welfare state development. 
Some studies explicitly analysed the politics of welfare state adaptation with respect to new
social risks resulting from societal changes, which coincides to a certain degree with the purpose
of this text.(e.g. Bonoli 2006, Häusermann 2006, Taylor-Gooby 2006, Tepe/Vanhuysse 2010)
The  most  influential  studies  of  this  kind  are  based  on  comparisons  between  industrialised
countries. Hence, they basically presuppose a high level of economic development and a stable
democratic system. It has to be considered in how far the theoretical conclusions of these studies
are therefore applicable to explain social policy in a country with a considerably lower level of
economic development and a much younger democracy. Furthermore, most studies presuppose
the existence of party systems in which the main parties have more or less stable ideologies,
which can be allocated on different positions on a scale from left to right. As will be seen, this is
not the case in Argentina. 
Stephan  Haggard  and  Robert  Kaufman(2008)  compared  social  policy  of  several  Asian,
Eastern European and Latin American countries. Therefore, this study has the advantage for the
purpose of this text that it includes a broad range of different countries outside the industrialised
world. However, the dependent variable used by Haggard and Kaufman is not identical with the
one  of  this  text:  while  Haggard  and  Kaufman  explain  centrally  the  evolution  of  social
expenditure in relation to the GDP and the evolution of the welfare state as a whole, this text
intends to explain the failure of welfare state adaptation. 
Nevertheless, the theoretical knowledge stemming from all these studies is extremely valuable
for this text. If there is no evidence for the contrary, there is little reason to assume that factors
identified to be influential by those international studies would be of no importance in Argentina.
7 The  dependent  variable  is  the  subject  that  shall  be  explained:  e.g.  the  dimension  of  social  expenditure,  the
development of a certain type of welfare state etc..
16
In  some  cases  there  is  evidence  that  the  Argentinean  context,  or  the  subject  that  is  to  be
explained, differs so strongly from those chosen in other studies, that the logic resulting from
these studies cannot be applied without at least amending it. There are also factors that can be
considered  important  in  the  Argentinean  case  that  have  not  been  dealt  with  in  international
studies.
In this sense, the case study design of this text brings about the possibility to examine the
Argentinean case in much more detail than it would be possible in a systematic international
comparison,  as  it  relieves  me  from  the  necessity  to  generalise  and  compress  realities  into
internationally comparable data. It also allows me to adapt existing theories to the peculiarities of
the Argentinean case. 
At the same time, the case study design poses limits to the possibility of using statistical
methods to underpin the hypotheses of this text. Therefore, this text will have to rely more on
logical and theoretical conclusions than international comparisons. Finally,  it can be said that
case studies and comparative studies are based on each other. This text is a good example for
this.  While,  as  mentioned  before,  theories  resulting  from international  comparisons  form an
indispensable theoretical basis for analysing the Argentinean experience of failed welfare state
adaptation,  this  case  study  also  evaluates  which,  or  which  parts,  of  these  theories  can  be
considered valid for this purpose, or contrariwise, which cannot. Thereby it also contributes to
test and refine these theories and may be helpful for future comparisons.
Manfred  G.  Schmidt  et  al(2007),  Peter  Starke(2006),  Giuliano  Bonoli(2006),  Nico
Siegel(2006) and others have summarised the main theoretical approaches towards explaining
social policy and categorized them into different “schools”. These different theoretical schools
group approaches with regard to the factors that they consider decisive in determining welfare
state  development.  In  practice,  most  authors  apply mixed approaches  that  take aspects  from
different schools into consideration. Yet, the distinction of different schools serves well to give
an overview of the main theoretical “tools” used in contemporary political science social policy
analysis. In the following I will make short reference to each theoretical school identified by the
above mentioned authors, and on this basis present the hypothesis that will guide this text. 
The so called school of “socioeconomic functionalism” assumes that the main determinant of
social policy is the socioeconomic development of the underlying society. In an influential work
Harold Wilensky(1975) argued on the basis of a comparison of 22 countries,  that  there is  a
positive  relation  between  the  level  of  economic  development  and  the  dimension  of  social
expenditure as a percentage of the country’s GDP. Other authors argued that the emergence and
expansion  of  social  needs(growth  of  unemployment,  ageing  of  the  population  etc.)  exert
17
pressures  on  governments  to  respond  with  social  policies  to  these  needs.  This  kind  of
“automatism” cannot be observed in the Argentinean case. Contrariwise, it is the purpose of this
text to explain why social policy has virtually not been responsive to the expansion of uncovered
social risks during several decades. 
Theories of the “power resources centred” and the “party centred” schools try to explain more
concretely why the emergence and/or expansion of social needs can affect social policy. The first
of the two argues, that social policy decisively depends on how capable the different interest
groups are in influencing the government’s social policy agenda. The power resources theory has
thereby put central emphasis on the political strength of working classes, arguing that powerful
working classes  are  associated with bigger  and more redistributive welfare states.(e.g.  Korpi
1983,  1989,  2006) Some authors  have  also  examined  the  power  resources  of  more  specific
interest groups, which may constitute just a part of the working class or fractions of different
classes.(e.g.  Bonoli  2006) If,  for  example,  pensioners  are  a  big group  and the organizations
defending their interests(these can be: trade unions, pensioners associations, left parties etc.) are
powerful, it is likely that social policy reforms will respond, at least to a certain degree, to their
demands. On the contrary, if the unemployed are weakly organised, like they are in most cases,
this school would assume that the chances are lower that their interests will occupy the same
priority in the government’s social policy agenda as those of the before mentioned pensioners.
The “party centred school” focuses more on the importance of the ideological standpoints of the
different parties, and on the impacts of electoral competition. Most studies assume that strong
social  democratic/centre-left  and  left  party  representation  in  governments  and  parliaments
favours welfare state expansion, or at least reduces the profoundness of cost containment reforms
in  comparison  to  their  conservative  counterparts.  Lets  consider  again  the  example  of  the
unemployed: The party centred school would assume that in a democratic system, the interests of
the unemployed will be influential when unemployment is high, although they may be weakly
organised, because they constitute an important constituency,  which especially centre-left and
left  parties  will  try  to  mobilize  to  win  elections.  Giuliano  Bonoli(2006)  has  argued  that  in
western countries the would-be beneficiaries of welfare state adaptation to new social risks have
often been small, dispersed and politically weak groups, which made it difficult for them to make
governments take up their social policy interests. On the basis of empiric data with regard to the
Argentinean social structure I will argue that this argument is not valid for the Argentinean case.
The would-be beneficiaries of welfare state adaptation in Argentina comprise the majority of the
population and are rather concentrated on the lower income strata than being dispersed over the
society. In this sense, the politics of welfare state adaptation in Argentina are strongly related to
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social classes and the distributive conflict between these. In accordance with the power resources
theory, this text argues that welfare state adaptation failure has to be seen in the context of a shift
of power from labour, which largely had an interest in adaptation measures, towards employers
and international creditors, whose interests were strongly conflicting with the requirements of
welfare state adaptation. Yet, the indicators commonly used by power resources theory studies
for measuring working class power, namely left party strength and trade union affiliation and
centralisation,  are  too narrow to adequately reflect  the power  relations in Argentina  and the
respective  changes  after  the  abandonment  of  the  import  substitution  strategy.  Therefore,  a
broader  perspective on power will  be applied that  also considers  the impacts  of  formal  and
informal  institutions  and of  ideological  power.  Furthermore,  it  will  be argued  that  a  central
weakness of the would-be beneficiaries of welfare state adaptation has been that the social forces
representing formal workers and those representing informal and unemployed workers were not
successful in building a political alliance.
Peter Starke(2006: 111/112) identified a theoretical school that focuses on the importance of
ideas  and ideologies.  This school assumes that  widespread  perceptions  of  what constitutes a
social  problem and what  not,  or  about the  consequences  of  one or  another  alleged  problem
solution, have decisive influence on the direction of welfare state reform. So, for example, do
Keynesian  economists  emphasise  the  benign  economic  effects  of  countercyclical  social
programmes, such as unemployment benefits, as these stimulate demand in times of crisis, while
neoliberal  or  orthodox economists  have  recently  been  preoccupied  with  how unemployment
benefits could be reduced or modified so that they would stimulate the expansion of the labour
force and reduce the risk of inflation.(Bryson-2003: 81 – 88) It  can also make an important
difference, whether the predominant perception in the society is that the unemployed have too
little incentives to look for work and are therefore unemployed, or whether people generally
assume that unemployment has causes that are not the individual’s responsibility. Perceptions are
always heterogeneous, but the predominance can shift over time and can differ geographically.
These ideological  shifts (from keynesianism to neoliberalism,  from welfare to workfare  etc.)
may have direct  influence on what governments  consider  appropriate in the sphere of social
policy,  and/or indirect  impact,  as politicians in democratic  systems have strong incentives to
avoid  policy decisions  that  are  widely regarded  inappropriate.  This  text  will  argue  that  the
predominance  of  neoliberalism as  guiding  ideology  during  the  military  dictatorship  and  the
governments of the 1990s significantly contributed to the failure of welfare state adaptation. The
prevalence  of  a  neoliberal  common sense explains  a  considerable  part  of  why social  policy
reform during the 1990s has constituted a setback rather than a progress with regard to welfare
19
state adaptation, although a labour-based party was governing and the trade unions continued to
show high affiliation rates. 
Another school, summarised by Tobias Ostheim(2007: 75 – 83), focuses on the impact of
globalisation processes on social policy. Early authors that have been grouped into this school
assumed that governments tend to compensate social risks that emerge from increased financial
and trade openness.(e.g. Cameron 1978: 1255 – 1259) More recent literature often found that
globalisation rather stimulates welfare state retrenchment than expansion, arguing that high non-
wage labour costs associated with the welfare state diminish the competitiveness of the national
economy in comparison with international competitors.(e.g. Strange 2003, Scharpf 2000, Rhodes
2000) However, another group of scholars argued that there are no clear direct and empirically
sustainable effects of globalisation on welfare state development.(e.g. Kite 2004, Swank 2003)
Nevertheless, it seems very important for the direction of social policy reforms how governments
and other influential actors perceive the relationship between globalisation and the welfare state.
For this reason, the impact of globalisation is hardly separable from the influence of predominant
ideologies, interpretations or perceptions. Furthermore, the kind of globalisation that has been
advanced during the last decades contributed to the shift of power in detriment of labour and in
favour of capital, particularly of the financial sector.(e.g. Olsen/O'Connor 1998: 21) It moreover
increased  the  influence  of  international  actors  like  the  IMF,  the  World  Bank  and  the  Inter-
American Development Bank(e.g. Huber 1996: 161), who pursued social policy reform goals
that were largely contradicting welfare state adaptation. In this sense, this text will argue that the
effects of globalisation on the politics of welfare state adaptation failure have been indirect. 
A further school argues that welfare state reform is strongly determined by past decisions.  So,
for example, Gøsta Esping-Andersen(1990) found in his very influential study about the genesis
and  development  of  different  welfare  state  types(regimes)  that  the  historical  legacy  of  the
respective welfare state determines to an important degree its actual constellation. Two reasons
can  mainly be made responsible for  this  “path-dependency”.  On the one hand,  once chosen
institutional  designs  can  often  only  be  changed  at  high  costs  at  a  later  point.  While  some
institutional designs, such as those of the rather universalistic Scandinavian welfare states, seem
to require only minor modifications that can be effected within the logic of the system in order to
respond adequately to the new social needs associated with labour market changes, the design of
the Argentinean welfare state required much more profound reforms, which considerably raised
the difficulty and the costs of welfare state adaptation. This text will argue in this regard, that the
once chosen social policy design, which was largely based on the insurance principle, proved
particularly  unable  to  provide  protection  against  the  social  risks  that  resulted  from  the
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transformation of the labour market after 1975. On the other hand, past policy decisions create
vested interests, which are likely to be defended in the future, and may create political patterns
and dynamics that become institutionalised in the long run. By this, past social policy decisions
can modify the polity that canalises the contemporary politics of the welfare state. As will be
argued in this text, path-dependency is an important factor for explaining the inability of the
Argentinean welfare state to adequately respond to the new constellation of social needs within
the society. Vested interests have been peculiarly strong in the health insurance sector. The fact
that the trade union leaders were endowed with ample control over the health insurance funds of
their respective occupational group created incentives for these to defend a highly fragmented
and inequitable system against progressive reform proposals during the 1970s and 1980s that
would have favoured particularly the most vulnerable sectors of the society, but also increasingly
big parts of the trade unions' rank and files. This contributed, among others, to the failure to form
a political alliance between the trade union movement and the organisations of the unemployed
and  informal  workers,  which  ultimately  weakened  the  political  power  of  the  would-be
beneficiaries of welfare state adaptation. 
Another  school  of  theories  focuses  on  the  importance  of  institutions.  Susana
Belmartino(2005a),  Fabián  Repetto  y  Javier  Moro  (2004)  argued  that  institutions  influence
which actors are involved in social policy making and how these are related to each other. In an
influential  text,  George  Tsebelis(1995)  considered  that  the  more  actors  (“veto  players”)  are
provided with the institutional power to block political decisions, the lesser is the government’s
ability to introduce big changes on its own, which can slow down social policy reform, where
usually strongly divergent interests are at stake. However, the Argentinean political system has
very weak institutional  veto players  and very ample presidential  powers.(e.g.  Negretto  2002,
Rubio/Goretti 1996) In this text I will argue that mainly the analysis of the informal institutions
associated with the Argentinean political system contribute to an explanation of why welfare
state adaptation has failed. The lack of democracy within the dominant peronist party, the trade
unions and many of the biggest social movements, as well as the common practice of welfare
state clientelism, have significantly narrowed the possibilities of the poorer sectors of the society
to take advantage of their numerical strength and to influence the social policy agenda in their
favour. Furthermore, these institutions have provided important incentives for office holders to
avoid welfare state adaptation, as the establishment of genuine social rights would have limited
the possibilities of vote-for-favour strategies.
21
2 LABOUR MARKET TRANSFORMATION AND WELFARE STATE
REFORM: THE ARGENTINEAN CASE 1975 – 2010
This  chapter  has  the  purpose  to  lay  the  empirical  foundations  of  the  assumption  which
constitutes nothing less than the point of departure of this work: the failure of  welfare state
adaptation in the context of profound labour market changes. 
In  the first  part  of  this  chapter  the evolution of  the Argentinean  labour  market  since  the
abandonment of the ISI strategy in the mid 1970s will be analysed. It will be argued that this
evolution was very unfavourable  for  the  poorer  sectors  of  the  society,  which led to  a  stark
expansion of social needs. 
In the second part of this chapter the main social policy changes since 1975 will be  analysed.
According the logic of the “socioeconomic school”, the expansion of certain social needs created
strong demand-side pressures on the welfare state. However, as will be seen, the Argentinean
welfare state has not been reformed towards covering these social needs.
Furthermore, these parts enable us to identify the dominant patterns in social policy reform
after 1975, which will be used as a basis from which we will depart our analysis of the politics of
welfare state adaptation failure in chapter three.
In  a  third part  of this chapter,  I  will refer  to the discussions about how to categorize the
Argentinean welfare state with the regime approach, and whether Argentina has shifted from a
predominantly  “corporatist”  model  towards  a  “liberal”  model  or  not.  This  point  has  been
included because recent studies have found that the welfare state regime membership is a key
variable  for  explaining success  or  failure  of  welfare  state  adaptation.(Bonoli  2006: 24 – 26,
Tepe/Vanhuysse 2010: 230) Within this chapter we will concentrate on the institutional aspects
of the Argentinean welfare state regime and its implications for welfare state adaptation. The
politics associated with the Argentinean welfare state model, and its implications for welfare
state adaptation failure will be discussed in chapter three. 
2.1 The deterioration of the Argentinean labour market conditions
and the expansion of social needs after 1975
Labour markets and welfare states are related to each other in several  ways.  As has been
argued in the introduction, the labour market decisively determines the magnitude of social risks
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such as unemployment and precarious employment. Rising female labour market participation
creates  new  social  demands,  such  as  child  care  facilities  and  income  maintenance  during
maternity leave. Social insurance schemes, such as the Argentinean health and pension systems,
designed in the expectation of permanent full employment,  become increasingly exclusionary
when unemployment,  precarious  employment  and wage differentials  increase,  and individual
registered  work  histories  are  becoming more  unstable.  Therefore,  new trends  on  the  labour
market require in most cases welfare state adaptation to be able to adequately cover social risks. 
The other way round, welfare states also impact on the evolution of the labour market. So, for
example,  can social programmes decisively influence wage levels, especially for low income
groups. If the welfare state guarantees universal benefits that allow people to live without labour
market  participation,  jobseekers  will  not  have  to  accept  jobs  that  are  paid  worse  than  the
minimum guaranteed by the state. In this sense, income maintenance programmes can strengthen
the  position  of  workers  in  wage  bargaining  and  de  facto fix  a  bottom line  for  low wages.
Contrariwise, the absence of income maintenance programmes for the unemployed allows the
virtual free fall of lower wages when labour market conditions deteriorate, unions are weakened
and minimum wages are inexistent, too low, or simply not applied, as it is the case in big parts of
the informal economy.
The  social  insurance  centred  corporatist  design  of  the  Argentinean  welfare  state  can  be
considered particularly unprepared for the changes that hit the Argentinean labour market from
the mid 1970s on, mainly as it did not contain any kind of unemployment insurance or non-
contributory income maintenance programmes for unemployed and precarious workers. At the
same time,  the  Argentinean  labour market  transformations  after  the  abandonment  of  the ISI
strategy were peculiarly profound. 
In  this  part  of  chapter  two,  the  central  labour  market  variables  that  express  these
transformations  and  that  have  been  considered  central  regarding  the  welfare  state,  will  be
analysed.  These variables are:  unemployment,  informal  employment,  unstable work histories,
wage (respectively income) evolution and female labour market participation.
a) The political and economic context of the Argentinean labour market
transformation
Following the military coup of 1976, the new dictatorial government implemented a radical
change  of  the  economic  development  strategy  from  import  substitution  to  world  market
integration. Within very short time it eliminated export taxes, reduced import barriers, liberalised
cross  border  financial  transactions and  deregulated the  domestic  financial  market.
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(Beccaria/Groisman/Maurizio  2009:  13)  The  following  quarter  of  a  century  has  been
characterised by recurrent crises, growing foreign debt and a steady deterioration of the labour
market. 
Elaborated by the author. Sources: INDEC database for 1980 – 2009, Vargas de Flood(2006 : 201) for 1976 - 1980
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Figure 3: GDP per capita in Pesos of 1993, between 1975 and 2009
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Elaborated by the author. Sources: INDEC database for 1980 – 2009, Vargas de Flood(2006: 201) for 1976 – 1980
As Mario Damill and Roberto Frenkel(2006: 109/110) argue, the evolution of the Argentinean
labour market has been strongly related to this change in the development strategy and to the
weak  macroeconomic  performance  associated  with  the  new model.  In  this  sense,  the  weak
economic performance and the particular form of world market integration of the Argentinean
economy after  the  mid  1970s contextualises  the  expansion  of  social  needs,  and hence,  new
demands towards the welfare state. Yet, at the same time, as for example pointed out by Stephan
Haggard  and  Robert  R.  Kaufman(2008:  181  – 220),  weak  macroeconomic  performance  and
world market competition also created counter pressures that have been argued to constrain the
political and economic viability of welfare state adaptation. In chapter three I will come back to
what will be described in this part, in order to examine the impacts of weak macroeconomic
performance and world market integration on the politics of welfare state adaptation.  For now,
the focus will be on giving an overview over the macroeconomic and political context of labour
market deterioration during the last three and a half decades.  
Grossly four periods can be distinguished with regard to this.
The first period, between 1976 and 1983, is characterised by the implementation of the first
wave of neoliberal economic reforms. The particular strategy towards world market integration
comprised,  besides  the  mentioned  deregulating  reforms,  the  suspension  of  collective  wage
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Figure 4: GDP per capita growth in % points between 1976 and 
2009
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bargaining and the overvaluation of the Argentinean currency. These reforms were justified with
the high inflation experienced by the country since the mid 1970s. The suppression of collective
wage bargaining led to an average real wage reduction of over 30 % in 1976. This general wage
reduction was accompanied by increasing wage differentials, as lower wages fell comparatively
stronger than the higher ones.(Beccaria/Groisman/Maurizio 2009: 14) The overvaluation of the
local currency, combined with the liberalisation of trade, reduced the competitiveness of national
industries  and  led  to  a  rapid  rise  in  foreign  debts.  The  reforms  had some initial  success  in
reducing  inflation  rates,  but  led  to  a  deep  financial  crisis  in  1981/82,  which  was  finally
responded with a devaluation of the currency.(Damill/Frenkel 2006: 110) The severe economic
difficulties experienced by the country can be observed in figures 3 and 4. The over 5.5 % fall of
the per capita GDP between 1975 and 1983 indicates a significant loss of wealth of the society as
a whole, which, as will be seen later, came along with an increasing unequal distribution of the
remaining wealth.
The second period, from 1984 until 1989, was characterised by heterodox economic policies,
high  inflation,  high  foreign  debts,  internationally  high  interest  rates,  reduced  access  to  new
credits and unfavourable terms of trade. The dramatic rise of the public foreign debt derived in
big part from the decision of the military government in 1982 to nationalise the external debts of
the  private  sector,  which  emerged  highly  indebted  from  the  experience  of  trade  openness.
Furthermore, in 1980 the government decided to exempt employers from contributions to the
pension  system  and  the  national  housing  fund  in  order  to  increase  their  competitiveness.
(Barbeito/Lo  Vuolo  1998:  127) Therefore,  the  public  deficit  grew significantly  and  reached
about 15 % of the GDP in 1982 and 1983.(Beccaria/Groisman/Maurizio 2009: 15) The high
foreign debt obligations, in combination with the other unfavourable circumstances mentioned
above, led to a persistent deterioration of the economic and social situation, which is why this
period has often been  called “the lost  decade”,  although Argentina successfully  returned  to
democracy in 1983. In this context, the government did not manage to control inflation rates,
which were rising steeply from 1987 on and culminated in the hyperinflation crisis of 1989/1990.
Between 1983 and 1989 the per capita GDP shrank nearly 12 %.(See figures 3 and 4)
The third period, from 1990 to 2001, was characterised by the implementation of a second
wave  of  neoliberal  reforms,  which  comprised  the  almost  complete  privatisation  of  public
enterprises,  fiscal  austerity,  the removal of most of the remaining trade and financial  market
regulations, the flexibilisation of the labour market, and the pegging of the Argentinean currency
to  the  dollar  on  a  one  to  one  basis.(Lo  Vuolo  1998b:  189/190)  The  latter  implied  a  new
overvaluation of the Argentinean currency, which was even exacerbated during the first years of
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the 1990s, because, despite a rapid decline, the Argentinean inflation rate remained considerably
above the one of the United States.  Although the government managed to get  inflation rates
under control and economic growth returned, Argentina experienced in the 1990s what might be
called “anti-poor growth”8.  While the GDP experienced high growth rates between 1991 and
19989 the deterioration of the labour market continued. The average real wages stagnated on a
low level, income inequalities increased,  unemployment and precarious employment expanded
rapidly,  and  regular  full  time employment  shrank.(Beccaria/Groisman/Maurizio  2009:  16/17,
Damill/Frenkel 2006: 110, 125 – 131) In this context, rising rates of absolute poverty reflect
mainly the increasingly unequal distribution of the growing national product.(Beccaria  2007:
557)  Like  in  the  late  1970s,  the  combination  of  an  overvalued  currency  with  financial  and
commercial  deregulation  showed initial  positive  effects  on growth  and inflation,  but  proved
unsustainable  in  the  long  run.  The  overvaluation  of  the  local  currency  diminished  the
competitiveness of national manufacturing industries.  In  order to compensate the competitive
disadvantage posed by the expensive currency, companies exerted strong downward pressures on
wages and focussed on the rationalisation of the production via the importation of more efficient
machinery to replace labour force. The new structure of relative prices therefore favoured the
importation of  both capital  and  consumer  goods,  which  resulted  in  a  negative  foreign  trade
balance.  In  this  context,  the  attraction  of  foreign  capital  was  the  only way to  maintain  the
pegging of the Argentinean peso to the US dollar. In  the first  years  of the 1990s significant
amounts of foreign capital were invested in Argentina, mainly due to favourable conditions on
the international financial markets and the sale of state enterprises to foreign investors. However,
the deregulation of financial markets made capital flows into and out of Argentina extremely
volatile, so that changing circumstances on the international financial markets, or the exhaustion
of  privatisation  possibilities,  could  rapidly  revert  the  direction  of  capital  flows.  Taking  into
consideration the already high foreign debt and the strong dependence on the inflow of foreign
capital, the volatility of capital flows constituted an enormous vulnerability for the Argentinean
economic model of the 1990s. Already in 1994/1995, the so called “Tequila crisis” evidenced
this. Although the crisis originated in Mexico, its impact on the international financial markets
resulted in a reduction of capital flows into Argentina. As a direct consequence, the economic
growth turned negative and unemployment shot up to over 18 %. However, with the financial
help of  the International  Monetary Fund(IMF)  Argentina  was able to quickly overcome this
crisis. Yet, when in 1997/1998 crises hit several Asian countries, Russia and Brazil, international
8 In allusion to the fashionable notion of “pro-poor growth”.
9 With the exception of the 1994/1995 “Tequila crisis”.
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financial  market  conditions  turned  unfavourable  for  Argentina  again,  which  immediately
triggered  a  local  economic crisis.  Towards  the  second half  of  2001 the  deterioration  of  the
economy began  to  accelerate.  In  this  context,  also  the social  and  political  situation became
increasingly acute. President De la Rúa’s government coalition had already lost the legislative
elections  in  October  2001,  when  towards  the  end  of  the  year  social  protests  reached  new
magnitudes. After one week of heavy protests and violent repression, which caused 26 deaths,
president De la Rúa resigned from government. His successor, Eduardo Duhalde, announced a
debt default  and finally decided to break with the currency exchange model of the 1990s by
allowing the Argentinean peso to float on the international currency markets, which, in practice,
implied a strong devaluation. In 2002,  after nearly four years, the crisis finally culminated with
an accumulated reduction of the GDP of over 20 %, with 21 % unemployment, over 50 % of the
population  living  with  a  per  capita  household  income below the  absolute  poverty  line,  and
unprecedented  levels  of   inequality.(For  numbers  see:  Vargas  de  Flood  2006:  201,
Beccaria/Groisman/Maurizio 2009: 21; For economic and political history see:  Messner 1996,
Barbeito/Lo  Vuolo  1998,  Beccaria/Groisman/Maurizio  2009,  Damill/Frenkel  2006,  Golbert
2004) Although the per capita GDP was about 10 % higher in 2002 than in 1990 (in the middle
of the hyperinflation crisis),  inequality had increased so strongly during this period, that  the
social situation was significantly worse in 2002. Compared to 1975, the per capita GDP was
about  12  %  lower  in  2002,  which  shows  how  weak  the  Argentinean  macroeconomic
performance was during the last quarter of the 20th century.(See figures 3 and 4)
The fourth and last period, was characterised by the economic recuperation after 2002. In
contrast to earlier currency devaluations, the 2002 devaluation did not lead to a similar inflation
process.10 Beccaria, Groisman and Maurizio(2009: 21) argue that the high unemployment rates,
the ample industrial excess capacities and the weak national demand prevented the transmission
of the devaluation into rising prices. Consequently,  the value of the national currency, which
hitherto had been a constraint to the international competitiveness of the Argentinean economy,
converted  into  a  comparative  advantage.  The  new  structure  of  relative  prices  favoured  the
competitiveness of many national products in detriment of their imported counterparts and posed
incentives  to expand exportation.  This also produced a reversal  of  the flows of  capitals and
tradeable goods and services. While the economic strategy of the 1990s precipitated a negative
trade balance, and therefore required capital inflows which it could not sustain in the long run,
the devalued currency triggered a high export surplus and considerable capital outflows. In this
context,  labour  intensive  sectors  like  manufacturing  industries  and  the  construction  sector
10 Recently in the second half of the decade the inflation begins to rise significantly again.
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expanded  notably.  This  macroeconomic  recuperation  translated  rapidly  into  falling
unemployment rates and later also into rising wages, which hence created positive effects on the
national demand. The implementation of export taxes furthermore improved the fiscal situation
of the national government.(Damill/Frenkel 2006: 115/116) The per capita GDP increased over
53 % between 2002 and 2009.(See figures 3 and 4)
b) The evolution of employment and unemployment after 1975
The evolution of employment and unemployment plays a central role for any welfare state. In
social policy regimes that build strongly on the principle of social insurance, as it is the case in
Argentina,  unemployment  can  reduce  or  eliminate  entitlements  to  old  age  pension  and
healthcare, and cause severe financial problems for pension systems. Moreover, the Argentinean
welfare state did a long time not comprise any unemployment insurance nor non-contributory
unemployment allowance. Unemployment constitutes thereby one of those social risks that have
not been adequately covered by the Argentinean welfare state. As long as unemployment is low
the social  consequences  of  this  gap  in  the social  safety net  may be  limited,  but  as  soon as
unemployment rises an increasing incidence of poverty seems to be unavoidable. 
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Elaborated by the author. Source: INDEC Database/Permanent Household Survey(EPH)11 
11 Until  May  1995  the  EPH  was  conducted  in  25  agglomerations.  From  October  1995  on  three  further
agglomerations have been included: Concordia, Río Cuarto and Mar del Plata-Batán. Since October 2002 the EPH
incorporates three additional  areas:  Viedma-Carmen de Patagones,  San Nicolás-Villa Constitución and Rawson-
Trelew. Since then the survey is realized in 31 agglomerations. From 2007 on the survey is conducted four times
each year. 
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Figure 5: Unemployment and involuntary underemployment 
between 1974 and 2009 
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Unemployment as a share of the economically active population Underemployment as a share of the economically active population
Elaborated by the author. Source: INDEC database/Permanent Household Survey(EPH)12
During  the  first  period  fallowing  the  abandonment  of  the  ISI  strategy(1976  –  1983),
unemployment  remained  relatively low.  As can  be  seen in  figure  5,  the unemployment  rate
oscillated between 2.3 % and 6 % and was 3.9 % in average.  Involuntary underemployment
experienced  a  very similar  evolution.  Although,  as  has  been  discussed  earlier,  foreign  trade
opening and overvalued currency exerted pressures on companies to reduce personnel costs, this
did not immediately result in rising unemployment, partly because the suspension of collective
bargaining and the elimination of employers’  contributions to the housing and pension funds
resulted  in  significant  personnel  cost  reductions  for  enterprises.  Furthermore,  the  military
government used the possibility to build up foreign debt to finance public investment, especially
in preparation of the Football World Cup, which took place in 1978 in Argentina.(Lo Vuolo
1998a: 53/54)  A further reason seems to be that the reduction of wages led to a reduction of
incentives to work, or to look for work, for those who were in position to choose. As can be seen
in figure 6, the economically active population(EAP) as a share of the total population decreased
from 39.9 % in May 1976 to 37.3 % in October 1983. 
Between  1984  and  1989,  unemployment  and  underemployment  experienced  a  gradual
increase.  In average 6 % of the economically active population were considered unemployed
12 Same as footnote 11. 
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Figure 6: Economically active population and employment 
between 1974 and 2009 
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Economically active population as a share of total population Employment as a share of total population
during the period. Unemployment  rose in comparison to the period 1976 – 1983, but it  still
remained relatively low.(See figures 5 and 7) If we consider, that there was no kind of income
transfer programme for the majority of the unemployed, it becomes clear that people had to do
anything possible to avoid unemployment. Many of those who lost their jobs during the 1980s
switched  as  self-employed  into  the  informal  economy.  In  this  context,  the  deterioration  of
employment conditions in the 1980s is partly reflected by the growth of the informal economy,
as  we  will  analyse  in  more  detail  later,  and  partly  by  the  rise  of  unemployment.
(Beccaria/Groisman/Maurizio 2009: 25 – 29) In this period, as can be seen in figure 6, the EAP
increased slightly, while the share of the employed population slightly fell. 
The third period, from 1990 to 2001, started in the middle of the hyperinflation crisis and
ended up with a financial crisis and the collapse of the convertibility regime13. Both crisis had
strong negative effects on the socioeconomic structure of the Argentinean society and resulted in
a shooting up of poverty rates. Despite these commonalities, the labour market impacts of these
two crises were quite different. As can be seen in figure 5, unemployment did not increase very
much during the hyperinflation period 1989/1990. The unemployment  rate  was 6.1 % in the
second semester  of 1988 and rose during hyperinflation to a maximum of 8.6 % in the first
semester of 1990, but fell to again to 6.4 % in the second semester  of 1990. The increase in
poverty during the hyperinflation is therefore rather the result of the deterioration of wages and
incomes  than  of  increasing  unemployment.  From 1991 the  government  gained  control  over
inflation again by pegging the exchange rate of the Argentinean peso one-to-one to the dollar. As
has been described earlier, this has been done on the basis of a strongly overvalued peso, which
resulted in a competitive disadvantage of the Argentinean economy with regard to the production
of tradeable goods and services. The new price structure resulting from this exchange rate regime
had significant impacts on the evolution of employment and unemployment during the 1990s.
The expensive peso created unfavourable conditions for important parts of the manufacturing
industries, of which many closed their production in Argentina, or moved big parts of it into
other  countries.  At  the  same  time,  those  who  remained  “rationalised”  their  production  by
reducing  the  number  of  workers,  as  the  overvalued  currency  made  wages  comparatively
expensive, and extended the importation of machinery, which resulted cheaper due to the new
exchange rate. While during the 1980s many of those who lost their jobs were able to escape into
the informal sector, the capacity of this sector to absorb new labour force was largely exhausted
during the 1990s. Luis Beccaria and Fernando Groisman(2009a: 109) suppose that this has partly
to do with the fact that the new economic policy also negatively affected important parts of the
13 The convertibility regime refers to the one-to-one pegging of the Argentinean peso to the US dollar. 
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informal economy. So, for example, can be assumed that the proliferation of supermarkets and
shopping  centres  deteriorated  the  viability  of  small  informal  commercial  enterprises.  In  this
context, despite high economic growth rates, the 1990s are characterised by a persistent increase
in unemployment levels, as can be seen in figure 5.  Due to the contagion effect of the Mexican
“Tequila Crisis”, unemployment reached the unprecedented level of 18.4 % in the first semester
of 1995. Although the crisis was quickly overcome, unemployment levels did not return to the
levels of the early 1990s. Until the second semester of 1998, unemployment fell 12.4 %, but the
beginning of a new crisis resulted in a rapid increase again. Until the first semester of 2002,
unemployment  rose to  21.5 %,  which  equates an increase of  over  9 % points.  The average
unemployment rate has been 12.7 % between 1990 and 2001, and thereby more than twice as
high as in the period from 1984 – 198914.(See figure 7) As can be seen in figure 5, involuntary
underemployment  increased  in  line  with  the  unemployment  levels  during  the  1990s,  which
resulted, taken together, in a strong decrease of full-time employment. As can be seen in figure
6, rises in unemployment are related to a growth of the economically active population and a
simultaneous decline of the employment rate, which reaches extraordinary low levels.15
From 2002 until 2009, employment increased and unemployment fell significantly. As can be
seen  in  figure  5,  the  incidence  of  unemployment  persistently  decreased  between  the  first
semester of 2002, from the very high level of 21.5 %, until the second semester of 2008, where it
reached 7.6 %. In 2009 there is a 1 % point increase due to the international financial crisis, but
recent  information indicates  that  unemployment  is  falling again  in  2010.  Mario  Damill  und
Roberto Frenkel(2006: 116/121) relate this positive tendency to the economic recuperation and
the devaluation of the Argentinean peso, which created favourable conditions for employment
generating growth, in contrast to the experience of “jobless-growth” during the 1990s. However,
between 2002 and 2010 the average unemployment rate was 12.2 % and thereby only slightly
lower than in the period 1990 – 2001.(See figure 7) On the one hand, this has certainly to do with
the fact that the period began with a very high unemployment level, and therefore the average
does not show adequately the reduction that has been reached. On the other hand, unemployment
levels stagnated, or even rose, from 2007 on, and as Fernando Groisman(2008: 202/203) points
out, the consolidation of a profound social and sociogeographic segmentation over more than 30
years obstructed the labour market entry of many of the very poor. As can be seen in figure 6,
both employment and the EAP expanded significantly, although employment expanded stronger
14 6 %.
15 In the first semester of 1996 only 34 % of the population have paid work and in the first semester of 2002 another
lowest point is reached with only 32.8 %.
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and therefore accounted for the fall in the incidence of unemployment. However, there remains
an important breach between these two variables.
Finally, it is important to make some remarks regarding the interpretation of these numbers. The
unemployment rate is calculated on the basis of the Permanent Household Survey(EPH) of the
National Statistical Institute(INDEC). The criteria applied by the INDEC is very strict, so that
already somebody who worked one hour during the week before the survey is not considered
unemployed. Furthermore, persons who did not actively look for work in the week of the survey
are considered economically inactive and therefore not unemployed. The lack of decent income
maintenance programmes for the unemployed means that unemployment is simply not an option
for most of the people, as this would mean the complete loss of income. Therefore, many people
that  would  be  unemployed  in  western  countries  try  to  survive  in  the  informal  economy in
Argentina. Considering these two aspects, it becomes clear that the official unemployment rate
does only reflect one part of the deterioration of the labour market conditions in Argentina. Other
aspects  are the expansion of the informal  sector,  the decrease of  average  wages,  the rise of
income inequalities and unstable work histories, which will be analysed in the following points.
Elaborated by the author. Source: INDEC Database/Permanent Household Survey(EPH)16
16 Same as footnote 11. 
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Figure 7: Average unemployment rates in four periods after 1975
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c) The expansion of informal employment after 1975
Informality poses severe constraints to the effectiveness of corporatist  welfare states,  as it
triggers in most cases the exclusion from a big part of welfare state protections, namely those
associated with the social insurance principle. 
Before analysing the evolution of informal employment, it is necessary to distinguish between
two different concepts of informality that are commonly used. One of the most applied concepts
originates  from  the  International  Labour  Organisation(ILO)  and  is  often  called  “productive
informality”.  “Productive  informality”  refers  to  the  small  size  and  low  productivity  of  the
enterprises which compose the informal sector. For operational reasons the following criteria is
commonly used for its  measurement:  “A worker is  considered informal  if (s)he is a salaried
worker in a small firm, a non-professional self-employed, or a zero-income worker. A firm is
considered  small  if  it  employs  less  than  5  workers.”(SEDLAC  database,
http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar,  09/17/2010)  The  concept  of  “legal  informality”,  in  contrast,
refers  to  the  informal/unregistered  legal  status  of  the  worker  himself.  Sometimes  legal
informality measurements refer only to unregistered salaried employment, like it is the case in
figure 8.  Luis Beccaria and Fernando Groisman(2009a: 95 – 102, also see figure 9) apply a
broader  approach  and  consider  unregistered  self-employed  workers,  unregistered  salaried
workers,  domestic service workers and auxiliary family workers as legally informal workers.
The term unregistered refers to the evasion of work regulations and is usually measured with the
criteria of whether the worker is registered with the national pension system or not.(SEDLAC
database,  http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar,  09/17/2010)  This  criteria  also  applies  for  self-
employed workers in Argentina, as also those are obliged to pay contributions to the pension
system.(MTEySS/ILO 2007)
For  the purpose of this text,  legal  informality is  the more interesting categorisation,  as it
measures the relative number of workers who do not pay social insurance contributions, and who
are  hence  not  building  up  the  corresponding  entitlements.  If  legal  informality  expands,  the
coverage of social insurance and/or the benefits paid out can be assumed to fall. This is likely to
be  a short  term result  in  health  insurance  and  a medium to long-term effect  in  the  pension
system.
In  the following,  the term informal employment  will always  refer  to the concept  of legal
informality. 
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Elaborated by the  author.  Sources:  Beccaria/Groisman  (2009a:  110)  for  the  years  1974  and 1980,  SEDLAC
Database (09/17/2010) for the years 1986 - 200917
17All  numbers  are  based  on  the  results  of  the  Permanent  Household  survey  which  has  been  conducted  in  the
agglomeration of Buenos Aires until 1991, then in 15 agglomerations until 1997, then in 28 agglomerations until
2006, and from 2007 on in 31 agglomerations.
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Figure 8: Unregistered salaried employment as percentage of total 
salaried employment
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Elaborated by the author. Source: Beccaria/Groisman (2009a: 110, 133)18
With regard to the first period, from 1976 to 1983, there is only data available for the year
1980. To be able to make some assumptions about the evolution of informal employment after
the abandonment of the ISI strategy from 1976 on, data from 1974 will be used as point of
reference. On this basis it can be assumed that the incidence of informal employment remained
relatively stable during the first period, at least until 1980. As figure 8 shows, the proportion of
unregistered salaried employment19 slightly decreased from 17.6 % in 1974 to 16.6 % in 1980.
This  has  possibly  to  do  with  the  fact  that  the  military  government  suspended  employers’
contributions  to  pension and housing funds to  reduce  personnel  costs  for  enterprises  and to
promote  registered  employment.(Barbeito/Lo  Vuolo  1998:  337)  Hence,  there  have  been  less
incentives  for  employer’s  to  create  unregistered  jobs  because  pension  and  housing  fund
contributions  constituted the  biggest  part  of  the non-wage labour  costs.  If  unregistered  self-
employed workers,  domestic service workers and auxiliary family workers are also included,
informal employment slightly rose from 39 % of the employed population in 1974 to 40 % in
18 Luis Beccaria and Fernando Groisman include the following groups in their definition of informal employment:
informal/respectively unregistered self-employed workers, unregistered salaried workers, domestic service workers
and auxiliary family workers(Beccaria/Groisman 2009: 101/102)
19 In relation to the total of salaried workers.
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Figure 9: Informal working population as a share of total working 
population
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1980.(See figure 9) This slight increase is related to an overall reduction of salaried employment
and an increase of the number of self-employed workers, of which many chose to work in legal
informality.  The  relative  stability  of  informality  rates  during  the  first  period  after  the
abandonment of the ISI strategy has also to be seen in the context of a steep increase in foreign
debt and the assumption of big parts of employer’s non-wage labour costs  through the national
government,  which may account  for the delay of  some labour  market  effects  resulting from
commercial  and  financial  liberalisation  combined  with  the  overvaluation  of  the  national
currency.
For the second period, 1983 to 1989, I have data for the years 1986 and 1988 with respect to
unregistered salaried employment, and data for 1986 only regarding total informal employment.
Therefore, data from the years 1980 and 1991 will be used as points of reference to identify the
trends that have prevailed throughout this period. Unregistered salaried employment experienced
an important increase in relation to formal salaried employment. While its relative weight was
16.6 % in 1980, it rose to 24 % in 1986, to 30 % in 1988 and ended up with 32.5 % in 1991.(See
figure 8) The informality rate among salaried workers nearly doubled between 1980 and 1991.
Also informal  employment  as  a  whole increased  its  share of  the total  employed  population,
constituting 40 % in 1980, 44.2 % in 1986 and nearly 51 % in 1991.(See figure 9) The rise of
informality during the 1980s reflects  the weak  economic performance during this  period. In
addition, the high debt burden, that has been built up during the military government, and the
increase in international interest rates, made it impossible for the democratic government of Raul
Alfonsín to go on with the policies of economic promotion, financed by foreign debt, that have
been implemented by the military dictatorship. In 1984, the government reintroduced employer
contributions to the pension and housing funds, which increased incentives for employers to save
non-wage labour costs through informal employment.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 337) 
During the third period(1990 - 2001), unregistered salaried employment first decreased during
the high growth years from 32.5 % in 1991 to 29 % in 1994. From 1995 on, the relative weight
of unregistered salaried employment increased again, reaching nearly 39 % in  2001.(See figure
8) This steep upward tendency was related to the so called convertibility plan, which resulted in
a strongly overvalued currency, and a new wave of neoliberal reforms, which included further
deregulation  of  foreign  trade and financial  flows.  The combination of  these policies  exerted
strong pressures on companies to reduce wage costs, which was partly done by evading social
insurance contributions. At the same time, the unemployment weakened the power of the trade
unions, so that these were less able to reinforce the right to formal employment. According to
information of the ministry of work(MTEySS 2007: 5), only 5 % of the newly created salaried
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jobs were registered employment between 1991 and 2001. The overall informal employment rate
increased  as  well,  but  far  slower  than  the  incidence  of  unregistered  salaried  employment,
departing from 51 % in 1991 and reaching 52.5 % in 2001.(See figure 9) It  is therefore the
composition of the informal sector that changes during the 1990s, rather than its overall size.
(CEDLAS 2010: 2) The relative stability of the overall  informality rate  has to be seen in a
context of rising unemployment. While during the 1980s “informalisation” was one of the main
indicators  for  the  deterioration  of  the  labour  market,  the  1990s  brought  a  deterioration  of
incomes and productivity within the informal sector and an expansion of unemployment. As has
been argued in point b), this can be related to the exhaustion of the capacities of the informal
sector  to  absorb  further  work  force,  and  to  the  weakening of  certain  parts  of  the  informal
economy through the economic policies of the 1990s.(Beccaria/Groisman/Maurizio 2009: 14) 
In the last period, from 2002 on, the proportion of unregistered salaried employment showed a
slow downward  tendency.  Departing  from  44  %  in  2002,  it  began  first  to  increase  in  the
aftermath of the devaluation to 48 % in 2004, but then fell persistently to finally reach 36 % in
2009.(See figure 8) Despite the downward tendency, the proportion remains very high and can
be compared to that of the late 1990s. However,  according to the ministry of work(MTEySS
2007: 5) 85 % of the newly created salaried jobs between 2003 and 2007 were registered with
the social insurance system. Therefore, it seems that the proportion decreased due to the creation
of additional registered jobs, rather  than the replacement of informal employment. For the share
of informal employment,  I only have data until the second semester of 2005. Until that date
informality  as  a  whole  remained  very  elevated  and  concerned 54.6  %  of  the  employed
population.(See figure 9) Even if it would be assumed that informality as a whole decreased with
the  same  pace  as  unregistered  salaried  employment  during  the  following  years,  informality
remained  on  very  high  levels.  The  improvement  of  labour  market  conditions  had  therefore
stronger impacts on the reduction of unemployment levels than on the incidence of informality.
(Compare  figures 5, 8 and 9) Rubén Lo Vuolo(2007) argued in this respect, that the persistence
of an ample informal sector  forms part  of the governments  strategy to enhance international
competitiveness.  As  Luis  Beccaria  and  Fernando  Groisman(2009a:  114)  demonstrate,
informality is strongly associated with the risk of being poor. Over 70 % of the informal workers
live in poor households in the second semester of 2005. Furthermore, the informality risk is not
equally distributed within the society. The fact that in 2005 about 65 % of the informal workers
have not completed secondary education, indicates that it is especially the low skilled workers
who remain trapped in informality. 
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d) Unstable work histories after 1975
Unstable work histories as such constitute a social risk, as they are linked to recurrent periods
of unemployment, which cause loss of income and health insurance in most cases. In addition to
that, unstable work histories have negative long term impacts on social insurance systems, as
they may prevent the attainment, or reduce the benefit-level, of entitlements to old-age pensions.
This is especially true for the Argentinean case, where 30 years of contributions are required to
be entitled to receive a pension at regular retirement age.
Unfortunately,  the  availability  of  data  with  regard  to  job instability  is  somewhat  limited.
Therefore the strict separation of four periods will not be applied here. 
From a theoretical perspective, the growing importance of informal employment  is likely to
cause  increased  job instability,  as  informality  usually  includes  the evasion of  labour  market
regulations, which allows quicker and cheaper “hiring and firing”. The flexibilisation of labour
market regulations, which has been implemented during the 1990s, also significantly reduced the
costs of dismissal with regard to the formal labour market.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 243) 
The increase of the unemployment rate(see figure 5) and the rise of the average duration of
unemployment(see  figure  10)  support  the  assumption  that  work  histories  have  increasingly
become unstable, as they indicate that it has become more likely to suffer unemployment, and
once  unemployed  it  takes  in  average  longer  to  get  a  new job.  Luis  Beccaria  and  Fernando
Groisman(2009b: 59, 81 – 83) come to a similar conclusion analysing longitudinal and pseudo-
panel data. 
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Elaborated by the author. Source: SEDLAC Database (09/17/2010)20
As can be seen in figure 10, the average duration of unemployment in 1986 was relatively
short  with  1.8  months.  In  the  following  decade  the  average  duration  steadily  and  steeply
increased until it reached 8.1 months in 1996. Until 1998 it fell to 6.1 months, but began to rise
again with the beginning of the crisis until it culminated with 10.35 months in 2004. From then
on it decreased only very slowly, so that the average duration of unemployment was still 8.6
months in 2009, despite much stronger reductions in the incidence of unemployment.
The profound deindustrialisation process since the mid 1970s led to an unequal distribution of
the risk, and the average length, of unemployment. Only between 1991 and 2001 employment in
manufacturing  industries  decreased  41  %,  and  in  the  construction  sector  it  fell  22  %.
(Beccaria/Groisman/Maurizio  2009:  30)  In  this  context,  low  skilled  workers  are  facing  the
biggest risk of unemployment. Furthermore, Fernando Groisman(2008: 202/203) argues, that the
consolidation of a social and sociogeographic segmentation over more than 30 years obstructs
the labour market entry of many of the very poor, which is very likely one of the reasons why the
average duration of unemployment remains high. 
It  has  to be  added  that  for  the  pension  and  health  insurances  it  makes  no  difference  if
contributions are not paid because the respective individual is unemployed or because he or she
20 Same as footnote 17. Unfortunately I do not have data for the years between 1974 and 1986.
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Figure 10: Average duration of unemployment in months
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is  employed  informally.  Therefore,  information  specifically  regarding the  stability  of  formal
work histories would be more meaningful with regard to social insurances. As has been argued
in the points b) and c),  low skilled workers  are the most affected group by both the risk of
unemployment  and  the  risk  of  informality.  Corina  Rodríguez  Enríquez  and  María  Fernanda
Reyes(2006) find in their assessment study of social assistance programmes in the 2000s, that
only very few beneficiaries, of which the big majority can be considered low skilled workers,
found  formal  employment.  Most  of  those  who  found  formal  employment  fell  back  into
unemployment or informality again after very short time. Formal work histories are therefore
especially unstable among low skilled workers, which means that although they may be working
most of their life, it is unlikely that they will be able to attain pension entitlements.
As will be shown later, another factor increasing the incidence of unstable work histories is
that the rise of female labour market participation has not been accompanied by an expansion of
accessible child  care  facilities,  so  that  women are often forced to remain outside the labour
market during prolonged periods.(Rodríguez Enríquez/Reyes 2006) The lower retirement age for
women further exacerbates the difficulties of female workers to attain pension entitlements.(Kay
2000: 11)
e) The evolution of real wages and income distribution after 1975
The social outcomes of social insurance centred welfare states are usually very sensible to
changes in the wage and income structure of the population. As benefits of pension insurance
systems are usually determined by the former income, as is the case in Argentina, decreasing
wage levels may lead to falling benefits for salaried workers and increasing income differences
may cause a drifting apart of benefit-levels, which easily results in benefits below the poverty
line for low income workers. In most corporatist welfare states, health insurance benefits do not
depend on the wage level of the insured worker. This is not entirely true for the Argentinean
case,  where  health  insurances  are  organized  in  line  with  occupational  groups  and  differ
considerably with regard to what kind of treatment or medicine is covered, and how much the
beneficiary  has  to  pay out  of  his  own pocket.  These differences  reflect  the average  income
differences between the respective occupational groups, so that wage decreases for some of them
and increases for others may lead to a further differentiation of health insurances with regard to
their quality.
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Elaborated by the author. Source: The data has been kindly provided by Fernando Groisman and is identical to
that used in Beccaria/Groisman/Maurizio (2009: 28)
Labour  market  deterioration  in  Argentina  since 1975 resulted in  a  significant  decrease  of
average real wages. 
During  the  first  period,  from  1976  until  1983,  average  real  wages  experienced  strong
fluctuations. In 1976 they fell steeply as a consequence of the before mentioned anti-inflation
programme  of  the  military  government,  which  included  the  suspension  of  collective  wage
bargaining. While they recuperated with the stabilisation of the economy in the following three
years,  average real  wages declined strongly again as a result of  the economic crisis  and the
devaluation of the currency in 1981/1982. 
During the second period(1983 – 1989), wages first recuperated in 1983 and 1984 with the
return to democracy. Thereafter, they experienced a steady decline. In 1985 they fell due to the
so called “Plan Austral”, an attempt of the government to regain control over inflation, which
included wage increases  below inflation.(Lo  Vuolo 1998a:  80)  In  1986,  average  real  wages
recuperated slightly but began to fall  dramatically  with the renewed acceleration of inflation
from 1987 on. As can be seen in figure 11, real average wages fell to less than half of the 1974
level during hyperinflation crisis in 1989 and 1990. This explains why the poverty rate shoots up
during these years, although unemployment only increases by 2.5 % points.
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Figure 11 : Evolution of the average real wage (1975 =100)
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During the third period, 1990 to 2001, average wages first increased until 1995, but then
slightly declined in the aftermath of the “Tequila Crisis”, and thereafter basically stagnated on a
low level until the devaluation in 2002 led to steep fall again, this time even below the level
reached during the hyperinflation crisis one decade before.
During  the  last  period,  from  2002  on,  average  real  wages  began  to  recover  again,  but
considering  the  low starting  point,  they remained  comparatively  low.  In  2007,  average  real
wages were about 30 % lower than those of 1975.(Beccaria/Groisman/Maurizio 2009: 28)
The decline of average real wages partly reflects the weak macroeconomic performance of
Argentina since the mid 1970s. However,  while average real wages fell about 30 % between
1975 and 2007, the real per capita GDP increased about 28.5 % during that period. This indicates
that the distribution of incomes has significantly changed since the mid 1970s. Wage earners
were one of the losing groups in this respect.  Considering that  around 75 % (INDEC 2009,
www.indec.gov.ar) of all working Argentineans are wage earners, this has significant negative
effects with respect to the financing, and ultimately the quality, of protection against social risks,
especially regarding health  and old-age. Yet, average real wage decline is only a part of the
whole story. Within the group of wage earners low skilled workers experienced much stronger
losses  than  their  better  qualified  counterparts.(Beccaria/Groisman/Maurizio  2009:  35) The
Global Wage Report 2008/2009 of the International Labour Organisation finds in a comparison
of 31 countries that wage inequality21 increased faster in Argentina than in any other country
between the mid 1990s and the mid 2000s.(ILO 2008: 24)  
It  can also be observed that wage differences between unregistered and registered salaried
workers have been increasingly diverging. The dotted graph in figure 12 shows that in 1992 the
average income of registered salaried workers was about 60 % higher than that of unregistered
salaried workers. In 2001 it was about 115 %, and in  2005 over a 120 % higher. The differences
reflect, on the one hand, that informality concerns low skilled/low income workers much more
than better qualified groups. On the other hand, it shows that there is an increasing segmentation
between informal and formal salaried employment. This indicates that informality is less likely
to  be  a  voluntary  choice  of  the  respective  workers,  but  rather  the  only  alternative  to
unemployment. 
The graph with the squares in figure 12 shows the average income differences between the
formal and informal sector applying a productivity oriented definition of informality22.  It can be
21 Measured with the so called 90/10 ratio.
22 For an explanation of the difference between the productivity oriented and the legal  definition of informality
please see point c).
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seen,  that  during  the 1990s the incomes in  the informal  sector  have decisively deteriorated,
irrespectively which definition of informality is applied.
Source: CEDLAS (2010): Informalidad laboral en Argentina: 1992 – 2009; Informe CEDLAS, Julio 2010, p. 3
(www.cedlas.org)
The  virtual  free  fall  of  informal  sector  incomes  can  be  related  to  the  increase  of
unemployment, which reflects that the offer of labour force has been significantly higher than the
demand,  especially  regarding  low  skilled  workers,  who  constitute  the  majority  of  informal
workers.(Beccaria/Groisman 2009a: 114) This imbalance quickly translated into falling incomes,
as minimum wages, collective wage bargaining and other potentially mitigating factors were of
little effectiveness for the informal sector.
Unfortunately, at the time of writing this text I do not have data for the years between 1975
and 1992. However, unemployment rates have been low during most of the 1980s and  the late
1970s.(See figure 5)  In  a  situation of  lower  unemployment,  income differences  between  the
informal  and  the  formal  sector  have  probably  been  lower  than  in  1992.  If  we  furthermore
consider that unregistered salaried employment was far less frequent during the late 1970s (see
figure  8),  it  is  likely that a considerable proportion of informal  workers  (most  of them self-
employed)  voluntarily chose informality  to  avoid bureaucratic  work  and to  evade  taxes  and
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Figure 12: Income differences between formal and informal 
employment
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contributions.23 In this context, the relation between welfare state and informality is somewhat
different. Voluntarily informal workers may have the option to return to formal employment and
thereby may be able to plan the attainment  of pension entitlements.  This is  not  the case for
involuntarily informal workers, for whom informality constitutes the last resort before becoming
unemployed.  Also,  if  voluntarily  informal  workers  count  with  similar  incomes  as  formal
workers, they may be able to save for retirement and to self insure in health. Therefore, it is not
only the expansion of informality that has diminished the capacities of the Argentinean welfare
state  to  protect  against  social  risks,  but  also  the  deterioration  of  incomes  among  informal
workers. 
The generally steep rise of income inequality can be shown with the Gini coefficient. As can
be seen in figure 13, the Gini coefficient was a little over 0.35 in 1975 and increased steeply
during the first period(1976 – 1983) following the abandonment of the ISI strategy,  reaching
about 0.43 in 1983. During the following period(1984 – 1989) the coefficient slowed down its
upward trend and even fell between 1984 and 1985. From then on, income inequality began to
rise again, reaching a value of over 0.5 during the peak of hyperinflation in 1989. During the
third period, the economic stabilisation caused initially a slight decrease of the Gini coefficient to
0.44 in 1993. From 1994 on, inequality rose steeply again until the Gini coefficient reached a
value  of  approximately 0.54 in  2002.  During the  last  period after  2002,  inequality first  fell
significantly until 2006, but then slowed down its downward trend and remained at the still very
high value of about 0.47 in 2009.24
Figure 14 gives an overview of how the income distribution between deciles has changed
between 1974 and 2009. While the poorest 10 % of the population lost over 50 % of their share
of the GDP, the richest 10 % increased their share by over 27 %. The figure also shows the
pattern with which the income distribution has been changed: those who earned less, lost most,
and those who already earned most, won most. A look on the deciles in between shows that it
was basically the richest 20 % of the society who benefited from the rising inequality, while the
GDP share of the 8th decile remained stable and the resting 70 % percent of the society lost.
23 Self-employed  workers  obligatorily  have  to  pay quite  high  pension  insurance  contributions  as  they have  no
employer to share them with.
24 In comparison the EU-27 average regarding the Gini coefficient was 0.3 in 2005(Eurostat database, 2010), which
gives an impression about how unequal household per capita incomes are distributed in Argentina.
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Source: Gasparini/Cruces (2010: 5)
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Figure 13: Income inequality in Argentina between 1974 and 2009, 
Gini-Coefficient (household per capita income)
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Agglomeration of Buenos Aires Argentina
Elaborated by the author. Source: SEDLAC Database (09/17/2010)25
The  steep  increase  of  inequality  had  significant  impacts  on  the  functionality  of  the
Argentinean corporatist welfare state. There is a tax financed public health system that mainly
serves the poorer parts of the society and which runs parallel to the social insurance based health
system.  Furthermore,  public  education  is  tax  financed.  But  the  two  biggest  pillars  of  the
Argentinean welfare state are pension and health insurance. As long as social risks mainly stem
from illness or old-age these insurance schemes seem effective in redistributing resources from
the young to the old and from the healthy to the ill. But if, as is the case in Argentina, social risks
stem increasingly from the unequal distribution of incomes in the society,  these schemes are
unable to adequately cover social risks, as their design usually hardly provides a redistribution of
incomes from rich to poor. And this is especially true for the Argentinean system. First of all,
because  most of  the very poor  are  excluded  from social  insurances.  And secondly,  because
benefits  of  social  insurances  are  tied  to  contributions,  and if  the  latter  are  low,  due to  low
incomes, the former are low as well. While in most corporatist welfare states health insurance
benefits are not tied to the height of contributions, in Argentina they somehow are due to the
particular type of occupational group centred organisation of the system, where basically healthy
25Calculated  on  the  corresponding  numbers  from  1974  and  2009.  In  1974  the  underlying  surveys  have  been
conducted in the agglomeration of Buenos Aires and in 2009 in 31 agglomerations.
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Figure 14: Evolution of incomes as a share of the GDP between 
1974 and 2009, in deciles
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low income earners finance the treatment of ill low income earners and healthy high income
earners finance the treatment of ill high income earners.
f) Female labour market participation after 1975
The expansion of female labour market participation creates new social demands towards the
welfare state, such as income maintenance programmes during maternity leave and accessible
child care facilities. Also the attainment of pension entitlements is more difficult when work
histories are interrupted for child care reasons.
As can be seen in figure 15, female labour market participation has significantly increased
since  1980.  According  to  data  from  CEPAL,  the  gradual  rise  of  female  labour  market
participation has been a constant process. In 1980, 27.5 % of the economically active population
were women. This number increased to over 35 % in 1990, to about 40 % in 2000 and nearly 45
% in 2010. 
However,  women  are  clearly  disadvantaged  in  the  Argentinean  labour  market,  which
exacerbates  earlier  discussed  problems like  unemployment,  precarious  employment,  unstable
work  histories  and  low incomes for  low skilled workers.  Between  1986 and 2009,  working
women earned in average over 28 % per month less than their male counterparts. The incidence
of unemployment was about 30 % higher and the average duration of unemployment was even
over 40 % higher than the male average. Also were female salaried workers 35 % more often
affected by legal informality.(calculations by the author on the basis of data from the SEDLAC
database, http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar, 17th of September 2010)26 
26 Calculations  made by the author  on the base of SEDLAC data.  All  numbers are based on the results  of the
Permanent Household survey which has been conducted in the agglomeration of Buenos Aires until 1991, then in 15
agglomerations until 1997, then in 28 agglomerations until 2006, and from 2007 on in 31 agglomerations.
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Elaborated by the author. Source: CEPAL Database
Elaborated by the author. Source: SEDLAC Database (09/17/2010) for the years 1986 - 200927
27 Same as footnote 17.
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Figure 15: Female economically active population as a share of 
total economically active population between 1980 and 2010
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Figure 16: Gender and income. Average monthly labour income 
relation female/male
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g) Demographic change and age-structure after 1975
Demographic change affects the welfare state for a wide range of reasons. Ultimately, a lot of
academic  work  has  focussed  on  population  ageing  as  it  poses  challenges  for  financing  the
pension and healthcare systems. As has been specified in the introduction, this text focuses on
the welfare state adaptation failure with regard to the profound changes that hit the Argentinean
labour  market  after  1975.  Therefore,  demographic  change  and  population  ageing  are  not
precisely  part  of  the  focus  of  this  work.  However,  recent  literature  about  welfare  state
adaptation(e.g. Tepe/Vanhuysse 2010: 218,219/230) has found that the “timing” of population
ageing may partly explain a welfare state’s capacity to adapt to new social risks resulting from
deindustrialisation. Markus Tepe and Pieter Vanhuysse argue on the basis of a comparison of 21
OECD countries,  that  countries  which  experienced  post-industrialisation  processes  relatively
early, and which were therefore still less affected by population ageing, were better able to adapt
their welfare states to social risks stemming post-industrialisation. In contrast, welfare states that
had to deal with both challenges(population ageing and post-industrialisation) at the same time,
show a stronger  elderly bias  and a less  satisfactory adaptation to  new social  risks.  For  this
reason,  I  considered  it  useful  to  give  a brief  overview of  the demographic  evolution of  the
Argentinean society since the abandonment of the ISI strategy.
 As has already been argued, the abandonment of the ISI strategy initiated a profound and
rapid  process  of  deindustrialisation.  Now,  the  question  is:  Has  Argentina  challenged
simultaneously a process of population ageing that could be made, at least partly, responsible for
welfare state adaptation failure? 
As can be seen in figure 17, the Argentinean population slightly aged since 1975. The share of
the 65 years old and older population increased from 7.6 % in 1975 to 10.5 % in 2010. At the
same time the share of the potentially economically active population, aged 25 to 64, expanded
slightly from 63.2 % to 64.4 %.  Consequently the share of the population 14 years  old and
younger decreased from 29.2 % to 25 %. In comparison, in the EU-27, were population ageing is
a much discussed issue, 17.1 % of the population was 65 years old or older in 2008.(Eurostat
database) 
A commonly used indicator for population ageing, and the challenges that it poses for pension
and  health  systems,  is  the  so  called  old  age  dependency  ratio,  which  indicates  the  relation
between working age and pension age population. As can be seen in figure 18, between 1975 and
2010 this indicator increased from 12 to 16 persons in pension age per 100 persons in working
age. However, this value is still very low, and has increased only moderately considering the
length of the period. In comparison, in 2008 this ratio was 25.4 pension age persons per 100
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working age persons in the EU 27 and 30.4 in Germany. In fact, Argentina’s old age dependency
ratio  is  comparable  to  that  of  the  early  1960s in  Germany.(Eurostat)  Back  then,  population
ageing can hardly be said to have been a big issue in that country.
Therefore, the Argentinean welfare state can be considered one of those who did not face the
challenges of rapid population ageing and post-industrialisation simultaneously.   According to
the study of Markus Tepe and Pieter Vanhuysse, this is a condition that makes welfare state
adaptation more likely.  However,  welfare state adaptation towards social risks resulting from
post-industrialisation, as will be seen in the point 2.2., has not been successful in Argentina. As
will  be  discussed  in  point  3,  counter-pressures  against  welfare  state  adaptation  have  been
predominating, and created an overall political context unfavourable for welfare state adaptation.
Elaborated by the author. Source: CELADE/CEPAL database
52
Figure 17: Evolution of the Argentinean age-structure, 1975 - 2010
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Elaborated by the author. Source: CELADE/CEPAL database
2.2 Welfare state reform after 1975: Ignoring social change?
As has been argued in 2.1., labour market transformations have been extraordinarily rapid
and  profound  in  Argentina  since  the  mid  1970s.  These  transformations  implied  important
changes in the constellation of social risks prevalent in the society, and thereby challenged the
effectiveness of social policy arrangements that had been designed for a predominantly formal
male breadwinner labour market close to full employment. In the introduction it has been argued
that the adaptation of the welfare state to the new labour market conditions largely failed in
Argentina.  In  this  chapter,  empirical  evidence  will  be  used  to  underpin  this  argument.
Furthermore, the following description of the contents of welfare state reform after 1975 will
constitute the basis for the political analyses, which is going to be approached in chapter three.
Welfare state reform is often associated with changes in the legal fundaments of the different
welfare state institutions. However,  a look at  the evolution of social  expenditure shows, that
many changes are not necessarily dependent on active social policy legislation. So, for example,
do de facto changes often occur many years before they are legally legitimized. As will be seen
later, this happened with the replacement rate of pension entitlements between the mid 1980s and
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Figure 18: Evolution of the old-age dependency ratio since 1975
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mid 1990s.(Kay 2000: 12) Also, high inflation during big parts of the analysed period allowed
governments to cut back certain benefits without having to incur to legal reform steps. This is
especially true for social assistance programmes, whose legislation usually does not include any
mechanism  of  automatic  indexation.(e.g.  Gasparini/Cruces  2010)  For  these  reasons,  two
dimensions will be analysed: the evolution of social expenditure and the changes in the social
rights guaranteed by the state.
Before  the  following  subchapters  will  approach  in  more  detail  reform and  continuity  of
pension, health, family, unemployment and assistance policies, some characteristics and trends
of the welfare state as a whole will be addressed.
Generally, we can assume that welfare state adaptation to the new socioeconomic context,
shaped  by  an  enormous  rise  of  income  inequalities,  un-  and  sub-employment,  requires  an
increase of total social expenditure. The welfare state has increasingly to cope with additional
social risks, such as unemployment and precarious employment, while spending requirements for
old age and health not only remain, but can be assumed to rise as well due to technological
progress and population ageing. 
As  can  be  seen  in  figures  18  and  20,  the  short  term evolution  of  social  expenditure  in
Argentina  has been highly pro-cyclical  after  1975.28 This means that  social  expenditure was
lowest in moments when social need was biggest. However, despite widespread claims that the
Argentinean welfare state experienced strong retrenchment  or even dismantlement during the
1990s(e.g. Lo Vuolo 1998b: 191), social expenditure had, in the long run, an upward tendency,
both measured as per capita expenditure at constant prices and as a percentage of the GDP. As
can be seen in figure 19, the real per capita social expenditure has been oscillating between 1975
and 1990, but did neither experience a clear up nor downward trend over the period. From the
1990s on, a slight upward trend can be observed, although this trend has been interrupted during
the first years after the currency devaluation. Figure 20 shows that social expenditure as a share
of  the  GDP  increased  strongest  during  the  1980s,  mostly  during  the  government  of  Raúl
Alfonsín. However, this increase can be ascribed to an important part to the significant decrease
of the per capita GDP during this period. 
Thus, it can be said that the deterioration of the Argentinean labour market did coincide with
a significant rise of social expenditure from about 14.6 % of the GDP in 1975 to about 23.5 % in
2008.  Nevertheless,  this  coincidence  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  increase  of  social
expenditure reflects a social policy response to the deterioration of the socioeconomic indicators.
As I will argue, the additional resources have scarcely been used for measures to protect against
28 The economic cycles can be observed in figures 2 and 3.
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the  two  social  risks  that  have  become  the  main  sources  of  poverty  after  the  mid  1970s:
unemployment and precarious employment. 
Elaborated by the author29. Sources: For social expenditure: Vargas de Flood(2006: 190) for the years 1975 –
1979 and DAGPyPS(2010) for the years 1980 – 2008. For population numbers: INDEC database
29 Does not include expenditure which has been categorised as “science and technology”(Ciencia y Tecnología) and
“potable water and canalisation”(agua potable y alcantarillado) by the “Centre for Analyses of Public Expenditure
and Social Programmes”(Dirección de Análisis de Gasto Público y Programas Sociales).
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Figure 19: Per capita social expenditure in Pesos at constant 
prices of 2001
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Elaborated by the author30. Sources: Vargas de Flood(2006: 188) for the years 1975 – 1979 and DAGPyPS(2010)
for the years 1980 – 2008
Like virtually all welfare states, the Argentinean welfare state regime during the mid 1970s
constituted  a  mixture  of  three  different  types  of  public  social  security  provision:  Social
insurance, mainly in health and pension systems, public provision with universal access, mainly
in  education  and  the  public  health  sector,  and  means-tested  benefits  in  social  assistance
policies(with largely discretionary practices).(Isuani 2010: 111) 
Yet, the social insurance principle plays a dominant role in the Argentinean welfare state
regime. There are several social insurance types that aim at providing pensions, health care for
active  as well  as  retired persons,  and family allowances.  Except  the family allowance fund,
social insurances are obligatory for both dependent and self-employed workers. Yet, coverage
only  extends  to  formal  workers  and  their  core  family  members,  which  means  that  the
unemployed or informal workers do not build up pension entitlements, have no health insurance
coverage and also did not receive family allowances until the end of 2009. Healthcare for those
outside the formal labour market is provided by the public health sector, which runs parallel to
the health insurance funds. There is little cooperation between the public health sector and social
health insurances. The latter usually contract private health service providers rather than public
30 Same as footnote 29.
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Figure 20: Social expenditure as % of the GDP
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hospitals.(Barbeito/Lo  Vuolo  1998:  169) Although  an  unemployment  insurance  has  been
introduced in the early 1990s, it has remained of little importance, as coverage is very low due to
strict eligibility criteria, as well as benefits are very low and limited to only a very short period.
(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 206) Due to the fact that three of the main components of the Argentinean
labour market  transformation were  the increase of unemployment,  informal employment  and
income inequalities,  social  insurance  coverage  was  falling  and  benefits  became increasingly
unequal. 
Theoretically, (deeper) modifications of the social insurance legislation, facilitating access to
benefits and strengthening redistributive mechanisms, could have countervailed these trends, but
as will be seen later, rather the opposite has been done, at least until the early 2000s. Social
insurance reform, especially during the 1990s when several big reform steps were implemented,
was  mainly  concerned  with  lowering  non-wage  labour  costs,  strengthening  the  domestic
financial  market,  and  introducing  market  mechanisms  into  social  security  systems.(e.g.  Kay
2000, Lloyd-Sherlock 2005, Lo Vuolo 1998b) 
Another  possible  way  of  adapting  the  welfare  state  would  have  been  to  shift  social
expenditure  priorities  towards  programmes  of  universal  or  means-tested  access,  as  those
programmes are also accessible for the growing group of unemployed and informal workers,
who are excluded from social insurances and over-proportionally affected by poverty. Despite
growing emphasis on targeted means-tested programmes in the governments’ rhetoric from the
1990s on(Cortés/Marshall 1999: 211, Lo Vuolo 1998b: 237), there has not been a significant
priority  shift  regarding  social  expenditure.  Figure  21  even  shows  that  the  bias  towards  the
insurance principle has rather been strengthened since the mid 1970s.
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Elaborated by the author.31 Sources: For social expenditure: Vargas de Flood(2006: 190) for the years 1975 –
1979 and DAGPyPS(2010) for the years 1980 – 2008.  For population numbers: INDEC database
While in 1975 social insurance expenditure32 was 131 % higher than social expenditure on
programmes with universal and means-tested access33, the breach increased to 266 % in 1985,
290 % in 1995, fell  in the aftermath of the big economic crisis  at the beginning of the new
millennium to reach 110 % in 2005, but grew again until reaching 170 % in 2008. Figure 21 also
indicates that both types of social expenditure were of a pro-cyclical nature. A comparison with
the figures 3 and 4(see 2.1.) reveals that per capita social expenditure of both kinds fell during
periods of economic downturn and increased during periods of economic expansion. However,
social  insurance  per  capita  expenditure  was  far  more  sensible  to  the  economic  cycles  than
expenditure on means-tested or universal social programmes. This has mainly to do with the
31Social  insurance  per  capita  expenditure  includes  spending  on:  -  the  semi-public  health
insurances  (called  Obras  Sociales)  –  the  pension  insurance  funds  –  the  pensioners  health
insurance (called INSSJyP) – the family allowance fund
Per capita expenditure on social programmes with universal or means tested access includes spending on: – the
public health sector – social assistance and employment programmes – the unemployment insurance(due to the fact
the the available data does not disaggregate employment programmes and unemployment insurance)
32 Does not include unemployment insurance.
33 Includes expenditure on unemployment insurance. Does not consider expenditure on education.
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Figure 21: Social insurance expenditure per capita vs. universal 
and means tested expenditure per capita, in Pesos at constant 
prices of 2001 
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Social insurance per capita expenditure
Per capita expenditure on social programmes with universal or means-tested acces and unemployment insurance
extraordinarily pro-cyclical character of pension and health insurance expenditure in Argentina.
(See figures 23 and 28) Although pension legislation establishes that pension levels of already
retired  workers  cannot  be  adjusted  downwards  in  the  case  of  decreasing  wage  levels(Law
24.241, Article 32), this rule only refers to nominal pension levels. This means, that in periods of
high  inflation,  when  real  wage  decreases  basically  reflect  nominal  wage  increases  below
inflation  level,  also  real  pension  levels  become  extremely  volatile.  Considering  that  the
Argentinean economic crises after 1975 were mostly coinciding with elevated inflation, the size
of the breach between social insurance and universal/means-tested social expenditure depends
heavily on whether it is measured during a period of economic recession or a period of economic
boom. This explains to an important extent why the breach decreased so heavily in the early
2000s.  Another  factor  is  certainly  that  social  expenditure  on  means-tested  and  universal
programmes, measured as per capita expenditure at constant prices, has increased importantly in
2002. Also, social insurance expenditure took longer to recover than it was the case after earlier
crises. Since 2005, the breach is growing rapidly again. Looking at the period as a whole, it
becomes evident that the insurance principle bias of the Argentinean social expenditure has been
strengthened. In other words: although the highly vulnerable groups of unemployed and informal
workers were growing rapidly until the early 2000s, the share of social expenditure34 spent on
programmes accessible for those groups had a decreasing tendency. The picture would look even
worse  if  spending  on  private  health  insurances,  which  spread  mainly  during  the  1990s  and
reached a coverage of about 10 % of the population, was included in the calculations.(Lloyd-
Sherlock 2005: 1896) Since the early 2000s crisis, the distribution of social expenditure seems to
have improved. As has been argued, this “improvement” owes a bigger part to the steep fall of
social  insurance  expenditure  than  to  increased  spending  for  those  excluded  from  social
insurances. Since 2005 the breach is growing again. Yet, it has also to be considered that since
2002 unemployment  and informality have been shrinking,  which puts  this development in a
more favourable light. Nevertheless,  compared to 1975, the insurance principle bias of social
expenditure is stronger in 2008 and the group of those excluded from these insurances remains
significantly bigger.  
Also, the strong rise of income inequalities since 1975, if it is not to cause highly unequal
benefits,  exclusion  from  social  protection  and/or  financial  unsustainability,  requires  the
introduction  of  stronger  distributive  mechanisms.  Social  insurances  have  commonly  limited
redistributive effects, as their benefits are mostly dependent on former contributions. This is the
case  with  the  Argentinean  pension  system,  but  also,  as  will  be  seen  later,  with  the  health
34 Regarding: Pension, health, social assistance and family allowances 
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insurance  system.  The  family  allowance  fund,  which  also  works  with  some  kind  of  social
insurance principle, until recently mainly discriminated between those who are formal salaried
workers  and  those who are  not.  Despite  rising levels  of  income inequality,  social  insurance
benefits have, in their majority, rather been linked tighter to former contributions than becoming
more redistributive. With this regard, neither social insurance financing nor expenditure can be
considered progressive. However, this issue will be addressed in more detail in the following
subchapters, as the evolution has not been uniform across time and between the different social
insurance  sectors.  Apart  of  that, only  those  who  have  access  to  social  insurances  could
potentially  benefit  from  redistributive  mechanisms  within  them.  In  a  context  of  high
unemployment  and  informal  employment,  broader  redistributive  mechanisms are  required  to
guarantee a comprehensive and financially sustainable social safety net. 
With this regard, tax financed programmes have clear advantages. In the case of tax financed
programmes  with  universal  access,  benefits  are  usually  flat  while  financing  is  progressive.
Although  the  Argentinean  tax  system  has  been  characterised  as  being  regressive35(e.g.
Sabaini/Santiere  1993),  flat  benefits  have  positive  redistributive  effects  compared  to  the
exclusionary  and  highly  regressive  character  of  most  social  insurance  benefits. However,
considering the steep increase of income inequalities in Argentina since 1975, significant steps
towards more progressive taxation seem to be unavoidable if social security provision is to be
put on a solid financial basis and inequality is to be countervailed. Historically, overall taxation
has been very low in Argentina compared to other countries with similar  average per capita
income.(Melo 2007: 115) From the 1960s on personal income tax revenue declined steadily and
reached insignificant values of around 0.05 % of the GDP between 1976 and 1991, while social
insurance contributions increased their share, especially during the 1970s36, which contributed to
the regressive  character  of  the Argentinean  tax  system.(Melo  2007:  143,  Barbeito/Lo  Vuolo
1998: 135) Sabaini and Santiere(1993: 171) find in their interesting tax system analysis, that in
1986 the poorest 10 % of the Argentinean households had an average tax burden of 21.8 % of
their income, while the average tax burden for all households was 19.4 %, and 20,1 % for the
richest 10 %. Figure 22 shows that the regressive character of the Argentinean tax system has not
been altered significantly during the last decades. 
35 This regressive character obviously only exists in relative terms. In absolute terms higher income groups pay in
average more taxes than lower income groups do. Therefore, tax financed social programmes with universal access
and flat benefits have still positive redistributive effects.
36 Total  extra  wage  costs(combined  employer  and  employee  social  insurance  contributions  and  housing  fund
contribution) increased from 33.7 % in 1970 to 51.2 % in 1977.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 337/338)
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Elaborated by the author. Source: Dirección Nacional de Investigaciones y Análisis Fiscal (2010)
The biggest  part  of  national  tax  revenue comes  from indirect  taxes  and social  insurance
contributions, which can both be considered regressive taxes.37 Although, their combined share
has declined from 77 % of the total tax revenue in 1980 to 60 % in 2009, they remain clearly the
most important sources of national tax income. In contrast, progressive personal income taxation
has  virtually  not  played  any significant  role  until  the  early  1990s,  and  in  2009 it  still  only
represents 6.3 % of the gross national tax yield.(See figure 22 and Melo 2007: 143) Corporate
profit taxation in Argentina, which has been characterised progressive by Juan C. Gómez Sabaini
and Juan J. Santiere(1993: 171), increased from 8 % of national tax revenue to 12 %. Property
taxation, which is usually also considered progressive, constituted 4.2 % of the gross national tax
income in 1980, declined importantly during the 1990s, at the same time as personal income tax
was reinforced, and increased again in the new millennium, mainly due to the reintroduction of
taxes on credits and debits on current accounts, to represent 8.1 % of the national tax income in
2009.  However,  what  the  “Dirección  Nacional  de  Investigaciones  y  Análisis  Fiscal”  calls
37 Indirect/Consumer taxes can be considered regressive as poorer households spend in average bigger parts of their
monthly income, which means that their tax burden, measured as percentage of their income, is higher than that of
higher income groups who can save parts of their  income and therefore avoid consumer taxes.  Social insurance
contributions are regressive in Argentina, as incomes are only considered up to certain level.
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Figure 22: Composition of gross national tax revenue between 
1980 and 2009
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“taxation of properties”,  is  to an important  part composed by taxes on credits  and debits  on
current accounts, which are of regressive nature(Sabaini/Santiere 1993: 171). Therefore, only a
part of the “property taxation” in figure 22 can be considered progressive. Certainly, this text is
not the right place for a detailed discussion of the Argentinean tax system.  However, the low
importance of progressive elements in the tax system indicates that a social policy shift towards
tax  financed  instruments  would  only  have  limited  redistributive  impact  if  it  was  not  to  be
combined with efforts of tax reform. As will be seen later, the increased transfer of tax revenue
to the pension system during the 1990s had regressive redistributive effects, as pension benefits
are tied to former earnings and pension entitlements have increasingly become an exclusive right
of the better off.  
Another possible social policy response to increasing income inequality is to make social
expenditure more progressive by introducing targeted means-tested programmes focussing on
the poor population. This strategy has been very present in the governments’ rhetoric since the
1990s.(Cortes/Marshall  1999:  211,  Lo  Vuolo  1998b:  237)  As  studies  of  the  CIPPEC
Institute(Feldman 2009, Filc 2007) show, the means-tested social programmes are those with the
strongest redistributive character in Argentina. However, as will be seen later, these programmes
contain several severe weaknesses. For now it is enough to mention that these programmes do
only capture a very small part of social expenditure and have therefore  limited effect in practice.
The following subchapters will approach with more detail reform and continuity of pension,
health, social assistance and family policies. 
a) Pension policies
As can be seen in figure 23, Argentinean pension expenditure as a share of the GDP has
increased significantly since 1975. The strongest increase has occurred between the early 1980s
and the early 1990s. Since then, pension expenditure remained at around 8 % of the GDP(with
the  exception  of  the  years  immediately  following  the  currency  devaluation  in  2002).  In
comparison, Chile(2000) spends around 7 %, Brasíl(1999) around 10 % and Uruguay(2002) over
15 %.(Rofman 2006: 92) Most corporatist welfare state regimes in Europe spent significantly
more than Argentina:  Germany(2007) spends 12.4 %, Austria(2007) 13.8 % and  Italy(2007)
14.6  %.(Eurostat  database)  Yet,  in  2010  only  around  10.5  %  percent  of  the  Argentinean
population were 65 years old or older(CELADE database), compared to 20.5 % of the German
population(Database  of  the  Bundesamt  für  Statistik).  Considering  this,  Argentina  spends  a
relatively big share of its GDP on pensions. Also, pension expenditure has increased quicker
since 1975 than the share of the population aged 65 years or more. 
62
Elaborated by the author. Sources: For social expenditure: Vargas de Flood(2006: 188) for the years 1975 – 1979
and DAGPyPS(2010) for the years 1980 – 2008.  
The level of pension expenditure alone does, however, tell relatively little about whether or
not pension policies responded to the deterioration of labour market conditions. For this reason it
is necessary to examine changes in the legal fundaments of the pension system as well as data
regarding coverage and inequality of pension benefits.
The Argentinean pension system has historically been based on the social insurance principle. As
has  been  argued  before,  social  insurance  based  pension  schemes  usually  reproduce  the
inequalities  prevalent  in  the  labour  market.  Therefore,  labour  market  deterioration  can  be
assumed to lead, at least in the long run, to a decline of coverage and an increase of income
inequality  among  pensioners.(Huber  1996:  143/144)  However,  this  is  just  a  very  general
assumption. The specific regulations of a social insurance system can determine to an important
degree  whether,  how  strong  and  how  fast  labour  market  deterioration  impacts  on  pension
coverage and inequality. So, for example, can permissive rules for pension access and relatively
high  minimum  pensions  preserve  high  levels  of  coverage  and  maintain  benefit  inequalities
relatively low. As will be seen in the following description, the different governments since the
abandonment of import substitution industrialisation pursued very different strategies regarding
coverage and benefit inequality.
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Figure 23: Pension expenditure as % of the GDP
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Lets start with marking the point of departure. The pay-as-you-go pension system in force in
1975 provided relatively wide coverage and very generous benefits. Three big funds covered
public sector workers, private sector workers and self-employed workers. Additionally a number
of  special  pension  regimes  provided  coverage  for  the  police,  the  military,  provincial  and
communal  workers,  and  some  other  smaller  occupational  groups.(Huber  1996:  150/151)
Depending on the effective number of years worked, pension benefits constituted between 70
and 82 % of the average salary during the three best paid years out of the last ten years before
retirement.(MTEySS/SSS 2003: 15) The retirement age was set at 60 years for male and 55 years
for female salaried workers, and 65 respectively 60 years for self-employed workers. Access to
pension entitlements was relatively permissive. Although 30 years of work have theoretically
been  established as  a  requirement  for  the attainment of  pension entitlements,  the effectively
required number of years of contribution was set significantly lower.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998:
158/159) This number varied over time and between occupational groups, but in general, until
the 1993 reform bill, it remained relatively low. So, for example, according to law 18.038, self-
employed workers were required to have contributed a minimum of only fifteen years to attain
entitlement to a pension in 1975.  For those who were not able to fulfill this requirement, there
was a pension for advanced age, which required ten years of contributions and could be applied
for by former salaried workers 65 years old or older and former self-employed workers 70 years
old or older. This pension gave entitlement to 70 % of the value of the regular pension that the
respective worker would have received if he or she had complied with the requisites for a regular
pension.  Furthermore  the  contributory  system  provided  invalidity  and  widow  pensions.
(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 159/160) Apart  of the system of contributory pensions, there were
means-tested  non-contributory  pensions  for  advanced-age  and  invalidity  providing  benefits
amounting to 70 % of the minimum pension.(Laws 13.478 and 18.910)
During the short democratic period between 1973 and 1976, efforts have been undertaken to
increase  coverage  among  rural  workers,  and  to  generally  facilitate  the  access  to  pensions.
(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 126) As can be observed in figure 24, coverage among the elderly
continued  to  expand  rapidly  during  the  military  dictatorship  between  1976  and  1983.  The
benefits  to pension age population38 ratio39 increased from 67.8 % in 1976 to 84 % in 1983.
38 The regular pension age has been different for self-employed and salaried workers, and has been modified during
the 1990s. Yet, for operational reasons and due to limited availability of data I always refer to men 65 years or older
and women 60 years or older.
39 Remind that the total number of pension benefits also includes invalidity pensions, widow pensions and cases of
early retirement,  which is why the ratio shows higher values than the real pension coverage among the elderly.
Nevertheless, the ratio serves as an indicator for the evolution of coverage. 
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However, available data shows that the coverage increase already started during the preceding
democratic government.(CELADE database, MTEyFR/SSS 2001) Furthermore, the employment
rate  fell  from  37.8  %  of  the  population  in  May  1976  to  35.3  %  in  May  1983,  while
unemployment was only 0.3 percentage points higher.(INDEC database) This indicates that an
important number of workers became economically inactive(not unemployed), which most likely
means that they retired. The rapid increase in the pension benefit to pension age population ratio
does therefore not necessarily reflect active policymaking of the military government, but may
rather result from the measures implemented by the preceding government in combination with
the deterioration of labour market conditions, which provided incentives to retire for those who
were able to do so. At the same time, the average pension benefit level diminished drastically
during the military rule.(See figure 25) 
Elaborated by the  author.  Sources:  For number  of  benefits40:  MTEyFR/SSS(2001)  for the years  1975 –  1996,
MTEySS/SSS(2008) for 1997 – 2008, MTEySS/SSS(2009) for 2009 and MTEySS/SSS(2010) for 2010; For number of
men aged 65+ and women 60+: CELADE database41.
41
40 The benefit numbers are annual averages until 1996. Between 1997 and 2007 they correspond to December of
each year. In 2008 the number is from August, in 2009 from December and in 2010 from March. 
41 Unfortunately the CELADE database only provides estimates for every 5th year. For operational reasons it has
been  assumed  that  the  increase  of  the  number  of  pension  age  persons  has  been  steady  between  the  available
datapoints. The overall steadiness of the increase during 35 years(between 8 datapoints) justifies this assumption.
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Figure 24: Evolution of pension coverage among the elderly 
(Number of Benefits / Number of men 65+ and women 60+)
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Elaborated  by  the  author.  Sources:  For  averge  benefits42:  MTEyFR/SSS(2001)  for  the  years  1975  –  2000,
MTEySS/SSS(2010) for 2001 – 2010; For minimum benefits43: Cárcamo Manna(1998: 15) for 1980 – 1991 and
MTEySS/SSS(2010)  for  1992  –  2010;  For  inflation-adjustment:  INDEC  database  for  1992  –  2005  and  IPEC
database for 2006 – 2010.
43
The dramatic fall of average pension levels during 1976 has been mainly a consequence of the
before mentioned wage freeze in times of high inflation.(See 2.1.) From 1977 on, pension levels
began recuperating, yet never reaching the average value of 1975, until they drastically fell again
during the crisis in 1982. As can be seen in figure 25, the real minimum pension diminished
significantly  less  in  1982 than  the  average  pension,  which  led  to  a  reduction  of  inequality
between pension levels. During 1983, the last year of the dictatorship, pension levels were raised
again. While the decrease of the year  before affected in the first instance pensions above the
minimum, the increase affected both equally, which implied that the relatively small difference
between minimum and average pension was preserved. 
During  the  democratic  government  of  Raúl  Alfonsín,  between  late  1983 and  mid  1989,
pension  benefit  levels  decreased  steadily,  yet  maintaining  the  inequality  between  benefits
relatively low. A comparison of  figures  11(evolution of wages,  see 2.1.) and 23 shows, that
42 The average pension levels are annual averages until 2000 and correspond to December of each year afterwards.
43 The minimum pension levels are annual averages until 1991 and correspond to December of each year afterwards.
Unfortunately I do not have data for the years 1975 – 1979.
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Figure 25: Evolution of average and minimum pension benefits, in 
Pesos of 1997
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average pensions did not follow the evolution of wages during the 1980s.  While real  wages
experienced increases during 1984 and 1986, average pensions fell steadily.  This reflects the
increasing fiscal imbalances that plagued the system. As can be seen in figure 26, the pension
system was nearly exclusively financed through contributions until 1979. With the suspension of
employer contributions in 1980, huge tax transfers became necessary. The gradual reintroduction
of  employer  contributions  from  1984  on,  however,  could  only  partly  undo  the  imbalance.
(Barbeito/Lo  Vuolo  1998:  337)  Other  factors  exerting  fiscal  pressures  remained,  such  as
population ageing, the strong expansion of coverage, and increasing unemployment and informal
employment.(MTEySS/SSS 2002: 15) Therefore, and notwithstanding the legally established 70
% to 82 % replacement rate, real replacement rates during the mid/late 1980s rarely surpassed 55
%, which consequently led to a flood of legal claims.(Kay 2000: 12) In 1986, the state declared
“Pension  Emergency”  and  suspended  in  the  alleged  name of  “national  interest”  all  judicial
processes  claiming  for  pension  benefits  according  to  legislated  levels.(Arza  2009:  16/17,
Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 162) However, official replacement rates were not amended. 
Coverage rates were sustained on a very high level during the government of Raúl Alfonsín.
(see  figure  24)  This  has  partly  to  do  with  the  fact  that  a  growing  informalisation  and
precarisation of the labour market only unfolds its impacts on pension entitlements after several
years. On the other hand, access to pensions remained permissive and was facilitated through the
reiteration of so called “moratoriums”(moratoria)44.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 162/163)  According to
Alberto Barbeito and Rubén Lo Vuolo(1998: 161), nearly a 100 % of the formerly economically
active population had access to pensions in the 1980s, even though many of them had remained
outside the formal labour market during prolonged periods. A permissive handling of the access
criteria has also been applied with respect to invalidity pensions. This led, in the context of a
difficult  labour  market  situation,  to  the  triplication  of  invalidity  pensions  during  the  1980s.
(calculated  on  the  basis  of  MTEySS/SSS 2002:  16  and  MTEyFR/SSS  2001)  Other  smaller
measures  like the law 23.226 from 1985, which guaranteed right to a widow pension to not
married life partners,  have further contributed to the high benefits to pension age population
ratio.(http://www.mujer.gov.ar/leg.htm, opened on 29th of October 2010) 
44 Pension  “moratoriums”  were  programmes  that  facilitated  the  attainment  of  pension  entitlements  through  the
posterior payment of contributions.
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Elaborated by the author. Sources: MTEyFR/SSS(2001) for the years 1975 – 2000 and Arza(2009: 34) for 2001
- 2008
From mid 1989 on,  the  peronist  government  of  Carlos  Menem changed  the direction  of
pension policies quite radically. While under his predecessors coverage had been raised, benefit
inequalities  had  been  diminished  and  average  benefit  levels  had  been  reduced,  the  new
government induced exactly the opposite in all three areas. As can be seen in figure 24, coverage
began to decline steeply from the early 1990s on. Figure 25 shows, that the breach between
minimum and average pension began to grow rapidly, as the minimum was fixed at a very low
level, while the average recuperated with the stabilisation of the economy and the decline of
inflation. In comparison, under the government of Raúl Alfonsín the minimum pension benefit
constituted in average 86 % of the average pension benefit, but only 58 % under Carlos Menem.
(Own calculations on the basis of the data used for figure 25) 
One of the very view measures that intended to expand pension coverage during this period
was the introduction of a non-contributory pension benefit for mothers of seven or more children
through law 23.746 from 1989, which was approved by the two chambers of the congress very
shortly after president Menem took over.
The payment of lower benefit  levels than guaranteed by law during the 1980s led to the
accumulation of enormous debts with the beneficiaries, which amounted to about eight billion
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Figure 26: Financial sources of the Argentinean pension system
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dollars in the early 1990s. To consolidate this debt the government decreed, that all debts of the
pension system until the 31st of March 1991 would be obligatorily converted into public bonds
with  a  duration  of  ten  years.(Barbeito/Lo  Vuolo  1998:  162,  Lo  Vuolo  1998b:  217/218)
Furthermore,  in  1991  the  5  %  points  employer  contributions  to  the  national  housing
fund(FONAVI)  were  permanently  transferred  to  the pension system to improve its  financial
situation.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 338) As can be seen in figure 26, the gradual reduction of the
fiscal imbalance of the system only persisted until 1993. The steep rise of the imbalance from
1994 on can be ascribed to mainly four reasons. First of all, the partial privatisation of the system
caused enormous transitional costs, as contributors who switched to the private system began to
pay their contributions to private funds, while the financing of pension entitlements attained
before 1994 remained the responsibility of the public pay-as-you-go system.(Rofman 2006: 94)
Secondly, the government decided to integrate several loss-making provincial pension funds into
the  national  pension  system.45(MTEySS/SPSS  2010:  5,  Lo  Vuolo  1998b:  221)  Thirdly,
agreements between the national government and several provinces, with the aim to stimulate
growth, led to reductions of the employer contributions in certain areas.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 221)
In 1996, these constituted an average national reduction of employer contributions of 37.9 %
according  to  the  ministry  of  labour.(La  Nación  6th of  November  1996) And  fourth,  the
acceleration of the persistent deterioration of the labour market  implied an additional  loss of
contributions.(Arza 2009: 4) 
The main strategy of the government to countervail the rising deficits of the pension system
during the 1990s was the reduction of coverage.(Rofman 2006: 95) This strategy was based on a
stricter handling of the eligibility criteria and the implementation of significantly stricter rules
with  the  reform  bill  from  1993.  Furthermore,  after  a  decade  and  a  half  of  labour  market
deterioration, the rise of unemployment and informal employment increasingly began to affect
pension coverage negatively, as the number of workers that had been permanently excluded from
the formal labour market increased. Figure 24 shows that the rapid reduction of coverage among
the elderly already started in 1993, which means, one year before the enactment of the stricter
eligibility criteria in 199446. This confirms that the different handling of the same rules under
different governments is a very important factor in Argentinean pension policies. 
45 Catamarca, Jujuy, La Rioja, Río Negro, San Luis, Tucumán, Salta, Mendoza, San Juan, Santiago del Estero y
Ciudad  de  Buenos  Aires.(MTEySS/SPSS  2010:  5)  Financing  for  the  assumed  deficits  came  mainly  from
International Financial Organisations.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 221)
46 The pension reform was sanctioned in 1993 and implemented in 1994.(Arza 2009: 4)
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The pension reform bill from 1993 introduced several very profound changes to the pension
system. Although the enacting of stricter rules of access received considerably less attention than
the privatisation component of the reform, it was one of the modifications with the strongest
social impact. From 1994 on, the number of required years of contribution was increased to 30,
which implied that the attainment of pension entitlements became basically restricted to long-
term formal workers. This contrasts strongly with the increasing informalisation of the labour
market  and the rising levels of unemployment.(Arza 2009: 7) At the same time,  the regular
retirement age was gradually elevated from 60 to 65 years for male salaried workers, and from
55 to 60 years for female salaried workers.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 219) The benefits to pension age
population ratio fell dramatically from 82.3 % in 1994 to 70.9 % in 2000 and 65.6 % in 2005.
(see figure 24)47 
The privatisation component of the reform induced the creation of two parallel systems: one
public  pay-as-you-go  system  and  one  mixed  system  with  a  basic  public  pay-as-you-go
component and a private individual capital account component. Workers had to choose between
the two systems.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 219) However, who did not actively choose within a limited
period was automatically allocated to  one of  the private  funds,  which  led in  practice  to  the
transference of most contributors to the private scheme.(Arza 2009: 9) 
The benefits of the new public pay-as-you-go system were composed by three elements. The
first component was the so called “Universal Core Pension” (Prestación Básica Universal/PBU).
Its  value  was  uniformly  set  at  2.5  times  the  value  of  the  mean  monthly  workers’  pension
contribution(Aporte Medio Previsional Obligatorio/AMPO)48. Yet, for every year of contribution
exceeding 30 years, the PBU increases by 1 %. The second and the third components, the so
called “Complementary Benefit”(Prestación Complementaria/PC) and the “Additional  Benefit
for  Continued  Affiliation(to  the  public  system)”(Prestación  Adicional  por  Permanencia),  are
stronger tied to former contributions. Both are calculated on the basis of the average income
during the last 10 years before retirement. The PC only concerns contributions that have been
made before the enactment of the pension reform in 1994. For each year of contribution before
1994 the PC provides pension entitlement to 1.5 % of the average income of the last 10 years of
contribution. The PAP concerns all contributions that have been made after 1994 and provides
pension entitlement to 0.85 % for each year of contribution.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 219) 
47 Alternatively, Calvo et al.(2010: 225/226) estimate that the coverage rate among the population at retirement age
decreased from 78 % in 1992 to 65 % in the mid 2000s.
48 The AMPO is calculated by dividing the sum of all  pension system contributions  in one month through the
number of contributors. The AMPO is calculated twice a year and serves as some kind of “measuring unit” for the
pension calculation.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 219)
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The pensions of workers who chose the mixed system were composed by the “Universal Core
Pension”(PBU) and the so called “Ordinary Pension”(Jubilación Ordinaria/JO), which was based
on the principle of individual capital accounts and managed by private funds called “Pension
Fund  Administrators”(Administradoras  de  fondos  de  Jubilaciones  y  Pensiones/AFJP).  The
pension benefits of the JO finally depended on the contributions made by the worker and the
investment  returns  of  the  respective  private  pension  fund.  The  individual  capital  account
component showed many similarities with the Chilean system.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 219/220) 
In  general,  the  new  calculation  formula  of  benefit  levels  implied  a  significantly  lower
replacement rate than the 70 % – 82 % established in anterior pension laws.
Although the state continued to guarantee a minimum benefit, the stricter eligibility criteria
severely reduced the possibilities of access.  This is  due to the fact  that, in order to obtain a
minimum  pension,  workers  have  to  comply  with  the  same  requirements  that  have  been
established  for  the  attainment  of  regular  pension  entitlements.(Lo  Vuolo  1998b:  220)
Furthermore, the value of the minimum benefit was set very low with 150 pesos, and has not
been increased between 1992 and the collapse of the convertibility regime in 2002. For this
reason, the minimum benefit relatively decreased between December 1992 and December 2001
from 68.8 % to 41.8 % of the mean pension benefit.(See figure 25) 
Shrinking pension coverage and low minimum pensions contributed not only to the rise of
poverty levels,  but also led to an increased participation of older people in the economically
active population(Alós et al 2008: 34), which aggravated the severe unemployment problems.
For high incomes, the contribution assessment ceiling was set  at 60 AMPOs which equalled
4560 Pesos in June 1997.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 220)
As a whole, the 1993 pension reform law reduced the degree of solidarity in the Argentinean
pension  system.(Mesa-Lago  2009:  15)  While  before  benefits  depended  mainly  on  earnings
during the last years before retirement, from 1994 on, they began additionally to depend stronger
on the number of years of contribution. This increased the inequalities between pension benefits,
as those who have lower incomes are much more likely to contribute less years to the system
than those  with higher  incomes.(see  2.1.)  Additionally to  the  disadvantages  that  result  from
gender discrimination in the labour market,  women’s pensions were going to be significantly
lower in the private accumulation scheme due to their longer life expectancy.(CNM 1994: 21)
Also of importance is that the shift towards a mixed system with individual capital  accounts
caused  significant  transitional  costs(Kay  2000:  7),  which  had  to  be  financed  through  tax
transfers.  Due  to  the  regressive  character  of  the  tax  system,  and  the  fact  that  the  pension
expenditure became increasingly concentrated on those who formerly earned well, while low
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earners were increasingly denied access to any kind of pension, the Argentinean pension reform
of 1993 exacerbated the trend of rising income inequalities through its regressive redistributive
impacts.(Goldberg/Lo Vuolo 2006: 82/83) 
One of the justifications of the reform was that in the old system workers had supposedly too
little incentives to pay contributions, while the creation of a stronger link between contributions
and  benefits  would  provide  incentives  for  the  correct  payment  of  these.(Arza  2009:  7,
Goldberg/Lo Vuolo 2006: 84) However, as can be seen in figure 27, the trend of a decreasing
coverage of the working population has continued after the reform. According to Rafael Rofman,
Leonardo  Lucchetti  and  Guzmán  Ourens(2008:  29)  the  percentage  of  working  persons
contributing to the pension system decreased from 50.9 % in 1994 to 45.3 % in 2000 and 43.4 %
in 2006.  Especially the 40 % of the working population with the lowest incomes experienced a
dramatic reduction in their coverage rate, while it increased very slightly for the best earning 40
%. In 2006 only 13.3 % of the poorest quintile of the working population were contributing to
the  pension  system,  while  this  number  was  63.4  %  for  the  richest  quintile.
(Rofman/Lucchetti/Ourens 2008: 32) There is also a strong positive correlation between the level
of  education  and  the  probability  of  being  contributor  to  the  pension  system.
(Rofman/Lucchetti/Ourens 2008: 16) This means, the higher the income and educational level,
the more likely is the attainment of pension entitlements. 
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The  numbers  visualised  in  figure  27  indicate,  that  since  the  pension  reform  the
insider/outsider divide has deepened significantly. Generally, this tendency can be attributed to
the  deterioration  of  labour  market  conditions.  The  coverage  increase  among  high  earners
possibly has something to do with the new incentives. However, in contrast to the assumption of
the government that a closer link between contributions and benefits would lead to an increased
willingness to pay social insurance contributions, the establishment of stricter eligibility criteria
may  have  created  conciousness  among  low  earners  that  their  chances  to  attain  pension
entitlements are indeed very low, and that therefore pension contributions were basically lost
income. 
In  March 1995, the government  reached the passing of the so called “Pension Solidarity
Law” aimed at mitigating the increasing financial imbalance of the pension system. Despite the
name, the actual law has little to do with common understandings of solidarity. While before,
pensions have been automatically adjusted according to the evolution of the AMPO, that means
in relation to the evolution of the average pension contribution, which ultimately depends on the
evolution of wage levels, the “Pension Solidarity Law” abolished this automatic mechanism, and
established that the government may decide each year about pension level increases according to
their fiscal possibilities.(Kay 2000: 12) Despite the elimination of automatic pension adjustment
for already retired workers, the AMPO still served as point of reference for the determination of
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Elaborated by the author. Source: Rofman/Lucchetti/Ourens 2008: 32
Figure 27: Pension system coverage of the working population by 
income quintiles 
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the pensions of retiring workers. However, in August 1997 the government used an emergency
decree (Decreto de Necesidad y Urgencia/DNU, 833/97) to completely eliminate the AMPO and
to replace it by the so called “Pension Module”(Módulo Previsional/MOPRE), which was not
anymore attached to the mean pension contribution, but was instead adjusted arbitrarily by the
government.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 222)
In  the same year,  law 24.828 created a so called “Houswife Pension Scheme” within the
private  branch  of  the  pension  system,  which  worked  purely  according  to  the  principle  of
individual pension capitalisation accounts. The affiliation to this pension scheme was voluntary.
The minimum contribution equalled 11 % of the lowest income possible to register with the
pension  insurance.  However,  the  affiliation  to  this  scheme  did  not  entitle  to  any  kind  of
minimum pension, so that pensions resulting from this system can be expected to be very low. In
practice this law changed little with regard to the exclusion of women from pension entitlements.
During the short government of the so called “Alliance”(Alianza) under President De la Rúa,
from late 1999 to late 2001, pension policies followed the same line that has been pursued by its
predecessor. As can be seen in figures 24 – 27, pension coverage among the elderly as well as
the working population continued to fall,  the breach between minimum and average pension
continued to rise, and the fiscal imbalance of the system continued to worsen. 
Encouraged by the IMF, and in face of the economic and fiscal crisis suffered by the country
since late 1998, the government decided to cut pension benefits over 500 Pesos by 13 % in July
2001.49(La Nación 21st of July 2001, 31st of July 2001) Short time later, the government forced
the private pension funds to buy treasury bills.(Kay 2009: 6)
In  November  2001,  article  15  of  the  decree  1387/01 reduced  worker  pension  insurance
contributions from 11 % to 5 %, justified with the need to stimulate consumption. However, just
one month later, through article 5 of the decree 1676/01, the reduction was limited to only those
who were affiliated to the private capitalisation system. Taking back the reduction for workers
affiliated to the public pay-as-you-go scheme was justified with the difficult fiscal situation. This
measure  further  increased  the  bias  of  the  Argentinean  pension  system  towards  its  private
component, as it provided incentives for workers to opt for the latter. Yet, in the long run, the
reduction  of  contributions  was  going  to  affect  private  scheme  pension  levels  negatively.
Furthermore, it aggravated the problem that the high administration costs consumed a big share
of the actual contributions.(Arza 2009: 8)
49 The so called “zero deficit bill” also included a 13 % wage reduction for public employees.(La Nación 31st of July
2001)
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In late 2001 President De la Rúa resigned in face of the rapidly aggravating economic and
social  situation  and  the  rise  of  massive  protests.  The  succeeding  peronist  interim  president
Rodríguez Saa restored the 13 % cut in pensions and public sector wages.(Kay 2009: 6) On the
23rd of December he announces Argentina’s default on big parts of its public debts. Due to the
lack of support from his own party, he felt forced to resign after only one week in charge. In
early  2002  the  peronist  interim  president  Eduardo  Duhalde  takes  over.  Short  time  after  he
decides  the devaluation of the curreny,  which implies the end of the so called convertibility
regime.(Golbert  2004: 13) The default  and the devaluation seriously affected private pension
funds, as government bonds constituted 64 % their assets at that time.(Mesa-Lago 2009: 15, Arza
2009: 8) 
From 2002 on, pension policies changed direction again.  While during the 1990s pension
policies  were  inducing  bigger  inequalities  between  benefit  levels,  lower  coverage,  a  bigger
financial imbalance, and privatisation, after 2002 these trends were reverted in all four areas. 
Average pension levels fell steeply as a consequence of the lack of an automatic indexation
mechanism  during  the  short  but  intense  burst  of  inflation  in  the  aftermath  of  the  currency
devaluation. Minimum pensions, in contrast, were maintained at about their former real value,
which led to a  significant  flattening of  pension benefit  level  differences.  Under the in  2003
elected peronist president Néstor Kirchner, minimum pension levels were frequently raised at
higher rates than those above the minimum, which implied a further reduction of inequalities.
(Arza 2009: 15, also see figure 25) In December 2001, the minimum pension benefit constituted
only 41.8 % of the mean benefit, but until March 2010 this indicator rose to 77.8 %.(Calculations
by the author on the basis of MTEySS/SSS 2010: 28) Simultaneously, the share of pensioners
receiving the minimum benefit rose to over 70 % in 2008.(Arza 2009: 16) Benefit increases for
those above the minimum clearly lacked behind the wage development.  While in December
2001  the  mean  pension  benefit  constituted  41.2  %  of  the  mean  wage  of  pension  system
contributors, this relation worsened to 35.6 % until March 2010. However, the minimum pension
increased in relation to the mean wage of pension system contributors, from only 17.2 % in
December  2001  to  27.7  %  in  March  2010.(Calculations  by  the  author  on  the  basis  of
MTEySS/SSS 2010: 22/28)  
From 2005 on,  with  the so called  “pension  inclusion programme”(Programa de Inclusión
Previsional),  the  government  enacted  measures  to  increase  the  pension coverage  among the
elderly  population.  The  articles  1  to  5  of  Law  25.994  introduced  the  possibility  of  early
retirement  for  unemployed  workers  who  are  at  the  most  5  years  younger  than  the  regular
retirement age and have at least contributed 30 years to the system. The early retirement benefit
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was set at 50 % of the regular pension benefit, yet cannot be lower than the minimum pension.
Once the regular pension age is reached, the respective worker receives the full regular pension
benefit to which he or she is entitled. 
Article  6  of  the  same  law  and  decree  1454/05  opened  a  so  called  “pension
moratorium”(moratoria provisional) which allowed workers at retirement age who did not fulfil
the requirement of 30 years of contributions to immediately receive a pension benefit. However,
the idea of the moratorium was that the respective pension benefit recipients pay their “debt”
with  the  pension  system,  resulting  from  the  missing  years  of  contribution,  in  60  monthly
payments  that  were  automatically  discounted  from  the  perceived  pension  benefit.  Camila
Arza(2009: 12) estimates that these discounts constituted in average about 40 % of the pension
benefit. This is why, in practice, the benefits of the “moratorium pensions” were considerably
lower  than  regular  pensions,  at  least  during  the  first  five  years  of  perception.  The  main
components of the “pension inclusion programme”, specified in law 25.994, had only a limited
duration of two years, and were effectively closed on the 30th of April 2007(Arza 2009: 11). This
means that law 25.994 has not implemented a permanent change of the eligibility criteria of the
Argentinean  pension system.  Only those components  of  the moratorium introduced  with the
decree 1454/05 were of permanent character.  However,  these are of far lower impact as they
only refer to self-employed workers and only allow to cancel debts with the pension system that
originate from the years previous to the enactment of the 1994 pension reform.
The overall positive impact of the moratorium on pension benefit coverage was enormous.
This is  especially true for the first  two years,  when all components of the pension inclusion
programme were operating. According to information of the “Ministry of Work, Employment
and Social  Security”(Ministerio  de Trabajo,  Empleo y Seguridad Social/MTEySS) 2,387,793
new  beneficiaries  obtained  pension  entitlements  through  the  programme  between  the  third
quarter of 2005 and the first quarter of 2010.(MTEySS/SSS 2010: 34, see also figure 24) 
The pension inclusion plan was also an important improvement regarding gender equality in
the pension system. Women’s chances of attaining pension entitlements have been drastically
reduced  through  the introduction of  stricter  eligibility  criteria  with the 1993 reform.  This is
related to what has been argued in point 2.1.. Women are far stronger affected by factors that
minimize the  chances  to  fulfil  the  strict  elgibility criteria  established  with the 1993 refrom:
unstable work histories, prolonged periods outside the labour market due to child care or family
work, unemployment, informality, low pay and so on.(see 2.1. for more detail) In contrast, the
moratorium  over-proportionally  enabled  the  attainment  of  pension  entitlements  for  women.
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According to Camila Arza(2009: 12) about 87 % of the beneficiaries from the moratorium were
women. 
The overall annual costs of the pension inclusion programme have been very high and show
the government’s  commitment  to  pension coverage  extension.  In  July 2007, the moratorium
accounted for about 30 % of the total pension expenditure.(Arza 2009: 12) However, as can be
seen in  figure  23,  the total  pension expenditure in 2007 and 2008 consumed only a similar
proportion of the GDP as it  had done during the 1990s.  This has been possible because the
pension  expenditure  as  a  proportion  of  the  GDP had  been  drastically  reduced  between  the
devaluation of the currency in 2002 and the initiation of the pension inclusion programme in
2005. The relative decline of pension expenditure during these years had mainly to do with the
lack of mechanisms of automatic indexation in a context of returning inflation and very strong
GDP growth. In simplified terms, the financial resources set free through economic growth and
the  reduction  of  all  pensions  above  the  minimum  in  the  aftermath  of  the  2002  currency
devaluation allowed a rapid expansion of the pension benefit coverage, without exceeding the
proportion of the GDP destined to the pension system during the 1990s, when coverage had been
declining steeply.(See figures 23 and 24) 
With  the  recuperation  of  the  economy  also  the  dependency  of  the  pension  system  on
government transfers started to decrease slightly.(See figure 26)
In 2008, the congress approved a law, presented by the government, which reintroduced an
automatic mechanism of pension benefit indexation. Already years before, the reintroduction of
such a mechanism had been on the agenda of several oppositional parties, and had also been
repeatedly demanded by the supreme court. Expressed in simplified terms, the new mechanism
consists  of  two  components:  the  evolution  of  pension  system  revenue  divided  through  the
number of beneficiaries,  and the evolution of wages.  Whichever  component is lower will be
taken to determine the pension adjustment. This way, pensions are falling behind wages in the
long run, which is supposed to protect  the system against  the financial  effects  of population
ageing.(Página  12  5th of  September  2010,  Arza  2009:  17)  The  indexation  mechanism only
determines pension benefit increases since March 2009. Pensioners who received benefits above
the minimum were not given compensation for the loss of purchasing power between 2002 and
2008, which is why inequalities between benefits did not increase abruptly.(Arza 2009: 17) Yet,
in the long run they can be expected to grow again as new pensioners retire with diverse benefit
levels, and the uniform indexation mechanism will maintain these differences over time. The
government can still  decide to frequently  raise the minimum pension level  stronger  than the
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indexation mechanism would require,  however,  it cannot anymore that easily compensate the
costs of over-proportional increases of the minimum pension with reductions of higher pensions. 
Interestingly,  the fragmented opposition recently converged around a law project to fix the
benefit level of the minimum pension at 82 % of the minimum wage, which would imply an
increase of about 36 %.(El Clarín 12th of October  2010) The project  was approved by both
chambers of the parliament, but immediately vetoed by the president. Overriding the presidential
veto would require the vote of two thirds of the chamber of deputies, which is currently not at the
reach of the supporters of the project.(Página 12 15th of October 2010)
In 2007, by means of law 26.222 and the decrees 22/07, 313/07 and  897/07, the government
introduced several changes to the pension system, aiming at a reinforcement of the role of the
state  in  it.  While  article  1  of  decree  22/07  prolonged  the  validity  of  the  reduced  worker
contribution for  the  capitalisation  scheme until  the  1st  of  January  2008,  article  5  of  decree
313/07 established that new contributors of the private pension scheme had to pay a monthly
contribution of  11 %  already from 28th of  May 2007.  This  way the  government  gradually
reduced incentives  for  workers  to  opt  for  the capitalisation system. The pension reform law
26.222 established various changes to the system that furthermore promoted the affiliation to the
public pension scheme: a) Women aged 50 and older and men aged 55 and older with very low
amounts on their individual pension capitalisation accounts were automatically transferred to the
public  pay-as-you-system50,  b)  new  contributors  of  the  pension  system  were  automatically
registered with the public scheme unless they actively chose otherwise51, c) contributors of the
private scheme obtained the possibility to switch to the public system during 180 days from the
enactment of the law52,  and d) public system benefit entitlements for each year of contribution
after 1994 were increased from 0.85 % to 1.5 % of the average wage of the last 10 years before
retirement.  Also in 2007, after  having been demanded by the trade unions and the Supreme
Court(Página 12 16th of August  2005),  privileged regimes for scientists,  teachers,  judges and
diplomats were reactivated, which implied that these occupational groups switched back into the
public system.(Arza 2009: 13) With the purpose of managing the stocks that had been transferred
from the private pension capitalisation accounts to the public scheme, decree 897/07 established
50 This change lead to the transfer of about 400,000 contributors from the private to the public scheme.(Arza 2009:
32)
51 As mentioned before a big majority of new contributors did not make any choice since 1994. Therefore this
change had considerable influence on the distribution of new pension insurance members between the public and the
private scheme. Camila Arza(2009: 32) estimates that due to this modification the public system would additionaly
receive 700,000 new contributors each year.
52 According to Camila Arza(2009: 32), 900,000 contributors took this opportunity.
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the so called “Guarantee and Sustainability Fund”(Fondo de Guarantía de Sustentabilidad/FGS).
(Arza 2009: 32) 
The additional revenue, resulting from the transfer  of contributors from the private to the
public scheme, became a key resource for financing the expansion of coverage. Not only did the
public system benefit from the increase of their monthly revenue through the new contributors,
but  also  from  the  transfer  of  the  accumulated  capital  from  the  private  accounts,  which
represented about 1 % of the GDP with respect to those who switched, or were transferred, to the
public system as a consequence of the 2007 pension reforms.(Arza 2009: 13)
Short  time  after  the  financial  crisis  of  2008  began  to  globally  affect  pension  funds,  the
government  effected  the  complete  nationalisation  of  the  private  pension  scheme  and  the
reestablishment  of  a  single  public  pay-as-you-go  pension  system.  The  accumulated  private
pension assets, which had reached a value of about 9 % of the GDP, were transferred to the
“Guarantee and Sustainability Fund”.(Arza 2009: 4)
In face of the versatile character of pension policies since 1975, it may be helpful to resume
the central trends with respect to the adaptation of pension policies to the transformations on the
labour  market.  As  has  been  argued  before,  social  insurance  systems  are  usually  prone  to
reproduce the changes on the labour market instead of countervailing them. In Argentina this
would have implied rising inequalities between pension benefit levels and decreasing coverage.
However, the different governments in Argentina since 1975 followed quite different paths after
1975. During the military dictatorship the real values of pensions fell drastically, but at the same
time,  coverage  expanded  enormously  and  also  the  breach  between  minimum  and  average
pension decreased significantly during the last two years  of the dictatorship.  The democratic
government of the “Union Cívica Radical”(UCR) between 1983 and 1989 sustained coverage
rates on a high level and kept inequalities between benefits very low. Therefore, during the first
15 years of labour market deterioration, pension policies successfully countervailed the trends
towards rising inequalities and social exclusion. The  average pension level fell strongly during
the period, but this reflects rather the impoverishment experienced by the society as a whole than
an impoverishment of the pension system in particular. Pension expenditure as a share of the
GDP nearly doubled between 1975 and 1989.(See figure 23) During the following 12 years the
pension  policies  of  the  “Partido  Justicialitsa”(PJ)  and  the  succeeding  coalition  government
between the UCR and the “Frente País Solidario”(FREPASO) reverted these trends and enabled
the reproduction, if not reinforcement, of the persistently deteriorating labour market variables
through the pension system. From 2002 on, governments led by the centre-left wing of the PJ
followed a path comparable to that of the UCR government during the 1980s, although with the
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advantage of a more favourable evolution of the economy. Yet, a central problem is that, despite
the renationalisation of the system, the strict eligibility criteria of the 1993 reform bill remain in
force until today. In contrast, the centrepiece of the so called “Pension Inclusion Plan”, which
enabled  the  rapid  expansion  of  coverage,  was  only  a  transitory  measure  with  two years  of
duration. Taking the persistently high levels of income inequality(see figure 13 in 2.1.) and the
low and unequal affiliation to the pension system among the working population(see figure 27)
into consideration, it is likely that similarly adverse trends as during the 1990s will return if no
lasting institutional changes will be implemented. 
b) Health care policies
Public health expenditure in Argentina as a percentage of the GDP increased during the last
35 years. This has been an international trend, which can be observed in most countries in Latin
America and the OECD.(CEPAL database,  OECD 2010) In  2008, Argentinean public health
expenditure amounted to 5.3 % of the GDP(See figure 28) and was quite similar to that of Brazil
with 4.9 % and Costa Rica with 5.8 %. Chile’s public health expenditure was lower with about
3.4 % of the GDP that year.(CEPAL database)
According  to  OECD(2010)  data  referring to  2008,  public  health  expenditure was 8 % in
Germany,  8.1 % in Austria, and 7% in Italy.  This means European corporatist welfare states
spend a higher share of their GDP on public health care.
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Elaborated by the author. Sources: For social expenditure: Vargas de Flood(2006: 188) for the years 1975 –
1979 and DAGPyPS(2010) for the years 1980 – 2008.  
As was the case with the pension system, the evolution of public health spending alone tells
us  relatively  little  about  whether  health  policies  have  responded  to  the  labour  market
transformation  process  or  not.  Therefore,  we will  start  with  a  short  description of  the  main
characteristics of the system during the mid 1970s. On that basis we can make some theoretical
deliberations about the expectable impacts of labour market deterioration on the health system.
Hence, a mixed analysis of disaggregated spending data and changes in the legal fundaments of
the system will show that governments not only failed to respond to the changes on the labour
market, but even exacerbated their negative impacts through reforms that pursued other aims
than welfare state adaptation. 
Already in the mid 1970s the Argentinean health care system was strongly fragmented and
consisted of a public sector, a semi-public social health insurance sector and a private health
insurance sector. Although access to the public health sector was theoretically free and universal,
it attended mainly those who had no insurance coverage, which means predominantly the poor
population. On the other hand, the public sector also dealt with the major part of chronic and
more  complex  diseases.  The  social  health  insurance  system  consisted  of  around  300  social
insurance funds called “Obras Sociales”(OO.SS.), of which the majority was administrated by
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Figure 28: Evolution of health expenditure as a percentage of the 
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the  trade  union  of  the  respective  occupational  group.  Affiliation  to  the  OO.SS.  became
obligatory for salaried workers in 1970. They were financed through a levy on the wage and
coverage extended to the core family members. Self-employed workers could choose between
relying on the public system, joining one of the social health insurance funds or affiliating to one
of the private insurers. In practice, formal workers and middle class were mainly concentrated in
social  health  insurances,  while  the  upper  class  often  preferred  private  insurers.(Barbeito/Lo
Vuolo 1998: 169, Lloyd-Sherlock 2006: 356) Pensioners had a separate social health insurance
called “National Social Service Institute for Pensioners”(Instituto Nacional de Servicios Sociales
para Jubilados y Pensionados/INSSJyP), which was financed through a mix of wage levies and a
tax on pension benfits.(Lloyd-Sherlock 2006: 359) 
Theoretically, the whole population was covered by the Argentinean health care system, as
the public sector provides coverage in the case of not being insured. However,  between and
within the three types of health care provision there were important inequalities regarding the
access to, and the quality of, health care. 
In  general  terms,  the  mentioned  distribution  of  social  classes  between  the  three  sectors
reflected the quality of the provided health care. Yet, also within each type there were important
inequalities.  So  for  example,  the  public  sector,  although  theoretically  universalistic,  was  in
practice considerably worse in most poor areas.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 180)  
The social health insurance sector in Argentina has been extraordinarily fragmented. There
were around 300 different social health insurance funds with a widely varying quality. Each one
constituted a monopoly in its respective occupational group. As average wages were not equal
between these groups, also the revenues per covered person differed enormously between the
“Obras Sociales”. To countervail these differences in revenue, the “National Institute of Obras
Sociales”(Instituto  Nacional  de  Obras  Sociales/INOS)  was  responsible  for  redistributing  a
certain share of the social health insurance revenue between the different funds. However, the
assignation of resources did not follow clear rules, but has been handled arbitrarily. Under these
circumstances, the distribution of funds ended up being a currency in political negotiations and
did little to mitigate inequalities between social health insurances.(Mera 2010: 105) 
Besides the inequalities, inefficiency plagued the system. For the provision of health services
the “Obras Sociales” usually contracted private sector firms. In face of the virtual absence of
state regulation, this led to the emergence of an oligopoly of private health care providers and
severe  problems  with  corruption.  These  circumstances  resulted  in  a  heavy  curative  bias  in
detriment of prevention, and common problems like over-invoicing, over-medication, and the
application of expensive treatments in situations where they were neither necessary nor aiding.
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Patients were also often demanded co-payments  above those legally established.(Barbeito/Lo
Vuolo 1998: 169/170, Lloyd-Sherlock 2005: 1896, Lloyd-Sherlock 2006: 356/357) 
It  can therefore be said that the system already faced severe problems of inefficiency and
inequity during the mid 1970s. The problems of inefficiency and inequity are closely related to
each other, as most experts agree on that both have a lot do with the fragmented character of the
system.(e.g.  Belmartino 2005a/b, Lloyd-Sherlock 2005, Maceira 2009) The fact that the core
health indicators of Argentina compare very unfavourable to that of several other countries with
similar per capita income that spend significantly less on health care, have to do with both the
bad administration of resources and the inequitable distribution of them.(Maceira 2009: 3) The
deterioration of the labour market could thereby be expected to have at least important impacts
on the distribution of the health care resources between different groups of the society, thereby
aggravating the equity problems of the system. 
For these reasons, the main focus of this chapter will be on how the distribution of resources
within  the  health  sector  has  changed  since  1975,  and  on  how  the  different  governments
responded to the impacts of labour market deterioration on the health care system. 
Four main impacts can be identified: Firstly, a decline of health insurance coverage, mainly
due to rising unemployment and informal employment. Secondly, and as a direct consequence of
the first point, the dependence of an increasing share of the population on public health sector
provision. Thirdly, an increase of inequalities within the health insurance sector, due to the rise
of income inequalities between different occupational groups. And fourth, the rise of regional
disparities as a consequence of the geographically unequal distribution of the impacts of labour
market deterioration.
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Elaborated by the author. Sources: Vargas de Flood(2006: 188) for the years 1975 – 1979 and DAGPyPS(2010)
for the years 1980 – 2008.   
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Figure 29: Social health insurance expenditure vs. public health 
sector expenditure, as percentage of the GDP
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Elaborated by the author. Sources: For mid 1980s: Estimates by Barbeito/Lo Vuolo(1998: 169),  for 1991 and
2001: INDEC national censuses,  for 2004 and 2008: MSN(2010) for the number of persons covered by social
health insurances and Lloyd-Sherlock(2006: 358) for an estimate of persons covered by private health insurances,
For population numbers: INDEC database.
As can be seen in figure 29, public health expenditure was more or less equally distributed
between the public health sector and the social health insurance sector in 1975 and 1976. Social
health insurances provided services for the majority of the population, but the public sector, as
has been mentioned before, provided treatment for more complex and chronic diseases also for
insured  patients.  As  can  be  seen  in  the  same  figure,  the  military  government  changed  this
distribution drastically in favour of social health insurance expenditure. While expenditure on
both sectors  was nearly equal  when the military took over,  public health  sector  expenditure
passed to constitute only 46.4 % of social health insurance expenditure when the junta had to
cede  power  in  1983.  The increase  of  social  health  insurance  expenditure  may partly  be  the
consequence of the 3 % point rise in health insurance contributions legislated shortly before the
military took over. Nevertheless, the government seems to have actively pursued a stronger role
of social health insurances, which may be seen in the fact that expenditure also increased during
years in which wages were indeed falling.(Lo Vuolo/Barbeito 1998: 126, 337, also figures 11
and 29) At the same time, financing for the public health sector was reduced radically through
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Figure 30: Health insurance coverage, in percent of the population
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the transference of the responsibility for parts of the sector to the provincial level without an
equivalent  transfer  of  resources.(Vargas  de  Flood 2006:  148,  Barbeito/Lo  Vuolo 1998:  126)
Furthermore, the military junta introduced fees into the hitherto free public health sector.(Lloyd
Sherlock 2006: 355, Vargas de Flood 2006: 148) The small progress that the anterior democratic
government had made towards a more integrated system were rapidly dismantled. The military
government also attempted to restructure the system of OO.SS., and to lastingly quit trade unions
their control over them, which, however, largely failed.(Vargas de Flood 2006: 148) Overall, the
military  junta  induced  a  strong  expenditure  shift  towards  the  insurance  principle,  which
exacerbated the negative effects of rising unemployment, income inequality and informality.
The  most  important  reform initiative  of  the  succeeding  democratic  government  of  Raúl
Alfonsín  was  the  attempt  to  introduce  a  unified  and  comprehensive  social  health  insurance
system called “Seguro Nacional de Salud”(SNS). In its original version, this project aimed at the
reorganisation and integration of the health sector under the leading role of the state. The public
health sector and the social insurances were supposed to converge into one system, which would
allow to extend an equitable coverage to the whole population.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 130,
172) In face of fierce resistance from the trade unions, the peronist opposition, and the private
health  sector,  this  project  largely  failed.(Mera  2010:  107) Those  parts  of  the project,  which
finally reached legal status, did change relatively little in practice.
In  1988,  the  INOS  was  replaced  by  the  so  called  “National  Health  Insurance
Administration”(Administración  Nacional  del  Seguro  de  Salud/ANSSAL),  which  since  then
controled the so called “Solidarity and Redistribution Fund”(Fondo Solidario de Redistribución)
with  the  purpose  to  countervail  the  unequal  distribution  of  financial  resources  among  the
different social health insurances.(Maceira 2006: 126/127, Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 172) Yet,
despite the replacement of the INOS by a new entity, the redistribution of resources continued to
lack rules, which enabled the use of its resources for political awards more than anything else.
(World Bank 1993: 76) Due to these circumstances, the ANSSAL did in practice not reduce the
increasing  inequalities  within  the  sector  that  resulted  from rising  wage  differences  between
occupational groups.(Lloyd-Sherlock 2006: 357) 
In the context of increasing unemployment and informality the share of the population that
had no insurance coverage, and therefore depended on the public sector, increased.(see figure
29) The economists Alberto Barbeito and Rubén Lo Vuolo(1998: 169) calculated that around
74% of population were covered by social health insurances during the mid 1980s.53 According
53 However, they remind that this number is not exact due to double affiliation and problems with the elimination of
former members from the lists of social insurance institutes.
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to  information  from the  national  census,  63.1  % of  the  population  were  covered  by  health
insurances54 in  1991.  Yet,  as  can  be  seen  in  figure  29,  the  social  insurance  bias  of  health
expenditure has not been significantly reduced during the Alfonsín government,  which hence
implied the increase of existing inequalities.  
In contrast to the 1980s, attempts of health reform during the 1990s were more concerned
with fiscal and non-wage labour costs than with the inequitable and fragmented character of the
system. No steps towards extending health insurance coverage or breaking the divide between
the public health sector and social health insurances were undertaken. The reforms of the public
health sector and  the social health insurance sector were approached separately and did not aim
at the creation of a more integrated system. Also, no significant progress regarding the regulation
of the fragmented system was made.(Alonso 2007: 160, Lloyd-Sherlock 2006: 358)
By  decree  1269  of  July  1992,  the  government  of  Carlos  Menem  advanced  towards  a
complete decentralisation of the public health sector, which since then became mainly provincial
responsibility.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 231) Again, the transfer of fiscal responsibilities to subnational
level  was not combined with an equivalent  transfer  of fiscal resources.  This way,  the public
health sector not only faced new fiscal restrictions as a whole, but the before mentioned regional
inequalities  within the  public  health  sector  were  further  exacerbated.(Cetrángolo/Gatto  2002:
18/19)  
Figure 31 shows that the inequality between the public health sector and the social health
insurance sector,  regarding the assigned resources per covered person, increased significantly
during the 1990s. In reality the health insurance bias is even bigger than the figure indicates, as it
does neither consider (most of)55 private health insurance expenditure, nor does it consider that
spending on the public health sector is partially used for the attention of members of poorer
social health insurances, as well as for more complex treatments for the general public.(Maceira
2009: 3) Therefore,  the breach in the expenditure per  covered person can be assumed to be
somewhat higher than figure 31 already indicates.
54 Includes social health insurances and private health insurances.
55 It only includes private health insurance expenditure that stems from the obligatory contributions in the case of
formal salaried workers. It does neither include private health insurance expenditure of self-employed workers  nor
voluntary extra payments.
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Elaborated by the author. Sources: For social expenditure: Vargas de Flood(2006: 188) for the years 1975 – 1979
and DAGPyPS(2010) for the years 1980 – 2008. For the number of persons covered: INDEC national censuses for
1991 and 2001(discounting number of  persons  covered by private  insurers  according to  Lloyd-Sherlock(2006:
358)) and MSN(2010) for 2004 and 2008. For population numbers: INDEC database.
In 1993, the government introduced, with advisory and financial support of the World Bank,
the  possibility  for  public  hospitals  to  become  largely  self-managed.  The  officially  stated
arguments  for  this  reform  step  were  that  self-management  would  increase  the  hospitals’
management  capacities,  local  participation,  and  the  capacity  to  recover  costs  by  means  of
charging social health insurances for the attention of insured patients. The additional income
created through this was supposed to (mostly) remain in the respective hospitals, so that these
could use them to invest in medical equipment, which hence would make them more attractive
for potentially chargeable customers. However, later evaluations by different scholars, and even
the World Bank itself, found that in practice cost recovery from the treatment of insured patients
was minimal.(Lloyd-Sherlock 2005: 1898) Despite the low impact of the reform, it constituted
an attempt to introduce some kind of market mechanism into the public health sector.
The  centrepiece  of  the  1990s  health  reform  process,  yet,  were  the  attempts  to  introduce
market mechanisms into the social health insurance system.(Alonso 2007: 159)
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Figure 31: Public health sector expenditure per covered person vs 
social health insurance expenditure per covered person, in 2001 
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In  1993, decree 9/93 allowed social  insurance members  for the first  time to switch between
different social health insurances under certain circumstances.  However,  several  years passed
until  this  measure  was effectively implemented.(Alonso 2007:  155) Decree  1141 from 1996
finally established that workers would be able to change social health insurance from the 1st of
January 1997 on. In the following year, decree 504/98 implemented further regulations, which
gave union leaders some influence in the decision about acceptance or decline of requests of
workers who wanted to switch from one insurance to another. The introduction of competition
was restricted to social health insurances, which meant that private insurers remained formally
excluded. 
Despite these limitations, the liberalisation further diminished the already low importance of
redistributive mechanisms in the Argentine health insurance system. Article 7 of decree 504
established  that  after  switching  social  health  insurance,  the  complete  employer  and  worker
contributions had to be transferred to the newly elected insurance. Article 11 defined that the
newly elected social health insurance was only obliged to offer the legislated minimum coverage
56 to workers switching from other insurances. They were therefore not obliged to offer switching
workers  the  same coverage  as  to  their  original  members.  Under  these  circumstances,  social
health insurances were able to offer workers coming from other occupational groups medical
coverage according to the height of their health insurance contributions. This created enormous
incentives to change social health insurance for high income earners in occupational groups with
low average wage. At the same time, low earners had nothing to win. As a consequence of this,
social  health  insurances  of  occupational  groups  with  low  average  wages  lost  their  “best”
contributors, which further increased inequalities between health insurances and income groups.
(Lloyd-Sherlock 2005: 1900) This has to be seen in a context where inequalities between social
health  insurances  had  already  been  enormous.  In  1994,  the  average  monthly  social  health
insurance revenue per beneficiary varied from 5 to 80 Dollars, depending on the occupational
group.(Lloyd-Sherlock 2006: 357)
Although members were formally not allowed to switch to private insurers, many social health
insurances started to contract out their administration to private enterprises, and served thereby
as “forefront” of a gradual process of de facto privatisation in the sector.(Lloyd-Sherlock 2006:
359) According to the newspaper El Clarín(24th of April  2003), most workers who switched
social  health  insurance  between  1998  and  2003  were  over-proportionally  young  and  well
56 The minimum coverage is fixed through the so called “Obligatory Medical Plan”(Plan Médico Obligatorio/PMO),
which had been introduce in 1995.
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earning, and most of them switched to social health insurances that were associated with private
insurers.
In  1998,  the  ANSSAL was  replaced  by  the  so  called  “Superintendencia  de  Servicios  de
Salud”, which was supposed to improve the functioning of the entity as a control mechanism,
instead of being merely a (re-)distributor of funds, which had increasingly become the image of
the  ANSSAL.(Alonso  2000:  23)  Despite  this,  Peter  Lloyd-Sherlock(2005:  1899) asserts  that
accountability and regulation improved  little  through the reforms  of  the 1990s,  and  that  the
fragmentation of the system was rather exacerbated than reduced. 
Besides  the  introduction  of  market  mechanisms,  the  government  pursued  a  reduction  of
employer  contributions. These  were  reduced  from  6  %  to  5  %  in  1995,  which  severely
challenged the financial sustainability of the system.(Lloyd-Sherlock 2006: 358) 
The  same  decree,  on  the  other  hand,  converted  social  health  insurances  with  mixed
administration(trade  union/employer/state),  such as  for  example those for  teachers,  bank and
railway  workers,  into  pure  trade  union  social  health  insurances.  It  also  created  a  so  called
“Obligatory  Medical  Plan”(Plan  Médico  Obligatorio/PMO),  which  required  that  any  social
health insurance would have to cover a certain minimum catalogue of treatments. To secure the
financial viability of the “Obligatory Medical Plan” for social health insurances of occupational
groups with low average wages, the decree guaranteed a certain minimum revenue to all OO.SS.
via the redistribution of funds through the ANSSAL.(Lo Vuolo 1998b 232) This was potentially
putting limits to the rise of inequalities within the social health insurance sector. Yet, the minister
of health himself admitted that the social health insurances were in practice able to flout the
terms of this package.(Lloyd-Sherlock 2006: 359)
In  general  terms,  the trend  towards  liberalising  the health  insurance  sector  constituted an
adaptation to the market  demand of  affluent  clients.(Lo  Vuolo 1998b: 233) In  consequence,
protection  against  health  risks  became increasingly stratified  through  the market,  weakening
thereby the occupational group specific stratification typical for corporatist welfare states. While
before,  redistributive  mechanisms  played  a  limited  role  within  the  health  insurance  of  each
occupational  group,  the reforms  of  the 1990s further  minimized  the  already small  solidarity
component in the system. In this sense, the reforms exacerbated the negative impacts of the steep
increase of income inequalities on the health care system. 
In June 2000, the coalition government under Fernando De la Rúa started a renewed attempt
to  allow the  direct  competition  between  social  health  insurance  funds  and  private  insurers.
However, opposition from the trade unions and social health insurances led to the suspension of
the decree in March 2001.(Alonso 2007: 159) 
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The economic crisis at the turn of the millennium had disastrous impacts on the finances of
the social health insurances. For the reason that contributions to the system are calculated as a
percentage of the wage, the dramatic fall of real wages resulted in an equally dramatic fall of
social health insurance revenue.(See figure 11 in 2.1.) In March 2002, employer contributions to
the health insurance system were raised from 5 % to 6 % again.(La Nación 17 th of November
2002)  Simultaneously,  to  reduce  the  costs  of  the  social  health  insurances,  the  provisional
government  of  Eduardo  Duhalde  replaced  the  “Obligatory  Medical  Plan”  (PMO)  by  an
“Emergency  Obligatory Medical  Plan”,  which contained a revised  and reduced  catalogue of
obligatorily covered treatments and remedies.(La Nación 15th of February 2002) Although new
treatments were incorporated from time to time(Cohen 2009: 60), the validity of the reduced
emergency PMO has been extended through various decrees57  and a law58, so that it is still valid
at the time of writing this text.
During 2002, the government initiated a programme called “REMEDIAR”, which aimed at
providing free access to basic remedies  for the poor population through the nationwide over
6500  so  called  “Centres  for  Primary  Health  Attention”(Centros  de  Atención  Primaria  de
Salud/CAPS). The programme was initially financed through credits from the Inter-American
Development  Bank(IADB).(Tobar  2004:  14)  In  2004,  the  posterior  government  of  Néstor
Kirchner  announced  the  implementation  of  a  so  called  “Federal  Health  Programme”(Plan
Federal de Salud). The programme aspired an improvement of public health sector efficiency by
countervailing the heavy curative bias of the system. Among others this was intended through a
strengthening of the CAPS in the areas of preventive medicine and health problems of lower
complexity.(Cohen 2009: 30)
Figure 31 shows that per covered person expenditure indeed rose quicker for those covered by
the public system than for those covered by the social health insurance system between 2004 and
2008. This led to a slight reduction of the breach. However, the main reason for this was that the
expenditure on the state run social health insurance for pensioners was increased much slower
than the expenditure on the public health sector and the semi-public health insurances for the
economically active population and their families.(DAGPyPS 2010) The same figure shows that
health expenditure per person has generally increased significantly, which can be attributed to a
big part to the economic growth, the recuperation of wages and the reduction of the population
without health insurance coverage. 
57 Decree 2724 (2002), Decree  1210 (2003), Decree 756 (2004) 
58 Law N° 25972 (2004)
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According  to  Cohen(2009:  74),  the  inequalities  between  social  health  insurances  have
decreased since the peak of the crisis in 2001/2002, but at the same time, the inequalities within
the health insurances increased,  as the deregulation allowed them to offer different  coverage
packages to their members according to their income.
Overall, in the aftermath of the economic crisis, health policies have neither continued the line
of the governments of the 1990s, which aggravated the effects of labour market deterioration,
nor did they reverse these policies. The inequity and the inefficient fragmentation have largely
been preserved. 
In  a comparison of Daniel  Maceira(2009:  3),  on the basis of data from the World Health
Organisation  referring  to  the  year  2004,  Argentina  had  the  fourth  highest  per  capita  health
expenditure out of 18 middle-to-high income countries,  while  it  only ranked fourteenth with
regard to child mortality. Although the relatively high child mortality of Argentina can for sure
be related to various factors, Peter Lloyd-Sherlock(2005: 1894) emphasises that the inequity and
inefficiency of the Argentinean health care system contributes significantly to this number.
The general  trend  in  health  policies  since  1975 went  towards  aggravating  the expectable
negative impacts of labour market deterioration. This is especially true for the structural changes
that  have  been  introduced  by  the  military  dictatorship(1976  –  1983)  and  the  neoliberal
governments  of  the 1990s,  namely the priority shift  towards  the insurance  principle and the
reduction of solidarity elements within the insurance system. The decentralisation of the public
health sector has moreover aggravated regional disparities in health care.(Cetrángolo/Gatto 2002:
39) All these changes have to be seen on the background that already the previously existing
system was little prepared for the transformations that hit the Argentinean labour market from
the mid 1970s on. The government of Raúl Alfonsín attempted a progressive reorganisation of
the system, but was not able to implement its project. Since the peak of the economic crisis in
2001/2002, health policies have not undertaken bigger attempts to reform the system.
Health policies can therefore be said not only to have failed to adapt to the changing social
situation, but to have even exacerbated the adverse effects of these changes with regard to health
care.
c) Family policies
The evolution  of  the  Argentinean  labour  market  since  1975 posed  several  challenges  for
family policy reform.  Between  1980 and 2010, female labour market  participation increased
from 27.4 % to 44.9 % of the economically active population.(see figure 15 in 2.1.) At the same
time,  according  to  La  Nación(7th of  December  2003),  the share  of  single  parent  households
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increased from 9.4 % in 1980 to 16.1 % in 1999. These developments induced a rising demand
for the provision of care for children, elderly and disabled persons in order to enable parents to
combine labour market participation with family. The evolution also required reform regarding
labour  market  regulations,  so that  job protection,  income maintenance,  and periods  of  leave
would be more adequate with regard to the compatibility of labour market participation and care
responsibilities. The promotion of gender equality would thereby be a central aspect.
Taking the increasing income inequalities and the deterioration of average wage levels after
1975 into account, family policies were also required to increase redistributive efforts, if having
children was not to become a poverty trigger for households.(see figures 11, 13 and 14 in 2.1.) In
1980, household sizes did not differ significantly between income groups. While households of
the poorest income quintile consisted in average of 3.6 members, the corresponding number was
3.2  for  the  richest  income  quintile.  However,  since  then  numerous  households  became
increasingly concentrated within the lower income groups. In the second semester of 2009, the
average household size was 4.3 for the poorest quintile and only 2.5 for the richest.(SEDLAC
database) According to the 1997 “Social Development Survey”(Siempro 2000: 19) 43.1 % of the
poorest quintile were 14 years old or younger, while this number was only 12.9 % for the richest
quintile. 
Family policies in Argentina mainly consist in cash transfers to families and have arguably
neglected the provision of services, such as child care institutions, which would facilitate the
labour market participation of parents in general, and women in particular. This bias towards
family allowances  in detriment  of  services  is  common to most so called corporatist  welfare
states, and especially strong in the Southern European cases59. 
There are several types of family allowances that aim at supporting the economic well-being
of families.60 All benefits enumerated in footnote 60 had already been introduced before 1975.
(Rofman/Grushka/Chebez 2001: 6) Besides the monthly cash transfers for each child under 18
59 We will later come back to these concepts with a  short description of the corporatist welfare state regime and the
southern European welfare states.
60 According to decree 1388/2010 there currently(10/2010) exist family alowances for: 
- Each child under 18 years,  a monthly payment of 220 Pesos for those who earn up to 2400 Pesos per
month, 166 Pesos for those who earn up to 3600 Pesos, and 111 Pesos for those who earn up to 4800 Pesos
- Each disabled child (without age limit), a monthly payment of 880 Pesos for those who earn up to 2400
Pesos per month, 660 Pesos for those who earn up to 3600 Pesos, and 440 Pesos for those who earn more
- Maternity, replacing the full wage during three months 
- Birth, a single payment of 600 Pesos
- Adoption, a single payment of 3600 Pesos 
- Marriage, a single payment of 900 Pesos 
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years, female workers have the right to 90 days of maternity leave per child, during which the
family allowance system assumes the payment of the former wage. The period can be prolonged
by six  month without wage replacement.  For  the period of  leave,  labour market  regulations
guarantee the possibility of returning into the previous work position.(Rodríguez Enríquez 2007:
29) The family allowance system is financed through a payroll tax on the wage, which is paid by
the employer. Until very recently it applied only to salaried workers and pensioners of the formal
sector.
The insurance-like system was organized in three different  funds for service,  industry and
state workers. Theoretically, the administration of the system was shared between employer and
labour representatives,  but most of the time since its existence it had been intervened by the
state.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 172/173)
Elaborated by the author. Sources: Vargas de Flood(2006: 188) for the years 1975 – 1979 and DAGPyPS(2010) for
the years 1980 – 2008.   
- Pregnancy, a monthly payment of 220 Pesos for those who earn up to 2400 Pesos per month, 166 Pesos for
those who earn up to 3600 Pesos, and 111 Pesos for those who earn up to 4800 Pesos  
- Each child at school, an annual payment of 170 Pesos for those who earn less up to 4800 Pesos a month
- Each disabled child at school, an annual payment of 170 Pesos
1 Euro = 5.52 Pesos / 1 Dollar = 3.95 Pesos (13th of October 2010)
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Figure 32: Evolution of the expenditure on family allowances as a 
percentage of the GDP
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As can be seen  in  figure  32,  the  military government  radically  cut  down expenditure  on
family allowances. While in 1976 expenditure constituted 1.6 % of the GDP, it was only 0.45 %
when the junta lost power in 1983, which resembles a reduction of 72 %. Despite the steep fall of
expenditure, contribution levels remained at 12 % of the wage. It had been quite common in the
history of family allowance funds, that part of their revenue was spent on other areas of social
security or public policy.(Rofman/Grushka/Chebez 2001: 8/9) The reduction of family allowance
expenditure after 1976 can partly be explained through transferences of this kind. Furthermore,
the drastic reduction of wages during the military government reduced the revenue of the family
allowance funds. From 1981 on, the funds also had to pay family allowances of retired state
employees,  which  had  formerly  been  paid  directly  from  the  government’s  budget.  These
measures implied an increase of outgoings, while the funds’ revenue tended to fall.(Barbeito/Lo
Vuolo 1998: 173)
During the democratic government of Raúl Alfonsín, family allowance expenditure stopped
decreasing but did not recuperate the reduction of the preceding period. The level of expenditure
was basically the same when the government was voted out of office in 1989, as it had been
when it  took over  in  1983.(see  figure  32)  In  1985, three  percentage  points  of  the employer
contributions destined to the family allowance funds were permanently transferred to finance the
pension system.(Barbeito/Lo  Vuolo 1998:  162) Considering  that  already  before  money from
these funds had been used for other purposes, and that this measure did not affect the expenditure
shown in figure 32, it seems that the measure was more a consolidation of already informally
applied  transferences  than  anything  new.  According  to  Rubén  Lo  Vuolo  and  Alberto
Barbeito(1998: 174),  the real  value of family allowance benefits fell by approximately 80 %
between 1970 and 1988. 
Under the succeeding government of Carlos Menem, spending recuperated very slightly with
the stabilisation of prices in the early 1990s, but afterwards remained stable on a low level until
the economic collapse of 2001/2002.(see figure 32) In 1991, decree 2284/91 eliminated the three
family allowance funds and unified the administration of family allowances under the control of
the ministry of labour and social security(MTySS).(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 234) With the “National
Employment  Law”(Ley  Nacional  de  Empleo)  of  1991,  further  1.5  %  points  of  employer
contributions  destined to  finance  family allowances  were  permanently transferred  to  another
programme,  the  so called “National  Employment  Fund”(Fondo Nacional  de Empleo),  which
among  others  financed  the  new  unemployment  insurance.  The  reiterated  reductions  of  the
contributions  to  the family allowance  system consolidated  the persistent  deterioration  of  the
value of their benefits.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 234) Yet, also the transference of 1.5 percentage points
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in 1991 was nothing new, but rather consolidated legally what had already been practice since
1985, as the unemployment benefit implemented that year by the Alfonsín government had also
been financed by the family allowance funds.(Chebez/Salvia 2001: 6)
In 1996 several changes to the family allowance system were implemented. Pensioners were
transferred to a separate non-contributory family allowance system. Most of the family benefits
were  graduated  inversely  to  the  wage  level  of  the  respective  recipient.  Wage  earners  with
incomes  above  a  certain  threshold  were  excluded  from  most  family  allowance  benefits.
However, per child61 a certain amount was exempted from the yearly income tax base of those
who had earnings above this threshold. For all other salaried workers of the formal sector, three
benefit  levels  have been  introduced  that  were inversely related  to  the wage level.(Lo  Vuolo
1998b: 234) Despite the progressive graduation of the main family benefits, the core problem of
the system persisted.  It  continued to exclude informal and unemployed  workers62,  and hence
most poor families. According to the “Life Quality Survey”(Encuensta de Calidad de Vida) from
2001, only 31.2 % of all Argentineans under the age of 18 were receiving child allowances that
year, and only 4.7 % of children living in extreme poverty.(Salvador 2007: 24) 
Family allowance expenditure fell again in the aftermath of the deep crisis of 2001/2002, and
began  recently  to  recuperate  slightly  from  2005  on.  In  2009  the  government  of  Christina
Fernández de Kirchner extended child allowance coverage to unemployed and informal workers.
This can be considered as an important  progress.  Yet,  this measure will  be discussed in the
following chapter about social assistance policies, as the government implemented it mainly as
an anti-poverty measure and not as a family policy. The programme replaces anterior assistance
policies and the extension of the family allowance system is restricted to the child allowance
benefits,  which  means,  among  others,  that  most  poor  mothers  continue  without  access  to
maternity leave.
The  availability  of  data  regarding  care  provision  coverage  and  expenditure  is  still  very
limited, at least for the first twenty years of our analysis(1975 – 1995). However, the available
information is sufficient to show the most important trends.
Although two laws previous to 1975 required the provision of child care services from firms
with more than 50 female workers and established rules for the introduction of child care centres
61 6000 Pesos in October 2010, www.afip.gov.ar
62 Unemployed  workers  receiving  unemployment  insurance  benefits  also  received  familiy  allowance  benefits.
Nevertheless, as will be shown in the following chapter, only about 5 % of the unemployed were covered by the
unemployment insurance.
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in municipalities, these laws have not been regulated until today and have therefore not been
applied in practice.(Salvador 2007: 13)
Public child care provision has been largely neglected in Argentina, and there has not been a
significant trend towards improving this situation, as surveys from the mid 1990s and mid 2000s
show. Child care institutions for  children up to two years  are still  today very uncommon in
Argentina.(Salvador 2007: 13) For children aged three and four years public child care coverage
is very low. According to the “Social Development Survey”(Siempro 2000) from 1997, only
18.7 % of all Argentinean children aged three and four attended a public child care institution
that year. This implies that the provision of child care services for 81.3 % of all children at that
age  was provided either  through the market,  mainly private  child  care  institutions  and child
minders, or the family, respectively its social networks. The survey also shows that the public
provision of child care services had a considerable lower coverage for the poorest 20 % of the
population than for the richest 20 %. Yet, the disadvantage in the access to child care provision
experienced by the poor was even much bigger regarding market provided childcare. According
to the survey, 58.4 % percent of the children of the richest income quintile attended a private
child care institution, while the corresponding number was only 6.3 % for the poorest quintile. In
1997, combined public and private child care coverage for children at the age of three and four
was only 22.4 % for the poorest quintile, while it was 49.3 % for the third quintile and 83.7 for
the richest quintile.(Siempro 2000: 41) The average child care coverage(public and private) for
all children aged three and four was 36.4 % in 1997 and increased only very slightly to 39.1 % in
2007.(Salvador 2007: 16, Siempro 2000: 41) The inequalities between income groups regarding
child  care  access  have  not  been  reduced  between  1997  and  2007.(Salvador  2007:  18/19)
According to María Vargas de Flood(2006: 156), coverage for children aged five years and older
increased  significantly  during  the  1990s  due  to  the  introduction  of  an  obligatory  school-
preparatory  kindergarten  year.  The  policies  that  led  to  this  increase  were,  however,  less
concerned about facilitating female labour market participation than about improving the poor
educational indicators of the country. In 2007, the average child care coverage rate for five year
old children was 78.8 %.(Salvador 2007: 16) 
Care for disabled persons and the elderly is partly provided through the health system. Yet,
the quality and the type of the coverage depends decisively on the financial  resources of the
respective  family,  which  implies that  in  lower  income groups the family has to  provide the
biggest part of care work.(Sanchís 2007: 32) 
Also school attendance does not facilitate the combination of work and family too much, as
shifts are usually half day only in public schools, and the access to private all-day schools is
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restricted,  especially for  low income groups.(Salvador 2007:  48)  In  2005, only 5.4 % of  all
pupils attending public primary schools had all-day shifts.(Sanchís 2007: 12)
In the context of a reduced role of the state in this sector, poor households had very little
access to care provision other than their own family or social network. Better off households, in
contrast, were more likely to be able to contract care services from the market. In a society with
extraordinarily high levels of inequality, this led in practice to the quite common paradox that
lower class mothers had to leave their own children while caring for the children(or  elderly
family members) of those who were able to pay for care provision.(Rodríguez Enríquez 2007:
44) In general, the inequity in access to care provision clearly limits poor mother’s ability to
participate in the labour market. This is reflected in their considerably lower rates of economic
activity. In 2006, only about 45 % of the women of the poorest income quintile aged 15 to 64
years  had or were looking for paid work, while the corresponding number was 70 % for the
richest quintile.(Rodríguez Enríquez 2007: 53) This, in turn, aggravated the income situation of
poor households, and created thereby a kind of vicious cycle.
Looking at the period as a whole, it can be said that family policies received very low priority
after  1975.  The reduction  of  family allowance  expenditure,  and hence  of  the  benefit  levels,
during  the  military  government  has  not  been  reversed  by  any  of  the  following  democratic
governments  until  2009.  The  long-standing  deterioration  of  family  allowance  benefit  levels
implied  the virtual  dismantlement  of  a  redistributive  mechanism within the group  of  formal
salaried workers. Not only did this mechanism redistribute resources from childless workers to
those with children, it also redistributed resources from better off families to poorer ones, as the
latter have averagely more children. The progressive graduation of the benefits in 1996 slightly
increased the redistributive character of the system, but the overall amount of resources spent on
it remained very low. If we consider that the process of labour market deterioration after 1975
led  to  a  dramatic  rise  of  income  inequalities,  and  that  bigger  families  were  strongly  over-
represented  among the losers  of  this process,  the reduction of  family allowance  expenditure
clearly aggravated the situation. Also, increasing parts of the society, and in particularly of the
poor, were denied access to family allowances due to the rise of informality and unemployment.
This has changed in late 2009. However,  as has been said before,  the 2009 measure will be
discussed with more detail in the following chapter.
Family policies can also hardly be said to have responded adequately to the increasing female
labour market participation. Paid work and family are still very hard to combine, especially for
poor parents. I have no data about child care coverage for the years prior to 1997, but in that year
coverage was very low and poor families were strongly disadvantaged regarding the access to
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both public and private care provision. Also the access to care provision for disabled or elderly
family members depended strongly on the wealth of the respective family. During the following
ten years, this situation did virtually not improve. In face of the restricted access to child care in
general, and the virtual absence of child care provision for children up to two years in particular,
90 days of maternity leave are far from solving the problem. Furthermore, maternity leave is
only  available  for  salaried  workers  of  the  formal  sector  and  therefore  excludes  most  poor
working women. There have been little attempts to improve and promote the participation of
men  in  child  care.  There  is,  for  example,  still  no  parental  leave  scheme  for  fathers.  The
incompatibility of work and family implies in practice a discrimination against women, as well
as against the poor, who are deprived of an important source of income.
d) Social assistance policies and unemployment protection
In the introduction and in chapter 2.1. I have argued that the expansion of unemployment and
precarious employment has been the main trigger of the rise in poverty rates. Social assistance
and unemployment protection are those social policies, that have the specific purpose to protect
against these social risks. Therefore they occupy a central role in this analyses of welfare state
adaptation. 
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Elaborated by the author. Sources: Vargas de Flood(2006: 188) for the years 1975 – 1979 and DAGPyPS(2010)
for the years 1980 – 2008.   
Figure  33  shows  that  spending  on  social  assistance  and  unemployment  protection  is
significantly lower than the expenditure on pensions or health care.  Taking into account that
poverty has been affecting more than 25 % of the Argentinean population since 1995, and even
over 50 % in 2002(see figure 1 in introduction), and that unemployment between 1995 and 2009
affected in average 13.8 % of the economically active population(see figure 5 in 2.1.), spending
on  social  assistance  and  unemployment  protection  is  very  low.  Between  1975  and  2008,
spending as a share of the GDP rose by approximately 50 %. Yet, the share of poor persons
increased by about 350 %(see figure 1 in introduction) and the share of unemployed persons
increased by 116 %(see figure 5 in 2.1.) during the same period. This shows that the increasing
effort that has been undertaken in unemployment and social assistance policies clearly lacked
behind the rise in poverty and unemployment. The welfare state effort per poor or unemployed
person fell,  despite the overall  spending increase shown in figure  33. On the other  side,  the
increasing share of the GDP directed towards these policies also shows that the governments’
social policies have not completely ignored the evolution of the labour market nor the rise in
poverty. Figure 33 indicates that spending trends in assistance and unemployment policies differ
100
Figure 33: Expenditure on social assistance, employment 
programmes and unemployment insurance as percentage of the 
GDP
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mainly  between  the  military  dictatorship(1976  –  1983)  and  the  democratic  governments
afterwards. 
As has been done in  the chapters  before,  we will  start  with a  short  description of  these
policies during the mid seventies as point of departure.
Historically,  social  assistance policies and unemployment protection have always  been of
residual  character in Argentina.  They were generally little systematic,  weakly organised, and
comparatively little resources were destined to these. Big diversity and high discontinuity have
been common characteristics. Although they have usually been targeted programmes, the group
of  beneficiaries  has  generally  been  defined  very  unclearly,  which  allowed  discretionary
practices.  Income  stability  for  the  working  age  population  was  principally  pursued  through
commitment  for  full  employment,  labour  market  regulation,  centralised  wage  bargaining,
minimum wages and family allowances. From the perspective of this strategy, unemployment
was  seen  as  a  temporal  problem that  could  be  tackled  through  the  regulation  of  severance
payments.  The  counterpart  of  this  approach  was  that  the  Argentinean  welfare  state,  which
expanded from the mid 1940s on, neither comprised an unemployment insurance nor significant
non-contributory cash transfer schemes for unemployed or poor workers. (Barbeito/Lo Vuolo
1998: 179 – 183, Lo Vuolo 1998b: 240)
Between 1975 and 2010 there has been a multitude of tiny social assistance programmes on
different government  levels.  They are all included in the spending data used in this chapter.
However,  it  is  neither  possible nor  would it  make any sense  to describe  each  one of  them.
Therefore,  I  will  focus  on  the  most  important  social  assistance  programmes  that  have  been
implemented since 1975, as well as I will describe the general trends that prevailed in assistance
and unemployment protection policies during these years. There have also been several small
programmes handing out microcredits  and subsidies for small  productive projects.  These are
considered in the spending data but will not be described separately. Housing programmes will
not be analysed here, and neither will the spending on them be considered. The reason for this is
that available spending data is not sufficiently disaggregated to allow me to determine which part
of the spent money served for means of poverty alleviation, and which part was actually directed
towards facilitating middle classes to buy or construct property. The Argentinean economists and
social policy experts Alberto Barbeito and Rubén Lo Vuolo(1998: 174) assert that neither the
subsidised credits of the Banco Hipotecario Nacional, nor the construction programmes of the
National Housing Fund(Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda/FONAVI) responded to the necessities
of the very poor.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 174)
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As can be observed in figure 33, the military government radically cut down expenditure on
social  assistance  and  unemployment  protection.  While the preceding  democratic  government
spent about 1.3 % of the GDP for policies of this kind during 1975, the military junta reduced
spending to only 0.37 % in 1983. Although the official unemployment rate remained relatively
low during  these  years(see  figure  5  in  2.1.),  poverty  levels  were  increasing,  mainly due  to
drastically falling wages.(see figure 1 in introduction and figure 11 in 2.1.)
 After the transition to democracy, the UCR government of Raúl Alfonsín partly recovered
expenditure on social assistance and unemployment protection. At the end of the presidential
term in 1989, expenditure on these policies amounted to about 0.85 % of the GDP, more than
twice as much as in 1983, but still considerably less than during 1975.(see figure 33) Yet, during
these years,  unemployment  increased moderately and poverty skyrocketed from 1986 on.(see
figure 1 in introduction and figure 5 in 2.1.) The by far biggest social assistance programme of
the  1980s  was  the  so  called  “National  Alimentary  Programme”(Plan  Alimentario
Nacional/PAN).  It  was  introduced  in  1984  and  consisted  in  the  monthly  repartition  of
approximately 1 million boxes with food to poor families.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 130, Vargas
de Flood 2006: 151) The programme has been accused of serving clientelistic practices due to
the lack of clear  criteria  and the discretionary selection of beneficiaries.63(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo
1998: 180/181) Although the number of distributed boxes increased from about 900,000(which
came close to cover 100% of the poor population) in 1984 to 1,400,000 in the following years,
the coverage of the poor population declined, due to the sharp in increase in the incidence of
poverty.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 180) As has been the case with most social programmes in
Argentina, expenditure on the PAN was pro-cyclical in the short run.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998:
181) 
In 1985 a kind of unemployment allowance was introduced. The benefit was paid out by the
family allowance funds of the private sector and consisted in the monthly payment of a subsidy
of 70 % of the minimum wage plus family allowance benefits. The receipt of the unemployment
benefit  required  having  been  salaried  worker  in  the  formal  sector  for  at  least  nine  months
previous to the loss of employment. The maximum duration of the benefit was limited to only
four months. The average number of beneficiaries ranged from 56,795 in 1985 to 153,059 in
1989. If we compare these numbers with the numbers of unemployed persons, we see that the
coverage has been very low, but significantly higher than the coverage of the unemployment
insurance implemented by the Menem government in 1991. The benefit covered 9.1 % of the
63 In 2003,  Aldo Neri,  minister  of health  of the Alfonsín  administration,  admitted openly to  the newspaper  La
Nación(15th of June 2003), that clientelism played a certain role in the execution of the programme.
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unemployed in 1986 and 17.1 % in 1989. In 1990 the benefit was eliminated by the Menem
government.(Chebez/Salvia 2001: 6)
Generally, the Alfonsín government increased spending on social assistance policies, but the
increase was clearly insufficient  with regard to the rapidly deteriorating social situation. The
implemented policies focussed on the distribution of goods, and income transfer programmes
only played a subordinated role during the 1980s. 
As has been very common for Argentinean social assistance and unemployment protection
policies, the newly elected peronist(PJ) government under Carlos Menem suspended most of the
programmes of the anterior government in 1989 and tried to replace them by new structures. Yet,
the replacement of the PAN through a programme of so called “Solidarity Vouchers”(Bonos
Solidarios) in the middle of the hyperinflation crisis proved being problematic. In contrast to the
PAN,  the  new  programme  did  not  distribute  food  but  some  kind  of  quasi  monetary  food-
vouchers,  which  rapidly  lost  value  in  the  context  of  hyperinflation.  The  coverage  of  the
programme also resulted being significantly lower than that of the PAN. These two factors may
explain the  initial  reduction  of  social  assistance expenditure  at  the beginning of  the Menem
government.(see  figure  33)  However,  an  important  constant  was  that  the  selection  of  the
beneficiaries continued to be discretionary, providing large spaces for clientelistic mechanisms
and political co-optation strategies.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 237)
From 1991 on, the government of Carlos Menem expanded expenditure on social assistance
and  unemployment  protection  measures.  In  that  year,  the  “National  Employment  Law”(Ley
Nacional de Empleo) created the so called “National  Employment Fund”(Fondo Nacional de
Empleo).  The  fund  was  financed  through  the  reassignation  of  1.5  %  points  of  employer
contributions,  hitherto  destined  to  finance  family  allowances,  and  served  to  finance  the
introduction  of  an  unemployment  insurance  and  several  smaller  transitory  employment  and
training  programmes.  However,  due  to  the  strict  eligibility  criteria,  the  coverage  of  the
unemployed population was minimal and benefits were both extraordinarily low and restricted to
a  short  period.(Lo  Vuolo 1998b:  206/240/241) In  1995 and  2002,  when the average  annual
unemployment  rate  reached  values  of  17.5  %  and  19.7  %  respectively,  spending  on
unemployment insurance only amounted to about 0.2 % of the GDP.(INDEC Database, Vargas
de  Flood  2006:  189)  In  December  of  2002,  156,273  persons  received  benefits  from  the
unemployment  insurance,  while  during that  year  averagely  3,121,966 had been unemployed.
This  means  that  only  around  5  % of  the  unemployed  were  covered  by  the  unemployment
insurance. Furthermore, the average benefit of 190 Pesos in December 2002 can be considered
very low.(INDEC database, MTEySS/SSS 2010: 41)
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Parallel  to  the  introduction  of  a  contributory  unemployment  insurance,  the  government
started in the early 1990s, with the financial and technical support of the several International
Financial  Institutions,  a  multitude of small  and fragmented social  assistance  programmes.  In
1995 there were over 60 different programmes of this kind.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 238) Nevertheless,
they only captured very little resources. In 1995, spending on unemployment insurance, social
assistance and employment programmes constituted together only 0.96 % of the GDP.(DAGPyS
2010) The low proportion of resources spent on these programmes, despite high rates of poverty
and unemployment, can be related to two reasons. First of all, they covered only a very small
part  of the poor as well  as of  the unemployed  population.(see figure 34) And secondly,  the
benefits were very low, meaning that the benefits alone did not even cover the basic alimentary
needs of the recipients, not to mention the general basic needs which include housing and so on.
(see figures 35 and 36) 
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*Numbers are from December of each year for 2005 - 2008 and from September for 2009.
** Numbers are annual averages for 1995 -1997 and from June of each year afterwards.
Elaborated by the author. Sources: For the number of unemployment insurance beneficiaries: own calculations on
the basis of data from Velásquez Pinto(2005: 51) and INDEC database for 1995 – 1997 and MTEySS/SSS(2010: 41)
afterwards. For the number of beneficiaries of workfare programmes: Golbert (2004: 22) for 1995 - 2001 and
MTEySS/SE(2009)  afterwards.  For  the  number  of  beneficiaries  of  the  “Programa  Familias  por  la  Inclusión
Social”: Web page of the Ministry of Social Development,
http://www.desarrollosocial.gov.ar/Planes/PF/resena.asp (15th of November 2010)
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Figure 34: Number of unemployment insurance and social 
assistance beneficiaries
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* The poverty line marks the minimum income necessary to satisfy the basic needs.
Elaborated by the author. Sources: For poverty line: INDEC database for 1996 – 2005 and Leonardo Gasparini64
for 2006 – 2009. For the benefit levels: Bertranou/Paz (2007: 117) for ‘Plan Trabajar’. Decree 565/02 for PJJHD.
Resolutions  MDS  648/06,  MDS  693/07  and  MDS  287/09  for  ‘Programa  Familias  por  la  Inclusión  Social’.
Gasparini/Cruces(2010: 15) for ‘Asignación Universal por Hijo’.
64 Due to the political intervention of the national statistics institute (INDEC), information regarding the poverty
lines  is  not  reliable  anymore  from 2006 on.  Leonardo Gasparini  has  kindly  provided me with  alternative  data
regarding the poverty lines between 2006 and 2009. He is professor of the University La Plata and director of the
CEDLAS institute.
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Figure 35: The benefits of social assistance programmes as % of the poverty line*, for 
a family of two parents(30,30) and three children(5,3,1)
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* The extreme poverty line marks the minimum income necessary to satisfy the basic alimentary needs.
Elaborated by the author. Sources: Same as for figure 35.
So called employment(workfare) programmes became the centrepiece of social  assistance
policies during the 1990s and the early 2000s. Despite their work component, these programmes
were  usually  categorised  as  income  transfer  programmes.(Barbeito/Lo  Vuolo  2003:  10,
Gasparini/Cruces 2010: 13) They consisted in hiring unemployed workers for jobs considered of
public interest. The unemployed received in exchange monthly non-wage payments of typically
no more than 200 Pesos.65 Between 1992 and 1996, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security
implemented over ten such programmes, which, in their majority, had only a duration of up to
two years.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 241) 
The biggest and most famous programmes of this kind were the three consecutive versions of
the so called “Work Programme”(Plan Trabajar), which were co-financed by the World Bank.
The first version of the programme was implemented in late 1995 and consisted in contracting
unemployed workers below the poverty-line for daily 6 hours of municipal work in exchange of
a  monthly  non-wage  payment  of  200  Pesos.  The  receipt  of  the  “benefit”  was  limited  to  a
maximum duration of six month.(Vargas de Flood 2006: 158) During 1997 the annual average
65 During the 1990s the peso was pegged to the dollar, so that 200 pesos equalled 200 dollars. However, due to the
overvaluation of the peso, the purchasing power of 200 pesos was very limited. Hence, these non-wage payments
can be considered very low and constituted only a small fraction of the average wage in the formal sector.
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Figure 36: The benefits of social assistance programmes as % of the extreme poverty 
line*, for a family of two parents(30,30) and three children(5,3,1)
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number of beneficiaries of the “Work Programme” reached its peak with about 103,000. It was
by far the most extensive employment programme during the 1990s, however only covering a
very small proportion of the poor and the unemployed.(Golbert 2004: 22)
Training programmes during the 1990s, where they existed, provided only simple training,
which  is  why  they  did  usually  not  result  in  significant  improvements  of  the  respective
unemployed workers’ labour market situation.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 243)
During  the  PJ  government  of  Carlos  Menem  expenditure  on  social  assistance  and
unemployment protection increased by about 69 %, from 0.85 % in 1989 to 1.44 % of the GDP
in 1999.(see figure 33) Yet, unemployment increased by 86 %(see figure 5 in 2.1.), and although
poverty was lower than during the peak of the hyperinflation crisis in 1989, it was persistently on
the increase in the medium and long run. The novelty of the 1990s was the introduction of
income transfer programmes. However,  the benefits were very low and covered only a small
proportion of the needy, therefore being far from constituting genuine social rights.(See figures
34 – 36)
Under the short coalition government(UCR and FREPASO) of President Fernando De la Rúa
expenditure on social assistance and unemployment protection stagnated despite the increasingly
rapid rise in poverty and unemployment rates.(see figure 1 in introduction and figure 5 in 2.1.)
The government reduced the number of beneficiaries from the inherited “Work Programme” by
over a half. Simultaneously it introduced its own programme with a very similar design, called
“Labour Emergency Programme”(Programa de Emergencia Laboral), which was partly financed
by credits of the IADB and the World Bank.(Golbert 2004: 22, El Clarín 12th of January 2000)
In December of 2001 president De la Rúa had to resign in the middle of a deep economic,
social  and  political  crisis.  Less  than  one  month  later,  in  January  2002,  the  provisional
government of Eduardo Duhalde(PJ) implemented a first version of the so called “Programme
for Unemployed Heads of Houshold”(Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados/PJJHD) as a
response to the dramatic social  and political  consequences  of the crisis66.(Neffa 2009: 67) A
second version of the programme was decreed only a few months later. It consisted in a income
transfer  of 150 Pesos per month, and covered over  2 million families at its peak.(Rodríguez
Enríquez/Reyes 2006: 16/17) The most important difference to anterior non-contributory income
transfer programmes was therefore the relatively high coverage.(See figure 34) The access to the
programme was  means-tested,  requiring  a  situation  of  unemployment  and  poverty from the
beneficiaries, and was only open for households with at least one child under 19 years. In the
66 Over half of the population were affected by poverty and between a quarter and one third were even affected by
extreme poverty.(INDEC database)
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first version the quantity of benefits was limited through a fixed budget. This limitation was later
eliminated by the decree 565/02 as a result of negotiations between the government and various
organisations of the civil society. However, the rules of the programme still excluded important
parts  of  the  poor  population,  namely  those  who had  precarious  work,  received  some other
insufficient benefit, or simply had no child under 19 years of age.  The programme contained
furthermore conditionality, requiring the school attendance of the children, the compliance with
a plan of vaccinations, and the participation of the head of household in a work programme,
which usually consisted in 4 to 6 hours of communal work.(Neffa 2008: 81) 
As the figures 35 and 36 show, the benefit level was set very low. It was even far from being
sufficient to satisfy the basic alimentary needs of an average poor family.(See figure 36) Due to
the fact that the amount has not been adjusted during the following years, its real value has been
reduced significantly through inflation. While in the last quarter of 2002 it covered 19 % of the
poverty line income of the five-member family in figure 35, it passed to cover only 9 % of this
line in the last quarter of 2009.
In  some  municipalities  the  programme  also  offered  training  courses  as  an  alternative  to
communal work, which, however, had very low impact on the beneficiaries’ chances of finding
work in the formal labour market.(Rodríguez Enríquez/Reyes 2006: 20)
In contrast to former social assistance programmes, the PJJHD pretended to establish a social
right for all families that complied with the requisites.(Article 1, Decree 565/02) The explanatory
statement attached to the decree even described the programme as one of universalistic character.
The formulation of the decree clearly showed a big progress with regard to former programmes,
which had been limited to a certain number of benefits, and had therefore not constituted genuine
social rights.  This progress very likely reflects the influence of the organisations of the civil
society in the elaboration process.(Neffa 2008: 180 – 182) However, the social right character of
the programme was rapidly lost. Only one and half month after the start of the programme, an
internal resolution of the ministry of labour and social security closed the inscriptions, which
implied that posterior to the 17th of May 2002 there has been no way of acceding the benefit,
notwithstanding  the  compliance  with  all  requisites.(Pautassi/Rossi/Campos  2003:  7/15)
Therefore, the number of beneficiaries persistently fell from 2003 on. All families that were not
able to present the required documentation before this date were denied access, as well as all
those who entered unemployment or poverty recently after the closure of the inscriptions. The
closure also applied to all those who lost the benefit because they found formal work. This can
be seen as quite problematic due to the fact that in average around 50 % of them lost the newly
found job job again during the first four month. (Rodríguez Enríquez/Reyes 2006: 20) According
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to  Julio  Neffa(2008:  102),  after  the  closure  of  the  inscription  the  government  returned  to
negotiate the awarding of benefits with organisations of the unemployed, called “piqueteros”,
and local politicians, which had to offer political support in exchange. Laura Golbert(2004: 21)
estimated that over 20 % of the benefits were allocated through such kind of clientelistic deals.
Due to the established eligibility criteria, the conditionality, and the closure of all regular ways of
access  to  the programme,  it  was far  from reaching  the self-proclaimed goal  of  universality.
According  to a  study of  Monza y Giancometti(2003),  quoted through Neffa(2008:  100),  the
programme only reached about 25 % of all poor households in 2002, and was also far from
covering all unemployed heads of household. Furthermore, the benefit level of the programme
was set so low that it  hardly affected the poverty and extreme poverty rates. The permanent
household  survey(Encuesta  Permanente  de  Hogares/EPH)  from  October  2002  contained  a
special section for the measurement of the programme’s impact on poverty and extreme poverty.
The CELS Institute estimated on the basis of this survey that poverty still affected 57.5 % of the
population after the cash transfers of the programme, while it would have affected only 0.6 %
percent of the population more without these transfers. The impact on extreme poverty, defined
as  the inability  to  cover  the  basic  alimentary needs  with the household’s  income,  has  been
slightly  bigger,  but  still  not  very impressing.  The  cash  transfers  implied  a  reduction  of  the
extreme poverty rate from 30.5 % to 27.5 % of the population.(Pautassi/Rossi/Campos 2003:
31/32)  However,  the  impact  of  the  programme  on  the  official  unemployment  statistics  was
enormous, as beneficiaries of the plan were not considered unemployed anymore.
Parallel to the PJJHD, the government introduced the so called “National Alimentary Security
Programme”(Plan Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria), which consisted mainly in the provision
of food for extremely vulnerable groups.(Vargas de Flood 2006: 167/168) Another programme
introduced during 2002 was the “Income for Human Development”(Ingreso para el Desarrollo
Humano/IDH), which had a design comparable to that of the PJJHD, yet not requiring communal
work. The programme was furthermore stronger targeted and the number of beneficiaries did
only reach  about  200,000.(Cruces/Epele/Guardia  2008:  22)  Like  most  of  the  targeted  social
assistance programmes, also this one received financing from one of the International Financial
Institutions, namely from the IADB.(Marchionni/Conconi 2008: 213)
In 2004 the government decided the implementation of the so called “Programme for the
Social  Inclusion  of  Families”(Programa  Familias  por  la  Inclusión  Social).  According  to  the
ministry of labour(www.trabajo.gov.ar,  23rd of  September 2010) it  received financial  support
from the IADB. The programme had a similar design to that of “Bolsa Escolar” in Brazil or
“Oportunidades” in Mexico.  Access  was restricted to  women with children younger  than 19
110
years who had formerly been receiving the PJJHD or the “Income for Human Development”
benefit.  The  programme contained conditionality similar  to  that  of  the PJJHD, however  not
requiring  the participation in  work programmes.(Zaga  Szenker 2009: 4/11)  The idea  was  to
separate those beneficiaries of the PJJHD who were considered “employable” from those who
were considered not employable due to child care responsibilities.(Campos/Faur/Pautassi 2007:
21) Despite the obvious advantage for the beneficiaries of not having to participate several hours
a day in municipal  work,  the approach can clearly be marked discriminatory from a gender
perspective. Instead of enabling women to work through the provision of accessible child care
facilities and a strengthening of the fathers’ responsibilities for child care, mothers were simply
classified “unemployable”.(Rodríguez Enríquez/Reyes 2006: 28) The established benefits were
comparable to those of the PJJHD, yet, they depended on the number of children. A family with
two children received 125 pesos per month, families with three children 150, and so on. The
maximum benefit was 200 pesos for families with five children or more.(Art. 10, Resolución
MDS 825/05)67
In  2006  the  government  implemented  a  training  programme  called  “Employment  and
Training Insurance”(Seguro de Capacitación y Empleo/SCyE), which was supposed to attract the
beneficiaries  of  the PJJHD with the supposedly best  employability.  The programme had not
much to do with an insurance, and access was only open for recipients of the PJJHD. The aim
was  to  offer  improved  training  to  those  with  chances  of  formal  labour  market  integration.
However, as the receipt of the benefit was restricted to a maximum of two years, only very few
persons switched from the PJJHD to the SCyE.(Rodríguez Enríquez/Reyes 2006: 28/29)
After having been demanded for several years by different organisations of the civil society,
politicians and academics, the government decided in 2009 to extend the child allowance system
to  children  of  informal  and  unemployed  workers.  In  October  2009  a  governmental  decree
amended the family allowance law for this purpose. The initiative was called “Universal Child
Allowance”(Asignación Universal por Hijo/AUH), although it continued to exclude formal self-
employed workers and high earners. Theoretically, informal workers were not allowed to earn
more than the minimum wage if they wanted to receive the benefit, yet, this was hardly possible
to control. The benefit level established was the same as the child benefit for formal workers of
the  lowest  income  group68,  which  was  180  Pesos  per  month  and  child  at  that  moment.
67 The benefit was increased by 50 pesos on the 1st of March 2006 through Resolución MDS 648/06, maintaining the
steps of 25 pesos extra per child up to 5 children. Resolución MDS 693/07 increased the benefit on the 1 st of March
2007 by 5 Pesos, also increasing the extra for each child from 25 to 30 Pesos. The extra for each child was again
increased, this time to 45 Pesos, on the 1st of March 2009 through Resolución MDS 287/09.
68 See next chapter for an explanation of child allowances and income groups.
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(Gasparini/Cruces 2010: 15/16) On the 1st of September 2010 the benefit was increased to 220
pesos.(El Clarín 28th of July 2010) The receipt of part of the benefit was tied to the conditionality
that the children attended school and complied with a plan of vaccinations.(Gasparini/Cruces
2010: 15/16) The inscription to the programme was not compatible with other social assistance
and workfare programmes, which is why it basically replaced former programmes such as the
PJJHD and the  “Programme  for  the  Social  Inclusion  of  Families”.  It  can  be  considered  an
enormous  progress  in  two  senses.  Firstly,  the  coverage  is  significantly  higher  than  that  of
anterior social assistance programmes. And secondly, it is the first time that a social assistance
policy in Argentina establishes a genuine right. The access to the benefit is for the first time open
to all families that fulfil the legally establishes requirements, without any temporal restriction for
the  inscription  or  limitations  of  the  total  number  of  benefits.  As  Leonardo  Gasparini  and
Guillermo  Cruces(2010:  36)  point  out,  this  restricts  the  possibility  to  arbitrarily  select  the
beneficiaries and to award the benefits in exchange for political support. The benefit level is
higher  compared  to  earlier  assistance  programmes,  although  only  for  families  with  several
children.(See figures 35 and 36)
On the other hand, the programme still excludes poor households without children under 19
years, which cannot apply for hardly any of the numerous social assistance programmes. 
It can also be argued that child allowances are in reality a family policy, no matter who receives
them,  and  should  therefore  not  replace  social  assistance  programmes  that  are  particularly
targeted at the poor population. So for example, already in 2001 the “National Front against
Poverty”(Frente Nacional contra la Pobreza/ FRENAPO), an alliance of various civil society
associations including one of the two big trade union confederations, proposed to combine the
introduction of a universal child allowance with that of an unemployment benefit.(Golbert 2004:
24)
The  expansion  of  child  allowance  coverage  was  financed  through  the  interests  of  the
nationalised assets from the hitherto private pension scheme. This has been criticised, as the fund
was originally supposed to secure the long-term financial sustainability of the pension system. In
a context of high inflation the interests are necessary to maintain the real value of the fund,
which means that the use of these for the financing of other programmes reduces the real value
of the assets. Therefore, in the long run, the programme is financed to a big part through the
pension system contributions. Yet, this leads to the situation that high income earners are largely
exempted  from the  financing  of  the  programme  due  to  the  contribution  assessment  ceiling.
(Gasparini/Cruces 2010: 36/37)
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Also  in  2009,  the  government  starts  a  programme  called  “Argentina  Works”(Argentina
Trabaja),  which provides jobs in “cooperatives”69 with a wage of approximately 1300 Pesos.
(Página  12 4th of  November  2009)  The “benefit”70 level  constitutes  a  progress  compared  to
former workfare programmes, as it is significantly higher and includes the affiliation to a social
health insurance. The number of benefits was limited to approximately 100,000 , which means
that the government was able to decide who received one of those benefits and who did not. The
criteria for the selection of beneficiaries have not been clearly stated in the resolution of the
ministry of social development that gave birth to the programme.(Resolution MDS N° 3182/09)
In contrast to the Universal Child Allowance, the programme was therefore far from constituting
a social right and provided plenty of margin for clientelistic practices. Furthermore, like it was
the case with earlier workfare programmes,  the work done by the beneficiaries is potentially
work that would have to be done anyway, which means that it is possible that the programme
replaces decent jobs, which would at least require the payment of the minimum wage.(LoVuolo
2010: 7/8/12)
Since  the  economic  crisis  at  the  turn  of  the  millennium  a  multitude  of  different  social
assistance and unemployment protection measures have been implemented. Between 2001 and
2003 the expenditure on these kind of policies was increased by 68 %, from 1.46 % to 2.46 % of
the GDP.(See figure 33) Yet, it must be considered that 2002 and 2003 were the years with the
strongest social impacts of the economic crisis. Unemployment climbed to a maximum of 21.5
%  in  May  2002(INDEC  database)  and  poverty  skyrocketed,  affecting  57.5  %
(Pautassi/Rossi/Campos 2003: 31/32) of the population in October of that year.  These levels
decreased  during  the  following  years  and  also  expenditure  on  social  assistance  and
unemployment protection as a share of the GDP fell  by 22 % between 2003 and 2008. The
relative expenditure decrease reflects the fact, that despite the introduction of new programmes
such as the “Programme for the Social Inclusion of Families” and the so called “Employment
and  Training  Insurance”,  the  total  number  of  beneficiaries  fell,  as  the  access  to  these  new
programmes was virtually always restricted to the beneficiaries of the programmes initiated in
2002. Unfortunately, consolidated spending data for 2009 and 2010 is still not available. Yet, it
is assumable that the extension of the child allowance system and the implementation of the
workfare programme “Argentina Works” significantly pushed expenditure upwards. This time,
69 According to Rubén Lo Vuolo(2010) they have little in common with “real“ cooperatives. They rather seem to be
small state run firms.
70 I put the word benefit between inverted comma because it could also be considered a wage instead of a benefit.
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and in  contrast  to  2002/2003,  the  rise  of  expenditure  would not  be in  the  context  of  rising
poverty and unemployment, but in the context of improving socioeconomic variables. 
If  we  observe  the  figures  34  to  36,  we  see  that  the  governments  before  the  currency
devaluation  in  2002  pursued  a  quite  different  strategy  with  regard  to  income  transfer
programmes than those afterwards. While before coverage was extremely low and benefits came
at least close to cover the basic alimentary needs of a poor family, these kind of programmes
became mass  programmes  after  the currency  devaluation,  but  with  importantly  reduced  real
benefit  levels.  This  contrast  shows some similarities  to what  has  been found with regard  to
pension policies. Also pension coverage has been extended importantly in the new millennium,
while benefit levels were kept relatively low if we consider that wages increased far stronger. 
Looking  at  the  whole  period  between  1975  and  2010  we  can  identify  several  patterns.
Expenditure on social assistance and unemployment protection radically decreased during the
military  junta,  and  increased  more  or  less  steadily  during  the  democratic  governments
afterwards. While the hyperinflation crisis and the government change in 1989 led temporarily to
a  fall  of  expenditure  on  these  areas,  the  opposite  happened  with  the  peak  of  the  crisis  in
2001/2002. From the early 1990s on, we can observe a shift away from the repartition of goods
towards  income  transfer  programmes,  which  later  became  the  dominant  type  of  assistance
policy. The increase in expenditure neither correlates neatly with the rise of unemployment nor
with that of poverty. This does not mean that there is no relation. It is even very likely that there
is  one,  but  it  shows  that  this  relation  is  conditioned  by  other  factors.  The  democratic
governments, at least on national level, pursued similarly to what we have observed with regard
to the pension system strategies of comparatively high coverage and low value benefits during
the 1980s and 2000s,  while the governments of the 1990s awarded averagely higher  benefit
levels,  but  at  a  significantly  lower  scale.  Interesting  is  also,  that  International  Financial
Institutions  have  virtually  always  played  an  important  role  as  adviser  and  financier  in  the
implementation of targeted social assistance programmes. In assistance policies, the participation
of these institutions has continued during the 2000s, at least during the first half of the decade,
while in health and pension policies their role was reduced. The IADB and the World Bank were
the  two  institutions  with  the  strongest  presence  in  Argentinean  social  assistance  and
unemployment  protection  programmes.  Striking  is  that  all  governments  during  the  observed
period avoided the introduction of genuine social rights to social assistance or unemployment
protection. Only in 2009 the extension of child allowances to the families of unemployed and
informal workers can be seen as a guaranteed right. As has been mentioned, this measure can
certainly also be categorised as family policy, but it has explicitly been introduced with social
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assistance purposes and also replaced other assistance programmes. Nevertheless, it can be said
that  it  is  the  first  programme  that  breaks  with  the  extremely  volatile,  fragmented  and
discretionary character of preceding programmes. 
All these patterns require closer political analyses from both a theoretical as well as an empirical
perspective. For this reason we will come back to these patterns in the following chapters. 
At the beginning of this chapter I have argued on the basis of the spending data that social
assistance and unemployment protection policies did not adapt adequately to the labour market
changes, as the spending increase lacked significantly behind the magnitude of the increases in
poverty  and  unemployment.  Roughly  estimating  the  social  assistance  and  unemployment
protection expenditure for 2010, including the “Universal Child Allowance” and the “Argentina
Works” programme, it seems that the downward trend between 2003 and 2008(see figure 33) has
been reversed and that expenditure as a share of the GDP is today significantly higher than in
2002/2003. This constitutes a real improvement, as the rise in expenditure takes place for the
first time since 1975 in a context of improving socio-economic and labour market variables. Yet,
these  variables  are  still  considerably  worse  than  they  had  been  in  1975.  The  implemented
measures  are still  too weak to effectively protect  the population in situations of poverty and
unemployment. The benefit levels of the big majority of the programmes are not even sufficient
to cover the basic alimentary needs of the beneficiaries, not to mention their general basic needs.
Moreover, the programmes continue to exclude important parts of the poor and/or unemployed
population, namely those without children under 19 years, or those who for some reason cannot,
or do not want to, comply with the conditionalities. Considering that unemployment and poverty
have been massive problems in Argentina for decades now, the adaptation of social assistance
and unemployment protection policies has been advancing very slow, and the way to go is still
long.  
2.3 Welfare state regime and welfare state adaptation in Argentina:
an institutionalist perspective
The most commonly used categorisation of welfare state regimes today is that developed by
Esping-Andersen in his renown study from 1990.71 He distinguishes between so called social
democratic/socialist  welfare states,  corporatist/conservative welfare  states,  and liberal  welfare
states. 
71 Which shows many similarities with that developed decades earlier by Richard Titmuss.
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His categorisation centrally bases on two aspects: institutional aspects and political aspects. In
this chapter I will focus on the former and its implications for welfare state adaptation. The latter
will receive particular attention in my discussion of the theoretical framework for the analysis of
the politics behind welfare state adaptation failure,  as well  as in a successive chapter,  which
deals with the historical legacy of the Argentinean welfare state. 
In  Esping-Andersen’s(1990)  study  the  institutional  aspects  of  the  welfare  state  served  to
identify three welfare state clusters. Within each of these clusters, welfare states show strong
institutional  similarities  to  each  other.  Three  variables  have  been  used  to  identify  these
similarities within, respectively the differences between, the three clusters. 
The first variable is the degree of so called de-commodification provided by the respective
welfare state. This variable refers to the degree to which the welfare state entitles to a decent and
culturally  acceptable  living  standard  without  participating  in  the  labour  market.  Or  in  other
words,  the degree of labour market  independence provided by the welfare  state.  Based on a
comparison of 18 countries, Esping-Andersen concludes that liberal welfare states are little de-
commodifying,  conservative/corporatist  welfare  states  offer  medium  to  high  de-
commodification,  and  social  democratic/socialist  welfare  states  de-commodify  strongest.
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 35 – 54) 
The  second  variable  is  concerned  with  social  stratification.  Welfare  states  do  not  treat
everybody the same way, and hence change or consolidate lines of stratification existent in the
society.  With  this  regard,  the  author  found  in  his  study,  that  liberal  welfare  states  largely
reproduce the social stratification created through the market, conservative/corporatist welfare
states  reinforce  stratification  along  the  lines  of  occupational  groups,  and  social
democratic/socialist welfare states tend to be relatively universalistic.(Esping-Andersen 1990: 55
- 78)  
The third variable refers to the way in which the state, the market and the family participate in
the provision of social protection. Liberal welfare states show an important degree of private
sector participation in the provision of welfare through, for example, private pension or health
insurance funds. Also child and elderly care is largely provided through the market. Yet, the
market does not provide anything for free, and the market is not providing services in regions
where demand is weak and investment returns are meagre. Therefore, welfare provision, besides
the  market  and  the  state,  relies  to  an  important  degree  on  the  family,  not  only  due  to  the
inequities in the access to market provided care, but also because income maintenance schemes
are weak for low earners in most liberal welfare states. Corporatist/conservative welfare states
mainly provide public or semi-public income maintenance and health provision schemes based
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on the principle of social insurance. The role of the state is thereby relatively dominant. On the
other  hand,  most  exponents  of  this  regime   promote  the  assumption  of  important  welfare
functions, such as care for children and the elderly, through the family, and in particular through
unpaid female work, which is reflected in relatively low female labour market participation in
these countries.72 In consequence, the welfare of large parts of the society de-facto depends on
the family, as children and elderly depend on the care of unpaid family members, mostly women,
and the latter depend on the income provided through the usually male breadwinner.73 In Social
democratic/socialist welfare state regimes the state plays the central role in welfare provision,
also providing welfare functions that are partly left to the family and the market in the other two
models, such as child and elderly care.(Esping-Andersen 1990: 79 – 104, Esping-Andersen 1999:
32 - 72)  
The welfare state regime debate is of importance for our analysis of the failure of welfare
state  adaptation  in  Argentina,  as  several  authors  found(e.g.  Bonoli  2006:  24-  26,
Tepe/Vanhuysse  2010:  230)  that  welfare  state  adaptation  processes  have  not  been  equally
successful  in  all  three  welfare  state  types.  These  authors  found  that  so  called  social
democratic/socialist welfare states adapt easier to new circumstances than the other two. 
Different reasons for this have been identified, which can again be divided in two groups:
those which refer to institutional aspects and those which refer to political aspects. 
Focussing on the institutional characteristics with regard to the three above described variables,
the Argentinean welfare state of the mid 1970s showed important similarities with the so called
conservative/corporatist welfare state model. The fragmentation of the social insurance system
along  the  lines  of  occupational  groups  was  extraordinarily  strong,  and  also  the
state/market/family divide in welfare provision came impressively close to that of the ideal type
of the conservatice/corporatist welfare state regime. However, regarding the de-commodification
variable the Argentinean welfare state deviated from the coporatist/conservative ideal type.  It
would have scored significantly lower on Esping-Andersen’s de-commodification chart than the
rest of the corporatist/conservative welfare states in his study. This can be related to mainly three
reasons: The inexistence of an unemployment insurance, the lack of non-contributory income
maintenance  programmes,  and  the  limited  coverage  of  social  insurance  schemes  due  to  the
importantly bigger size of the informal economy. 
In practice, these characteristics created a strong insider/outsider divide between all those who
worked in the formal sector and those who were unemployed or worked in the informal sector.
72 France can be considered an exception as it provides ample public child care provision.
73 Of course there are families with a female breadwinner and a male carer, but this is still not very common. 
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For  this  reason,  Armando  Barrientos(2008,  2009)  proposed  to  characterise  the  Argentinean
welfare  state  of  the  mid  1970s  as  an  “informal-corporatist  welfare  state”.  Also  the
characterisation of a southern European welfare state type by Maurizio Ferrera(1996), apart of
directing  attention  to  some  interesting  political  aspects  to  which  we  will  come  back  later,
emphasises that the insider/outsider divide, and hence the resulting lower de-commodification
capacity,  distinguishes  the  southern  European  welfare  states  from  their  northern  corporatist
neighbours. Therefore, both notions, “a southern (variant of the corporatist/conservative) welfare
state  regime”  or  an  “informal-corporatist  welfare  state  regime”,  seem  to  be  quite  accurate
categories for the Argentinean model.
Well  then,  what  has  the  institutional  affinity of  the Argentinean  welfare  state  with these
welfare state regime types to do with welfare state adaptation failure? 
First of all, the existence of the insider/outsider divide, typical for this welfare state regime,
suggests that the Argentinean welfare state of the mid 1970s contained problematic black spots.
Unemployed and informal workers were not protected through the welfare state. This problem
might have been considered a minor issue back then, as the groups that fell through the cracks
were relatively small compared to today. Yet, they existed, and they began to grow rapidly from
the  mid  1970s  on. The  inexistence  of  unemployment  insurance  and  non-contributory
programmes that  would guarantee the right  to a minimum income outside the labour market
implied that the welfare state virtually only provided some independence from the labour market
for pensioners. This had important impacts on how the Argentinean welfare state responded to
the profound changes on the labour market. 
Social  democratic/socialist  regimes,  or  even liberal  and conservative regimes  that  possess
contributory and non-contributory unemployment protection schemes, would have automatically
adjusted  social  expenditure  to  a  certain  degree,  as  rising  numbers  of  unemployed  persons
translated  into  a  rising  number  of  unemployment  benefits,  and  hence  led  to  rising  social
expenditure  for  unemployment  protection.  The  provision  of  a  labour  market  independent
minimum income also affects the labour market, as it prevents wages from falling below the line
of income guaranteed by the state. The fact that most welfare states rely on progressive taxation
for  the  financing  of  these  programmes,  also  implies  that  social  expenditure  becomes  more
progressive when expenditure shifts towards unemployment benefits, especially if these are non-
contributory. 
So for example in Sweden, expenditure on unemployment protection as a share of the GDP
increased by 156 % between 1990 and 1995 due to the rise of unemployment rates in the context
of  economic  recession.(OECD  database,  ILO  database)  Also  in  Germany,  a
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conservative/corporatist welfare state with an unemployment insurance and a means-tested non-
contributory minimum income scheme, expenditure on unemployment protection as a share of
the  GDP  rose  by  88  %  due  to  the  rise  in  unemployment  between  1990  and  1995.(OECD
database,  ILO  database)  Even  under  the  neoconservative  government  of  Margaret  Thatcher,
which was very critical  of  the provision of  unemployment  benefits  as  it  assumed that  these
would impede market forces from fixing adequate wage levels, expenditure for unemployment
protection  rose  by  67  %  between  1980  and  1985  as  a  response  to  the  increase  in  the
unemployment rate from 6.9 % to 11.4 %.(OECD database, UK Office for National Statistics
database) 
In  none of  these cases  increased spending on unemployment  protection can be related  to
active policymaking. In all three of them, the increase of social expenditure was a direct and
immediate result of the automatic response of inherited social  policy institutions, namely the
right to unemployment benefits and a certain minimum income. In Argentina in contrast, the low
degree of de-commodification, and in particular the lack of unemployment protection, implied
that the welfare state did hardly provide any alternative source of income to the labour market.
Hence, when the labour market ceased to be a source of (sufficient) income for growing parts of
the society,  these basically fell into a situation of no or extraordinarily low income, in other
words  poverty.  No  automatic  response  of  the  existing  welfare  state  institutions  to  the
deterioration of the labour market situation was to be expected, and hence, active social policy
reform was required. But as we will attempt to explain in the following chapters, Argentinean
politics failed to deliver the urgently required responses. 
The strong social  insurance  bias,  typical  for  the informal-corporatist  regime,  implied that
increasingly unequal incomes in the labour market were reproduced on the benefit side, due to
the  linkage  between  contributions  and  benefits.  The  stratification  along  occupational  lines,
especially  regarding  social  health  insurances,  implied  that  with  rising  income  inequalities
between different occupational groups74 also health care provision quality increasingly diverged
between these groups. Furthermore, the contribution-benefit nexus excluded increasing parts of
the population from entitlements to  social  insurance  benefits.  This  means  that  also  the core
institutions  of  the  Argentinean  welfare  state,  pension  and  health  insurance,  required  active
reform if they were supposed to adapt to the changes that hit the underlying society. In contrast,
social democratic/socialist welfare regimes, that provide a big proportion of their benefits and
services  on  a  universalistic  basis,  require  far  less  adaptation,  as  their  benefits  are  usually
74 So for example have industrial and construction workers seen their incomes drastically reduced since the mid
1970s, while this is not the case, at least not to the same extent, for occupations that demand high educational levels.
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relatively flat and independent of the work history of the recipient. Regarding pension insurance,
Argentinean governments of the 1980s and the new millennium found temporary solutions, but,
however, did not implement lasting institutional changes for the future. With regard to health
insurance adaptation, politics failed entirely. 
The  reforms  of  the  1990s,  as  for  example  Armando  Barrientos(2008,  2009),  Rubén  Lo
Vuolo(1998a/b) and Evelyne Huber(1996) have argued, were inspired by neoliberal ideas and
headed towards reforming the welfare state along the lines of the liberal welfare state regime.
Although the reform process was able to complete this transformation in Argentina, welfare state
stratification, especially regarding health care and pensions, shifted its point of orientation from
the lines of occupational groups to the lines of income groups. The liberalisation of the social
health  insurance  sector  has  thereby  reduced  the  solidarity  factor  that  existed  within  each
occupational group. 
Armando Barrientos(2008: 141 – 146, 2009: 91 – 94) argued that the Argentinean welfare
state broke with its corporatist-informal path during the 1990s and became a liberal-informal
welfare state. It is certain that the institutional characteristics of the welfare state shifted towards
a more liberal design, however, as I will argue in the following chapters, the politics associated
with the Argentinean welfare regime remained largely in tact, and also the institutional shift was
incomplete. Furthermore, one of the key components of neoliberal welfare state reform during
the 1990s,  namely the partial  pension system privatisation,  has  been  completely reversed  in
2008. For these reasons I opine that Argentina is still today a corporatist-informal welfare state.
Another typical feature of the informal-corporatist respectively southern welfare state is the
bias towards income transfers in family policies, and the low importance that it ascribes to the
public  provision  of  daycare.  Also  this  feature  would  have  required  active  reform  if  the
Argentinean welfare state was to respond to the increasing female labour market participation. 
In  general,  it  can  be  said  that  the  institutional  arrangements  common  to  most
conservative/corporatist  welfare  states,  and  in  particular  those  common  to  the  corporatist-
informal  or  southern  welfare  states,  are  little  flexible  with  regard  to  labour  market
transformations such as they occurred in Argentina. While the social democratic/socialist model
adapts to a certain extent automatically to these changes, the corporatist-informal model requires
active, and most likely profound, welfare state reform to be able to respond adequately to these
changes. Yet, this requires political will and can be politically, as well as economically, costly. 
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3 POLITICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE STATE
ADAPTATION FAILURE
I  have  dedicated  a  fairly  important  part  of  this  work  to  the  analysis  of  the  nature  of
Argentinean labour market transformation and social policy reform after 1975. This is today not
very common in political science social policy analysis, which often focuses quasi exclusively
on politically explaining social policy. However, welfare state adaptation failure, which is what
this text attempts to explain, constitutes in itself a hypothesis. I have done my best to combine a
wide  range  of  labour  market  and  social  policy data  that  comprise  the last  35 years  to  give
evidence for this hypothesis. To put the picture together I have drawn on the work of political
scientists, sociologists, economists, historians and legal scholars, as well as on a wide array of
statistics from different sources, on newspapers and legal texts. Other scholars might interpret
the same data I used differently, or even put other aspects in the foreground. Well, that is social
science! This is one reason why I considered it appropriate to dedicate some space to discuss the
nature of welfare state adaptation failure.  
Moreover,  the evidence brought  forward  allows to identify medium and long term social
policy patterns in the four analysed areas. The relatively long period of study and the knowledge
about these patterns makes it possible to add a multivariate longitudinal comparative component
to  the political  analyses  of  this  text.  The case  study design  of  the present  work offers  little
possibility to reasonably apply quantitative statistical methods, which is why these comparisons
will be essentially of qualitative nature. Qualitative multivariate longitudinal comparison sounds
horribly complicated, but is actually nothing more than a cumbersome scientific description for
an undertaking that is, in principle, of limited complexity in this case. This undertaking basically
consists in looking for correlations between the social policy patterns that are relevant for our
hypothesis of welfare state adaptation failure on the one side, which constitutes a disaggregation
of our dependent variable, and possible explanatory factors, such as institutional transformations,
changes in the power relations etc. on the other side, which constitute our candidates for the
independent or explanatory variables.  Already in the description of social  policy reform after
1975  some  correlations  have  been  alluded.  So,  for  example,  that  the  military  dictatorship
coincided  with  a  reduction  in  social  assistance  expenditure,  while  during  democracy  social
assistance expenditure rose, or that the less neoliberal governments during the 1980s and the
2000s,  expanded  pension  coverage  and  maintained  benefit  level  inequalities  low,  while  the
121
strongly neoliberal influenced governments of the 1990s reduced coverage and induced rising
inequalities in benefit levels. Correlations of this kind will later be analysed with more depth.
Yet,  a correlation does not necessarily indicate causality.  The probability that  some of these
correlations may simply be coincidence, or the result of related third factors, is even quite high,
and due to the case study design of this work I am not able to test the likeliness of a causal
relation through cross-sectional comparisons. It is therefore essential to analyse the plausibility
of a causal relation from a theoretical perspective. 
The following subchapter will be dedicated to a theoretical discussion of the main instruments
that political science social policy analysis has brought forward to explain social policy. At the
end of this subchapter a specific theoretical framework for the Argentinean case of welfare state
adaptation failure will be proposed. 
Following the theoretical  discussion, I  will  proceed with an in-depth analysis  of the main
causes of Argentinean welfare state adaptation failure and substantiate the line of argumentation
with empiric evidence.
3.1 Relevant theories of social policy research and the Argentinean
case
The  following  subchapters  will  discuss  the  most  important  theoretical  'instruments'  of
contemporary  political  science  social  policy  research  with  regard  to  the  specifics  of  the
Argentinean case of welfare state adaptation failure. The classification below draws on Manfred
G.  Schmidt  et  al(2007),  Peter  Starke(2006),  Giuliano  Bonoli(2006)  and  Nico  Siegel(2006).
Although different authors put stronger emphasis on one or another approach in their respective
welfare state analysis, it is important to mention here that most of them apply a mixture of these
approaches. As will be indicated, the independent variables emphasised in one approach usually
interact  with  those  of  other  approaches,  so  that  a  complete  separation  is  rarely feasible  nor
meaningful  in  practice.  Yet,  the  categorisation  of  these  approaches  into  different  schools
provides a good panoramic view over the theoretical instruments that a large number studies has
made available  for  social  policy analysis.  The  specific  theoretical  framework  for  this  work,
which will be proposed in the last part of this chapter, will resort to these instruments, yet, taking
advantage  of  the  case  study  design  and  adapt  and  complement  these  with  regard  to  the
particularities of the Argentinean case of welfare state adaptation failure.
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a) Theories of the socioeconomic determination of social policies
Theories  of  socioeconomic  functionalism  explain  public  policy  mainly  as  reaction  to
structural,  social  and economic developments in the underlying society.  Following this logic,
social policies are centrally defined by the emergence of social and economic needs on the one
hand, and the availability of socioeconomic resources of the society and state on the other hand.
(Schmidt/Ostheim 2007a: 29 – 39) Harold L. Wilensky, an important advocate of this approach,
published in 1975 an influential study under the title “The Welfare State and Equality” in which
he compared the evolution of social expenditure as percentage of the GDP in 22 industrialised
countries.  He came to the conclusion that  the level  of economic development constitutes the
most  important  determinant  for  social  policies  and  the  level  of  social  expenditure.  Besides
economic factors,  the “socioeconomic school” has  identified demographic  variables,  like the
share of citizens in retirement age, as important determinants for pension or healthcare spending.
(Schmidt/Ostheim 2007a: 29 – 39) International comparisons with a most-dissimilar-systems-
design, i.e. comparisons between countries with very different levels of economic development,
show a strong correlation between the level of economic development and social expenditure.
Nevertheless, such socioeconomic approaches cannot explain differences between countries with
similar  levels  of  development.  Furthermore,  it  is  not  clear  in  what  way  the  level  of
socioeconomic development translates into social policy inputs. In Argentina social expenditure
as a share of the GDP rose by approximately 6.2  % points between 1975 and 1995. This does
coincide  with  a  massive  expansion  of  demand  for  the  provision  of  social  protection,  but,
however, not with a growth of per capita GDP, which was approximately 1.6 % lower in 1995
than in 1975. Furthermore, as I have argued, it is doubtful whether the increase can be related to
the expansion of  social  needs,  as  spending increases  were  concentrated  on traditional  social
insurance areas, and not on those social risks that experienced the strongest expansion. 
Theories of socioeconomic functionalism are rather appropriate for explanations that point at
the very long run and that include a large number of cases. In the context of a case study, in
contrast, it seems adequate to refer to this approach in combination with other theories. So, for
example, can be argued that the level of economic development and the socioeconomic structure
impact on the constellation of interests and the respective power structures  within a society.
Abrupt socioeconomic changes, like they often occur in the context of economic crises, may not
only  change  power  structures  but  also  discredit  hitherto  dominant  ideologies  and  political
patterns. As we have alluded in the chapter about social policy reform after 1975, some patterns
in social  policy changed after  the profound hyperinflation crisis  in  1989 and again  after  the
“exchange rate” crisis in 2001/2002. One example is that the introduction of market mechanisms
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into the social security systems became a central policy aim after the first crisis, while this aim
has not been further pursued, and even partly reversed, after the second crisis. 
b) Power resources centred approaches
Theories seeking to explain welfare state development with an emphasis on power resources
assume that social policy is mainly determined by the relations of power between different social
groups  or  classes  with  opposed  interests.  There  is  a  strong  influence  of  (neo)marxist  class
sociology  and  political  economy.  Most  of  these  approaches  pay  special  attention  to  the
organisational, mobilisational and electoral capacities of opposed social classes or groups. Vote,
parliament and/or cabinet shares of left parties and the strength of trade unions are often used as
indicators for strong working class influence on social  policies. On the other hand, the vote,
parliament and/or cabinet shares of liberal or conservative parties are often used as indicators for
employer  or  church  influence  on social  security  systems.(e.g.  Korpi  1983,  Esping-Andersen
1990, Rothstein 1998) These factors are not only held responsible for the dimension of social
expenditure,  but  also  for  the  level  of  redistribution(Walter  Korpi)  and  the  organisational
characteristics(Gøsta Esping-Andersen) inherent in the respective welfare state. Tobias Ostheim
and Manfred Schmidt(2007a: 40 – 50) ascribe generally high explanatory potential to power
resources based approaches. Also in the Argentinean case, power relations seem to be of special
importance for the creation, the evolution and the adaptation problems of the welfare state. 
As will be shown in chapter 3.3., due to the necessarily redistributive character of welfare
state adaptation, the related interests diverge largely between different socioeconomic classes.
While  the  working  class,  and particularly  unemployed  and informal  workers,  had  important
interests in an adaptation of the welfare state, employers had strong interests in avoiding it. The
socioeconomic polarisation of the society after 1975 increasingly diminished and divided the
middle class, so that this sector was increasingly split between one part that largely shared the
interests of the working class, and one part that rather shared the interests of the employers.
There is  a relative consensus among scholars,  that in Argentina the distribution of power
resources between labour and capital has shifted significantly towards the latter after 1975.(e.g.
Grewe 1996, Birle 1996, McGuire 1997, Lo Vuolo 1998a/b, Levitsky 2001) In this sense, the
distribution of power resources after 1975 has been largely unfavourable for the adaptation of the
welfare state. 
Social policy reform after 1975 was less profound than the increasing concentration of power
on the economic elite would suggest on the first view. Yet, as the Argentinean welfare state had
hardly been  an  instrument  for  progressive  redistribution(Barbeito/Lo  Vuolo 1998),  it  can be
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assumed that welfare state reform has been of far less importance for the dominant business
sectors than economic policy reform.  The consequences  of organised labour’s  loss of  power
resources are therefore mainly reflected in the dramatic shift in economic policies, but not so
strong in social policies. 
Besides the distribution of power resources between social classes, also the power relations
within  social  classes  are  important  for  an  understanding  of  the  politics  of   welfare  state
adaptation failure. So, for example, were trade union leaders largely able to preserve the control
over, and the resources of, the health insurance funds, which constituted a significant source of
personal power for them, while social policy has done little to provide social protection for the
increasing group of poor households and informal or unemployed workers. In terms of power
resources the latter represent a particularly weak group, hardly organised and vulnerable to the
clientelistic strategies of political parties.(Levitsky 2001: 24) With regard to the employers, the
partial privatisation of the pension system may be a indicator for the increasing power of the
financial sector, who had particular interest in this measure.
Many of the commonly shared assumptions of power resource theory studies refer to OECD
countries and are barely applicable to the Argentinean case. So, for example, did left or social
democratic parties, despite strong trade unions, not play an influential role in the Argentinean
politics since the rise of peronism. While democracy has been stable in most Western European
and North American countries after 1945, this has not been the case in Argentina, where short
periods  of  authoritarian  democracies  alternated  with  military  dictatorships  until  1983.  This
implies that the commonly used indicators, left party vote,  parliament or cabinet shares and
union strength, are too narrow to adequately capture the role of power relations in the politics of
welfare state adaptation failure in Argentina. The chapters 3.3. to 3.5. will therefore provide a
broader perspective on power, that considers organisational, economic, electoral and ideological
power resources.
Apart  of these general  characteristics  of  the Argentinean  case,  some comments  about  the
interaction between class or group specific power resources and other variables can be made.
Dominant ideas or ideologies can influence what social classes or groups perceive to be in their
interest.  At  the  same  time,  power  relations  also  influence  which  ideologies  or  common
perceptions are preponderant in a society.(Korpi 1989) Alliances between different social forces
or  classes can decisively alter the impact  of strong working classes(O’Donnell1977,  Esping-
Andersen 1990), as well as can different institutional designs(Repetto/Moro 2004). Moreover,
power relations between social classes or groups on its own do not automatically translate into
certain welfare state arrangements. It finally depends on a variety of contextual factors, and on
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how the different actors use their power resources, the political strategies that they deploy and
the coalitions that they establish, how strong they will be able to shape social policy in their
interest. 
c) Political party centred theories 
Despite  many similarities  to  the power  resources  approach,  party centred  theories  have  a
narrower perspective as they see the main determinant of social policy production and outcome
in the party composition of parliaments and governments.(Schmidt/Ostheim 2007b: 51 – 62)
Douglas Hibbs(1977) asserted that the policies of a government reflect the preferences of the
electorate of the government parties. Left or social democratic parties are commonly supposed to
have  a  stronger  inclination  to  expand  social  policies  than  conservative  or  liberal  parties.
However, also many social democratic parties have pursued cost containment policies regarding
the welfare state during the last  two decades.  This might not necessarily fully contradict  the
findings of Hibbs from the mid 1970s, as the composition of social democratic electorate might
have changed since then. Furthermore, also social democratic parties have not been able to defy
the  paradigm shift  from a  keynesian  to  a  neoliberal  consensus.  The  “Agenda  2010” of  the
German  Social  Democratic  Party/Greens  government  and  the  “New  Deal”  of  British  New
Labour  are  only  two  examples  for  social  democratic  social  policy  agendas  that  reflect  the
influence of neoliberal thinking.(Bundesregierung 2003, Department of Social Security 1998)
With regard to the type of social rights guaranteed by the state, Gøsta Esping-Andersen(1990)
argued that in the long run social democratic and left parties favour universalistic social policies,
while christian democratic parties tend to strengthen occupational group specific social insurance
arrangements,  and  non-confessional  conservative  and  liberal  parties  prefer  market  provision
where this is possible.
In the Argentinean case the partisan composition of parliaments and governments until 1983
must been seen in a different light. In contrast to the countries examined by Douglas Hibbs,
Argentina did only experience short periods of democracy, which were mostly periods of limited
democracy due to the prohibition of the main opposition party.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998) The
absence of democratic party competition clearly weakened the importance of electoral strategies
and increased the necessity to build support coalitions around extra-parliamentary forces. Only
from 1983 on  democratic  party  competition  determines  the  composition  of  parliaments  and
governments. 
Another important particularity of the Argentinean case is that there exists no clear left-right
division in the party spectrum. The two historically strongest parties(UCR and PJ) have been
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defined as parties of the centre.(Alcántara Sáez 1996: 415/416) Although the PJ can be classified
as a labour-based party75, it has always integrated members from the whole ideological spectrum.
In contrast to the assumption that a party's policies reflect the interests of their electorate, the PJ,
which has governed during nearly 20 of the 27 years since the return to democracy, has largely
ignored the interest in welfare state adaptation of the majority of its voters and members. The PJ
governments  during  the  1990s  even  implemented  a  fierce  neoliberal  course  that  implied  an
important setback in this regard.
The mentioned particularities indicate that the relation between the party composition of the
parliaments and governments and the evolution of social policies is more complex in Argentina.
Instead of  focussing on the mere  party  composition of the government  and parliament,  it  is
important to take into consideration which sector of the respective party, and ultimately which
ideological  strand,  is  predominating  in  the  party  at  a  certain  moment,  as  most  parties  in
Argentina  are  little  homogeneous  and  integrate  a  very  wide  range  of  different  ideological
standpoints. In chapter 3.3. it will be argued that in Argentina the main political parties are not
representations  of  one  particular  social  force,  but  the  different  social  forces  compete  about
influencing the agendas of these parties.
d) Theories of the importance of ideas: development strategy, dominant
social and economic thought and the welfare state
A growing literature examines the role of ideologies and ideas in the design, implementation,
reform  or  dismantlement  of  social  policies.(e.g.  Béland  2005,  Bleses/Seeleib-Kaiser  2004,
Deacon 1998, 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, Palier 2001, Starke 2006) The role of ideologies and
ideas  with  regard  to  welfare  state  politics  is  multifaceted  and  their  importance  has  to  be
understood  in  interaction  with  other  approaches  towards  explaining  social  policy.  While
advocates  of  the socio-economic approach assume that  social  policies  are  responses  to what
Peter Starke(2006) calls “problem pressures”, proponents of the ideology/ideas centred approach
argue that already the perception and identification of problems is  not exogenous to politics.
Ideologies and ideas strongly influence what is perceived as a problem and what not. In other
words they form part of the social construction of the problem itself. Based on a study of Ian
Hacking,  Peter  Bleses  and  Martin  Seeleib-Kaiser(2004)  argue  “that  the  perception  of  what
constitutes ‚reality’ depends on dominant conceptualisations of ‚facts’ and of the processes used
to measure them. Consequently, with a change in the definition of ‚facts’ or processes used to
75 As a very high proportion of its membership and electorate has historically been working class.(e.g.  Levitsky
2001, De Riz 1996, De Riz 2008: 14/15)
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measure them, the ‚objective’ facts themselves might change.“(Bleses/Seeleib-Kaiser 2004: p.
110) 
Once an issue is perceived as a problem, and hence entered into the policy agenda, ideologies
and ideas importantly influence the design of the supposed solution to it. Alan Deacon(1998,
2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2003) argued in numerous publications how different ideas and strands of
though shaped New Labour’s social policy agenda. Worth mentioning in this context are the
ideas of Charles Murray(1984), who was particularly concerned with the supposedly “perverse
incentives” provided by income maintenance programmes for the poor, meaning that those kind
of programmes keep people from working, and the ideas of Lawrence Mead(1997), who argued
that long-term unemployed persons lose their work ethic, which hence requires that the state
introduces  conditionality  into  its  social  programmes.  Corina  Rodríguez  Enríquez  and  María
Fernanda  Reyes  (2006)  show  that  very  similar  ideas  have  shaped  most  targeted  social
programmes in Argentina since the second half of the 1990s. It is probable that the English New
Labour experience, as well as the anterior experience with similar approaches during the Clinton
administration,  had  certain  influence  on  the  Argentinean  social  assistance  policy  approach.
Except in family policies, all the policy trends that according to Maurizio Ferrera(2008: 93/94)
prevailed in European social policies over the last 20 years can also be detected in Argentina,
especially  during the 1990s when the  role of  several  International  Financial  Institutions76 as
advisers and financiers was particularly strong.(see chapter 2.2.) Examples for these trends are
the attempts to better  target  social  assistance  policies,  to complement pay-as-you-go pension
schemes by capitalisation accounts, to tie benefits stronger to contributions, to tighten eligibility
criteria and to lower or freeze employer contributions. 
According to Bruno Palier(2001: 16/17) this could be explained through a process of “policy
learning” from other countries, which are perceived to perform well with certain measures. On
the other hand, it is quite evident that many of these policies have been actively promoted by
international organisations, which have been very influential in the highly indebted Argentina.
Under these circumstances I suggest that governments are not only subjects of “policy learning”
but also objects of “policy teaching”.
Ideas and/or programmes are usually integrated into a wider ideological framework. 
“The ability to frame a policy programme in a politically – and culturally – acceptable
and desirable manner is a key factor that can help explain why some policy alternatives
76 IADB, World Bank and IMF.
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triumph over  others  and  why elected  officials  decide  to  ‘do  something’  in  the  first
place”.(Béland 2005: 12) 
So, for example, have several authors argued that social policy reform in Argentina during the
1990s was part of a wider economic strategy framed by neoliberal thinking.(e.g.  Barbeito/Lo
Vuolo 1998, Cortes/Marshall 1999, Lloyd-Sherlock 2004, 2005, Kay 2000) Susana Sottoli(2000:
11) finds in her comparative study that those Latin American countries who carried out the most
profound neoliberal  economic reforms, also implemented the most profound neoliberal  social
policy reforms.
Peter  Hall(1993)  furthermore  assumes  that  governments  “learn”  from  their  own  policy
failures.  Under  certain  circumstances,  these  failures  are  not  only  capable  of  causing  the
abandonment  of  certain  ideas,  but  of  the  wider  ideological  frame(“policy  paradigm”).  As
mentioned in the subchapter about socioeconomic approaches, this is most likely to happen in
and after situations of economic crisis, such as they hit Argentina several times during the period
of study. Indeed, as will be shown in the subchapters following the theoretical discussion, the
crises of 1982, 1989 and 2001/2002 correlate with significant ideological shifts with regard to
economic and social policies. As will be seen, these ideological shifts correlate with changes in
social  policy patterns that  coincide widely with the core ideas of the new ideological  frame.
However, social policies did never adapt completely to these new ideological frames. In some
cases the proposed reform projects had to be modified in the face of trade union resistance. In
other occasions governments may have relinquished from even proposing reforms for strategical
reasons. In this sense, ideological influences may be stronger in influencing what governments
want to do than in influencing what governments can do.
With regard to changes in the prevailing governmental (and to a certain extent also public)
ideology,  broadly  four  periods  can  be  distinguished  since  1975.  Each  period  ends  with  an
economic crisis and a following change of government. The military government(1976 – 1983)
followed a neoliberal course. The Alfonsín government(UCR, 1983 – 1989) can be described as
heterodox, that is critical towards many aspects of neoliberalism but at the same time not willing
to fully return to keynesianism and import substitution industrialisation.77 The Menem(PJ) and
De La Rúa(UCR and FREPASO) governments(1989 – 2001) pursued again a strongly neoliberal
course. The governments of Eduardo Duhalde(PJ), Néstor Kirchner(PJ) and Christina Fernández
de Kirchner(PJ), following the 2001/2002 crisis, shifted again to a rather heterodox course. 
77It  must  be said that  the Alfonsín government  already shifted towards more neoliberal ideas from 1987/88 on,
however, was largely prevented by the opposition from implementing these. 
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The  different  ideologies  prevailing  in  the  economic  thinking  of  these  governments  had
important impacts on the perception of certain features of the welfare state. A very clear example
are employer contributions. The neoliberal governments saw in the employer contributions(non-
wage labour  costs) a  major  obstacle for  the competitiveness of the national  economy in the
global  market,  and therefore  pursued policies  aiming at  a reduction  of  these.  The heterodox
governments, in contrast, increased employer contributions as a means of improving the fiscal
situation of the insurance systems, and questioned the direct relation between competitiveness
and non-wage labour costs.(e.g. El Clarín 27th of December 2003, Huber 1996: 172) Figure 37
shows  the  percentage  of  the  wage  that  workers  and  employers  had  to  contribute  to  social
insurances at the end of each period.
Elaborated by the author. Sources: For 1975 – 1989: Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 337/338, For 200078: El Clarín
27th of December 2003, For 2010: C.F.E. Institute http://www.cfe.com.ar/teoria_tablas_sueldos.htm (opened on
24th of November 2010).
The overall trend towards a new distribution of the financial burden associated with social
insurances  in  detriment  of  the  workers  plausibly  reflects  the  changes  that  occurred  in  the
distribution of power resources between capital and labour. However, the strong fluctuations also
78 Since the 1990s effective employer contributions are varying between regions and sectors. The numbers given for
2000 and 2010 are national averages.
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Figure 37: Employer and worker social insurance contributions as 
percentage of the wage, at the end of each period
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reflect the differing approaches that the distinct governments pursued with regard to non-wage
labour costs. 
As has been alluded in several occasions, ideology/idea centred approaches are in practice
hardly separable from other approaches towards explaining welfare state development. Common
perceptions or ideologies, and changes of them, affect the preferences of voters, have influence
on how the relationship between global economy and national welfare state is interpreted, and
can even shape what social  classes or  groups consider  their  interests.  The other  way round,
Walter Korpi(1989: 18 – 20) argues that the distribution of power resources impacts on public
perceptions. 
e) Theories focussing on the importance of globalisation processes
Following  Christoffer  Green-Pedersen(2004:  130  –  133),  the  impact  of  globalisation  on
welfare  states  can  be  divided  into  three  domains.  The  first  domain  is  concerned  with  the
increased openness of today's national economies in terms of trade. The second one centres on
the increased mobility of production. As exporting and importing has become easier and less
regulated and technological advances made transport cheaper, companies have greater freedom
today in choosing the location of production. Finally, the third domain of economic globalisation
with supposedly significant  influence on welfare states is the increased importance of global
financial markets.
The  generally  rarely  doubted  assumption  is  that  in  all  three  above  mentioned  domains,
national economies are facing more competition as a result of globalisation. Nevertheless, there
is much disagreement about the question in what way type and dimension of the welfare state
influence  the  competitiveness  of  national  economies.  Ian  Gough(2000:  234/235)  divided
scholarly positions in this regard into five categories. I will largely follow his categorisation, but
combine the last two categories due their relative similarity. 
The first position is based on the assumption that international competitiveness and extensive
social  policy  are  mutually  exclusive.  According  to  this  view,  cutting  back  the welfare  state
becomes  unavoidable  in  a  global  market.  Susan  Strange,  referring  to  this,  speaks  about  the
trivialization of governments: “Where states were once the masters of the markets, now it is the
markets which, on many crucial  issues, are the masters over governments of states.”(Strange
2003: 128) Other authors like Fritz Scharpf(2000) or Martin Rhodes(2000) generally share this
view with regard to the welfare state, although in a more limited version. Both argue that during
the post-war decades national economies were relatively closed. By this means, competition took
mainly place between different competitors that all had to follow the same regulatory rules, and
131
that all had to carry the same financial burdens because of the welfare state. So, no competitor
was better or worse off as a result of social policies. Enterprises were able to pass higher tax
burdens or social insurance contributions down to the consumer. This has been particularly true
in  countries  pursuing  the  ISI  strategy,  such  as  Argentina.(Huber  1996:  144)  Since  the
abandonment  of  the  ISI  strategy  and  the  embracing  of  the  globalisation  process,  national
companies  have increasingly to compete with companies  from other  countries,  or  even with
transnational  competitors.  These,  in  contrast,  are  not  necessarily  affected  by  the  same
regulations,  and  do  not  necessarily  have  to  pay  the  same  social  insurance  contributions.
Therefore these foreign competitors may be able to offer the same product at a lower price. With
respect  to the increased mobility of production, enterprises  may now decide to choose other
countries for their production where welfare state related costs are lower. In this regard Martin
Rhodes(2000: 259) used the notion “regime shopping”. 
With  respect  to  the  increased  importance  of  global  financial  markets,  Christoffer  Green-
Pedersen(2004: 131 – 133) asserted that balanced budgets and low inflation are crucial to gain
the confidence of these markets. If the government fails to guarantee this, financial markets will
raise the interest rates for the respective country or charge an additional risk premium, which
will shorten availability of “cheap” capital, and by this, slow down economic growth. The aim to
balance out the budget does not necessarily lead to welfare state retrenchment, but cuts in social
spending are at least one option towards this aim.
A second position claims the exact  opposite,  arguing that  international  competitiveness  is
strongly dependent on an extensive and efficient welfare state. Supporters of this position argue
that  increased  trade  openness  and  the  higher  mobility  of  production  have  led  to  more  job
insecurity and greater inequality of wages.  At the same time, the society as a whole benefits
economically from the globalisation process. The gains of the winners of this process are bigger
than  the  losses  of  the  losers.  Hence,  as  a  result  of  increased  international  competition,  the
necessity of a redistributive welfare state grows in order to secure social peace, stable consume
and sufficient  supply of  educated  workforce.  These three factors  are argued to be important
factors for companies.(Bofinger 2005: 240 – 245) While sufficient supply of educated workforce
is the precondition for any choice to invest in a certain location, stable consumption and social
peace are fostering investment and successful  export  business, as they provide the necessary
stability for long-term decisions. The result is high competitiveness, especially on the quality,
reliability and technological level. Furthermore, it has been argued that greater openness to the
international markets, as it produces more insecurity among workers, favours trade unions and
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social democratic parties, which hence is expected to lead to more redistributive and extensive
social policy.(Green-Pedersen 2004: 130/131) 
With regard to the increased importance of global financial markets, Green-Pedersen(2004:
131 – 145) assumes that while this process requires more fiscal discipline, it does not necessarily
demand welfare retrenchment, as balanced budgets can also be reached by raising tax revenue.
Timothy J. Sinclair(2000: 185) furthermore questioned the general necessity of totally balanced
budgets, stating that “the social and financial impacts of budget deficits are debatable, and the
costs and benefits they generate vary for different social interests.” 
The third position regarding the relationship between the welfare state and the international
competitiveness can be located between the first two positions, arguing that there is neither a
benign nor a malign reciprocal  influence. Most supporters of this point of view came to this
conclusion  less  by theoretical  considerations  than  by evaluating  empiric  data  and  reviewing
similar empirical studies of others.(e.g. Swank 2003, Kite 2004)
From  the  perspective  of  the  fourth  position,  different  types  of  social  policy  and  social
spending have  distinct  effect  on the competitiveness  of  the national  economy on the global
market.  Of  importance  with regard  to  this  is  the well  known categorisation of  welfare  state
regimes by Gosta Esping-Andersen(1990). Welfare states can have very different effects with
respect  to the encouragement to work, the ability to combine work and family,  the focus on
training programmes and so on. By this means, the type of welfare state might be more important
than the size of expenditure. Furthermore, Ian Gough(2000: 234/248 – 250) pointed out that the
same welfare state policies can lead to different effects on competitiveness in different countries,
depending  on  their  broader  institutional  system  and  industrial  relations,  as  well  as  on  the
country's economic structure and position in the world market. 
The big variety of different scholarly interpretations shows mainly one thing: The impacts of
globalisation processes on social policies are hardly generalisable and far from being obvious. 
Ultimately,  the impacts of globalisation processes on social policy will depend on how the
respective government and the public perceive the relationship between the two. Perceptions, in
turn, depend decisively on the ideological perspective. As has been argued in the last chapter, the
neoliberal  influenced  military junta  and  the  governments  of  the  1990s  have  interpreted  this
relation in a different way than the heterodox governments during the 1980s and 2000s. 
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Elaborated by the author. Source: World Bank database.
Elaborated by the author. Source: World Bank database.
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Figure 38: Exports and imports of goods and services as 
percentage of the GDP
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)
Exports and Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)
Figure 39: Exports and imports of goods and services as 
percentage of the GDP, in four periods
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Despite a significant and abrupt reduction of barriers and tariffs on foreign trade during the
last  Argentinean  military dictatorship,  imports  and exports  as  a  share  of  the GDP increased
relatively slow until 2001. Yet, after the 2002 currency devaluation they rose significantly.(See
figures 38 and 39) A comparison of the relative importance of foreign trade during the four
different periods with the social policy patterns identified chapter 2.2 shows virtually no relation.
This fact supports my assumption that the degree of participation in the global market has no
automatic effect on social policy in Argentina. Even if we compare the weight of foreign trade
with the trends in employer  contributions during each period there is no observable relation,
despite  the widespread  argument  that  increasing trade openness would force governments to
reduce  non-wage  labour costs.  The  opposite  is  the  case:  during the  period  with the  highest
economic weight of foreign trade, employer contributions were rising while worker contributions
remained stable.(See figures 37 – 39)
The impacts of globalisation processes on the politics of the Argentinean welfare state seem
to stem less  from globalisation  as  such,  than from the  particular  way in  which  the military
junta(1976 – 1983) and the governments of the 1990s inserted the Argentine economy into the
world market. The abrupt opening of the market, combined with an overvaluation of the local
currency, led to a rapid process of deindustrialisation. This, in turn, lastingly reduced the power
of  the  trade  unions,  as  these  were  best  organised  in  the  industrial  sector,  and  because  the
deindustrialisation implied rising unemployment. It can be observed that after both periods that
combined trade openness with an overvaluation of the local currency(1976 – 1983 and 1989 –
2001)79,  industrial  production as  a  share  of  the GDP had  declined  dramatically.  In  contrast,
during the Alfonsín government(1983 – 1989) this share remained stable,  and after the 2002
devaluation the share even slightly recuperated. 
79 During both periods the currency was most of the time overvalued.
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Elaborated by the author. Source: World Bank database.
Furthermore, the military government accumulated enormous amounts of foreign debt. While
Argentina's  total  foreign  debt  amounted  to  7800 million  US Dollars  in  1975,  it  was  45100
million in 1983 when the military had to cede power.(Vargas de Flood 2006: 143/147) Apart of
having  severe  economic  consequences,  the  high  debt  burden  “gave  enormous  leverage  to
international  financial  institutions, particularly the International  Monetary Fund(IMF),  private
banks,  and  creditor  governments,  where  a  neoliberal  view  of  the  economic  world  was
dominant.”(Huber  1996:  161)  By this  means,  Argentina  became,  like  most  Latin  American
countries, a candidate for “policy teaching”. 
f) Theories of path dependency 
“Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do
not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances
directly  encountered,  given  and  transmitted  from  the  past.“(Marx  2008:  15;
originally 1852)
Theories of path dependency are generally based on one of the key assumptions of science of
history,  in the sense that they put emphasis on the importance of past events and policies in
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Figure 40: Industrial production(valued added) as percentage of 
the GDP, at the end of each period
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determining contemporary decisions.  Hence,  public policy,  and in  particular  social  policy,  is
perceived in big part as wanted or unwanted consequence of former political decisions. Once a
social policy path has been chosen, it becomes increasingly difficult to significantly change its
direction. Political  heritage  is  therefore  supposed  to  limit  the  margin  of  action  of  any
government.(Ostheim/Schmidt 2007b: 85 – 95) Approaches of this kind are very influential in
contemporary  literature  about  the  welfare  state.  So,  for  example,  did  Gøsta  Esping-
Andersen(1990) apply, among others, a path dependency approach to explain the genesis of three
different types of welfare state regimes in his influential book “The Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism”. To explain the effect of path dependency on political decisions, the concept can
grossly be divided into two categories: “institutional path dependency” and “sociological path
dependency”. With the first I refer to the increasing organisational difficulty of abandoning or
changing the direction of a social policy path that has been consolidated over a longer time. In
most areas of the welfare state, the economic costs of changing the once chosen path constitute
important limitations to political action. As I have argued in 2.3., the particular Argentinean path
of  a  corporatist-informal  welfare  state  regime  has  posed  several  institutional  difficulties  to
welfare state adaptation. 
From the perspective of “sociological path dependency” it is rather political than economic
costs that limit the margin of government action. As Gøsta Esping-Andersen(1990) and Paul
Pierson(2001:  447)  argue,  welfare  state  arrangements,  and  in  particular  social  insurance
schemes, create extraordinarily strong vested (group) interests.  If  we refer  to the example of
pension schemes, it becomes clearly understandable that groups who contributed a long time to
the pension insurance will perceive it as their right to receive the equivalent benefits when they
reach the retirement age. Deeper changes in detriment of a certain group can easily be perceived
as a violation of their rights  and cause strong resistance.  Hence,  the political  costs of quick
changes in the area of social  policy appear to be extraordinarily high, particularly  in social
insurance schemes. 
This simple example can obviously not capture the whole picture. As the Chilean example of
pension privatization shows, profound changes are possible under  certain  circumstances. The
Argentinean case of partial pension scheme privatisation during the 1990s somehow serves as an
example  for  both,  the  abandonment  of  the  established  path(Barrientos  2008,  2009),  and  the
impossibility to carry out more profound changes(Isuani 2010), depending on the author. 
Theories of path dependency are often linked to approaches focussed on power resources, as
the dimension of the political  cost  of  a social  policy reform strongly depends on the power
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resources of the negatively affected group. Therefore,  cutbacks seem usually to be easiest in
detriment of groups that lack strong power resources. 
Sociological path dependency is especially strong with regard to the Argentinean social health
insurance funds. Although the system is highly inefficient and inequitable, various attempts of
reform during the 1970s and 1980s failed. Interestingly, during the same period the “Southern
European welfare states”(Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) shifted towards more universal state led
health systems.(Ferrera 1996: 22 - 24) Why did these countries successfully reform their health
systems while comparable attempts failed in Argentina?  Paul Pierson argues  that  “organized
labour’s role in social insurance confers a degree of influence which it  might not be able to
achieve  through  wage  bargaining  systems”.(Pierson  2001:  445)  As  will  be  shown later,  the
particularity that Argentinean trade unions directly control health insurance funds implied that
they, and especially their leaders, had peculiarly strong interest in the preservation of the system,
and were therefore fiercely, and ultimately successfully, resisting any attempt of deeper reform
of the system.  
Interestingly Richard Rose(1990: 283 – 284) assumed that path dependency is much stronger
in the area of social policy than in the area of economic policy. This coincides quite strongly
with the evidence of the Argentinean case,  where oscillations in economic policy have been
arguably more profound during the last 35 years than in the realm of the welfare state.80
Path dependency approaches are interrelated with other theories. I have mentioned before that
path dependency is biggest when the group negatively affected by a change has strong power
resources and is willing to resist. In democracies it can also be assumed, that vested interests of
big groups are electorally important.(Pierson 2001: 447) In this sense party differences matter,
because one party may depend heavier on the votes of particular beneficiary groups than another.
On  the  other  hand,  James  McGuire(1997)  argued  that  under  certain  circumstances,  like  it
happened in the Argentinean case, it may be easier to implement neoliberal reforms for a party
with strong links to the trade union movement, than for other parties, that appear to be electorally
more  independent  from groups  affected  negatively  by  these  reforms. The  explanation  rests
mainly on the assumption that parties with strong links to the trade union movement can easier
negotiate the reforms and contain union resistance. Path dependency approaches also overlap
with idea/ideology centred theories, as existing welfare state arrangements often seem to give the
“idea”  with  regard  to  how  new  problems  could  be  solved.  So,  for  example,  has  Germany
introduced  a  compulsory long-term care insurance,  and  also  the  first  income  maintenance
80 The dimension of the social policy changes in Argentina during this period is a quite controversial topic. I will
explain later in this text, to what I refer when I use the term “rigidity”. I will also discuss other interpretations.
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programme for unemployed workers in Argentina was based on the insurance principle, despite
the fact that unemployment was particularly widespread among formerly informal workers. 
g) Institutionalist approaches to the analysis of the welfare state 
Institutionalist  approaches  emphasise  the  influence  of  institutions  on  politics  and  their
outcomes.  Institutions  can  thereby  be  defined  in  a  wider  sense  as  “interpersonal  formal  or
informal rules and norms”81(Schmidt/Ostheim 2007c: 63). Among others, these institutions can
be the constitutional  rules,  the rules and norms of political  interest  aggregation and decision
making processes, or the organisation of interest mediation between society, economy and the
state. They all have in common, that they are rather fix structures that are not easily changeable,
and that operate like filters for the political action, which enables certain problem solutions and
impedes or hampers others. They also impact on the possibilities of the different actors involved
in politics to influence decisions.(Repetto/Moro 2004, Schmidt/Ostheim 2007c) 
Most comparative  studies  only compared  relatively stable  industrialised  democracies  with
regard to the importance of institutional factors that determine, or at least influence, welfare state
evolution. Yet, in Argentina formal institutions have been very unstable during the 20th century.
Periods of (mostly restricted) democracy alternated with periods of military dictatorship several
times.  Also  the  period  of  study  of  this  text  contains  the  experience  of  a  military
dictatorship(1976 – 1983). Therefore, a central question is: What difference make democracy or
dictatorship for welfare state politics, and hence for social policy? 
In  an  extensive  comparative  study including  21  East  Asian,  Eastern  European  and Latin
American countries, Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman(2008: 200 - 207) come to the
conclusion that democracy has a significant positive effect on social expenditure measured as a
share of the GDP. However, they argue that this effect was blocked in Latin America due to
economic and fiscal constraints during the last quarter of the 20th century. 
The data provided in 2.2. shows that several social policy patterns changed quite significantly
between the period of dictatorship and the democratic period. The military dictatorship reduced
the overall social expenditure from 14.6 % of the GDP in 1975 to 11.1 % in 1983. During the
democratic period, in contrast, expenditure rose to 23.5 % of the GDP until 2008.(DAGPyPS
2010) Therefore, the Argentinean case seems to constitute an exception in the Latin American
context, as social expenditure rose despite extraordinarily severe economic and fiscal constraints.
81 Translated by the author of this text. Original text of the quote: “interpersonelle formelle oder informelle Regeln
und Normen.”
139
In  fact,  the  period  with the  worst  economic  performance  and the lowest  taxation capacity82
coincided with the strongest  growth in social  expenditure in Argentina.  During the Alfonsín
government(1983 – 1989), the real per capita GDP declined by 11.8 %, and combined national
and provincial  net  tax revenue accounted for  averagely only 15.1 % of the GDP, but social
expenditure increased by 47 % from 11.1 % to 16.2 % of the GDP.(DNIyAF 2010, DAGPyPS
2010) Furthermore, the social policy patterns identified in 2.2. clearly show that democracy and
dictatorship coincide with distinct patterns of distributing social expenditure between different
programmes,  and ultimately also different  social groups.  In  the health sector  the dictatorship
drastically  shifted  expenditure  from  the  public  system  with  universal  access  to  the  union
controlled83 social health insurance system. The following democratic governments maintained
mainly  the  status  quo  with  this  regard.  The  military  junta  systematically  cut  down  family
allowance  expenditure,  while  the  democratic  governments  stabilised  it  on  a  low level.  The
strongest difference, however, can be observed regarding expenditure on social assistance and
unemployment protection, which had been radically reduced during the dictatorship, but which
has  been  increasing  more  or  less  steadily  since  the  return  to  democracy.84 How  can  these
correlations be explained? 
Democratic  governments,  in  contrast  to  dictatorships,  have  to  take  voter  preferences  into
account when they decide upon reforming the welfare state. The military government had not to
fear being voted out of office for reducing public health sector and social assistance expenditure,
while democratic governments increasingly needed the vote of the poor and the unemployed if
they wanted to win elections, as these groups were constituting ever bigger parts of the potential
electorate. 
However,  democracy  alone  can  only  explain  a  part  of  the  story.  Why  did  the  military
government  shift  expenditure  to  social  health  insurances  and  cut  down public  health  sector,
social assistance and family allowance expenditure in the first place? Why did the democratic
governments not shift expenditure back to the public health sector and why did they not recover
family allowance expenditure? Moreover, why did these governments rise the expenditure on
82 Taxation capacity is measured as tax revenue as a share of the GDP. Haggard and Kaufman(2008) use taxation
capacity as indicator for the degree of fiscal constraint.
83 The  military  junta  was  principally  very  hostile  to  the  trade  union  movement.  There  have  been  attempts  to
completely quit health insurance control from unions, which, however, was neither completed nor lasting.(Vargas de
Flood 2006: 148)
84 Spending  data(Vargas  de  Flood  2006:  188)  from  the  years  before  1975  shows  that  also  during  the  short
democratic period prior to the last military dictatorship expenditure on social assistance rose significantly,  which
further supports the assumption that there is a causal relation.
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social assistance and unemployment protection at a significantly lower pace than poverty and
unemployment were expanding? 
Democracy seems to  be  a  decisive factor,  but  if  other  factors  such as  power relations  or
prevailing ideologies are not considered, it has only limited explanatory power. Moreover, there
are other institutional factors that must be considered if we want to understand the particular
relationship between democracy and social policy in Argentina.
Since  1983,  Argentina  is  a  federal  and  presidential  democratic  system. The  Argentinean
president occupies a very powerful position with ample capabilities to govern and legislate by
decree and emergency decree85. Furthermore, the president can make use of a presidential veto to
block law projects of the parliament, which can only be overridden by a two-thirds majority of
the chamber where the law project  originated from.(Ferreira  Rubio/Goretti  1996: 443 – 451)
Therefore, the government largely determines the policy agenda in Argentina, and the number of
institutional veto players86(Tsebelis 1995) can be considered rather low. 
Table 1 shows the parliamentary situation of the different governments since 1983. As can be
seen, it has been the exception that the government party, or coalition, held a majority in both
chambers  at  the  same time.  Therefore  governments  had  to  win the  support  of  deputies  and
senators from other parties if they wanted to pass laws. 
85 With the use of emergency decrees the president basically assumes the fuctions of the parliament to modify,
abolish or pass laws.(La Nación 13th of April 2008)
86 George Tsebelis defines as a veto player, an individual or collective actor whose approval is necessary for a policy
change.(Tsebelis 1995: 301)
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Table 1: Governments and parliamentary majorities, 1983 – 2010
 
1983 -
1985 
1985 -
1987 
1987 -
1989 
1989 -
1991 
1991 -
1993
1993 -
1995 
1995 -
1997 
1997 -
1999 
House  of
Representatives
M M X X X X M X
Senate* 
X X X M M M M M
Government Alfonsín (UCR) Menem (PJ)
 
1999 -
2001 
2002 -
2003 
2003 -
2005 
2005 -
2007 
2007 -
2009 
2009 -
2011 
House  of
Representatives
X X X M M X
Senate* 
X M M** M M
neither X
nor M
(50%)
Government
De  la  Rúa
(UCR  /
FREPASO)
Duhalde
(PJ) Kirchner (FPV - PJ)
Fernández  de Kircher
(FPV and allies)
M = Government held majority of seats X = Government held minority of seats
* Until 2001 the senators were elected for nine year terms by the provincial parliaments.  From 2001 on every
second year one third were elected directly by the population.(McGuire 1997: 253)
** Between 2003 an 2005 the PJ held  the majority  of  seats in  the Senate,  yet  the party  was  very fragmented
internally. During the presidential elections, that were held simultaneously with the legislative elections, three PJ
candidates were competing against each other.
Elaborated by the auther. Sources: For 1983 - 1999: Negretto 2002: 398, For 1999 - 2001: Negretto 2002: 398 and
La Nación 25th of October 1999, For 2002 - 2003: La Nación 15th of October 2001 and Political Database of the
Americas, For 2003 - 2005: La Nación 5th of May 2003, For 2005 - 2011: Political Database of the Americas.
In practice, however, the ample margins for the use of emergency decrees from the 1990s on
severely limited the importance of the parliament. Emergency decrees could only be repealed by
majority vote of both chambers, but between 1983 and 2010, there have only been four years
during which the respective government held a minority of seats in both chambers.(See table 1)
Furthermore,  the governments often held the first  minority in the House of  Representatives,
which implied that through negotiations with one or several of the small provincial parties they
could reach ad-hoc majorities relatively easy. 
It  was the president Carlos Menem who systematically and excessively started to legislate
with  emergency  decrees. Between  1989  and  1999  he  emitted  54587 of  them(Ferreira
87 Negretto(2002: 396) counts only 272, but states that this number only includes those emergeny decrees which
have  officially  been  recognised  as  such  by  the  government,  while  the  higher  number  of  Ferreira  Rubio  and
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Rubio/Goretti quoted in La Nación 13th of April 2008), of which only 13 were repealed by the
two chambers of the parliament. The preceding Alfonsín government, in contrast, only resorted
ten times to legislation via emergency decree.(Negretto 2002: 388/396) The gap certainly reflects
differences in the style of government between the two presidents. However, also the the context
of the hyperinflation crisis contributed decisively to the concentration of power on the president
during the early 1990s. The extension of the supreme court from five to nine members virtually
eliminated this actor as a veto player, as Menem filled the new seats with political allies. This
decisively facilitated the legislation by emergency decree, as many of these decrees were in fact
hardly backed by the constitution. Generally, the government increased its influence on judges
during the 1990s by initiating a wave of removals and appointments of judges on all levels.(Lo
Vuolo  1998b:  210/211)  The  1994  constitutional  reform  finally  consolidated  the  extensive
possibilities to use emergency decrees, which also enabled the governments following Menem to
make excessive use of them. Fernando de la Rúa(1991 – 2001) emitted 73 of them, Eduardo
Duhalde(2002  –  2003) 158,  Néstor  Kirchner(2003  –  2007) 270  and Christina  Fernández  de
Kirchner emitted 5 between 2007 and the 20th of March 2009.(Ferreira Rubio/Goretti quoted in
La Nación 13th of April 2008, Ichaso 2009) These decrees played an important role in social
policy making, as they were, for example, frequently used to change benefit and contribution
levels  of  family allowances  or  pensions.(e.g.  La  Nación 3rd of  July 2006) Also the for  now
biggest social assistance/family policy programme, the so called “Universal Child Allowance”,
was implemented through an emergency decree.(La Nación 30th of October 2009) The fact that
president Christina Fernández de Kirchner emitted a significantly lower number of emergency
decrees than her predecessors may partly reflect a different style of government, but can most
likely be explained through the low necessity to resort to these decrees due to the government
majorities in both chambers between 2007 and 2009.(See table 1)
In  comparison, the Alfonsín government(1983 – 1989) faced clearly stronger  veto players
than his successors. It  only held the majority in the House of Representatives but not in the
Senate, and during the last two years it also lost the majority in the former chamber. As also the
use of emergency decrees was more restricted during the 1980s, and because of the fact that the
passing  of  laws  required  the  approval  of  both  chambers,  the  Alfonsín  government  had  to
negotiate reforms with the opposition more than successive governments.(Negretto 2002: 398) 
Excepting the case of social health insurance reform failure during the 1980s, institutional
veto  player  centred  approaches  seem to  explain  relatively  little  with  regard  to  welfare  state
Goretti(2008)  also  includes  those  that  were  de-facto  emergency  decrees  but  not  recognised  as  such  by  the
government.
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adaptation failure in Argentina. The institutional setting gives the government very big autonomy
for the implementation of its social policy agenda. Successive governments seemed to lack rather
the will to progress towards an adaptation of the welfare state, than the possibility to do so. What
is certainly true, is that the parliamentary opposition had hardly any possibility to impose steps
towards welfare state adaptation on the government. Yet, until the 2000s there have also been
few attempts of oppositional parties to do so. 
Despite  the  high  power  concentration  on  the  government,  parliaments  partly  served  as  a
channel for negotiations between trade unions and the government with regard to health and
pension insurance reform. Until the early 1990s a considerable number of PJ deputies were trade
union representatives, which gave trade unions also parliamentary weight in their negotiations
with the government.(Levitsky 2001: 20)
Without any doubt, social policy plays an important electoral role in virtually all democratic
countries.  As Paul Pierson(2001: 411 – 413) pointed out, in most countries vast parts of the
electorate are in some form social policy beneficiaries, and those who are currently not, expect in
their  big majority that  they may be at  some point  in the future.  Therefore,  voters’  electoral
choices are broadly and intensely affected by matters concerning the welfare state. Due to this
fact, being blamed for welfare state retrenchment can turn out to be very costly for governments.
On the other hand, promising benefit rises or new social programmes before elections, or even
implementing such measures shortly before election day, may help to influence voters’ choices
or to mobilise new voters. In this sense, social policies form part of a wider array of topics that
might convince some voters, and lead to the opposition of others. 
Social policy can also serve to win the support of big organised interest groups, such as trade
unions,  who may possibly be convinced to  support  the electoral  campaign  of  the respective
party.
What has been described is a common democratic process that provides incentives for parties
to reflect the interests of their supporters in social policies. The welfare for votes exchange is
thereby  impersonal  and  usually  concerns  bigger  groups.  This  exchange  usually  takes  place
within the frame of formal institutions.
In the weakly institutionalised political system of Argentina(Levitsky 2001, O'Donnell 2009),
however, the exchange of social assistance benefits for vote and party support is indeed very
personal and direct. To a great extent, individual benefits are exchanged for individual votes and
party support. The institutionalised political patterns of political support and voter mobilisation
via  social  policies,  particularly  assistance  policies,  do  in  large  parts  not  follow  the  before
described patterns of democratic interest representation. 
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Also within parties and the state, and between the state and the trade unions(who control social
health insurances), the assignation of welfare state resources is extensive and intensively used to
mobilise political support, and lacks clear institutionalised rules. As well here, the exchange of
resources for political support is strongly personalised. The federal government has high levels
of  discretion  with  regard  to  the  repartition  of  welfare  state  resources,  and  the  receiving
provincial, local or union leaders have high levels of discretion with regard to how to use these
resources. The Argentinean welfare state bureaucracy has only very limited autonomy, is very
vulnerable to government pressures, suffers frequent exchange of staff and very high levels of
partisan penetration. The strength of the clientelistic informal institutions has to be seen in the
context of these weaknesses of formal institutions.
These particularly clientelistic and co-optive institutionalised patterns of welfare state politics
in  Argentina  played  a  crucial  role  in  hampering  the  effective  transmission  of  poor  and
unemployed voters’ interests into the governments’ social policy agendas. The chapters 3.2. to
3.4., will deal with the clientelistic politics of the Argentinean welfare state in more detail, will
deliver empiric evidence, and show in what ways all this contributed to welfare state adaptation
failure. 
In  this  sense,  the  politics  associated  with  the  Argentinean  welfare  state  show interesting
similarities with those of the Southern European welfare states. Also the latter have provided
ample margins for practices of political clientelism.(Ferrera 1996: 25) So, for example, argued
Maurizio Ferrera(1997: 235/236) with respect to the Italian case that “the expansion of a highly
fragmented  pension  system  offered  ample  opportunities  for  distributing  differentiated
entitlements to selected party clienteles“ and served “as well as privileged currency for the voto
di scambio  (the exchange of preference votes for semilegal or outright illegal concessions of
benefits or other 'favours')”. 
h) A specific approach to analyse the Argentinean experience of welfare state
adaptation failure
So far, several theoretical approaches towards explaining social policy have been discussed
and broadly framed by the Argentinean context. 
The primary focus of this text is on why Argentinean welfare state adaptation has failed in a
context of profound labour market transformations. Therefore, it is useful to remember briefly
the main “contents” of Argentinean welfare state adaptation failure, before I then propose a more
concrete theoretical framework for the following political analysis.
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Pension policies have been most responsive to the deterioration of the Argentinean labour
market.  Despite  increases  in  unemployment  and  informality,  pension  coverage  is  today
significantly higher than it was in 1975. The average real benefit level is lower today, but, in
contrast to the trend of rising inequalities in the society as a whole, inequalities between the
pension benefits have been reduced. The share of the GDP destined to the pension system rose
quicker between 1975 and 2008 than the share of the population at pension age, so that despite
lower average pension levels, the elderly population as a whole increased their  pension income.
The poverty rate for the pension age population is therefore significantly lower than the poverty
rate  for  the society as a  whole,  and even much lower  than  for  the working age population.
(INDEC database) However, pension policies followed significantly different patterns during the
1990s,  leading  to  rising  benefit  inequalities,  falling  coverage  and  rising  poverty  among  the
elderly in that decade. The stricter eligibility criteria and the changed benefit calculation formula
that have been implemented with the 1993 pension reform, and which were two of the main
causes  of  shrinking  coverage  and  rising  benefit  inequality,  are  still  in  force  today.  The
improvements  reached  with  regard  to  benefit  equality  and  coverage  during  the  2000s  were
largely  based  on  temporary  measures.  The  pension  system  has  therefore  not  been  adapted
lastingly to the new labour market reality. Outcomes will deteriorate again if no further reform
steps are taken.
Health policies not only failed to adapt to the changing labour market conditions, but even
aggravated the already severe social consequences of it. The military government radically cut
down expenditure on the public health sector with universal access and shifted expenditure to the
social  health  insurances,  which  were  covering  a  steadily  shrinking  part  of  the  society.  The
following democratic governments did not return to the former, more equitable, distribution of
resources.  During  the  1980s,  the  Alfonsín  government  attempted  to  universalise  the  health
insurance system, but failed to do so, while the Menem government succeeded in introducing
market mechanisms into the system, thereby reducing the already scarce solidarity within it. 
Family policies showed no responsiveness to the deterioration of the labour market and the
increased  female  participation  in  it.  The  military  dictatorship  radically  cut  down  family
allowance expenditure and the following democratic governments maintained the expenditure on
that  low  level.  The  enormous  increase  in  poverty  affected  children  disproportionally
strongly(INDEC database), but the expenditure for family allowances as a share of the GDP was
nearly 60 % lower in 2008 than it had been in 1975, which ultimately exacerbated the problem of
child poverty. The persistently passive role of the state in day care provision makes work and
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family hard to combine, especially for poor households who most urgently require additional
sources of income. It furthermore consolidates old role models that discriminate against women.
Social assistance and unemployment protection policies play a central role when it comes to
protecting against social risks stemming from labour market deterioration. Also expenditure on
this area was drastically reduced by the military government.  Since the return to democracy,
spending on social assistance and unemployment protection has been increasing, but it took until
1998 to recover the pre-dictatorship level. However, that year the poverty rate was nearly five
times, and the unemployment rate nearly three times, as high as in 1975.(Gasparini/Cruces 2010:
5, INDEC database) In 2002, in midst of a deep economic and social crisis, the introduction of
the  so  called  “Programme  for  Unemployed  Heads  of  Household”  implied  a  significant
expenditure increase. However, since then, expenditure was shrinking until the introduction of
the so called “Universal Child Allowance” in late 2009. The resources destined to the respective
programmes  were  clearly  insufficient.  Yet,  another,  not  less  important  issue  is  that  the
impressive quantity of targeted social assistance and employment programmes reached in reality
only a small part of the poor and unemployed population, and benefit levels are until today far
from allowing to escape poverty, even mostly not enough to secure the alimentary needs of an
average poor family. Until 2009 none of the governments established genuine social rights with
regard to the situation of poverty or unemployment. Benefits were not only means-tested and
linked to conditionality, but restricted to a arbitrarily fixed number, which meant that even the
most serious situation of poverty and utmost disposition to fulfil conditionalities did not imply
any  right to  receive  one  of  these  benefits.  Only  the  recently  introduced  “Universal  Child
Allowance”, although being means-tested and tied to conditionalities, constitutes some kind of a
minimal social right. The measure may help to mitigate child poverty, but the benefit level is still
not even sufficient to secure the alimentary needs of an average poor family. Furthermore, the
requirements of the programme exclude all unemployed and poor persons that have no children
under  the age  of  19,  so that  still  today,  after  decades  of  severe  poverty  and unemployment
problems, the situations of unemployment and poverty, as such, do not entitle to social protection
through the state. 
As  the  preceding  theoretical  discussion  has  shown,  the  range  of  potentially  explanatory
factors is very broad. While the empiric evidence suggests that some of the discussed factors
weight heavier than others in the Argentinean case, the interdependence of these factors speaks
against focussing exclusively on a small number of factors. How will this apparent dilemma be
resolved?
147
The  correlations  between  the  central  social  policy  patterns  associated  with  welfare  state
adaptation failure after 1975 on the one hand, and certain potentially explanatory factors on the
other hand, as well as the theoretical plausibility of a causality of these correlations, helped me to
identify four strands of argumentation that seem to largely capture the core political dynamics
behind  welfare  state  adaptation  failure.  These  strands  incorporate  aspects  from virtually  all
theoretical schools identified above, however, concentrate on the elements that have been central
in the Argentinean case. 
The first  strand focuses on the historical  legacy of the welfare state  and shows how past
decisions shape the politics of welfare state adaptation until today. As I have argued in 2.2. and
2.3.,  the  welfare  state  in  force  in  1975 was  designed  for  a  formal,  male  breadwinner,  full
employment labour market, and hence completely unprepared for what came after 1975: rising
informality, unemployment, income inequalities and female labour market participation. Welfare
state adaptation failure is partly due to the difficulties to break with this legacy from the past.
Chapter  3.2.  will  go  back into the history of  the Argentinean  welfare  state  and identify  the
inherited institutionalised political  patterns,  heavily based on co-optation and divide-and-rule
strategies, that channel the politics of the welfare state until today, and that make the embarking
on  a  more  equitable  path  more  difficult.  This  strand  is  particularly  important  for  an
understanding of the failure to adapt the health care system. 
The second strand focuses on the distribution of power resources in the politics of welfare
state adaptation failure. This strand will argue that the shifts in the relations of power, but also
the strategical decisions of, and coalitions between, the different actors involved in welfare state
politics importantly contributes to an understanding of why social policy adaptation failed.  In
3.3. I will argue that both the magnitude and the direction of the change importantly depended on
the distribution of power resources among different classes and interest groups. The deterioration
of the labour market and the process of deindustrialisation weakened the trade union movement.
Rather than being able to request welfare state expansion, it focused on the defence of what has
historically been most important for the trade union elites: the control over the health insurance
system. For trade union leaders this strategy turned out to be relatively successful, as the social
health insurances remained under trade union control and even increased their share of the total
public health expenditure, however, in detriment of the public health sector, which took care of
the poor, the informal and the unemployed workers. By this means, the Argentinean welfare state
continued to fulfil two of its historic functions: co-opting trade union elites and driving a wedge
between the interests of these and the poor, thereby impeding a social policy coalition between
formal labour on the one hand, and informal and unemployed labour on the other.  Although
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growing in size and developing independent organisations, the power resources of the poor, the
unemployed and informal workers, and hence their possibilities to pressure governments towards
respecting  their  interests  in  the  social  policy  agenda,  remained  low  as  long  as  they  were
separated from the rest of the working class, as well as internally fragmented. As has been shown
in 2.1., the restructuring of the Argentinean economy caused mainly one thing: the redistribution
of resources from the poorer strata to the richer, and particularly to the very rich. Along with
their control over ever bigger shares of the GDP, the upper classes also increased their influence
on social policies and successfully pushed towards a step-by-step remodellation of parts of the
welfare state towards their interest, which is reflected in the reduction of solidarity within health
insurances, the partial privatisation of the pension system, the avoidance of a more progressive
tax system and the modification of social insurance contribution rates in favour of employers and
to the detriment of workers. Although feminist movements gained some strength from the late
sixties on, they were far from reaching the influence that their counterparts had conquered in the
industrialised countries, and particularly in Northern Europe.(D’Atri 2005: 2) While in the latter
countries women’s organisations reached considerable influence on the social policy agendas by
massively campaigning for the public provision of day care, Argentinean feminism had some
success in demanding legislative improvements, but was not able to pressure the state towards a
more active role in care issues.(Esping-Andersen 1999: 45, Gil Lozano 2004: 10) 
The  third  strand  will  analyse  why the  return  to  democracy  has  not  led  to  welfare  state
adaptation, despite the fact that a majority of the population would have benefited from it.  The
poor, informal and unemployed workers may have been weak in economic and in organisational
terms, but they have been constituting an increasing share of the electorate. Since the mid 1990s,
the poor alone have constituted between one quarter and one half of the population. Considering
that poverty in Argentina is measured as the insufficiency of income to satisfy the most basic
needs,  this  group  had  extraordinarily  high  interest  in  an  inclusion  into the  social  protection
system. Why then did democracy only imply a limited rise of social assistance expenditure and
little improvements with regard to the health care situation of the poor? - This strand will argue
that  the high levels  of  inequality and  the weak  institutionalisation of  the Argentine  political
system  systematically  restricted  the  possibilities  of  the  economically  weaker  sectors  of  the
society to take advantage of their numerical strength, and to promote their interests with regard
to welfare state adaptation. The extensive use of clientelistic practices importantly hampered the
transmission of the poors’ interests into the social policy agendas of the governments. Besides
directing considerable parts of the poor vote in a direction that did not reflect their long term
interests, welfare state clientelism provided incentives for politicians to avoid the establishment
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of any kind of genuine social right, as this would have significantly reduced the margin for vote-
for-benefit  strategies.  The  undemocratic  structures  of  the  PJ  party,  the  trade  unions  and
increasingly also of organisations of the unemployed, furthermore restricted the possibilities of
the weaker parts of the society to directly influence the political course of the organisations in
which they constituted a majority, or at least a considerable proportion, of the membership. At
the same time, the high concentration of power on, and autonomy of, very view persons on top
of the government strengthened the importance of direct channels of influence, which clearly
favoured the influence of the economic elite. Yet, the latter had considerable interest in avoiding
welfare state adaptation.
The  fourth  strand  focuses  on  the  role  of  neoliberalism  in  the  politics  of  welfare  state
adaptation  failure.  The  analysis  of  the  varying  influence  of  neoliberal  thought  contributes
importantly to an understanding of why welfare state adaptation progressed during the 1980s and
2000s,  but  experienced  significant  setbacks  during  the  military  dictatorship  and  the  1990s.
Voters’ decisions, as well as governments’ decisions, are strongly dependent on what kinds of
solutions are perceived to be possible and/or desirable. In turn, how realities are interpreted, and
what solutions are ultimately favoured, strongly depends on the logic,  respectively the wider
ideological frame, that is applied. In chapter 3.5. I will argue that the prevalence of a neoliberal
logic during the military government(1976 – 1983) and the governments of Carlos Menem(1989
– 1999) and Fernando De la Rúa(1999 – 2001) propelled reforms that further deteriorated the
capacities of the welfare state to respond to the social consequences stemming from the long-
standing labour market deterioration. During the military government the neoliberal logic has
mainly been reflected by the strengthening of meritocratic in detriment of redistributive elements
within the welfare state. The governments of the 1990s introduced market mechanisms in the
health system, partially privatised the pension system and increased the regressiveness of both.
All these social policy measures coincide with the neoliberal logic based on the assumption that
the market is efficient and just. Neoliberalism clearly provided little margin for interpretations
that would favour welfare state adaptation. The latter demanded active state intervention into the
increasingly unequal distribution of wealth generated by the market, while the first precisely was
about  letting the market  do its  work. The heterodox governments  during the 1980s and the
2000s, in contrast,  made some limited steps towards more redistributive and including social
policy.  Meritocratic  elements  have  rather  been  weakened  during  these  periods,  and  the
governments were attempting to increase the role of the state, rather  than the market,  in the
provision of social protection. I will moreover argue, that the prevalence of neoliberal thought in
the  society  during  the  1990s  made  these  policies  electorally  viable  and  helped  to  avoid
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resistance. It will also be dealt with the question of how these shifts between different dominant
ideologies during the last 35 years can be explained.
The argumentation along these strands will form the red line of this text. That distinguishes
the perspective of this political science work from that of a more historical approach, as I will
not attempt to describe each historical incident with detail, but focus on the central dynamics that
can be identified as the parameters of welfare state adaptation failure over longer periods. 
Power certainly constitutes the most recurrent theme of this social policy analysis. Ultimately,
my argument strongly bases on the finding that those who would have benefited from welfare
state adaptation did not possess the power to achieve bigger progress in this direction. Power is
at the same time source and result of other central themes of this text, such as institutions and
prevailing ideologies. Formal and informal institutions often reflect to a considerable degree past
power relations, while at the same time, these institutions can significantly enhance the present
power over social policy of certain actors, and limit the power of others. As I will argue in 3.5.,
also the shifting prevalence of different ideologies, and in particular the prevalence of neoliberal
thinking, has to be seen in the context of shifting power relations between social classes and
interest groups within these. Yet, power relations do not automatically or mechanically translate
into policy outcomes. As the following chapters will show, the way in which the relevant social
forces  organise,  the strategic  and political  decisions they take,  and the coalitions  they forge
considerably influence how strong, and in what way, the societal power relations are reflected in
the welfare state. At the same time, the political strategies of social forces also impact on the
future distribution of power resources. The overall picture resulting from the detailed analyses in
the chapters 3.2. - 3.5. will indicate, that while the abandonment of the import substitution model
triggered structural changes that resulted in an increasing shift of economic and political power
towards  those  actors  who  were  opposed  to  welfare  state  adaptation,  those  social  forces
potentially benefiting from it, largely took strategical decisions, and organised in ways, that were
exacerbating their loss of power, and which proved particularly ineffective for the promotion of
the social policy interests of the social classes they were originating from. 
In  this sense,  the theoretical  approach of this text  shows affinity with the power resource
theory. Yet, at the same time this text criticises the often narrow perspective on power applied by
power resource theory studies. Commonly applied indicators, such as left or labour party and
union  strength,  are  to  narrow  to  adequately  capture  power  relations  in  Argentina.  As  the
Argentinean case shows, labour-based parties can indeed act mainly in the interest of employers,
if  the  latter  manage  to  make governments  and  voters  believe  that  there  would be  no  other
alternative, or that these interests would be the interests of the society as a whole.  This study
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will also show that high unionisation rates do not necessarily favour progressive welfare states,
as, for example, the Argentinean union leaders had strong interests in the preservation of a highly
inequitable health insurance system.
In  contrast  to  several  fairly  influential  social  policy  analyses(e.g.  Pierson  1994/2001,
Haggard/Kaufman 2008), this text assigns only very limited importance to what has been called
a “context of austerity” or “fiscal constraint”. On the one hand, this has to do with the fact that
the evolution of social expenditure shows very little relation to the evolution of fiscal constraints
in the Argentinean case.(see 3.1.  g)  )  On the other  hand, In  my understanding welfare state
adaptation is primarily a question of distributing and redistributing resources rather than of the
overall quantity of societal resources. Fiscal austerity is not an apolitical contextual fact. Often
the same governments that implemented social policy cuts because there was supposedly fiscal
need  to  do so(e.g.  the  governments  of  of  Margaret  Thatcher  or  Gerhard  Schröder),  effected
massive tax cuts that were mainly favouring the well off. In this sense, these governments did
not try to cope with “fiscal austerity”, but to redistribute resources from those who saw their
social  benefits reduced,  mostly poor people,  to those who hitherto  paid the higher  tax rates,
mostly rich people. Similar examples can be found in Argentina. So for example,  excluded the
Menem government hundreds of thousands of mostly poor workers from pension entitlements,
which  was  supposedly  necessary  to  make  the  system  financially  viable,  while  the  same
government  radically  cut  down  employer  contribution  rates.  Furthermore,  the  partial
privatisation of the system, which particularly benefited the financial sector, caused tremendous
transitional costs, which, however,  has not been mentioned in the government's rhetoric about
fiscal constraints.
3.2 Historical legacy and the political economy of the Argentinean
welfare state 
This chapter will analyse central  aspects of the historical  development of the Argentinean
welfare  state.  Rather  than  aiming  at  completeness,  I  will  focus  on  those  aspects  that  will
contribute to a better understanding of why welfare state adaptation has failed after 1975. On the
one hand, there is the institutional welfare state legacy, which matters in the sense that it defines
the need to reform, and also to a certain degree the economic and political costs of such reforms.
Yet, chapter 2.3., where I have classified the institutional setting of the Argentinean welfare state
as corporative-informal, has already dealt with this issue in a sufficient way. On the other hand,
history has shaped the political economy and the politics of the welfare state. This chapter will
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concentrate  on these political  aspects  of  welfare  state  legacy,  which,  as  will  be  seen  in  the
succeeding chapters, played a decisive role with regard to the failure of welfare state adaptation. 
Like in the European corporatist/conservative welfare states, the predominance of the social
insurance principle roots historically in a period of authoritarian rule during the late 19 th and
early 20th century, and has since then been expanded, especially after the Second World War.
However, as will be argued, despite the preservation of the social insurance bias, the particular
political  dynamic associated with the Argentinean welfare state has been decisively modified
during  the  peronist  governments  of  the  1940s and  1950s. As  it  has  been  the case  with  the
European corporatist/conservative welfare states, the introduction of social insurances formed
part  of  strategies  of  containment  towards  the  labour  movement,  aiming  at  the  division,
pacification and deradicalisation of the working class. Later, in the context of democracy and
strong  Christian  democratic  parties,  the  conservative/corporatist  welfare  state  type  arguably
continued to be part of similar strategies, although conservative authors may prefer to speak of
‘harmonisation’ rather than containment and pacification. Either way, a certain continuity can
hardly be doubted. In contrast, peronism marks a profound rupture with regard to the strategic
political  aims pursued through social  policies.  While before containment was the aim, Perón
used the welfare state to mobilise and politicise the labour movement. Yet, in contrast to the
socialist governments of Northern Europe, Perón had little interest in a real empowerment of the
working class. The project was about building up massive but controlled labour support for a
government that stood ideologically rather on the right. A strong independent labour movement
was far from being in Perón’s interest. Rather than empowering the labour movement, the aim
was to co-opt it.
In what follows I will argue, that the strategic rupture during the peronist years(1943 – 1955)
lastingly reshaped the politics of the Argentinean welfare state. These years have moulded the
social  policy interests of different  groups,  and have modified the articulation between social
policy actors, in a way that distinguishes the Argentinean welfare state regime from that of most
European conservative/corporatist welfare states. During the decades succeeding this rupture, the
particular political dynamic associated with the Argentinean welfare state has been perpetuated.
As  will  be  evidenced  in  the  consecutive  chapters,  serious  impediments  for  welfare  state
adaptation stem from this legacy. 
a) The early roots of the Argentinean welfare state, 1823 – 1943 
From the early 19th century on, the state became an indirect social policy actor in Argentina,
operating via the so called “Charity Societies”(Sociedades de Beneficencia). The first Charity
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Society was  founded  in  1823 by the  governor  of  the Province  of  Buenos  Aires,  Bernadino
Rivadavia. Although it was a civil society charity organisation and administrated by women of
the economic and political elite, it was in big parts financed by the state. For the ‘high society’
the membership in the Charity Society was a symbol of prestige and a source of legitimisation.
The organisation provided social assistance on a highly discretionary basis and often tied the
benefits  to  disciplining  conditionalities  and  moral  paternalism.(Moreno  2004:  73  –  76,
Passanante 1987: 30/31) 
Later in the 19th century, the state assumed a central role in the provision of education, and a
minor role regarding health care,  mainly concentrating on the avoidance of epidemics.(Isuani
2008: 171/172) 
During that time, another form of protection against health risks originated in the civil society.
Between the mid-late 19th and early 20th century a multitude of friendly societies was founded.
Most commonly these organised around groups of immigrants according to their nationality or
religion. They constituted basically networks for mutual aid, and many of them adopted the form
of insurance societies that covered health care provision among other things. In 1914, there were
about 1,200 friendly societies with over 500,000 members.(Passanante 1987: 66 – 71) Only 7 %
of these friendly societies were controlled by trade unions. Nevertheless, the friendly societies
laid the foundations for the posterior creation of the social health insurance system, in which the
trade unions were going to play the dominant role.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 118)
Until  the early 20th century only a very small  group of  members  of  the army,  and some
employees of the public sector, had access to some kind of pension.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998:
116) The first genuine pension laws date back to 1904 and 1915.(Passanante 1987: 126) The
introduction of these pension schemes were initiatives  of  the government,  used as means of
containment,  division  and  deradicalisation  of  the  labour  movement.  At  that  time,  publicly
provided  pension  insurance  coverage  was  not  on  the  agendas  of  the  trade  unions.  On  the
contrary,  the  predominantly  anarchist  trade  unions  of  that  time  were  very  critical  of  these
policies.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 116) As was the case in most European countries, the first to
get pension funds were the federal civil servants in 1904, followed by the strategically important
railway workers in 1915. According to Aldo Isuani(1985: 122), the introduction of a pension
fund for railway workers was as an attempt of the state to reduce the conflicts in this strategically
important sector. During 1912, the railway workers had carried out a general strike for higher
wages and improvements regarding the work regulations. However, pension insurance was not
among the demands of the strike. The introduction of the pension insurance was therefore not a
compromise between the state and the labour movement, but the attempt of the former to contain
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the latter. For this purpose, the law included an article that provided incentives for workers not to
participate in strikes, as it determined that anyone who lost his or her job due to strike activities
also lost the right to a pension and all the contributions made until that date.(Isuani 1985: 122
and 2008: 173) During the first democratic period, two further occupational groups with strategic
importance were provided with pension systems, utility workers in 1921 and bank employees in
1923.(Lewis/Lloyd-Sherlock  2009:  117)  Despite  democratic88 elections,  the  oligarchy  still
exerted  hegemonic  influence  over  the  state,  while  the  working  class  was  only very  weakly
represented  in  it.  This  had  not  only  to  do  with  the  radicalism  of  big  parts  of  the  labour
movement, but also with the fact that vast parts of the incipient working class were immigrants
that  had  still  not  attained  political  rights.(Isuani  1985:  117/118)  In  1939,  Journalists,  print
workers  and  merchant  seaman  were  provided  with  pension  schemes.(Lewis/Lloyd-Sherlock
2009: 117, Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 116)
Until the 1940s, the state was firmly dominated by the landowning oligarchy.(Isuani 1985:
117, O’Donnell1977: 530) The labour movement, rather than demanding social policy from the
state, principally focussed on wage increases and better work conditions.(Isuani 1985: 122) Up
to the First World War, anarchist ideas dominated in the trade union movement. Later socialists,
and to a lesser extent communists, increased their influence, eventually becoming the leading
currents within the trade union movement during the 1930s.(Hänsch/Riekenberg 2008: 73/74) 
Although the Argentinean welfare state has its historical  roots in this period, the scope of
social policy in pension, health and social assistance remained low until the 1940s.(Isuani 2008:
170 – 174)
b) Import substitution industrialisation and the peronist way of expanding the
welfare state, 1943 – 1955
With  the  rise  of  peronism  during  the  1940s,  the  Argentinean  welfare  state  initiated  its
expansive phase. As has been mentioned, the political strategy associated with peronist welfare
state expansion lastingly moulded Argentinean welfare state politics. To be able to understand
this particularity of the Argentinean case, it is necessary to briefly embed the expansion of social
policy in a wider historico-political context. 
Until the 1930s the development of industries was limited in Argentina. Existing industries
were  usually  associated  with  foreign  capital  and  mainly  processed  agricultural  products.
However, after the economic crisis of the early 1930s, and especially with the initiation of the
88 Yet, it has to be considered that women were not allowed to vote and that many immigrants had still not attained
political rights, so that in reality only a minority of the population possessed electoral rights.
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Second World War, a number of national industries was build up that produced several hitherto
imported products. This incipient  trend of import  substitution was further deepened after the
military coup of June 1943, which brought a military group to power that aimed at increasing the
autarky of the country through the development of national industries. The consolidation of the
import  substitution  strategy(ISI)  propelled  the  emergence  of  a  national  urban  industrial
bourgeoisie, which was not only relatively independent from foreign capital, but also from the
class of big landowners.(Rofman/Romero 1997: 163/164)
Under this military dictatorship Perón led the secretariat of labour. From this post he pursued
policies that promoted, among others, income increases for workers. On the one side, this made
him very popular in the working class and increased therefore his power base. On the other side,
these  policies  were  also  supposed  to  contribute  to  the  strengthening of  the national  market,
something that  was considered vital  for a successful  expansion of national  industries. At the
same time, the government implemented policies that implied a significant transfer of resources
from the agricultural to the industrial sector.(Rofman/Romero 1997: 165/166) By this means, the
military dictatorship broke with the long-standing hegemony of the class of big landowners.
Beneficiaries of these policies were particularly those industrial sectors that were focussing on
the national market, and due to the necessity to enforce the local demand, also the working class.
(Birle 1996: 206 – 210) 
The groups benefiting from these policies also constituted the social forces that were going to
sustain and defend the model of import substitution industrialisation over the following 30 years.
Yet, alliances between the labour movement and parts of the industrial bourgeoisie are not a very
common phenomenon, and there is a wide range of material and ideological reasons for which
these  two  sectors  are  usually  adversaries  rather  than  allied  forces.  To  understand  this
phenomenon, and its consequences for the politics of the welfare state, it is necessary to briefly
analyse some features of the class structure of the Argentinean society during that period.
In contrast to most Latin American countries, but also most European countries, the peasantry
has  historically  been  only  a  very  small  group  in  Argentina.  The  majority  of  the  land  was
concentrated in the hands of relatively few big landowners. Due to the large territory and the
relatively small population, the land was exploited extensively rather than intensively. By this
means, the aim was not to produce the maximum possible per square footage, but the maximum
possible per rural worker, which resulted in comparatively high work productivity. In addition to
that, the scarcity of labour, in face of the virtual absence of a poor peasantry, and the high labour
demand implied that wages in Argentina were relatively high during the 19th and big part of the
20th century.  The high wages had ultimately also the purpose to attract new immigrants from
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Europe. When the labour demand of the agricultural sector started to decline during the 1930s,
the initiating process of import substitution industrialisation simultaneously increased the labour
demand in the industry. Thus, persistently favourable labour market conditions put the working
class in a relatively strong position.(O’Donnell 1977: 526 – 531) 
For  these  reasons,  the  labour  movement  was  potentially  a  powerful  political  ally  for  the
construction of a national industry focussed development model. Moreover, the working class
and the national market focussed industrial bourgeoisie shared a common economic interest in
the strengthening of the local demand. To strengthen the national market real wage increases
were necessary, which, for obvious reasons, found support from the labour movement. However,
it would have been a kind of a zero sum game if the wage increases were to be financed through
the industrial sector alone, as in a protected market employers would have been able to transmit
higher  wages  into higher  product  prices.  At this  point,  food prices  as  an instrument for  the
transfer of resources from the rural to the urban sector came into play. As workers during that
period spent a relatively big share of their wages on food, low food prices implied higher real
wages and more opportunity for the consumption of other non-agricultural products, something
that  was not only in the interest  of the workers,  but  also of the sectors  of  the industry that
produced for the national market. In this sense, by implementing measures to keep local food
prices relatively low, the government was reducing the returns of the landowners and increasing
the prospects of the urban sector, including both the working class and the national industries.
During some periods of import substitution industrialisation, the state additionally skimmed a
part of the revenue from agricultural exports and used it for infrastructure projects and subsidies,
which as well  proved advantageous for the industrial sector.  Of course,  this interest  was not
shared by the landowning oligarchy, who earned less while food prices were kept artificially low
and while  the state  skimmed a part  of  their  export  revenue.  Hence,  the ISI  model  provided
important economic incentives for a strategic alliance between the labour movement and parts of
the national industrial bourgeoisie. 
In  practice,  this  alliance  found  its  main  expression  in  the  peronist  movement  and  its
organisational  pillars,  the  “General  Labour  Confederation”(Confederación  General  de
Trabajo/CGT),  which  represented  the  trade  union  movement,  and  the  “General  Economic
Confederation”(Confederación  General  Económica/CGE),  which  represented  most  small  and
medium size industrial companies.(Basualdo 2001: 39, O’Donnell 1977: 533 – 546)  
The  welfare  state  was  both,  affected  by the  composition  of  this  alliance,  and  serving  to
construct  it.  As  has  been  mentioned,  the  peasantry  played  hardly  any  significant  role  in
Argentina.  Therefore,  also during times of democracy,  a  labour-peasantry alliance,  as it  was
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formed  in  the  Scandinavian  countries,  was  not  an  option.  The  existence  of  a  big  peasantry
provides important incentives for the labour movement to promote universalistic social policies.
First of all, a high number of poor peasants, as well as of unemployed workers, increases the
benefits of universalistic social policies for the labour movement, as the universal access to a
certain  minimum  standard,  and  de-commodifying  social  policies  in  general,  reduce  the
downward pressure that these groups exert on wages. Secondly, social insurance schemes are not
very attractive for peasants. Yet, if labour parties wanted to win the vote of the peasantry in the
quest for electoral  majorities, they had to propose social protection that would also serve the
peasants’ interests. On this background,  the alliance between labour and peasantry propelled,
according to Esping-Andersen(1990: 65 – 68), the introduction of universalistic social policies in
Scandinavia. This type of alliance was moreover relatively well compatible with the socialist
ideas that prevailed in the European labour movements, as the alliance was built  around the
solidarity between two underprivileged groups. However, the situation in Argentina was totally
different.  Neither  did the labour  movement  face  the  competition of  a  cheap  “labour  reserve
army”, such as a high number of unemployed or an extensive peasantry, nor was there the option
of such an alliance. The peronist alliance instead contained a part of the bourgeoisie, that shared,
in  the  particular  case  of  Argentina,  a  common interest  with  the  labour  movement.  Yet,  the
bourgeoisie  had  no  interest  in  redistributive  tax  financed  universalistic  social  policy
arrangements. In turn, a social health and pension insurance system, based on occupational group
specific  stratification,  was  not  the  worst  option  for  them.  The  contribution  based  financing
implied that they could avoid high tax levels, and the occupational group specific stratification
relieved  them from forced  solidarity.  The stratification  along  occupational  groups  moreover
distinguished them from workers in that they had their own insurance funds, which provided
higher quality and benefits. 
Despite the economic incentives that the ISI model provided, the formation of a cross-class
alliance with part of the bourgeoisie,  and the implications of this coalition for social and tax
policies, somewhat conflicted with the socialist and communist ideas that were dominant in the
Argentinean trade union movement at that time. Most trade union leaders during the early 1940s
came from either of the two currents.(Doyon 1984: 205, Torre 1989: 546) Well, then, how was
peronism able to incorporate the labour movement, particularly the trade unions, into a coalition
with a class that usually constituted its adversary, and that hardly served for the implementation
of policies based on the principle of solidarity?
Organised  labour,  and  especially  trade  union  elites,  have  always  been  confronted  with
conflicting interests  regarding social  protection.  On the one hand, universalistic  tax financed
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programmes clearly fitted better with the concept of solidarity and the socialist ideas that, at least
during the early 1940s, were predominating in the trade union movement. On the other hand, the
control over insurance funds constituted an attractive source of both financial and organisational
power.(Esping-Andersen 1990: 68) This potential power resource was of particular interest of
those who effectively held power in the unions, the trade union leaders. Yet, where trade unions
were democratic and trade union leaders  had to compete for  the leadership,  these could not
deviate too strongly from the interests of their rank and file. As has recently been argued, at that
time the Argentinean labour market and class structure minimized the strategic advantage for the
trade unions’ negotiation power that would have resulted from the introduction of universalistic
and de-commodifying social policies. While the cross class alliance was unlikely to find consent
about  a  progressive  and  redistributive  tax  system,  the  labour  movement  was  somehow
compensated through income redistribution vía real wage increases, which were partly financed
through transfers from the rural sector. This certainly contributed to the disposition of the trade
union leaders, and possibly also part of the rank and file, to deepen a social policy path largely
based on social insurances that implied a comparatively low degree of solidarity. Under these
circumstances, the control over social insurances was potentially a strong currency for the co-
optation of trade union leaders. Yet, if these were to be integrated lastingly into an alliance with
a part of the bourgeoisie, and if co-option was to function in the long rather than just the short
run, it was necessary to drive a wedge between the trade union leadership and the socialist and
communist ideas that hitherto predominated within the trade union movement. Furthermore, co-
optation does work best when leaders have large margins of autonomy from their rank and file,
as this allows them to a greater extent to pursue personal interests, which usually are of great
importance in co-optation processes. Autonomous leaders can more easily be co-opted by offers
that do not necessarily benefit the respective trade union as a whole, let alone the working class
as  a whole,  but  primarily the leader  on a personal  level.  In  the following I  will  argue,  that
peronism, in order to secure the support of the labour movement, exactly did what the recently
expressed  thoughts  suggest.  The  trade  union  leadership  was  ‘peronised’  and  socialist  or
communist  stances  were  repressed.  The  leaders  were  furnished  with  ample  autonomy with
respect to their rank and file, while they were made increasingly dependent on the state.(Goldin
1997:  122)  Thereby,  social  insurances  and  the  related  financial  and  organisational  power
resources constituted a key currency for the co-option of trade union leaders.
Since 1943, Perón began to systematically restructure the union movement,  a process that
reached such a profoundness that the Argentinean trade union specialist and law scholar Adrián
Goldin(1997: 20) speaks of a virtual refoundation of the trade union system. 
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In  1943,  hardly  20  %  of  the  urban  labour  force  had  been  organised  in  trade  unions.
(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 119/120) Yet,  with the support  of Perón the trade unions became
powerful  organisations  within  very  short  time.  Overall  trade  union  membership  increased
impressively  under  Perón’s  government,  from  529,000  in  1945  to  1,533,000  in  1948  and
2,257,000 in 1954.(Doyon 1975: 154/158)
However,  the  support  for  the trade  union movement  was  not  without  costs  for  the  trade
unions. Rather than being result of pro trade union believes, Perón saw his relation to the labour
movement in pragmatic terms. Indeed, the military dictatorship under which Perón became head
of the department  of labour was conservative and saw in the uncontrolled labour movement
primarily a threat to the social and economic peace.(Doyon 1984: 207) During a first period, the
main instrument used by this government to contain the labour movement, although with little
success, was repression. A big number of trade union leaders was arrested and their unions put
under inspection of the state. However, the movement seemed not to be disposed to relinquish
their strike activity. It  was Perón’s idea to complement the strategy of repression with that of
selective rewards, transforming thereby a predominantly hostile relation into one of carrots and
sticks and divide and rule. Rewards were conceded to those unions that were disposed to give up
militant  positions  and  demands that  conflicted  with the  interests  of  the  government.  So,  for
example,  did  the  railway  workers’  trade  union  receive  subsidies  for  their  hospitals  and  a
lowering of the repressive measures against the union, other unions received government support
in collective wage bargaining, while again other unions faced repression as they were not willing
to subordinate,  and so on. At the same time, Perón promoted several  measures that strongly
improved the life quality of the working class as a whole. Perón’s disposition to reward parts of
the labour movement have also been related to his ambitions to increase his personal power by
building up a support basis outside the military, and ultimately to become presidential candidate
after a future return to democracy. However, adversaries within the military saw Perón’s relation
to the labour movement with increasing suspicion. In  1945, these critics finally achieved his
arrest.  Yet,  Perón  had  not  only  progressed  towards  taming  the  unions,  he  had  made  them
powerful supporters. Shortly after his arrest the CGT organised mass demonstrations demanding
the liberation of Perón. Finally the government had to give in to these demands. The forced
liberation decisively weakened Perón’s adversaries within the military, which enabled Perón to
assume a  leading role  again,  and  finally  to  assert  himself  as  the regime’s  candidate for  the
presidential elections in 1946. With the support of a majority of the working class vote, Perón
became elected president against a broad coalition that included besides parties of the right and
the centre also communists and socialists.(Cramer 1999: 302 – 308, Torre 1989: 539) 
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Once president, Perón deepened his strategy of expanding and centralising the trade union
movement,  at  the same time that  he pushed its  co-optation forward.(Mainwaring 1982:  515,
Torre 1989: 547) His government  regulated the trade union system according to its  political
needs.  The state was thereby furnished with ample faculties to intervene into the union life,
which largely persist  until today.  So, for example,  could the state control  the statutes of the
unions,  decide which union was allowed to conduct  wage bargaining in each sector,  resolve
disputes between trade unions about areas of representation, supervise internal elections, suspend
the right to undertake wage bargaining, and so on. The trade unions themselves became strongly
centralised and hierarchical under Perón. The monopoly of one trade union per sector and the
lack of internal democracy made trade union elites highly autonomous of their own rank and file.
They neither faced internal competition via democratic mechanisms, nor external competition
via competing trade union organisations.(Goldin 1997: 21 - 25) While  usually union internal
democracy serves as a means to guarantee the representation of the rank and file’s interests
through its elected leaders, the trade union system installed by the peronist government made
union leaders highly independent from the preferences of their rank and file. Participation in
union elections was mostly very low. This may had to do with the fact that workers usually did
not have any real choice in these elections, as vote was by list, and there were no oppositional
lists in the majority of the cases. Moreover, the manipulation of the results was a very common
feature of these elections. The privileged position of union leaders at the top of the bureaucratic
hierarchy facilitated them to control internal media, election processes, financial resources, and
so on, which obstructed the formation of oppositional lists.(Torre 1974:  534 – 539) An empiric
study of Juan Carlos Torre(1974: 539 – 542), referring to the years 1957 to 1972, shows that
changes in the trade union leadership of the 25 biggest trade unions have hardly ever been the
result of union elections. In contrast, several union leaders lost control over their unions due to
state intervention. For this reason, union leaders were barely forced to represent the interests of
their rank and file. Their survival in office depended much stronger on processes that occurred
within  the  trade  union  elite  or  between  the  leaders  and  the  state.  According  to  Adrián
Goldin(1997: 25/26) this situation has hardly changed during the following decades. Under these
circumstances,  the  trade  union  elite  was  separated  from its  former  socialist  and  communist
influences and converted into an integral  part of the peronist movement and the alliance that
sustained the ISI model.
According  to  Hänsch  and  Riekenberg(2008:  77),   classical  conservative  ideas  and  the
influence  of  the  catholic  church  had some influence  on the  social  policy programme of  the
military government between 1943 and 1945. Yet, the recurrent theme leading Perón’s social
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policy agenda was rather pragmatic: the co-optation of the labour movement. Finally, during the
1950s the relation between Perón and the catholic church became even openly conflictive. The
social insurance system formed an essential part of the established relationship between the state
and the trade unions. As has been said, the trade union leaders had strong interests in the control
over  the  social  health  insurances.  While  some  trade  unions,  like  for  example  the  railway
workers’ union, maintained a kind of social insurance in form of a friendly society, the majority
of the members of friendly societies were affiliated to trade union independent organisations.
(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 118, Belmartino 2005b: 127/128) The railway trade union is a very
good example, as subsidies for the trade union’s health facilities constituted the main component
of the deal with which Perón negotiated the political support of the union.(Belmartino 2005b:
127/128/132, Cramer 1999: 302 – 308) The overall importance of the health insurance system in
co-opting trade union leaders becomes clear if we remember that before peronism only a small
minority(around 7 %) of friendly society affiliates belonged to union controlled societies, while
afterwards trade unions passed to control the majority of affiliates89.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998:
118) For the government, the union control over most of the health insurance funds constituted a
handy instrument for sticks and carrots tactics. These often implied extra resources for social
health insurances of union leaders that were loyal to the government, whereby these were able to
offer their rank and file privileges that finally consolidated the respective trade union leader’s
position, while critical leaders ran danger of being eventually replaced, as without state support
they were neither able to achieve comparable successes in wage bargaining nor were they able to
offer the privileges that other social health insurances were offering. These privileges were not
restricted to health care provision, but frequently included cheap holidays, subsidised credits, and
so on.(Passanante 1987: 128) The lack of regulation allowed trade union elites high degrees of
discretion in the administration of the health insurance funds, so that resources could easily be
misused for very personal political and economic interests.(Belmartino 2005b: 132) In this sense,
a  largely  trade  union controlled,  occupational  specific  social  health  insurance  system was  a
pragmatic decision of the Peronist government. It did not only contribute to forge a more or less
stable  alliance  between  two  classes  that  are  commonly  adversaries,  but  it  also  enabled  the
government to drive the wedge further between the trade union elites and the socialist ideas that
had formerly prevailed in the trade unions. From that point on, the expansion, or at least the
preservation, of the health insurance system constituted one of the primary interests of the trade
89According to María Ines Passanante(1987: 140), 65.8 % of the affiliates were members in trade union controlled
health insurance funds in 1976.
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union elites. As will be seen later, all attempts to reform the system against their interest largely
failed during the following decades.(Belmartino 2005a: 112, 2005b: 132)
Also the pension insurance system was expanded rapidly from 1944 on. Trade unions were
given participation in the administration of the funds, although in a more limited way than in the
health insurance system.(Isuani 2008: 174 – 176, Passanante 1987: 126) In 1944 the “National
Pension Institute”(Instituto Nacional  de Previsión Social) was created,  but  the pension funds
continued to be organised in line with occupational groups.(Passanante 1987: 126/127) The same
year shop workers were included in the system, followed by industrial workers in 1946. In 1954,
rural  workers,  university  teachers,  self-employed,  managers  and  entrepreneurs  got  pension
schemes.  The peronist  government  furthermore  switched  the modus operandi  of  the pension
system from capitalisation to pay-as-you-go financing.(Isuani 2008: 175)
Simultaneously with the expansion and reorganisation of the social insurances, some sectors
of  the  peronist  government  supported  the  construction  of  a  universalistic  public  health  care
system. In 1943 the “Public Health and Social Assistance Office”(Dirección Nacional de Salud
Pública y Asistencia Social) was created, which integrated the Charity Society, including their
health care facilities. In 1946, the public health office got the status of a ministry. It was presided
by Dr. Ramón Carrillo who pushed towards a further expansion and centralisation of the public
health sector.(Passanante 1987: 129/130, Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 118) During the 1940s and
1950s the state developed a relatively broad network of publicly funded hospitals and smaller
health care facilities. The ministry of health was the driving force behind this expansion.(Lloyd-
Sherlock 2006: 357) The parallel existence of a universalistic public health sector and a social
health insurance sector implied a certain rivalry. While most trade unions and the private health
care providers supported the social health insurance system, the poor, but also low earning trade
union sectors,  supported  the  public  health  system.(Passanante  1987:  142)  Yet,  the  poor  had
support from the health system technocrats of that time. On international level the idea prevailed
that a unified and universalistic state run health system would be the most efficient  solution.
(Belmartio  2005a:  105)  This  rivalry  found  its  expression  on  ministerial  level  between  the
ministry of health on the one hand, and the ministry of labour and welfare on the other, which
pursued the expansion of the union controlled social health insurance system.(Lloyd-Sherlock
2006: 357) While the former was influenced by positions that prevailed among health sector
technocrats of the time, the latter represented the pragmatic side of peronism, recurring to social
policy as a means of incorporating trade unions into the peronist movement.(Belmartio 2005a:
105, 2005b: 127/128)
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Another  area  where  the  ministry  of  labour  proved  capable  of  mobilising  support  for  the
government was social assistance. Until 1943 the state participated mainly in a indirect way in
the provision of social assistance through the Charity Society. Only with the rise of peronism the
state expanded its own activity. In 1943 the Charity Society was integrated into the public health
and social assistance office and short time later tied to the ministry of labour.(Moreno 2004:
78/79, Passanante 1987: 130/131) The transfer of the responsibility for social assistance policies
from the public health office to the ministry of labour was more than just  an organisational
decision. As has been said, while the former ministry was inspired by the universalistic ideas
prevailing in technocratic circles of the health sector, the latter was rather pragmatic and adapted
its  actions  according  to  the  political  necessities  of  the  peronist  project.(Belmartino  2005a:
105/106) In 1946, the government intervened in the Charity Society and finally resolved it in
1948. Most of its functions passed to the new “Eva Perón Foundation”(Fundación Eva Perón),
which was led by the president’s wife. This foundation continued with several aspects of the
modus operandi of the “Charity Society”. The funds came predominantly from the state and the
assignation  of  social  assistance  was  handled  discretionary.(Moreno  2004:  78/79,  Passanante
1987: 130/131) Like the former Charity Society, Eva Perón did not pursue the establishment of
social rights. Each case was dealt separately and arbitrarily. While the social security systems for
formal  workers  massively expanded  with  peronism,  social  assistance  policies  for  the  hardly
organised groups outside the formal labour market remained highly residual.(Cramer 1999: 301)
Yet, while the Charity Society’s paternalism was primarily of moralistic nature, the actions of
the Eva Perón Foundation were led by the political aims of the peronist government.(Golbert
2008:  27/28)  By  this  means,  social  assistance  became  an  important  instrument  of  political
clientelism, which, as will be seen later, it constitutes until today. Yet, the use of state resources
for  the  clientelistic  mobilisation  of  voters  and  political  supporters  was  not  new.  The  first
democratic Argentinean governments(UCR) between 1916 and 1930 already extensively used
state resources to redistribute jobs, medical and legal aid among their supporters via local party
leaders in the neighbourhoods.(Hänsch/Riekenberg 2008: 79/80) 
Not only were social assistance policies for the poor highly residual and discretionary,  but
also  formal  workers  lacked  any  kind  of  unemployment  insurance.  Very  likely  the  long-
standingly favourable labour market situation contributed to the assessment that  unemployment
was a temporal problem that could be tackled through the regulation of severance payments and
job  stability.(Barbeito/Lo  Vuolo  1998:  179  –  183,  Lo  Vuolo  1998b:  240)  Based  on  this
assessment  the  universalisation  of  social  protection  was  pursued  indirectly  via  the
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universalisation of formal employment and the incorporation of the core family into the social
insurance of the working head of household.(Lo Vuolo 1998a: 35)
 In  difference to most industrialised countries,  but also in contrast  to most countries with
similar level of development(Melo 2007: 115), redistributive policies in Argentina were scarcely
pursued through fiscal  means, such as progressive taxation and income transfer programmes.
The  central  instrument  with  which  the  Argentinean  state  intervened  in  the  distribution  of
incomes was active wage policy making, which ranged from exerting influence on the process of
collective wage bargaining to actually fixing nominal wages. These policies were furthermore
combined with other measures to sustain the real value of wages, like price controls for so called
“wage  goods”90(mainly food),   subsidies  for  manufacturing industries,  protection of  national
industries against imports and an overvaluation of the national currency91.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo
1998: 182/184, Foders/Glismann 1985: 171)
c) Political instability and the perpetuation of the welfare state, 1955 – 1976
Between 1955 and 1976 the political system of Argentina has been highly unstable. Military
dictatorships alternated with periods of, mostly restricted, democracy. However, the welfare state
has been perpetuated during this period, and its main institutional and political characteristics
have been consolidated.(Barbeito/Goldberg 2007: 188, Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 149) To better
understand this contrast between government instability and welfare state stability it is necessary
to  embed both  in  the  wider  historico-political  context.  Despite  the  fact  that  after  1976 this
context changed quite significantly with the abandonment of the ISI strategy, an understanding
of the consolidation process of the political  patterns associated with the Argentinean welfare
state importantly contributes to an explanation of why welfare state adaptation failed during the
following 35 years.  
Perón’s  strategy  was  impressively  successful  with  regard  to  making  the  PJ  electorally
dominant. Between 1946 and 1983 the peronist party did not lose any free election. The electoral
dominance was so strong that even when the military government,  that overthrew Perón and
prohibited  his  party,  called  for  elections  of  a  constitutional  assembly,  peronism reached  the
90 They are called “wage goods” because wage earners spend big parts of their income on them.
91 In 2.1. I have argued that the overvaluation of the currency in the context of trade openness had severe negative
impacts on wages in the medium and long run. However, during the period of import substitution industrialisation
importation was strictly limited. In this context, overvaluation served as a means to keep exportable goods relatively
cheap on the national market, which had positive effects on the real value of wages. This is especially true if we
consider that the main export good of Argentina has been food, which at the same time constitutes a big part of
workers’ consumption. 
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biggest quantity of votes in form of spoiled ballots.(Golbert 2008: 30) Yet, electoral dominance
was not enough to keep peronism in power. Why has this been so?
Guillermo O’Donnel(1977: 531 – 546) provides a very interesting analysis of the instability
of the political system during this period. While electorally dominant, the peronist cross-class
alliance had economically and organisationally very powerful adversaries. The hitherto dominant
class of big landowners, and particularly their most powerful organisation the “Argentine Rural
Society”(Sociedad  Rural  Argentina/SRA),  were  permanently  opposing  the  ISI  model  and
demanding a more liberal export oriented course. In practice, their most common demand was
currency devaluation as this would have increased their export revenue and led to a rise of local
food prices,  thereby reverting the rural-urban resource transfer.   Furthermore,  the cross-class
alliance  included,  besides  labour,  mostly  small  and  medium  size  industrial  companies  that
produced for the local  market and had low participation of foreign capital, while the biggest
companies  did  not  organise  in  the  CGE but  in  the  “Industrial  Union  of  Argentina”(Unión
Industrial  Argentina/UIA).  The  pendular  positioning  of  the  most  concentrated  and
internationalised business sectors, principally represented through the UIA, implied that neither
of the two opposed power blocs was able to lastingly establish a dominant position92. During
democratic  times  the  peronist  alliance  proved  more  influential,  while  during  military
dictatorships the latter group was able to stronger impose their will.  However, the standoff was
virtually permanent, so that also the military dictatorships experienced severe restrictions due to
massive  waves  of  strike  activity  and  factory  occupations,  while  the  (semi)democratic
governments  of  Frondizi(1958  –  1962)  and  Illia(1963  –  1966)  had  to  comply  with  several
demands of the military, such as the prohibition of the peronist party or the currency devaluation
effected in 1959.(O’Donnell 1977: 531 – 546)
The situation of a permanent power standoff and political instability implied that neither of
the governments following the overthrow of Perón in 1955 was able to completely impose their
interests. In the absence of free elections, which was the case during most of the period, voter
preferences became less important,  while governments had to be increasingly sensible to the
interests of the strongest organised groups, as in a virtual situation of standoff these were easily
able to destabilise the respective government.(Golbert 2008: 43) Under these circumstances, the
expansion of social insurance schemes served as a key instrument for the containment of trade
92 The reasons for the  pendular  positioning of the UIA are very well  explained in Guillermo O’Donnell’s  text
”Estado y alianzas en la Argentina, 1956 – 1976“(1977). Basically this sector pursued its short term interests, which,
depending on the situation of the balance of payments,  rather coincided with  the landowners’ call for currency
devaluation at one time, or with the CGT and CGE’s call for a reactivation of the national market at another time.
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union resistance. Weakly organised groups, such as for example the poorer sectors, were hardly
able  to  influence  social  polices,  which  further  deepened  the  insider-outsider  divide  already
inherent to the welfare state.  
After the government of Perón was overthrown by a military coup in 1955, the Eva Perón
Foundation was immediately closed. Although it was replaced by a return to the Charity Society,
the following dictatorial government showed little interest in social assistance policies, reducing
social assistance expenditure to a minimum.(Golbert 2008: 27 – 30) Also the financing of the
universalistic public health sector was scaled back significantly.(Lloyd-Sherlock 2006: 357) 
While  the  weakest  groups  clearly  faced  an  exacerbation  of  their  already  poor  social
protection, organised labour obtained several important social policy improvements in the face of
a wave of strikes and factory occupations.(Golbert 2008: 30, Lloyd-Sherlock 2006: 357) So, for
example, in 1957 the military government introduced family allowance funds, which were based
on the social insurance principle.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 123) The government also increased
pension coverage and renewed collective agreements. With the constitutional reform of 1957, the
government even included a wide range of social rights for workers into the constitution.(Golbert
2008: 30) With the incorporation of the domestic servants in 1956, virtually all occupational
groups  were  theoretically  covered  by  the  pension  system.(Lewis/Lloyd-Sherlock  2009:  117)
Although, the number of affiliates to the pension system rose to 4,892,000 in 1954, real coverage
never reached universality, due to the persistence of an important informal sector and widespread
evasion.(Lewis/Lloyd-Sherlock 2009: 116) In 1958, the government of Arturo Frondizi(UCR-I)
fixed ordinary pension levels at 82 % of the wage during the last years immediately before the
retirement.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 121) Pension increases were matched with the wage levels
resulting  from collective  agreements  in  each  occupational  group.  The system was  relatively
complex due to the high number of collective agreements, yet, it increased the unions’ influence,
as these were directly negotiating pension adjustments through collective wage bargaining. 
Initially,  the  pension  system  produced  surpluses  due  to  the  favourable  relation  between
working  and  retired  population.  These  were  frequently  used  for  other  types  of  public
expenditure. However, the high replacement rate and the deterioration of the relation between
contributors and beneficiaries implied that already during the mid 1960s pension funds ceased to
make surpluses.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 121, Cetrángolo/Grushka 2008: 12) 
During the years 1968 and 1969 the military government in power at that time introduced a
single wage coefficient that was applied for the indexation of all pension benefits. Replacement
rates were fixed at 70 % – 82 % of the average of the three years with the highest wage within
the last  ten years  before  retirement,  depending  on the  number of  years  worked.(Arza  2009:
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14/18) Simultaneously,  the fragmented system was unified into three  big funds,  yet,  several
groups preserved privileges regarding the retirement  age,  contribution and replacement  rates.
(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 159,  MTEySS/SSS 2003: 14) The reform also reduced the influence
of trade unions on the system.(Isuani 2008: 176)
In  the health sector  social  insurances  became increasingly dominant after  1955, while  the
public health sector suffered underfunding and a deterioration of its services.(Lloyd-Sherlock
2006: 357) Particularly the recurrent  authoritarian regimes recurred to a strengthening of the
social  health  insurance  system  in  order  to  contain  trade  union  resistance  or  to  co-opt  their
leaders.  The health  insurance  system became thereby one of  the main points  of  articulation
between  consecutive  governments  and  the  trade  union  movement.(Belmartino  2005a:  108,
Golbert 2008: 30, Lloyd-Sherlock 2006: 357) In 1970, the military government of Juan Carlos
Onganía consolidated and expanded the system of social health insurances by making affiliation
obligatory  for  all  salaried  workers  and  by  defining  fixed  contribution  rates.  The  law  also
consolidated the trade unions’ control over these funds. Both, trade unions and private health
service providers, which were usually contracted by the social health insurances, were strong
supporters of the law.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 124/125) On the one hand, this shift of resources
coincides  with  the  predominantly  ‘eficientistas’(O’Donnell  1977:  524)  ideologies  of  the
dictatorships.  They  preferred  social  insurance  arrangements  over  universal  provision,  as  the
former took personal ‘merits’, at least to a certain degree, into consideration. On the other hand,
organised labour has been very powerful during these decades, while the beneficiaries of public
health provision lacked power resources.(Golbert 2008: 43) Shortly before the implementation of
the  social  health  insurance  law there  had  been  a  massive  uprising  in  the  industrial  city  of
Córdoba.  The  fortification  of  trade  union  control  in  the  health  sector,  moreover,  somewhat
compensated the anterior pension reform, which reduced the influence of the trade unions.(Isuani
2008: 176) As will be shown later, also between 1976 and 2010, the health insurance system was
one of the key instruments for governments in the negotiations with trade union leaders. 
In  1973,  the  PJ  was  allowed to  participate  in  the  elections  after  the  fall  of  the  anterior
dictatorship. Shortly after Héctor José Cámpora(PJ) was elected president, Juan Domingo Perón
returned from exile, which caused Campora to dissolve the government and call for presidential
elections again, which hence Perón won with ample majority. The heterogeneous PJ party was
strongly divided between left and right at that moment, which even led to violent excesses and
assassinations between the two groups. Perón sided with the right wing of the party. With the
support of the government, the conservative wing of the trade union movement achieved the
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replacement of most left wing trade union leaders, among them famous leaders and participants
of the uprising in Córdoba 1969, such as Augustín Tosco and René Salamanca.(Munck 1998: 52)
The attempt of the peronist government to create one universal public health system during
the 1970s failed due to the resistance of the trade unions, which were reluctant to give up the
control over the health insurance system.(Passanante 1987: 143) Also the private health sector
was strongly opposed to the introduction of such a system, as it  benefited strongly from the
contracts with the social health insurances.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 126) In the end, the trade
unions could not only impede the introduction of one universalistic health system, but were even
able to achieve an increase of employer contributions from 2 % to 4.5 % of the wage in 1975.
(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 126/337) When the trade union leaders’ personal interests were at
stake, they seemed to be disposed to even oppose a government that they considered their own,
as  it  was  of  the  peronist  party.  The  fact  that  the  trade  unions  were  dominated  by  a  very
conservative leadership during that period may have further lowered their disposition to reform
the health system towards more equity, as long as this implied a loss of personal power.
How central the personal interests of the trade union leaders had become for the actions of the
union movement as a whole can be illustrated by another example.  During the mid 1960s, the
government of Arturo Umberto Illia(UCR-P) tried to strengthen union internal democracy. Trade
union leaders saw in these attempts a clear threat to their very personal power base. Although
these reforms would have potentially served the workers’ interests, as their leaders would have
been forced to be more sensible to the preferences of the rank and file, the trade unions resisted
fiercely, which ended up with the occupation of over 11,000 factories between the 21st of May
and the 24th of June 1964.(Golbert 2008: 36, Torre 1974: 536) As will be seen later, another
UCR government during the 1980s tried to democratise the unions, however, also failed due to
union resistance.(McGuire 1997: 191 – 192)  
d) Historical legacy and welfare state adaptation failure
History has shaped the political economy and the politics of the Argentinean welfare state in a
way that poses until today serious impediments for welfare state adaptation. 
I have argued that the consolidation of the social insurance principle and the lack of wider
solidarity in the Argentinean welfare state have been part of the peronist co-optation strategy and
the inclusion of the labour movement into a cross-class alliance with a fraction of the national
bourgeoisie. In the particular historical context it was somewhat rational for the working class to
join peronism, and to embark on the mentioned social  policy path. The peronist  government
decisively improved the average worker’s life quality, and the long-standingly favourable labour
169
market situation seemed to minimise the advantages for the labour movement that would have
resulted from more universalistic social policies.93
However, this historical context changed profoundly after 1975. The abandonment of the ISI
model led to the dissolution of the cross-class alliance that had sustained it, so that organised
labour was theoretically able to look for new allies and to realign their social policy goals. 
As  has  been  shown  in  chapter  2.1.,  the  labour  market,  and  with  it  the  socioeconomic
composition of the society, also changed profoundly after 1975. Under the new circumstances,
the  heavy  social  insurance  bias  of  the  Argentinean  welfare  state  became  increasingly
disadvantageous not only for the rising number of unemployed and informal workers, but also
for the formal workers themselves and the negotiation power of the trade union movement. At
the same time, these developments decisively increased the benefits for organised formal labour
that would result from more universalistic social policies and an alliance with the increasingly
numerous sector of poor and informal workers. 
Nevertheless, as will be shown, organised labour did not realign. Quite the contrary was the
case. So, for example, did the trade union movement block attempts to restructure the health
system in a more equitable and universalistic way. 
This failure of organised labour to realign, is to an important part the product of the historico-
political legacy from the first peronist governments and its consolidation during the following
decades. Due to the hierarchical and undemocratic structure that the trade unions had attained
during  that  period,  most  trade  union  leaders  had  become  little  sensible  to  changes  in  the
‘objective’ interests of their rank and files, as long as these did not coincide with their own very
personal  interests.  The  same undemocratic  structures,  moreover,  perpetuated  the  trade  union
leaders’ disposition for co-optation. While during the first peronism trade union leaders and their
rank and files seemed to have both benefited from the “reward”  received in the co-optation
process, at least in short-run economic terms, after 1975 these rewards were  increasingly to the
exclusive benefit of trade union leaders, even often contradicting diametrically the interests of
the rank and files. 
As the trade unions’ participation in the pension system has always been more limited, and
was further reduced during the late 1960s, path dependency appeared to be significantly lower
with regard to pension policies, despite the usually strong vested interests associated with them.
Furthermore, these vested interests have possibly been weaker in the Argentinean case than in
many European countries, due to the relative institutional instability of pension arrangements
93 Under  similarly  favourable  labour  market  conditions  also  the  relatively  strong  Australian  labour  movement
showed little interest in universalistic social policies during that period.(Esping-Andersen 1990: 66)
170
during  the  20th century(Lewis/Lloyd-Sherlock  2009),  which  potentially  impeded  the
development of sufficient trust into the system, so that many affiliates may have simply accepted
that having contributed to the pension system did not determine the right to perceive a previously
known return  one  day.  The  recurrent  periods  of  economic  crisis  and  high  inflation,  which
frequently changed the real values of the pension benefits, very likely contributed further to the
comparative weakness of vested interests in the Argentinean pension system. 
The virtually complete incorporation of the trade unions into the peronist movement(Grewe
1996: 197), and the establishment and consolidation of a conservative trade union leadership,
have weakened the preference of the labour movement for the unity of all subordinated classes
inherent in most left ideologies. The peronisation of the working class furthermore hampered the
establishment of significant left parties that would have favoured welfare state adaptation for
ideological-egalitarian reasons.
A power standoff between capital and labour arguably provides incentives for the creation of
tripartite negotiations between capital, state and labour in order to reach stable governability.
Yet, the particular composition of the power-blocs in Argentina, and the pendular positioning of
the most concentrated parts of non-agricultural capital, led to a extreme instability of the political
system and the crystallisation of patterns of bilateral negotiations of social policies, exacerbating
particularistic tendencies and opening ample margins for clientelistic practices. 
Another important  legacy from the past  is that  big parts of the Argentinean welfare state
bureaucracy  have  never  been professionalised and  never  gained  autonomy.  Especially  social
assistance administrations have been highly volatile, politicised and lacking effective regulation.
Social  assistance  programmes  were  usually short-lived  and  frequently  replaced  through  new
ones,  especially  when  governments  changed.  By  this  means,  governments  assured  that  the
administrations  of  social  assistance  programmes  were  dominated  by  their  supporters,  which
facilitated clientelistic practices. Also the social health insurance system impressed through its
lack of effective regulation. The margins for the misuse of resources have been extraordinarily
high and accountability very low. Yet,  the lack of regulation formed part of what made this
welfare state institution so valuable for trade union leaders. As well other areas like the public
health system have proved highly vulnerable to forms of clientelism, such as the provision of
jobs  for  political  support.(Lloyd-Sherlock  2005:  1894/1897)  This  lack  of  regulation  and
bureaucratic autonomy is product of, but also reproduces and perpetuates, the politicisation of
the welfare state and the modus operandi of significant parts of it in line with bilateral, and often
personalised, negotiations about political support, rather than clear criteria. 
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As will be argued later, the clientelistic and co-optive dynamics of the Argentine welfare state
politics  considerable  weakened  the  capacity  of  the  would-beneficiaries  to  propel  processes
welfare  state  adaptation,  while  at  the  same  time  they  provided  important  incentives  for
incumbent politicians to avoid the establishment of genuine rights for the increasingly numerous
group of those who were excluded from the social insurance systems.
3.3 The distribution of power resources in the politics of welfare
state adaptation failure
The last chapter has shown that the distribution of power resources between different social
forces,  as  well  as  the  particular  strategic  coalitions  between  distinct  forces,  had  important
influence  on  the  evolution  and  consolidation  of  the  Argentine  welfare  state.   Ernesto  Aldo
Isuani(1985: 7 – 22) compared the Argentinean state in one of his analyses with an arena within
which different social forces struggle for their interests. The state can theoretically be dominated
by  one  particular  social  force,  although  the  author  opines  that  this  is  relatively  unlikely,
especially during democratic times. Nevertheless, also during times when one social force or
class seems to dominate the state, for example in form of an authoritarian government, the state
can rarely be indifferent with regard to strong opposing social forces, which ultimately means
that the apparent dominance is in reality restricted. As has been seen in the last chapter, military
governments  that  were  largely  hostile  to  the  labour  movement  implemented  several  social
policies  in  face  of  rising strike  activity,  which was  not  only threatening the  stability of  the
government itself, but also the economic interests of those social forces that were sustaining it. In
this sense, it depends decisively on the distribution of power resources which interests are in
what way, and to what degree, reflected in the welfare state.
Although the two issues are unavoidably intertwined to a large degree, the aim of this text is
not to deliver a comprehensive political explanation of the Argentinean welfare state as a whole,
but to explain why welfare state adaptation has failed after the abandonment of the ISI strategy.
For this reason, it seems useful to start with a look at Argentina's  social structure during the
period of study, and a theoretical discussion of the different social groups’ interests with regard
to welfare state adaptation. In the discussion of these interests the transformation of the labour
market and the socio-economic changes discussed in 2.1. are of key importance, as it can be
assumed that these have decisive influence on group or class preferences. The class structure and
the theoretical interests of social classes matter, as they will ultimately form the bases that give
origin to the main social forces involved in welfare state politics. Yet, the structure of classes and
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their interests are not necessarily a 100 % mirrored by the social forces that emerge from these. It
can be assumed that the more democratic these social forces organise, the better, and the more
directly,  will  they  represent  the  interests  of  the  class(es)  that  form(s)  their  basis.  Yet,  the
organisations of the Argentinean labour movement can, for the reasons discussed in 3.2.,  be
considered  relatively  undemocratic,  which  means  that  they  possibly  represented  to  a  lesser
degree the social policy interests of the working class than it has been assumed in the majority of
the  comparative  studies  that  examined  working  class  power  influence  on  welfare  states  in
western countries. Therefore, it is necessary to direct our attention also to the way in which the
social forces organise. Furthermore, different social forces formed coalitions in many countries
to  increase  their  chances  of  influencing  (social)  policies.  In  turn,  the  composition  of  these
coalitions can have important impact on the kind of influence they exert on the welfare state,
which is why also this aspect has to be considered with regard to the Argentinean case of welfare
state adaptation failure. In a next step I will try to approximate the changes that occurred after
1975 in  the  distribution of  power resources  between  the  different  social  forces,  as  this  will
ultimately impact upon their capacity to influence welfare state reform. On this basis, the text
will  chronologically  analyse  the  role  of  power  resources  in  the  politics  of  welfare  state
adaptation failure after 1975.  
a) Class structure, social forces and welfare state adaptation failure in
Argentina
Power  resource  centred  approaches  have  put  central  emphasis  on  working  class  power.
Employers  have usually been seen as the opposed social force,  however,  they have received
much less analytical attention.94 Besides these two central groups, farmers and middle classes
have also been considered, often with regard to alliances between these and one of two first
mentioned classes.(e.g. Walter Korpi 1983/1998, Olsen/O’Connor 1998, Gøsta Esping-Andersen
1990, Huber 1996) In Argentina, salaried employment is the dominant form of employment. The
94 Peter  Swenson  has  criticised  the  power  resource  theory  for  mainly  focussing  on working  class  power,  yet,
ignoring the often active role of employers in the making of welfare states.(1991: 513 – 515) Walter Korpi(2006:
167- 172), one of the principal developers of the power resource theory, contested to these critiques stating that one
of the key differences between employer centred theories and the power resource approach lies in that the former
argue that employers adopted pro welfare state stances in certain contexts,  so for example in Sweden, while the
power resource theory assumes that employers are generally rather hostile,  or at best indifferent,  with regard to
ample  and  universalistic  welfare  state  development,  so  that  the  key  actor  remains  the  working  class.  In  the
Argentinean case it seems that employers, and in particular international creditors, played a somewhat active role,
however, using their influence to shape the welfare state little redistributive, highly meritocratic and exclusionary. 
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share of wage earners within the working population has been high, and also more or less stable,
during  the  period  of  study(1976  –  2010).(Beccaria/Groisman  2009:  110/133)  In  the  fourth
quarter of 2009, 75.3 % of all working Argentineans were wage earners.(INDEC database) As
has been argued earlier, farmers have historically been a very small group in Argentina.  The
extraordinarily high urbanisation rate of 93.1 % of the population in 2010 reflects this.(CELADE
database) According to data of Fernando Groisman and Luis Beccaria(2009: 110/133) the share
of the non-salaried working population, namely the self-employed and employers, has oscillated
between 22.4 % and 27.4 % between 1974 and 2005. Yet, around 80 % of these have been
categorised informal employment, and only about 20 % have been professional self-employed
workers(with higher education) or formal employers. Therefore, most of the self-employed can
be allocated in the lower social strata. Of course, also salaried labour is not homogeneous. As
have the income inequalities within the society as a whole, the inequalities within the salaried
population have been increasing after 1975. Moreover, the breach between formal and informal
employment has been growing rapidly, particularly during the 1990s.(See figures 12 and 13 in
2.1.)  As has  been shown in 2.1.(see figures  8  and 9),  informality is  not  limited to the self-
employed, but has been constituting an increasing share of the wage earners as well. On this
basis three groups of wage earners can be distinguished. A rapidly growing group after 1980
have been the informal wage earners, who constituted 36 % of all wage earners in the second
semester 2009(SEDLAC database), usually received very low pay and were excluded from the
social insurance schemes. The majority of formal wage earners, whose incomes have also been
decreasing significantly after 1975, disposed usually over higher income than informal workers
and possessed social insurance coverage in contrast to the former. A third, relatively small group
with usually high levels of education in certain areas has been clearly benefiting from the labour
market changes, received high wages and was by obligation included into the social insurance
system.(Beccaria/Groisman/Maurizio 2009: 11 – 38, Groisman/Beccaria 2009: 92 – 155)
From these divides in the social structure originate the main social forces that interact in the
politics of the Argentinean welfare state adaptation failure. A first social force originates from
the lower income strata of the society, which include the vast majority of the unemployed, the
informal wage earners and the informal self-employed, as well as some informal employers and
other poor groups. For convenience I will refer to these strata as “informal labour” or “the poor”.
The social force that originates from the poor is not one organisation, party or confederation, but
a diffuse multitude of (mostly local) organisations and smaller parties with different forms of
action. The majority fraction of the trade union movement, in contrast, does not represent these
groups,  not  even  those parts  of  the poor that  work as  informal  wage earners.  According to
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Adriana Marshall and Laura Perelman(2008: 8), registered employment constitutes in practice an
“indispensable requirement for union affiliation” in most Argentinean trade unions. The trade
union movement can be considered the main expression of the social  force originating from
formal labour. The unionisation level among manufacturing workers has been estimated very
high at about 70 % in 1990 and 66 % in 2001.(Marhall 2005: 25) If only the unionisation among
formal workers would have been considered, the number had resulted even significantly higher.
Although,  the  PJ  party  has  been  often  characterised  as  a  labour  based  party,  the  PJ  was
historically the expression of the alliance between labour and a part of the industrial bourgeoisie,
that is, it  has not been a classical  labour party with regard to the main pillars of their (non-
electoral)power. Even less has the PJ been a labour party from an ideological point of view. Yet,
as the PJ has traditionally concentrated the vast majority of the working class vote since 1945,
there is no other party with significant influence over a longer period that could be considered a
genuine labour party. Therefore, and for the reason that democracy has been fragile during most
of the 20th century, the power of formal labour depended more on the capacity of the trade unions
to influence the agenda of PJ and non PJ governments, rather than guaranteeing the consideration
of  labour  interests  by  bringing  a  labour  party  to  power.  This  importantly  distinguishes  the
Argentinean case from most of the western countries, where power resource theory studies have
put much emphasis on cabinet and parliament shares of labour parties.(e.g. Korpi 1983, Esping-
Andersen 1990) The high income groups among the wage earners, as well as the professional
self-employed workers, are usually not dependent on the results of wage bargaining and are often
not  affiliated  to  trade  unions.  These  groups  are  weakly  organised  and  seem to  pursue  their
interests mainly on an individual level. The employers, in contrast, form another important social
force  in  the  politics  of  the  welfare  state.  This  sector  is  represented  by  several  different
associations and confederations. 
What interests with regard to welfare state adaptation have the three principal social forces
interacting in the Argentine welfare state politics been pursuing after 1975? 
Informal labour, including the unemployed and other poor, had very strong interest in welfare
state adaptation. This growing group remained largely marginalised in a welfare state that had
virtually been exclusively designed for those who had stable employment in the formal sector.
First of all, this group aspired being included in the welfare state, getting access to core social
rights  such  as  decent  health  care,  pensions,  income  maintenance  during  periods  of
unemployment or precarious employment, family benefits and day care provision. As informal
labour has been located at the very bottom of the income scale, and as important parts of it have
been self-employed or unemployed, little redistributive job-linked social insurance schemes were
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neither accessible nor beneficial for this group. The poor had therefore a strong interest in a more
redistributive welfare state that would countervail  the increasing income inequalities. Chapter
2.2. has shown that these demands had little success. The poor still remain largely excluded from
the  welfare  state,  and  both  the  welfare  state  and  the  tax  system preserved  their  regressive
characters.
The aim of a progressive welfare state adaptation has not been shared by most of those who
were benefiting from the increasing concentration of incomes(and possessions) after 1975. The
beneficiaries  included  some  parts  of  the  well  educated  wage  earners  as  well  as  of  the
professional  self-employed  workers.  Yet,  the  main  social  force  pressuring  against  a  more
redistributive and inclusive welfare state have been the employers.95 Not only has the latter group
been decisively better organised, it has also been the biggest beneficiary of the bottom-to-top
income redistribution that took place after the mid 1970s. As figure 14 in chapter 2.1. shows, the
higher  the income,  the higher  was also the relative increase after  1975. Some scholars have
argued  that  employers  support  welfare  state  expansion  under  certain  circumstances,  so  for
example if they believe that it contributes to economic growth, imposes costs on competitors,
socialises costs of firm benefits or helps to avoid labour conflicts.(resumed by Swank/Martin
2001: 891) There is certainly some truth to these arguments. However, in the Argentinean case
employers achieved the limitation of labour conflicts by “cheaper” means, such as the reduction
of employment  protection in the context of high unemployment  and the co-optation of trade
union leaders.(e.g.  Cortes/Marshall  1999: 208, Lindenboim et al  2005: 5/6) In the context of
trade and financial market openness, the prevailing interpretation was not that social protection
would create growth, but that it  would hamper it.(See 3.1.) While it  is true that some social
policy  arrangements  may  benefit  one  competitor  and  disadvantage  another,  these  particular
interests of some employers hardly shape the mainstream interests of employers with regard to
the  welfare  state.  Considering  that  welfare  state  adaptation  in  Argentina  most  importantly
required the extension of social protection to groups that were not able to contribute to social
insurances,  and  hence  unavoidably  required  the  introduction  of  more  progressive  forms  of
financing, employers had important economic incentives to avoid welfare state adaptation. In
practice, employers have been pressuring for a redistribution of the social insurance contribution
burden  in  detriment  of  the  workers,  thereby  exacerbating  the  effect  of  the  sharp  decline  in
average real wages.(See figure 42) At the same time, the marketisation of social insurances was
in the interest of the employers, not only because market provided welfare usually reproduces the
95 According to Walter Korpi(2006: 171) employers’  rejection of extensive,  inclusive and redistributive  welfare
states is an internationally observable feature.
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original  economic stratification and therefore limits solidarity,  but also because it  opened up
enormous business opportunities. A universalisation of pension, health and family policies, as
well  as  the introduction of  non-contributory income maintenance  would have required  more
progressive taxation, which was threatening to reduce the employers’ privileges. Moreover, the
lack of income maintenance not only relieved employers from a redistributional burden, it also
had positive effects for employers with regard to the distribution of incomes through the market
in the first place. As has been argued before, the right to a minimum income frees unemployed
workers to a certain degree from the need to sell their work force at any price and under any
condition. Hence, employers saw in such proposals also a threat to the cheap labour supply and
the disciplining effects that the high unemployment and informality rates provided. Overall, it
seems that  welfare  state  reforms  after  1975 have  quite  amply satisfied  employers’  interests.
Social insurance contribution rates are today much lower for employers  than during the mid
1970s.(See  figures  37  and  41)  Expenditure  on  social  programmes  that  have  been  financed
through employer  contributions alone, namely family allowances and the  housing fund, was
decisively reduced.  Employer  contributions  to  the  housing  fund  have  even  been  completely
abolished. In the pension system the overall trend was towards lower employer contributions,
while worker contributions were raised during the mid 1970s and remained stable since then.
(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo: 337/338) The average wage has been falling dramatically since the mid
1970s, also because the welfare state did not provide alternative sources of income that could
have put a  limit  to the downward  pressure on wages and would thereby have mitigated the
consequences  of  the  enormous  imbalance  between  labour  force  offer  and  demand  that  was
characterising the Argentinean labour market during the last decades. Under such labour market
conditions, the lack of day care provision hardly constituted a problem for employers, as they did
not  have  to  fear  scarcity  of  labour.  Despite  relatively  high  unemployment  rates,  employer
associations have supported demands for better child care coverage in Germany during the last
years. This has mainly been the case because unemployment was not equally distributed between
different educational levels, so that employers had an interest in enabling well educated mothers
to work. Furthermore, the two biggest German employer associations, the BDI and the BDA,
explained that they did not aim at increasing expenditure on family policies as a whole, but at
redistributing  expenditure  from  money  transfers  to  day  care  provision.
(http://www.insm.de/insm/Themen/Soziales/ISNM-Dossier-Familie/BDI-BDA.html)  Yet,  also
this argument seems to be little convincing for Argentinean employers. In 2.2. it has been shown
that among the upper income quintiles, which concentrate most of the labour force with high
levels  of  education,  child  care  coverage  was  indeed  relatively broad.  In  face  of  high  wage
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inequalities, market provided child care results comparatively cheap for the upper income groups
in Argentina. Moreover, as family allowance expenditure was radically cut down during the last
military  dictatorship  and  has  not  been  recovered  since  then,  the  expansion  of  public  care
facilities would have been hardly financeable through merely redistributing the expenditure on
family policies.  This  implied  that  the  expansion  of  day care  provision  would have  required
additional resources, which would potentially have resulted in a higher tax burden for employers.
Theoretically,  formal labour has been increasingly sharing the interests of informal labour
with  regard  to  welfare  state  adaptation  after  1975.  As  has  been  argued  in  chapter  3.2.,  the
Argentinean welfare state had been importantly shaped by the particular cross-class alliance that
sustained the ISI model. Hence, the welfare state in force during the mid 1970s did only partly
reflect  the preferences  of the working class,  while the bourgeoisie had been able to block a
greater importance of universal, tax financed and redistributive elements. Due to the favourable
labour market, the trade union movement had been able to pursue redistributive aims primarily
via wage bargaining during the period of ISI. Yet, as the fall of real wages indicates, this strategy
has been increasingly ineffective for the working class after 1975. Under these circumstances,
formal labour’s interest in a redistributive welfare state has become increasingly important again.
96 While the favourable labour market conditions during the ISI period had minimised the risks
of prolonged involuntary exclusion from formal work, and had hence allowed a relatively broad
and stable access  to social  protection through the social  insurance system, after 1975 formal
workers have increasingly been threatened with the loss of social rights due to the increasing
instability of formal work histories. In this sense, universalistic non-contributory social policies
became  also  increasingly  important  for  the  social  protection  of  formal  workers  that  were
contributing  to  social  insurances  but  uncertain  about  their  future  capacity  to  do  so.  These
interests of formal labour suggest, hence, a social policy alliance between the poor and formal
labour.  Such  an  alliance  was,  in  turn,  conflicting  with  the  interests  of  the  local  industrial
bourgeoisie that had been part of the cross-class alliance supporting the ISI model. Anyway, as
will be briefly shown, the abandonment of the ISI strategy also put an end to the cross-class
alliance that was limiting formal labour’s ability to pursue their redistributive interests through
the welfare state.
The cohesion  of  the  peronist  multi-class  alliance  was  already  showing signs  of  breakage
during the short period of democracy between the early and mid 1970s. The domination of the
government through peronism allowed the interest conflicts that existed within the alliance to
96 According to Walter Korpi(1998: X), labour’s interest in a redistributive welfare state is also a commonality of
most labour movements in the industrialised world.
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come  to  the  forefront,  namely  the  classical  interest  conflicts  between  labour  and  capital.
(O’Donnell 1977: 553/554, Rougier/Fiszbein 2006: 101) On the background of the weakening of
the  ISI-alliance,  the  military  junta  that  overthrew  the  peronist  government  in  1976  was
eventually able to eliminate the power standoff in favour of those parts of the bourgeoisie that
opposed the ISI model. The military government not only achieved a weakening of the social
forces that sustained the ISI strategy, but was consolidating the breakage between labour and the
local industrialists by driving a wedge between the interests of the two groups. As world market
integration seemed to be irreversible, even if the two forces worked together, the weaker sectors
of the bourgeoisie  radically changed their relation towards  high wages and non-wage labour
costs. While before, these had constituted a means to amplify the national market, and hence to
increase their business scopes, in the context of trade openness the additional demand created
through high real wages and non-wage labour costs would possibly end up being satisfied by
imported goods. Contrariwise,  high wages and high non-wage labour costs have increasingly
been perceived as an obstacle for the viability of their businesses in the context of international
competition. Many small enterprises rapidly shifted towards informal employment. Under these
circumstances there was little room for a re-establishment of the original peronist multi-class
alliance. 
The new situation was suggesting another alliance for organised labour, which until that point
had been seen of little benefit for the trade unions: an alliance with the growing poor sector,
namely  the  unemployed  and  the  informal  workers.  Not  only  was  this  sector  increasingly
numerous and therefore, especially during democratic times, an interesting ally for the labour
movement. The generally increasingly miserable labour market situation and the lack of social
protection  for  this  sector  was  beginning  to  undermine  trade  union  power,  as  the  poor  were
forming a rapidly available reserve of cheap labour. Furthermore, the deterioration of the labour
market implied that unemployment, informality and poverty increasingly became a real, and not
very distant, threat  to the formal workers that formed the core of organised labour. Hence, a
social policy alliance between formal and informal labour around welfare state adaptation would
have been a plausible strategy for the labour movement to increase its electoral and economic
power. 
Nevertheless, during the 1980s the trade unions seemed not to move in their positions. During
the 1990s a minority fraction, the CTA, indeed changed its course towards such a strategy, but
the much more powerful majority fraction, the CGT, did virtually not do any attempt towards
this direction. Contrariwise, the social policy demands of this sector remained concentrated on
the  preservation  of  the  inequitable  and  fragmented  social  insurance  system,  which  was
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completely contrary to the interests of the poor, and therefore also impeding the formation of an
alliance between formal labour and the poor. 
An alliance between formal and informal labour would have improved the power resources of
the  labour  movement.  Therefore,  the  programmatic  adaptation  towards  demanding  more
universalistic social protection would have increasingly served for aims of power maximisation.
The example of the minority fraction of the trade union movement, the CTA, provides some
evidence for this. While the CGT lost members during the 1990s keeping distance to the poor,
their new social movements and demands, the CTA tried to incorporate these, and was thereby
able to increase significantly the number of their affiliates.(Palomino 2005: 23) Why then did the
majority of the labour movement not change their coalition strategy and pressure for welfare
state adaptation?
The main reasons may be found in the persistence of structures and political patterns that have
been  channelling  the  behaviour  of  big  parts  of  the  trade  union  movement  since  the  first
peronism, and in which the welfare state has played a decisive role. The hierarchical organisation
of the labour movement, the lack of internal democracy and accountability, the high dependence
of trade union elites on the state and the far reaching removal of socialist ideas from organised
labour created little willingness among, and little incentives for, powerful trade union leaders to
modify their strategy. The removal of socialist ideas implied that there were little ideological
incentives for union leaders to base their strategy on solidarity with the weakest sectors of the
society.  More  than  the  working  class  as  such,  trade  union  leaders  had  extraordinary  strong
personal interest in the preservation of the health insurance system. The latter constituted an
invaluable source of personal economic and political power. Due to the importance of the health
insurances for trade union leaders, these regularly formed part of the governments' co-optation
strategies. The lack of democracy and accountability further increased the incentives for trade
union leaders to engage in this game of co-optation. While the rank and file had relatively little
control over their leaders, and hence could do little to force these to take up working class’ social
policy interests,  the  personal  economic and political  power  of  trade  union leaders  depended
strongly on whether they preserved the control over social health insurances or not. In exchange
for maintaining the social health insurances, trade union leaders were often disposed to give in
with regard to other policy projects that were infringing working class interests in a very direct
and probably more profound way. Of course, the personal interests of union leaders were not
constrained to the area of health insurances, but these constituted the most important constant of
trade  union  leaders’  social  policy  interest.  “Cooperative”  trade  union  elites  were  moreover
rewarded  with  government  and  administration  posts  for  their  loyalty  in  privatisation  and
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flexibilisation issues. In some cases trade union leaders even became employers, as they were
put in charge of the privatisation of companies or were given shares of these in exchange for
supporting their privatisation.(McGuire 1997: 225/226) Figure 41 reflects the concentration of
the trade union movement on the defence of social health insurances in detriment of other social
policy areas. The reduction of non-wage labour costs has been a central employer interest. In this
regard employers were able to progress significantly. Overall employer contributions as a share
of the wage have been reduced by over 28 % between 1975 and 2010. Yet, the reduction was not
equally distributed among the different social insurance types. While employer contributions to
the social  health  insurances  increased  by one third  over  the period,  the  combined employer
contribution rates to the remaining social insurances have been reduced by over 38 %. 
Elaborated by the author. Sources: For 1975 – 1989: Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 337/338, For 2000: El Clarín 27th
of December 2003, For 2010: C.F.E. Institute http://www.cfe.com.ar/teoria_tablas_sueldos.htm (opened on 24th of
November 2010).
Walter  Korpi(1998:  X)  admits  that  gender  has  been  long  time  neglected  by  the  power
resource theory, which mainly concentrated on socio-economic stratification. Yet, it is likely that
the size, and particularly the shape, of the welfare state not only depends on cleavages between
social  classes and the related distribution of power resources,  but  also on the gender  related
distribution of power resources. According to Esping-Andersen(1999: 45), the expansion of day
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Figure 41: Employer contributions to social health insurances vs 
employer contributions to the remaining social insurances
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care  facilities  in  the Nordic countries  from the  late  1960s on “came  not  so much from the
commanding  heights  of  the  labour  movement  as  from  a  massive  popular  campaign  led  by
women’s  organisations.”  Comparing  the  Chilean  and  Uruguayan  welfare  states,  Jennifer
Pribble(2006) recently found that also in Latin America the mobilising capacity of women seems
to be a decisive determinant for the gendered nature of social  policy.  In  contrast,  the strong
catholic influence in the Southern European countries, which can be considered equally strong in
Argentina(Hänsch/Riekenberg 2008: 76), has been argued to hamper the expansion of day care
provision,  and measures  that  facilitate  female  labour market  participation in  general.(Ferrera
1996: 30) Although feminist movements in Argentina gained some strength from the late sixties
on,  they were  far  from reaching  the  influence  that  their  counterparts  had  conquered  in  the
industrialised countries, and particularly in Northern Europe.(D’Atri 2005: 2) On the background
of the relatively small size of the Argentinean feminist movement, it seems that while it had
some success in demanding legislative improvements, it has not been able to pressure the state
towards a more active role in care issues.(Gil Lozano 2004: 10, Salvador 2007: 18/19) Class
cleavages possibly contributed to the absence of influential womens’ campaigns for day care
provision.  As  has  been  alluded  before,  in  full  employment  labour  markets,  or  in  face  of
unsatisfied demand for skilled labour, employer associations have supported the expansion of
day care provision. In the Argentinean context of last 35 years, employers had arguably little
incentives to support such demands. Moreover, the high income inequalities on the Argentinean
labour market provided upper-middle and upper class women with relatively cheap and highly
flexible access to private day care provision, often in form of private child minders. In face of
this possibility, the interest of these women in public day care provision was possibly limited.
Women of the lowest income strata had a strong interest in child and elderly care provision, as
this would have enabled them to improve the scarce household income through participation in
the labour market. However, considering the difficult labour market situation for female workers
with low levels of education, the social policy priorities of these strata lay first of all in securing
the  survival,  for  which  income transfers  have  been  clearly  more  important.  As  long  as  the
survival is permanently threatened, child care provision is unlikely to become one of the first
priorities.  If  there  is  any truth to these  thoughts,  the high inequality  within the Argentinean
society, and hence also between women, made strong female cross-class alliances campaigning
for an expansion of day care provision more unlikely than in the relatively egalitarian societies of
Northern Europe. Unfortunately my information on contemporary Argentinean feminist history
is very restricted, and also the available data about day care provision is very limited, so that I
am not  able  to  deal  with  this  topic with the profoundness  it  deserves.  Certainly,  a  political
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analyses of the evolution of day care provision in Argentina applying a power resource approach
and  directing  particular  attention  to  women’s  mobilisation  is  an  important  area  for  further
research. 
b) The distribution of power resources after ISI
Comparative studies of the power resource theory often use long-term left party shares in
parliaments and cabinets as indicator for the strength of working class influence on social or
other redistributive policies.(e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990, Huber et al 2006, Korpi 1983) Yet, the
first  seven  years  of  the  period  of  study  have  been  under  authoritarian  rule  in  Argentina.
Moreover, as has been pointed out in 3.1., the two strongest parties in the Argentinean political
system, the UCR and the PJ, have been both classified by their members, as well as the members
of  the other  party,  as parties  of  the centre.(Alcántara  Sáez 1996) Michael  Coppedge’s(1997:
16/17/71) influential categorisation of Latin American parties has classified the PJ as not clearly
defineable(“other”) and the UCR as secular party of the centre. Although, the PJ traditionally
received the majority of the poor and working class vote, Huber et al (2006: 950) stated with
regard to the ideological positioning of the PJ, that classifying this party “as left of center is not
theoretically  meaningful“.  On  the  basis  of  the  political  standpoints  of  the  party,  Huber  et
al(2006: 954) defined the PJ as a centrist  party during the 1980s and as a centre-right party
during the 1990s. After 2003, the governing wing of the PJ party could be described as centre-
left.(Wiesehomeier  2010:  5)  During  the  second  half  of  the  1990s  a  third  party  entered  the
political  arena,  the  FREPASO,  which  has  been  categorised  as  centre-left  by  Micheal
Coppedge(1997: 16). However, this party was relatively short-lived as it broke completely down
in the aftermath of the economic shock in 2001/2002. Since this crisis, the Argentinean party
system  has  become  more  fragmented  with  the  PJ  becoming  the  dominant  party,  although
internally  divided,  while  the  UCR  split  into  several  parties.  This  brief  outline  of  partisan
landscape shows that working class power can hardly be measured in parliament and cabinet
shares of left parties in the Argentinean case. The virtual absence of significant left parties, due
to the lack of a clear left-right divide in the party spectrum, would misleadingly indicate that the
Argentinean  labour  movement  has  been  extraordinarily  weak  during  the  last  six  decades.
Although I will argue that the Argentinean labour movement saw its power resources reduced
after 1975, it can be considered relatively strong with regard to various aspects, such as the high
degree of centralisation of the trade union movement and the comparatively high unionisation
rate. Moreover, the Argentinean party system not only lacked significant and stable left parties, it
also lacked stable centre-right or right parties. 
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In the Argentinean case, the different social forces after 1975 did not primarily pursue their
interests via their own ideologically stable parties, as comparative power resource theory studies
usually assume, but via the pressure on, the influence over, respectively the manipulation or co-
optation of, the main parties of the political system.(e.g. Basualdo 2001) Considering this, the
main focus of this chapter will be on the capacity of the different social  forces to shape the
governments’  social  policy agendas,  and  not  so  much  on  the  “colours”  of  the  governments
themselves. The subsequent two chapters will attempt to shed more light on why the ‘objective’
interests in welfare state adaptation of vast parts of the population have scarcely been transmitted
via democratic elections into parliament and cabinet shares of forces that support such policies.
Due to the fact that the partisan composition of parliaments and governments can hardly be
used as quantitative indicator for the changes that occurred in the distribution of power resources
in Argentina, I will refer to some alternative indicators, such as the unionisation rate and the
evolution of real wages. However, power resources are not clearly quantifiable, so that I will
employ these indicators to underpin qualitative considerations rather than letting them speak for
themselves.  
As has  been  described  in  3.2.,  the  trade  union  movement  has  become highly  centralised
during  the  1940s  and  1950s.  This  feature  largely  persists  until  today.  Since  that  time  the
unionisation rate among non-agricultural workers has been comparatively high. Table 2 shows
that,  in  contrast  to  experiences  of  other  Latin  American  and  European
countries(Marshall/Perelman 2008, Marshall 2005), the unionisation rate has remained largely
stable since the abandonment of the ISI strategy and the embarking on a more neoliberal path.
Table 2: The evolution of unionisation rates of non-agricultural wage earners
Year 1948 1954 1965 1982 - 1986 1990 2001
Unionisation  rate
of  non-agricultural
wage earners 
38% 50% 36 - 43 % 45% 49% 42%
Elaborated by the author. Sources: Various sources quoted through Marshall (2005: 23 – 25).
Nevertheless, the course of the social and economic policy, as well as the evolution of real
wages, clearly show that labour’s interests have been on the defence after 1975. There is a broad
consensus among scholars that the distribution of power resources in Argentina has shifted in
favour  of  capital  and  in  detriment  of  labour  after  1975.(e.g.  Basualdo  2001,  Huber  1996,
Levitsky 2001, Lindenboim et al 2005, Svampa 2005) Figure 42 shows that the average real
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wage had a rising tendency until the mid 1970s, but was declining steeply since then. In 2005,
the average real wage amounted to only 57 % of its value in 1975. During the same period the
real  GDP per  capita  rose  by  11.2  %,  and  the  share  of  wage  earners  among  the  employed
population remained relatively stable,  so that the decline of real  wages reflects an enormous
redistribution  of  incomes  from  labour  to  capital.  According  to  estimations  of  Juan  M.
Graña(2007: 77/78), the wage share of the GDP fell from 40.1 % - 45.3 % in 1975, to 25.2 % -
28.4 % in 2005. A capitalists’ paradise!
Elaborated by the author. Source: The data has been kindly provided by Fernando Groisman and is identical to
that used in Beccaria/Groisman/Maurizio (2009: 28)
Why has formal labour been so dramatically losing ground despite stable unionisation rates?
And why has capital been able to advance so strongly? 
Walter  Korpi(Korpi  1998:  X)  argues  that  the  rise  of  unemployment  as  well  as
globalisation(trade and financial openness) have markedly improved the situation of actors that
control  economic  resources  in  detriment  of  labour.  The  Argentinean  case  confirms  this
observation. The increasing number of unemployed and informal low-income workers created a
quickly available and particularly cheap reserve of labour force,  which weakened the labour
movement’s negotiation power,  lowered the costs of strikes for employers,  as well  as it  had
subordinating and disciplining effects on the formal workers because these increasingly feared
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Figure 42: Evolution of the average real wage 
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the loss of their employment. This fear, in turn, had undermining effects on solidarity,  which
constitutes an essential prerequisite of any collective labour action.(Lindenboim et al 2005: 5/6) 
Table 3 shows the declining influence of the trade union movement over the PJ party, which
is reflected in the decline of union representatives in the PJ bloc in the chamber of deputies.
While trade unionists had occupied a dominant role in the PJ during the first half of the 1980s,
their influence was pushed back from the late 1980s on. The Menem government during the
1990s finally achieved the complete marginalisation of the union representatives in the party.
(McGuire 1997: 247) After the crisis in 2001/2002, the influence of the trade union movement in
the PJ, especially of the majority fraction (CGT), has increased again.(De Riz 2008: 14/15)
Despite these unfavourable conditions for the trade union movement, their weak performance
cannot be solely explained by external  factors.  Adriana Marshall(2006: 20) assumed that  the
system of  health  insurances  has played  a crucial  role in  the  relative stability  of  trade union
affiliation in Argentina. Although it is the obligation of wage earners to affiliate to one of these
insurances, it is formally not required to join the respective trade union. Nevertheless, Marshall
argued that  many perceived it as convenient,  as trade unions used resources from the health
insurance system to finance selective services for union members. With regard to industrialised
countries, scholars have found that in countries were trade unions rather than the state control
unemployment  insurances,  union  density  has  usually  been  higher,  and  labour  power  hence
stronger.(Olsen/O'Connor 1998: 19/20) This coincides largely with the argumentation of Adriana
Marshall for the Argentinean case. However, it is also plausible that the additional affiliation
reached through the provision of social services, cheap holiday offers or even credit cards, did
not result in a comparable increase of working class power. In other words, also the reasons for
which workers join trade unions are important for the constitution of labour power. Stability of
union affiliation in Argentina may reflect stronger the successful transformation of unions into
service  providers  rather  than  the  preservation  of  the  political  strength  of  the  trade  union
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Table 3: The decline of trade union representation in the PJ bloc in the
chamber of deputies
Year 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Trade  unionists
as  a  share  of
peronist
deputies
26,1% 27,7% 21,0% 20,0% 15,0% 7,8% 4,6% 4,2%
Elaborated by the author. Source: Levitsky (2001: 20).
movement. Under this light, the stability of trade union membership does primarily mean that the
financial sources of the unions have been relatively stable. 
The failure to construct a formal-informal labour alliance certainly weakened the capacity of
both social forces to exert influence on the social policy agendas.(Repetto 2006: 233/234, Lo
Vuolo 1998b: 257) The undemocratic structure of the trade unions and the disposition of most
trade union leaders to accept co-optive offers, which were beneficial for them on a personal level
but prejudicial for their rank and files, importantly contributed to the weakness of formal labour. 
The power resources of informal labour during most of the period were much more restricted.
In face of the deterioration of the socioeconomic situation and the rapid growth of poverty after
the military coup in 1976, the poor adopted new forms of collective action, which basically
aimed  at  securing  their  survival.  During  the  early  1980s  groups  of  poor  started  with  the
occupation of land, particularly in the south of the city of Buenos Aires.  These occupations
coincided with the formation of numerous local social movements based on the solidarity of the
poor in the respective neighbourhood. Soon these movements began to organise protests and to
demand  social  protection  from  the  state.(Merklen  2005:  51  –  59)  During  the  1990s,  these
organisations  adopted road blockades,  the  so called “piquetes”,  as  principal  form of  protest,
which enabled them to attain considerable presence in the media and the political debate.(Neffa
2008: 74) As will be shown later, since the abandonment of the ISI strategy, the poor have been
able to gradually build up their power resources and to constitute a social force in the Argentine
politics of the welfare state. Particularly during periods in which these movements coordinated
their actions, as it happened around the turn of the millennium, the poor achieved considerable
political strength, attaining an important rise of social assistance expenditure. Yet, as has been
evidenced in 2.2., the overall success of the poor in demanding welfare state adaptation to their
needs  has  been  very limited.  Until  late  2009,  all  governments  have  been  able  to  avoid  the
introduction  of  any  genuine  social  right  to  income maintenance  for  these  groups.  The high
fragmentation of informal labour’s organisations has been a major obstacle for the achievement
of bigger influence, as this allowed successive governments to apply co-optation and divide and
rule  strategies.  The  social  movements  have  thereby  been  confronted  with  an  additional
disadvantage compared to the trade union movement. The urgent need of their members made it
difficult  to  decline  selective  subsidies  from  the  state  that  demanded  political  support  in
exchange, or at least the abandonment of confrontation. In this sense, the social movements of
the poor have been permanently exposed to tensions between the immediate need to enable the
survival of their members and the aspirations to construct a long-term project that aimed at the
social  inclusion of  the  poor,  for  which  the  selective  and  discretionary  awarding  of  minimal
187
economic help linked to political conditionality clearly posed an obstacle.(e.g. Merklen 2005:
65)
The  role  of  employers  has  often  been  neglected  in  power  resource  theory  welfare  state
analyses.(Swank/Martin  2001:  891)  This  may  have  to  do  with  the  difficulty  to  measure
employer’s  power  resources.  Party-centred  comparisons  have  often  assumed  that  employer
influence is reflected in the strength of centre-right, right or liberal parties. As has been discussed
before, the party composition of governments and parliaments does not serve as an indicator for
changes in the employers' power resources in post ISI Argentina. The dramatic reduction of the
wage share and the reduction of the average real wage indicate that employers have increasingly
been stronger than labour in the distributive conflict. It is likely that the employers' superiority in
the distributive conflict, namely the determination of the real wage levels, coincided also with an
increasing superiority in the redistributive conflict, namely with regard to the progressiveness or
regressiveness of the welfare state, the tax system, and so on. As will be shown in the following
part  of  this  chapter,  employers  were  repeatedly  able  to  allocate  their  representatives  in  the
ministry of economy, and this ministry seemed increasingly to rank higher in the intra-cabinet
hierarchy than the ministry of  work and social  security,  which has been  led by trade  union
representatives during some periods. Indeed, as will be seen, social policy reform, particularly
during the 1990s, has often been designed in the ministry of economy and not in the ministry of
labour.  Walter  Korpi(2006:  172)  argues  that  the main  power  resource  of  the  employers  are
economic assets. These assets can, for example, be used for exerting influence via the control of
most of the media spectrum, lobbying or co-optation, but also to threaten with the transfer of the
production into another country, the transfer of high sums into another currency or the refusal to
sell  foreign  currencies  received  from  foreign  trade  to  the  central  bank,  thereby  negatively
affecting the nations currency reserves. In this sense, the increasing concentration of income(see
2.1.),  and  thereby  employers’  control  over  a  growing  share  of  the  GDP,  also  increased
employers’ power resources. Besides national and foreign capital within Argentina, also foreign
groups and institutions outside the country became increasingly influential with regard to social
policies due to the high foreign debts that the country had accumulated since the last military
dictatorship. As will be seen, especially the international financial institutions, such as the IMF,
the World Bank and the  Inter-American  Development  Bank,  have  been  increasingly  able  to
shape social policies. Figure 43 shows the rise of Argentina’s foreign debt in dollars since 1975.
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Although the  different  fractions  of  the internal  employer  sector  and  the  external  creditor
sector  did  not  always  agree  about  the  desired  economic  course,  in  social  policies  these
differences seem not to have played a significant role. Interestingly, during the two periods97 in
which the most powerful internal and external economic actors converged around several key
features  of the economic policy(Basualdo 2001),  also the reform of the welfare state headed
strongest towards employers’ interests, and in detriment of welfare state adaptation. Economic
policy has been the highest priority for the employer sector as well as the international creditors,
however,  it  seems that  during times of  relative  consensus about  the economic course of  the
government, they directed more attention to the reform of social policies. Walter Korpi(2006:
173) argued, that the “efficacy of economic resources as well as of labor power can be enhanced
97 These  periods  comprise  most  of  the  military  dictatorship  as  well  as  of  the  1990s.  The  main  organisational
expressions of employer unity during the military government has been the “Permanent Assembly of Employers’
Associations”(Asamblea Permanente de Entidades Gremiales Empresarias/APEGE), which played a key role in the
military coup of 1976 and which provided numerous officials of the dictatorship.(Rougier/Fiszbein 2006: 104/105)
Eduardo Basualdo(2001: 60 – 62) argues that  during the 1990s the dominant  economic actors found consensus
around the privatisation of state  enterprises,  which served both the internal  employer  sector,  which was  able to
increase their market control through the acquisition of under-valued enterprises, and the external sector of creditors,
which was interested in privatisation as a means of guaranteeing interest and debt payments.
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Elaborated by the author. Source: Vargas de Flood (2006: 143/147/150/154/161/163).
Figure 43: Argentina's foreign debt in billion US dollars
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via collective action”. In this sense, the consensus about economic policies increased employers'
power resources as it allowed a higher degree of unity and cooperation between the associations
of the different economic sectors, which hence enabled them to advance with regard to social
policies, an area in which labour has usually strong defence commitments. 
c) Power resources in the Argentine politics of welfare state adaptation failure
As has been shown in chapter 2.2., the military dictatorship had strongly regressive effects on
the welfare state. Not only was the overall welfare expenditure reduced significantly,  also its
distribution was shifted in detriment of the poorest sectors of the society who depended on social
assistance and free public health care provision. Furthermore, the financing burden of the welfare
state was decisively lowered for employers.  These changes largely reflect  the distribution of
influence between employers, formal and informal labour under the military regime. Employers
had very direct influence on the government. Formal labour was the target of severe repressions
by the military,  however, continued to constitute a strong social force, which the government
was not able to ignore. Informal labour was scarcely organised during that period, and in the
absence of elections it had virtually no possibility to influence the government’s course. 
The  1976  military  coup  had  the  support  of  the  landowning  oligarchy  and  the  most
concentrated  segments  of  the  national  and  international  capital  in  the  country.  José  Alfredo
Martínez de Hoz, a big landowner and president of Acindar, a big steel company,  as well as
president  of the “Argentinean Employers’  Council”(Consejo Empresario  Argentino/CEA),  an
influential employer association, became the minister of economy during the first five years of
the  dictatorship.  Representatives  of  other  employers’  associations,  such  as  the  “Argentinean
Rural Society”(Sociedad Rural Argentina/SRA), the “Argentine Chamber of Comerce”(Cámara
Argentina de Comercio/CAC) and the “Asociation of Argentine Banks”(Asociación de Bancos
de Capital Argentino/ADEBA) were put in charge of central positions in several ministries and
the central  bank. While representatives of the employers  were allocated in key positions, the
military government was strongly hostile towards the labour movement. It not only tried to break
working  class  power  by  direct  repression,  such  as  the  arrest,  torturing  and  killing  of  union
members, the outlawing of strikes and the intervention in the trade union organisations, but also
through economic policies that reduced the size of the industrial working class. While repression
was  the chosen means for  the  short  term,  the  change of  the  economic model  was  going  to
undermine working class power in the long run.(Cortés/Marshall 1993: 401, Lewis 1999: 49,
McGuire 1997: 171/172, Svampa 2005: 105)
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Also  the  employers’  association  that  had  supported  the  ISI  strategy,  the  CGE,  has  been
decisively weakened during the military dictatorship. In 1977, the military dissolved the CGE,
and although it was re-established in 1984, it was not able to recover its original importance. The
restructuring of the economy had strongly weakened the economic position of small industries.
During the 1980s, the big majority of the Argentinean entrepreneurs  was in favour of world
market orientation and a rather liberal market regulation. Since then, the UIA has become the
leading representation of the industry.(Birle 1996: 207 - 209) By this means, the situation of a
power standoff between two alliances  proposing different  development  strategies  was finally
dissolved in favour of a liberal oriented business elite, among them big landowners, the financial
sector, the commercial sector and parts of the big industry.(Birle 1996: 219)
As has been shown in 2.2., expenditure on social assistance and unemployment protection
radically  decreased  during the military junta,  and increased more or  less  steadily  during the
democratic governments afterwards. Spending data from the short democratic period before the
last  military dictatorship supports  the likeliness of  a causal  relation between the democratic,
respectively  undemocratic,  character  of  the  government  and  the  expansion,  respectively
reduction,  of  expenditure  on  social  assistance  and  unemployment  protection  programmes.
Spending  on  these  social  policies  had  a  significant  upward  trend  during  the  few  years  of
democracy  before  1976.(Vargas  de  Flood  2006:  188,  spending  data  for  1970-1975)  Laura
Golbert(2008:  43)  finds  similar  patterns  for  the  period  between  1955  and  1973.  From  a
theoretical perspective, this pattern plausibly reflects the strategical electoral importance of these
programmes, and hence represents the electoral power resources of the poor. As authoritarian
governments  do  not  need  to  win  elections,  voter  preferences  as  such  are  of  little  strategic
importance for them. However, also authoritarian governments have to bear powerful organised
interests in mind. This is especially true in Argentina, where during thirty years no power bloc
was able to achieve stability, let alone hegemony. In this context, the danger of losing power was
also eminent for authoritarian regimes. Therefore, also right wing dictatorships were prone to
maintain a  certain  degree  of  negotiation with organised labour.  Social  insurances,  especially
social  health insurances have often served as a link for  these negotiations,  due to their high
importance for trade union leaders.(Belmartino 2005a: 108, Golbert 2008: 30, Lloyd-Sherlock
2006: 357) The military attempted to restructure the social health insurance system, and to quit
trade unions their control over them, however, largely failed.(Belmartino 2005a: 112, Vargas de
Flood 2006: 148) Although about 90 % of the trade unions’ social health insurances ceased to be
directly union controlled during the years of military intervention, the regime failed to introduce
and regulate lasting legislative changes with this regard. Moreover, despite the intervention of
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the state, the social health insurances were one of the few aspects of union activity that continued
to function during the dictatorship. Gerardo Munck(1998: 236/237) argued that the allocation of
additional  resources to these insurance funds served as a kind of ‘battle horse’,  as the junta
wanted to show that social health insurances were indeed better working under military control
than under the trade union elite, which was accused of being corrupt and inefficient. By this
means, the military wanted to break down the prestige of the union leadership, as well as of the
unions as a whole, and undermine the credibility of these in the eyes  of the workers.  In  this
sense,  the  increased  assignation  of  resources  to  the  social  health  insurance  system  can  be
interpreted as a response to union power, however, instead of primarily trying to co-opt it, trying
to weaken it by discrediting the union leaders. Nevertheless, it is likely that the social health
insurances were part of a more multifaceted sticks and carrots tactic of the military junta. Despite
the repression, a part of the union movement continued to organise resistance. From 1977 on, the
so called “Group of 25” coordinated labour action including general strikes, of which the first
took place during 1979. Another fraction of the union movement, the so called commission for
“Governance(Gestión)  and  Work”,  was in  contrast  open  for  a  cooperation  with  the military
government  and  considered  the  Group  of  25  as  “dangerously  vulnerable  to  'leftist
subversion’”(McGuire 1997: 173).  Later  this divide led to the split  of the CGT into a more
combative  organisation,  the  CGT-Brasil,  and  a  more  cooperative  one,  the  CGT-Azopardo.
(McGuire 1997: 174) Interestingly the steepest rise in social health insurance expenditure as a
share of the GDP was effected in 1981 under general Viola, who had recently assumed power,
and who was disposed to negotiate the terms of a future return to democracy with pre-1976 party
leaders and a group of cooperative union leaders.(DAGPyPS 2010, McGuire 1997: 175/176) In
this sense, additional resources for the system of social health insurances may also have served
to co-opt the support of conservative trade union leaders for issues of crucial importance for the
military, such as the immunity from persecution for human rights violations.
The overall reduction of welfare expenditure, and the redistribution of resources within the
welfare  state,  moreover  coincided  with  the  neoliberal  ideology  prevailing  in  the  military
government  and  the business  elites  that  sustained it.  In  contrast  to  public  health  and  social
assistance,  social  insurance systems award merits  to a  certain degree,  and contracts with the
social health insurances were a particular lucrative business for private health care providers. 
With the return to democracy informal and formal labour recuperated an important power
resource  from  which  they  had  been  deprived  during  the  military  dictatorship:  their  votes.
Although this  did not coincide with increasing electoral  success  of  left  parties,  the electoral
importance of these two groups provided incentives for politicians to consider their social policy
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interests. The end of repression allowed the trade union movement to regain some organisational
power resources, however, the industrial decline and the deterioration of the labour market had
lastingly  weakened  them.  The  employers  had  been  economically  strengthened  through  the
military dictatorship, in the sense that they captured a considerably bigger share of the GDP.
Nevertheless, politically they had been temporarily weakened, partly because they had supported
a largely discredited military regime, and partly because their initially strong unity had broken
during  the  last  two years  of  it.(McGuire  1997:  175)  As  has  been  evidenced  in  2.1.,  social
assistance and unemployment protection expenditure began to recuperate during the Alfonsín
government(1983 – 1989), but remained clearly insufficient, not even reaching pre-dictatorship
levels. Despite the fiscal crisis, the pension system maintained very high coverage rates and low
benefit  inequalities.  The government also reintroduced employer  contributions to the pension
system. Yet, attempts to create a more equitable health care system failed due to trade union
resistance.
During the early 1980s, parts of the poor started to organise in local social movements, often
in combination with the occupation of land.(Merklen 2005: 51) Soon these movements began to
demand  social  programmes  from  the  state,  such  as  the  “National  Alimentary  Programme”.
Initially these organisations were highly democratic, yet, the need to negotiate social benefits
with the governments  increasingly posed limits to  these  forms  of  organisation.  To a certain
degree,  these  negotiations  replaced  the  hitherto  predominant  collective  forms  of  action  by
processes that took place between the leaders of the social movements and government officials.
The  latter  often  used  these  negotiations  for  co-optation  tactics.(Merklen  2005:  84)  In  the
Province  of  Buenos  Aires  some  social  movements  achieved  getting  involved  in  the
implementation  of  small  social  assistance  programmes.  Yet,  as  they  received  very  little
resources, were handed out discretionary, and did not constitute social rights, these programmes
were far from compensating the dramatic social decline that an increasing part of the population
was experiencing.(Merklen 2005: 56/57)
With regard to the employers and the trade unions, the Alfonsín government attempted to
establish  tripartite  negotiations,  however,  had  little  success.  While  both  employer  and  trade
union representations took part in the formal meetings, they informally continued to focus on
bilateral  relations  with  the  government.  The  trade  union  movement  frequently  and  abruptly
abandoned the tripartite negotiations and took stances typical to that of a political opposition.
Many of the most powerful employers, in contrast, prioritised lobbying and economic pressures
as  means of  influencing the government.  In  this  sense,  capital  had a clear  advantage  in  the
articulation of its interests. The incorporation of the trade unions into the peronist movement,
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and the relative weakness of the peronist party during the 1980s, put the trade unions in the role
of the principal representative of the peronist opposition. This deteriorated incentives for union
leaders  to  effectively  defend  the  interests  of  their  rank  and  files.  While  in  some occasions
compromises with, or even support to, the UCR government would have been clearly beneficial
for the working class, trade union leaders usually preferred to oppose in order to destabilise the
government and eventually achieve the installation of a peronist government.(Goldin 1997: 123
–  130) The  CGT  organised  13  general  strikes  during  only  five  and  a  half  years  of  UCR
government.(McGuire 1997: 234) The assumption of a categorically oppositional  role,  rather
than making the trade union movement’s positions dependent on its rank and file’s ‘objective’
interests, was also often in the very personal interest of the respective union leaders, as these
were occupying numerous important posts in the PJ party during the 1980s.(Goldin 1997: 123 –
130) 
The strong influence in the PJ party constituted a powerful tool for union leaders to block
undesired laws in the senate, where the UCR government was in the minority. In this context, the
ambitious  reform project  to  create  an  integrated  and  more  equitable  social  health  insurance
system, in which the state would have played a significantly bigger role, had little chances of
implementation.(Maceira  et  al.  2010:  5,  Barbeito/Lo  Vuolo  1998:  130) Strikes  of  the  trade
unions and the parliamentary opposition of the PJ resulted in a dilution of the contents of the
project to such a degree, that the finally approved legislation had no significant consequences in
practice.(Mera  2010: 107) The fierce  resistance  of  union leaders  to  any measure  that  would
reduce their control over social health insurances lay in the fact that these constituted one of their
main sources of economic power, and that they represented a key resource for union leaders to
consolidate their power over their rank and file, to further their political career, and to increase
their personal wealth through the large margins for corrupt practices provided by the lack of state
regulation and control.(Lloyd-Sherlock 2005:  1897, Lloyd-Sherlock 2006:  356/357,  McGuire
1997: 25) Employers  were against  the project as well, as it was to rely mainly on employer
contributions  and  general  taxes.(Cortés/Marshall  1993:  403)  For  working  class  interests  the
project contained several positive elements, but the fact that it threatened the personal interests of
the  trade  union elite  implied  that  the  trade  union  movement  ended  up opposing the  reform
together  with  the  employers.  In  this  sense,  the  personal  interests  of  trade  union  leaders
constituted  the  central  obstacle  for  attempts  to  adapt  the  health  care  system.  As  has  been
mentioned earlier,  also the attempts of the peronist government during the 1970s to create a
universalistic state run health system failed due to trade union and business resistance.
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President Alfonsín was of the centre-left wing of the UCR party.(Escudero 2001: 37) With his
presidential  campaign  Alfonsín  managed  to  make  some,  although  limited,  inroads  into  the
traditionally peronist working-class electorate. On this background, the UCR government hoped
it was able to win some support from the trade union movement, or at least to avoid trade union
resistance. However, the undemocratic structures of the trade unions and the tight adherence of
union leaders to the PJ posed severe obstacles for this aim. Partly for this reason, one of the first
government initiatives was a law project that aimed at making the trade unions more democratic.
(McGuire 1997: 191, Munck 1987: 106) In face of this threat to the very personal interests of the
trade union leaders, the two fractions of the hitherto split trade union confederation, the CGT-
Brasil and the CGT-Azopardo, re-united to confront the reform project. Finally, the law failed to
achieve  a majority in  the senate.  Only a weaker  version of  the law passed in  1984, which,
however, largely preserved the relatively strong control of  peronist union leaders over union
internal elections.(Gaudio/Domeniconi 1986: 424/425, McGuire 1997: 192) Although the main
aim of the UCR government was to achieve some trade union support, the democratisation could
have produced significant impacts on the politics of welfare state adaptation. 
After two consecutive electoral defeats in 1983 and 1985, the dominant role of trade union
leaders in the PJ was increasingly questioned. As can be observed in table 3, from 1987 on the
number of trade union representatives in the PJ bloc decreased rapidly. 
While  the  Alfonsín  government  attempted  to  adapt  the  health  care  system  and  pursued
egalitarian pension policies during the 1980s, the PJ government of Carlos Menem during the
1990s did the exact opposite. The health and pension systems became less redistributive, more
inequitable  and  more  exclusionary  during  that  decade.  Social  assistance  and  unemployment
protection  expenditure  continued  to  grow,  yet,  much  slower  than  the  number  of  potential
beneficiaries. 
This  shift  in  social  policies  coincided  with  an  unprecedented  political  influence  of  the
employer  sector  and  the  international  financial  institutions.  Although  the  PJ  government  of
Carlos Saúl Menem had been elected in 1989 with ample support from the biggest trade unions,
these  were  not  able  to  regain  influence  over  the  party.  Contrariwise,  Menem  completely
marginalised the trade union wing and quickly shifted towards a profoundly neoliberal agenda.
While  the  employer  sector  regained  more  unity  during  the  early  1990s,  the  trade  union
movement  suffered  increasingly  from  internal  divisions,  and  was  moreover  weakened  by
skyrocketing unemployment rates. Due to their increasing number, the poor became electorally
more and more important. The adoption of road blockades as principal form of protest allowed
the poor to actively enter the arena of welfare state politics during the second half of the 1990s.
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In October 1989, the CGT split into two parts after Menem loyal union leaders attempted to
destitute Saúl Ubaldini from his position as president of the CGT. One part, the CGT-Azopardo,
announced that it would only support a government that served the interests of the working class,
while the other part, the CGT-San Martín, had the position that union leaders had to support a PJ
government  even  if  its  policies  implied  some  costs  for  workers.(McGuire  1997:  228)  The
government  made  immediately  use  of  its  prerogative,  and  only  legally  recognised  the
government friendly confederation.(Goldin 1997: 116)
Menem  consciously  used  divide  and  rule  strategies  to  weaken  trade  union  resistance.
(McGuire 1997: 226) Loyal union leaders have often been rewarded with very personal benefits
for their political cooperation in the process of neoliberal adjustment. So, for example, Jorge
Triaca, the leader of the plastic workers’ union, was appointed minister of labour and later put in
charge of the privatisation of the SOMISA steel plant. Triaca had also been one of the leaders
that had cooperated with the last military dictatorship. José Pedraza, until today leader of the
railway  workers’  union,  participated  on  the  railway  privatisation  board.  Luis  Barrionuevo,
another very close ally of president Menem, was put in charge of the ANSSAL, the entity that
was  responsible  for  redistributing  a  part  of  the  resources  stemming  from  social  insurance
contributions  between  the  different  social  health  insurance  funds.  This  post  gave  him
considerable power over the finances of other unions. According to James McGuire(1997: 225)
an official of ANSSAL complained in 1991 that most of the individual funds did not even keep
books. This does not only show that these funds provided ideal  conditions for the misuse of
resources, but also that the redistribution of funds could not be effected other than arbitrarily.
Moreover, the ANSSAL lacked any clear rule for the redistribution of resources. In this sense,
Barrionuevo was furnished with faculties that sensibly affected the interests of other trade union
leaders. How powerful the use of the ANSSAL was for co-opting the support of union leaders
shows,  for  example,  the case  of  the powerful  metal  workers’  union under  the leadership  of
Lorenzo Miguel. Originally, Miguel had founded the oppositional CGT-Azopardo together with
the former CGT leader Saúl Ubaldini. However, when Ubaldini was about to declare a general
strike in March 1990, Miguel opposed the initiative after the ministry of labour had assigned his
trade union with the representation of the workers of two car parts factories rather than giving it
to the auto workers’ union. In November of the same year, he even withdrew all his allies from
Ubaldini’s CGT after  the ANSSAL agreed to absorb 25 million dollars of debt of the metal
workers’ union’s health insurance. In 1991, Barrionuevo had to resign after he quasi admitted in
a radio interview that he had not financed his mansion in a suburb of Buenos Aires by working,
but by corrupt practices in his trade union. In order to contain resistance, Menem also distributed
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lower government and administration posts to hitherto combative union leaders.(Goldin 1997:
116/117, McGuire 1997: 220/225 – 229) Barrionuevo’s resignation from the ANSSAL did not
put an end to the use of the social health insurance system for the co-optation of trade union
leaders.  In  December  1991,  several  trade  union  representatives  in  the  chamber  of  deputies
approved the labour market flexibilisation law(Ley Nacional de Empleo) in exchange for the
assumption of debts accumulated by the trade union’s social health insurances, although the law
constituted a clear violation of working class interests.(Etchemendy/Palermo 1998: 567, Goldin
1997: 126/127)
The  government  and  the  supporting  international  financial  institutions  clearly  pursued  a
neoliberal remodellation of the welfare state as a whole. Nevertheless, they had clear priorities
with regard to which areas had to be reformed most urgently, and in which areas a more gradual
progress with further reaching compromises was acceptable. In this priority list, labour market
flexibilisation and pension reform ranked above health care reform.(Lloyd-Sherlock 2005: 1896)
Therefore, and considering the extraordinarily high importance which union leaders ascribed to
the  social  health  insurances,  the  threat  of  social  health  insurance  reform  served  as  ideal
instrument  for  negotiating  the  approval  of  other  reform  projects  of  higher  priority.(Lloyd-
Sherlock 2005: 1897)
Trade union leaders seemed not necessarily to be inclined to cooperate with each other while
workers’  interests  were  at  stake  and  the  co-optation  payments  offered  by  the  respective
government were attractive. Yet, like in earlier occasions, the different fractions of union leaders
rapidly re-united when their very personal interests were at stake. When Menem planned to give
the “General  Tax Office”(Dirección General  de Impuestos/DGI)  influence with regard to the
assignment of the collected social health insurance contributions, the hitherto disunited union
leaders rapidly closed their ranks in early 1992 and prepared for a general strike. Although the
union leaders publicly denied that the reunification and the call for a general strike were related
to the social health insurance reform project, the strike was immediately called off when the
government agreed to withdraw the bill.(Goldin 1997: 118/119, McGuire 1997: 231) 
The reunited CGT contained different  standpoints, yet,  pursued a rather government loyal
course.  In  this CGT the more combative union leaders were marginalised,  such as Víctor de
Gennaro of the state workers’ union and María Sánchez of the teachers’ union, which eventually
led  to  the  foundation  of  the  “Argentine  Workers’  Central”(Central  de  los  Trabajadores
Argentinos/CTA), a new independent trade union confederation with combative stances towards
the neoliberal course of the government and more democratic structures. The CGT took a bit
more combative positions in  March 1993 when Naldo  Brunelli  of  the metal  workers’  union
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became secretary-general of the confederation. However, only shortly later the CGT moderated
its course again as the legislative elections were nearing and Brunelli had received a slot on the
list of PJ candidates for the house of deputies.(McGuire 1997: 231/232)
In  1993,  the government  advanced  plans  to  introduce  market  mechanisms into the social
health insurance system. The decree 9/93 mentioned for the first time the right of affiliates to
switch  between  different  social  health  insurances.  However,  the  negotiations  between  trade
unions and the government about the specific regulation of this right took several years, which
implied that it was not effectively implemented until 1997, and eventually remained limited to
some  competition  between  union  controlled  social  health  insurances,  excluding  the  private
insurance sector.(Alonso 2007: 155) 
In December 1993, the government announced a reduction of employer contributions to the
social health insurances,  which union leaders fiercely opposed, as this would have implied a
significant reduction of their economic power,  as well as a reduction of the health insurance
quality  for  formal  workers.  In  face  of  this,  the  largely  government  loyal  CGT scheduled  a
general  strike,  which,  however,  was  called  off  as  soon  as  the  government  showed  some
disposition to negotiate, and tax authorities heralded that they were thinking about investigating
the unions'  finances,  including that  of  the union controlled health  insurances,  as well  as the
personal  possessions  of  various  trade  union leaders.  This  decision to  call  off  the  strike was
criticised by some union leaders, which finally led to the foundation of a CGT internal current
with  more  combative  stances  called  “Movement  of  Argentine  Workers”(Movimiento  de  los
Trabajadores  Argentinos/MTA).(McGuire  1997: 232/233) In  December 1995 the government
finally reduced employer health insurance contributions from 6 % to 5 %.(Lloyd-Sherlock 2006:
358)
The same year, the Ministry of Economy proposed, with financial and advisory support of the
World  Bank,  a  reform  project  which  aimed  at  introducing  full  competition  in  the  health
insurance sector. This would have allowed affiliates not only to choose between different social
health insurances, but also to switch to private health insurers. Yet, trade union resistance was
again able to delay the project.(Lloyd-Sherlock 2005: 1897) Despite the pressures of the IMF
and private insurers(La Nación 11th of April 1998), the government finally gave in to several
trade unions demands, so that direct competition from private health insurances was blocked.
Also the possibility to switch from a “blue collar” social  health insurance to another  of the
“white  collar”  sector  remained  closed.(Lloyd-Sherlock  2005:  1897)  The  regulating  decree
504/98 from 1998 even gave  union leaders  some influence with regard to the acceptance or
decline  of  workers  who  wanted  to  switch  from one  insurance  to  another.  Shortly  after  the
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publication of  the decree,  the newspaper La  Nación(14th of  May 1998) insinuated the likely
relation between the concessions made to the trade union leaders and the nearing presidential
elections. In June 2000, the coalition government under Fernando De la Rúa decreed that from
January 2001 on social health insurances would directly compete with private insurers. However,
opposition from the trade unions and social health insurances was once more able to impede the
implementation. The decree was suspended by the government in March 2001.(Alonso 2007:
159) 
Despite the success of the trade unions in maintaining their control over the social health
insurances, the government was able to introduce market competition between union led health
insurance  funds  and  to  effectively  reduce  the  already  scarce  redistributive  character  of  the
system.  The  disposition  of  the  governments  during  the  1990s  to  give  in  to  union  demands
regarding the social health insurances has to be understood in the light of the existence of other
government  projects  which  required  union  cooperation  and  which  were  of  higher  priority.
(Lloyd-Sherlock  2006:  358)  Furthermore,  the  extraordinary  importance  of  the  social  health
insurance funds for the trade union leaders provided incentives for the government to use social
health insurance reform as a threat to discipline the trade unions more than as an instrument to
resolve the severe problems that plagued the system. In this sense, concessions in the area of
social  health  insurances  became a central  currency with which the government  bought  trade
union support, or at least neutrality, when I came to labour market liberalisation, pension reform
and the amendment of the constitution to allow the one-time re-election of the president. The
back and forth in the social health insurance reform can also be related to the different positions
within the  trade  union movement.  Not  all  unions were  generally  against  the introduction  of
affiliates’ choice. Especially bigger unions, such as for example the retail clerk’s trade union,
hoped  to  be  able  to  attract  new  members  and  hence  widen  their  influence.98(Alonso  2007:
161/163/164)
More profound than in the health sector was the reform of the pension system during the
1990s.  With the initiation of  the convertibility regime,  Walter  Schulthess,  an economist  and
close ally of the minister of economy Domingo Cavallo, was designated head of the “Social
Security Secretariat”(Secretaría de Seguridad Social). This was an hitherto uncommon personnel
decision, as it were usually lawyers from the ministry of labour that were put in charge of the
secretariat that dealt with pension policies. The appointment of Schulthess was one of the first
98 However, the strategy of these trade unions failed. In practice most social insurance members with higher incomes
opted for one of the smaller social insurance funds,  which served as a “forefront” for private insurers,  offering
privileged conditions for young and well earning workers.(El Clarín 24th of April 2003)
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signals  for  the  profound  “economisation”  of  pension  policies  that  took  place  during  the
succeeding years.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 215) From 1991 on, the secretariat worked on proposals for
pension reform with the aim of full privatisation. The following year, the government passed a
reform project to the congress which proposed the replacement of the pay-as-you-go system with
that of individual capital accounts for all workers under 45 years of age, and modifications of the
old system for those 45 years or older.(MTEySS/SSS 2003: 16) The employer associations were
supporting this initiative, especially those of the financial sector.(Alonso 1998: 602) However,
the proposal  found no majority in the congress, as several  PJ deputies representing the trade
union movement were opposing it.(MTEySS/SSS 2003: 16) As has been argued in chapter 3.1.,
Carlos Menem had de facto very ample margins for the use of emergency decrees, which would
have allowed the implementation of pension privatisation without approval of the congress. Yet,
in  this  particular  case  an emergency  decree  was  not  an option,  as the enterprises  that  were
potentially  going  to  compete  in  a  privatised  pension market  declared  that  a  privatisation by
decree  would not  give them sufficient  security with regard to  the legal  sustainability of  the
reform.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  government  was  forced  to  mobilise  parliamentary
support for the reform.(Alonso 1998: 595/596) As can be seen in table 3, at that time, around 15
% of the PJ deputies were trade union representatives.  To reach the approval of the law the
government had either to win support from the opposition or to close their own ranks. As the
main  oppositional  force,  the  UCR,  decided  to  oppose  the  privatisation  and  proposed  an
alternative law project, the government had to concentrate on achieving support among their own
deputies. This gave the trade unions important possibilities to influence the pension reform law.
(Alonso 1998: 604) One controversial  issue was the benefit  formula. In  this regard the trade
unions were able to achieve a slightly higher core benefit(PBU) and changes in the calculation of
the additional wage dependent benefit.(Alonso 1998: 610, Kay 2000: 12) The other conflictive
point was the privatisation as such. The CGT initially refused privatisation at all. Yet, it was
disposed to negotiate with the government. The latter, as so often, applied a mixture of carrots
and sticks and co-optation tactics. Again, the social health insurance system served as instrument
to threaten trade unions that were not willing to cooperate sufficiently. On the other hand, due to
the particular parliamentary situation, the government was disposed to give in to some union
demands. At the end, the system was only partially privatised, giving workers the possibility to
opt between a private scheme and a reformed pay-as-you-go scheme.(Alonso 1998: 606 – 610)
Once more the approval of trade union leaders was not only secured with concessions that made
the  reform  less  dramatic  for  workers(it  still  resulted  largely  detrimental  for  working  class
interests), but also with an offer that rather satisfied the personal power interests of the trade
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union  leaders,  namely  the  right  for  trade  unions  to  become  themselves  pension  insurance
companies.(Lo  Vuolo 1998b: 222) Considering that  trade union leaders  resisted fiercely any
attempt to weaken their control over the health insurances during the last 50 years, the attainment
of control over pension funds as additional resource of economic, personal and organisational
power  can  reasonably be  seen  as  an  attractive  offer  for  union  leaders,  although  less  so for
workers. Generally,  some trade union leaders seemed to feel strongly attracted by the idea of
converting their trade unions more and more into enterprises. So, for example, did the former
state oil workers’ trade union buy parts of the shipping fleet of the privatised oil company YPF.
The light and power workers’ union bought major shares of 15 power plants and opened a bank
with the aim to enter the retirement fund business resulting from the partial privatisation of the
pension system. The railway workers’ union purchased several privatised railway lines.(McGuire
1997: 237) The retail clerks’ union planned to manage a credit card and to offer life insurances.
(Murrillo 1997: 433)
 Finally  the  pension  reform law 24.241 was  approved  by the congress  in  October  1993.
(MTEySS/SSS 2003: 16, Lo Vuolo 1998b: 222) As has been described in 2.2., in practice the
new system reflected much stronger the original intentions of the government than the described
compromises  seem  to  indicate,  as  several  specific  regulations  of  the  law,  some  of  them
implemented afterwards, favoured the private scheme or reverted the concessions made to the
trade unions.
The above described successes of formal labour to partially block reform initiatives of the
government shall not detract from the fact that organised labour was clearly on the defence in the
welfare state politics of the 1990s. The implemented reforms implied significant changes in the
functioning of the health and pension system, which were disadvantageous for working class
interests and welfare state adaptation. Trade unions were able to slow down the government in
some areas, but they were not able to bring the government to support their interests. The failure
of formal labour to exert stronger influence stemmed less from the weakness of the trade union
movement in terms of membership or organisational resources than from the inclination of union
leaders to prioritise their personal interests over those of their rank and files, to support a PJ
government although it pursued neoliberal policies, and to engage in the game of co-optation.
The government clearly pursued policies that served largely upper class interests. The rising
income inequalities  implied  that  wealthier  members  of  the  social  health  insurances  became
increasingly  dissatisfied  with  the  quality  of  health  care  provided  by  many  of  these.(Lloyd-
Sherlock  2006:  358)  Therefore,  better-off  wage  earners  certainly  had  some  interest  in  the
introduction of the possibility to switch to another health insurance. With this regard, the trend
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towards liberalising the health insurance sector has been an adaptation to the market demand of
affluent clients.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 233) As has been shown, also the pension system has been
adapted  towards  the  interests  of  the  better-off.  While  low  wage  earners  were  increasingly
excluded from the benefits of the system, although not from financing it, high earners benefited
from the tighter link between contributions and benefits. This strategy potentially implied the
loss of parts of the working class votes,  but it  made the PJ more attractive for well  earning
employees  and  self-employed.  The  neoliberal  course  of  the  government  seemed  to  attract
important parts of these groups. While in 1989 the presidential candidate of the liberal UCeDé
received around 10 % of the votes, the PJ was able to absorb most of these votes in 1995.(De Riz
1996: 136)
Nevertheless, the most powerful support for the government came less from the better earning
wage earners than from the employer sector and the foreign creditors. The latter were mainly
represented by the international financial institutions. As has been alluded in 2.2., these played
an important  role as  promoters,  advisers  and financiers  in virtually all  social  policy reforms
during the 1990s. From within the country the government had been strongly influenced by the
employer sector. The interests of this sector in social policy reform have been best expressed by
a  document  of  the  Argentinean  Employers’  Council(CEA)  and  the  Foundation  for  Latin
American Economic Research(FIEL) in 1995. The CEA had already provided the first minister
of economy during the military dictatorship and became very influential again during the 1990s.
It  is  impressive how strong the proposals  of  this  document  and the policy initiatives  of  the
government  coincide.  The  CEA-FIEL(1995)  document  demanded  a  reduction  of  employer
contributions in all areas of the social security system, more market competition in the health
insurance  sector,  privatisation  and  less  redistribution  in  the  pension  system,  a  progressive
graduation of the child allowances and a stronger unification of unemployment protection and
social  assistance  policies  combined  with  the  introduction  of  work  conditionalities.  The
government tried to comply with virtually all of these demands and was also able to implement
most of them. 
Although the split  of the trade union movement during the 1990s put formal labour in a
weaker position in face of the relative unity of the employer sector, it provided some chances to
increase  the  pressure  for  welfare  state  adaptation  as  well.  The  alternative  trade  union
confederation emphasised its independence from the PJ government, gave internal democracy a
higher priority, and soon made the first attempts to construct an alliance with informal labour,
allowing  the  affiliation  of  unemployed  and  informal  workers,  and  demanding  social  policy
measures  that  would  benefit  formal  and  informal  labour  alike.(e.g.  Lo  Vuolo  1998b:  213,
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Golbert 2004: 24) The experience of the CTA moreover showed that this coalition strategy was
capable of increasing the power resources of the trade union movement during these difficult
times. While the CTA was able to significantly raise the number of affiliates during the 1990s,
the exact contrary happened with the CGT. The two trade union confederations pursued very
different lines with regard to the new social movements of the poor. While the CGT kept being
focussed  on  the  organisation  of  formal  workers,  and  maintained  a  very  distanced  position
towards  the new social  movements,  the CTA tried  to  incorporate  unemployed  and informal
workers, to take up their demands and to provide some kind of umbrella for their organisations.
(Campione/Rajland 2006: 319, Palomino 2005: 23) Until today there exist several organisational
links between “piquetero”99 organisations and the CTA.(Golbert  2004: 20/21) Various of the
CTA’s initiatives responded to the social needs of those outside the formal labour market, such
as  the  demands  to  transform  the  child  allowances  in  a  universal  right  and  to  implement  a
universal non-contributory unemployment benefit.  In contrast, most political initiatives of the
CGT  excluded  informal  workers.  They  aimed  mainly  at  maintaining  the  fragmented  and
inequitable health insurance system, rising the amount of income exempted from income tax100,
increasing the benefits of the contributory unemployment insurance, raising child allowances for
formal workers, and eliminating the progressive graduation of child allowances.(e.g. La Nación
26th of July 2000, Página 12 13th of July 2008, Clarín 7th of September 2008, La Nación 29th of
October 2010) All these demands were only serving formal workers with stable jobs, and they
were particularly favouring the better earning workers who benefited from the lack of solidarity
in the health insurance system, the income tax exemptions, and so on. 
Despite the positive trend in the number of affiliates, the CTA remained the minority fraction
of the trade union movement. Its influence on the governments’ social policies was overall lower
than that of the CGT. One of the main impediments for the CTA has been the hostility of the
governments, which furthermore held ample faculties to hamper the work of the CTA and the
affiliated trade unions. In Argentina, without the official recognition of the ministry of labour,
unions do not possess the right to conduct most of the essential functions of a trade union, such
as collective wage bargaining, and neither can they maintain a social health insurance.(Goldin
1997: 139) Until today the CTA and many of the affiliated trade unions are not fully legally
99 ‘Piquete’ stands for road blockade in Argentina. As the social movements of the poor adopted road blockades as
their principal from of action during the late 1990s these movements are commonly called “piqueteros”.
100 The amounts exempted from income tax are actually considerably higher than the average income of formal
workers. Therefore, only well paid workers would benefit from an increase of the tax exemption. 
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recognised and lack therefore many of the prerogatives that the CGT and the majority of the
affiliated unions enjoy.(Página 12 6th of May 2010) 
The alliance between the CTA and informal labour not only proved beneficial for the CTA,
but also for the poor, who were able to significantly increase their organisational strength and the
capacity to participate in the politics of social policy. The support of the CTA contributed to the
formation of broader networks that incorporated several social movements. By this means the
geographically highly fragmented social movements of the poor were able to coordinate their
actions, breaking thereby the limitation of their political influence to the local level and entering
the national stage of politics.(Massetti 2006: 31) One of the originally two biggest piquetero101
organisations, the “Federación Tierra y Vivienda”(FTV) was founded under the umbrella of the
CTA trade union confederation. Also some smaller social movements, such as the “Asociación
Tupac  Amaru”  and  the  “Movimiento  Territorial  de  Liberación”,  formed  part  of  the  CTA.
(Golbert 2004: 18, Página 12 12th of December 2010) The second of the originally two biggest
piquetero organisations, the “Corriente Clasista y Combativa”(CCC), was formed outside the
CTA with the support of a small maoist party(PCR). Yet, also the CCC was cooperating closely
with the FTV and the CTA. Around the turn of the millennium, the CCC and the FTV have been
the  most  influential  social  movements  of  informal  labour.  Several  more  radical  piquetero
organisations formed an alternative coalition of social movements called “Bloque Piquetero”.
(Golbert 2004: 18) The crystallisation of big networks of social movements towards the turn of
the millennium allowed unprecedented levels of unity and cooperation. 
Another important  step for the strengthening of informal labour as a social force was the
adoption of road blockades, called “piquetes” in Argentina, as primary form of protest. The first
road  blockades  took  place  in  1996 in  the  provinces  of  Neuquén  and  Salta  when  petroleum
workers  tried to impede the loss of their jobs.  Short  time later,  social  movements started to
incorporate  this  form of  protest  as  a  means  to  attain  public  attention  and to  reinforce  their
demands.(Merklen 2005: 76/77) Taking into consideration that most parts of informal labour
have not been able to strike, the road blockades appeared to be an effective way for making their
demands heard and creating pressure on the government.(Neffa 2008: 74/75)
This  qualitative  strengthening  of  informal  labour’s  power  resources  allowed  the  social
movements to negotiate their social policy demands directly with the federal government from
the second half of the 1990s on. The distribution of social benefits, particularly with regard to the
so called “Work Programme”(Programa Trabajar), were the central issue of these negotiations.
101 Most  of  the  social  movements  are  called  „piqueteros“  since  the  late  1990s  as  they  adopted  road
blockades(piquetes) as their primary form of protest.
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On  the  one  hand,  the  Work  Programme  pursued  not  only  the  alleviation  of  poverty  or
unemployment,  but  also  the  pacification  of  the  poor’s  protests.  Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  the
establishment  of  direct  negotiations  between  social  movements  of  the  poor  and  the  federal
government  implied  the consolidation and recognition  of  informal  labour  as  an actor  in  the
national politics of the welfare state.(Massetti 2006: 31) Some social movements were given the
administration of a certain quantity of Work Programme benefits, which they hence distributed
internally among their members.(Neffa 2008: 74/75, Merklen 2005: 66) The attainment of plans
served both the survival strategies of the poor affiliates and the consolidation of the respective
leaders’ positions in these organisations.(Golbert 2004: 21/22) 
With the assumption of president De la Rúa in late 1999 the relations between the government
and the social movements began to deteriorate again. According to Julio Neffa(2008: 74/75) the
increasing intensity of disputes was mainly due to attempts of the government  to reduce the
number of benefits and to change the mode of access, while the economic recession that the
country was experiencing since late 1998 simultaneously deteriorated the economic situation of
the poor. Moreover, the new government was less disposed to accept the piquetero organisations
as  legitimate  negotiating  partner.(Golbert  2004:  20) Beginning  in  late  October  2000,  3500
activists of social movements blocked the important “Route 3”(Ruta 3) in the La Matanza district
in greater Buenos Aires during one week demanding employment.(Merklen 2005: 74) Similar
actions were undertaken during the following months. During 2001 two national assemblies of
piquetero organisations were held, at which the big majority of the social movements of the poor
participated. On these assemblies the multiple social movements agreed on intensifying the road
blockades and finally concluding the year with an open-ended protest action.(Golbert 2004: 20,
Svampa 2008: 21) 
During the same year the CTA initiated the “National Front against Poverty”(Frente Nacional
contra la Pobreza/FRENAPO), which included besides trade unions also deputies, human rights
organisations, and even some bishops and employers. The FRENAPO elaborated a proposal that
suggested  the  implementation  of  a  non-contributory  unemployment  protection  scheme  that
would guarantee every unemployed head of household 380 pesos per month, the universalisation
of child allowances of 60 pesos per month, and a non-contributory minimum pension of 150
pesos  per  month  for  the  elderly.102 In  an  informal  referendum  during  December  2001  the
proposal received more than one million supporters in only a few days.(Campione/Rajland 2006:
319, Golbert 2004: 24)
102 In 2001, 380 pesos still equalled 380 dollars.
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The internal unity of informal labour and the alliance with the most progressive fraction of
formal labour gave the demands for welfare state adaptation unprecedented weight. The strength
of these actors was moreover reinforced by external factors. In face of the dramatic deepening of
the  economic  crisis  and  an  acceleration  of  capital  flight  in  the  second  half  of  2001,  the
government implemented the so called “corralito”, a restriction to the withdrawal of money from
bank accounts. This measure, in turn, led to a wave of protests of the middle classes, further
aggravating the situation of the government. On the 19th of December 2001, middle class protests
and the social movements of the poor united on the Plaza de Mayo, the central place in front of
the government headquarters, to demand the resignation of president De la Rúa. The president,
however, declared the state of emergency and disposed the repression of the protests. After one
weak of intensive conflicts and a balance of 26 deaths De la Rúa had finally to resign.(Neffa
2008: 77/78, Golbert 2004: 11 – 14) 
Under these circumstances, the demands of the poor could not be ignored. The succeeding
interim president Rodríguez Saa acknowledged that the state had to respond to the situation of
the the poor with social policies. In his introductory speech Rodríguez Saa promised the creation
of one million jobs. However, due to the lack of support from his own party(PJ) he resigned only
one week later. As soon as Eduardo Duhalde assumed as Saa’s successor, the social movements
turned out on the streets again and demanded the compliance with the promise of one million
jobs. The piquetero organisations have been able to significantly increase the number of activists
during those months. According to an interview of Laura Golbert(2004: 20) with one of the
coordinators of the CCC, the number of members of this organisation rose only between late
2001 and early 2002 from 12,000 to more than 50,000 persons. The conservative newspaper
Perfil(30th of March 2007) wrote later that the FTV and the CCC together reached a membership
of about 150,000 during the peak of the crisis in 2001/2002.  These numbers still do not include
the members of a multitude of smaller piquetero organisations. In face of the strength of the
social movements and the instability of his government, Duhalde declared that he would keep the
promise in form of a non-contributory unemployment protection scheme called “Programme for
Unemployed Heads of Households”(PJJHD).(Golbert 2004: 12/13/20) However, like it was the
case with anterior social assistance and unemployment protection programmes, the decree that
implemented the promised social policy in late January 2001 limited the number of benefits to a
certain  budget  that  would be determined by the government.  This implied that  many of  the
unemployed  would  eventually  remain  excluded  from the  programme.(Pautassi/Rossi/Campos
2003:  4)  Aware  of  the  vulnerability  of  his  government,  Duhalde  called  for  multi-sector
negotiations to legitimate his  social  and economic policy.(Neffa  2008: 76/77) The invitation
included the two trade union federations CGT and CTA, various employers’ associations, the
piquetero  organisations  and  representatives  of  the  church.(Golbert  2004:  16)  Although  the
benefit level of the programme remained very low with 150 pesos per month, the negotiations
led to the abolition of any budgetary restriction to the programme and to the introduction of
stricter  control  mechanisms  than  foreseen  by  the  government.(Decree  565/2002) The
acknowledgement  of the social  movements  as negotiating partners  in meetings  that  involved
powerful employers’ associations and trade union confederations shows how much the power
resources  of  these  movements  had  grown  since  the  late  1990s.  Figure  44  shows  a  strong
correlation between the rise in the number of road blockades and the increase in social assistance
and unemployment expenditure.
Elaborated by the author. Sources: For the number of road blockades: Massetti (2006: 30). For social assistance
and unemployment protection expenditure: DAGPyPS(2010).
The economic crisis  between the second semester  of  1998 and the first  semester  of 2002
importantly  changed  the  distribution  of  power  resources  between  the  different  social  forces
involved in the politics of welfare state adaptation. As has been argued, informal labour was able
to increase its power resources in various aspects. Its organisations were growing rapidly and the
multitude of social movements increasingly managed to coordinate their actions and demands,
while additional support came from the CTA. Formal labour remained largely on the defence and
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Figure 44: The number of road blockades and social assistance and 
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the  majority  fraction  of  the  trade  union  movement,  the  CGT,  suffered  from   growing
fragmentation. However,  also the unity of the employer  sector started to break from the late
1990s on. While during the early 1990s the different  employer  sectors converged around the
support for the massive privatisation programme that was linked to the neoliberal adjustment and
the convertibility regime, after the completion of the sell out of state enterprises the different
sectorial  interests  with  regard  to  the overvaluation  of  the  currency came  increasingly to  the
forefront.  The convertibility regime,  which fixed an exhange rate of one to one between the
Argentine peso and the US dollar, became more and more unsustainable, and employers were
vastly disagreeing about  what kind of  exchange rate  policy should replace  the convertibility
regime. On the one hand, external creditors, service providers and enterprises that were indebted
in foreign currencies supported the proposal  of a dollarisation of the country.  This way they
would have avoided the skyrocketing of the value of their foreign debt measured in national
prices, and foreign investors in the service sector would have maintained the dollar value of their
investments  in  Argentina.  On  the  other  hand,  export  oriented  industries  and  agricultural
enterprises, including those with participation of international capital, as well as any enterprise
that  had  invested  bigger  amounts  outside  Argentina,  were  strongly  in  favour  of  a  currency
devaluation, as this was going to increase their international competitiveness and the local value
of their foreign investments.(Basualdo 2001: 58 – 74/85 – 101) 
Finally,  president  Duhalde decided to effect  a currency devaluation.  Besides  the dramatic
short  term  effects,  particularily  the  skyrocketing  of  poverty,  this  radical  turnaround  in  the
exchange rate policy led to structural changes in the Argentinean economy that were going to
condition a new distribution of power resources between the main social policy actors. While the
longstanding deterioration of the labour market had put formal labour in the defence since 1976,
the devaluation of the exchange rate initiated a period of rapid economic recovery and a modest
trend of reindustrialisation. The devaluation furthermore changed the relation between labour
and capital costs in favour of more labour intensive modes of production. In this context the
labour  market  started  to  recover103,  and  trade  unions  were  able  to  gain  strength  again.  The
political  post-crisis context further contributed to the recovery of the trade union movement's
political  weight,  especially  that  of  the  majority fraction  CGT,  which  managed  to  reduce  its
internal fragmentation. Informal labour had entered the politics of welfare state adaptation as a
powerful actor during the years of crisis. However, with the return of economic growth and the
coming  into  power  of  a  centre-left  government,  the  social  movements  of  informal  labour
103As has been shown in 2.1., the labour market recovery during the last years has still not been able to reverse the
dramatic deterioration that took place during the preceding quarter of a century.
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increasingly  suffered  from  fragmentation  and  co-optation  through  the  government.  The
cooperation  among different  social  organisations  was more and more limited to fractions  of
informal labour. Employers, especially those sectors which have been strongest associated with
the mode of accumulation during the 1990s by the public opinion,  such as the financial sector
and foreign creditors, experienced a certain political discreditation, which reduced their influence
over social policies. 
These shifts in the distribution of power relations had impacts on the direction that welfare
state reform took after the peak of the crisis. Social assistance and unemployment protection
expenditure  has  been  slightly  reduced  until  2009,  but  at  a  lower  pace  than  poverty  and
unemployment  rates  were  decreasing.  In  2009,  expenditure  on  these  policies  increased
significantly  due  to  the  introduction  of  the  so  called  Universal  Child  Allowance  and  the
Argentina  Works  programme.  Pension  reform  after  2002  clearly  benefited  the  interests  of
informal labour, as the so called pension moratorium allowed more than two million poor elderly
to  access  a  pension  benfit.  Also  the  elevation  of  the  minimum pension  was  favourable  for
informal labour. The reintroduction of pension indexation in 2008 has been a central demand of
the trade union movement and most of the parliamentary opposition. The renationalisation of the
pension system was in the interest of the lower earning contributers and supported by the trade
unions.  Moreover,  the renationalisation was particularly interesting for the government,  as  it
opened  certain  access  to  the  enormous  amounts  of  accumulated  capital  from the  individual
pension accounts. In the context of two financial crisis during only one decade, and the lack of
unity of the employer sector, the politically weakened financial sector was not able to impede
this  step.  With  regard  to  the  health  sector,  no  significant  attempts  of  reform  have  been
undertaken. This can be related to the negative experience of the anterior decades. During these,
all attempts of health care reform largely failed. Moreover, the recovery of trade union leaders'
power resources raised the political costs of such a reform.
During  the  peak  of  the  economic  crisis,  social  actors  outside  the  government  achieved
significant  influence  over  the  design  of  the  PJJHD  unemployment  protection  scheme.  The
multisectorial  negotiations  had for  the first  time limited the discretionary character  of social
assistance programmes in Argentina, as they established the right to a PJJHD benefit for any
unemployed head of household who fulfilled the requirements determined in the decree 565/02.
However, as soon as the political situation seemed to stabilise again, the government started to
reverse the “rights”-character of the programme. An internal resolution of the ministry of labour
disposed that the inscription to the programme was going to end on the 17th of May 2002, which
implied that after this date nobody would be anymore able to access a benefit of this programme
209
via the legally established path. Nevertheless, Julio Neffa(2008: 102) shows that the number of
benefits continued to grow until 2003, which the author relates to the hand out of benefits outside
the legally established path. According to Laura Golbert(2004: 21) approximately 10 % of the
programme benefits  were  handed  out  in  negotiations  between  the government  and piquetero
leaders, and a somewhat bigger share through clientelistic party networks at the local level. The
restriction of the access to the programme's benefits was not only beneficial for the government
in fiscal terms, but allowed it to use the programme as a powerful instrument for divide and rule
and sticks and carrots tactics towards the piquetero organisations.(Merklen 2005: 86) While the
administration of a certain number of benefits were the carrots for those who were disposed to
cooperate, violent repressions were the sticks for those who were not. The repression culminated
with the death of two piqueteros and hundreds of injured persons in June 2002, which, however,
turned out to be politically costly for the interim president Duhalde.(Svampa 2008: 21)
The following president from the centre-left wing of the PJ party, Néstor Kirchner, tried to
avoid  open  repression  and  applied  instead  a  mixture  of  integration  and  co-optation  tactics
towards the more moderate social movements, and legal forms of repression towards the more
radical  groups.  A part  of  the  piquetero  movement  was  indeed  disposed  to  support  the  new
government, while the more radical organisations opposed it.(Svampa 2008: 22/23) The FTV
immediately declared its support to president Kirchner. Initially the CCC was more critical, but
finally  also  took a rather  government  friendly position during  Néstor  Kirchner's  presidency.
Eventually,  the differences between the CCC and the FTV led to the dissolution of the long-
standing coalition between the two movements. Also the more radical Bloque Piquetero suffered
from internal fragmentation. While some of the social movements of this bloc decided to support
the  government,  the  majority  was  opposing  it.(Masseti  2006:  31)  The  cooperation  with  the
government appeared beneficial for the social movements, and in particular for their leaders.
Government  loyal  organisations were strongly favoured in the distribution of social  benefits,
such as housing construction plans,  scholarships,  unemployment  benefits,  and so on. So, for
example,  were the FTV, and during some years  also the CCC,  incorporated into a housing
programme for  the  construction  of  several  thousand  houses.(Página  12  3rd of  August  2003,
Svampa 2008: 23 – 25) The so called “Movimiento Evita” opened various cooperatives whose
products were bought by the Province of Buenos Aires.(Escudé 2007: 5/6) Several leaders of
these social  movements  got  furthermore  posts in different  levels  of the government.  So, for
example,  Jorge  Ceballos,  leader  of  the  piquetero  organisation  “Barrios  de  Pie”,  became  an
official  in  the  ministry  of  social  development  in  2004.  Emilio  Pérsico,  leader  of  a  social
movement called “Movimiento Evita”, participated in the government of the Province of Buenos
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Aires under the governor Felipe Solá.(Escudé 2007: 2 – 5) Edgardo Depetri, founder and leader
of  a  social  movement  called  “Frente  Transversal  Nacional  y  Popular”,  was  deputy  in  the
government bloc between 2005 and 2009 and got  a sub-secretary post  in the government  in
2010.(Página 12 17th of March 2010) The leader of the FTV, Luis D’Elía, already cooperated
with  the  government  since  2003 in  the  execution  of  housing  construction  programmes,  and
became government official during a short period in 2006, leading the “Subsecretaría de Tierras
para el Hábitat Social”.(Página 12 3rd of August 2003, Svampa 2008: 24) D’Elía had to resign
short time later after he publicly defended the Iranian government, which proved unfavourable
for the image of the government.(Página 12 14th of November 2006) However, to preserve the
tight  relation between  the  government  and the  leadership  of  the FTV,  D’Elía’s  wife, Alicia
Sánchez, became an official in the ministry of social development, and Rubén Pascolini, another
representative of the FTV and close ally of D’Elía, was going to occupy the post from which the
latter had resigned.(Página 12 26th of January 2007) According to the newspaper La Nación of
the 11th of June 2006, at that moment around 50 representatives of social movements aligned
with the President were government officials in different ministries and departments.
Towards those piquetero organisations which continued to oppose, the Kirchner government
applied judicial measures of repression, namely the massive initiation of legal processes against
participants of road blockades. By criminalising and stigmatising their protests, the government
contributed to the creation of a public opinion largely hostile towards the social movements of
the poor.  Under these adverse circumstances, the oppositional social movements suffered from
increasing  fragmentation  and  a  weakening  of  their  mobilisation  capacities.  Ideological
differences between several of these social movements came again stronger to the forefront and
cooperation between them was increasingly limited.(Svampa 2008: 24 - 27)  
At the same time, and due to the favourable treatment of the government,  Kirchner  loyal
social  movements  were  able  to  expand  their  rank  and  files.  Besides  co-opting  existing
organisations, the government also promoted the creation of new structures. One of the biggest
organisations today, the “Movimiento Evita”, was founded in November 2005 with the explicit
aim to organise the poor in support of the government of Néstor Kirchner.(Interview with Emilio
Pérsico in  La  Nación 19th of  November  2005) As Maristella  Svampa(2008:  24) argues  with
regard  to  Luis  D'Elía,  leader  of  the  FTV,  the  government  loyal  organisations  increasingly
departed from their originally very democratic roots and went over to a rather personalistic style
of leadership.(Svampa 2008: 22 – 27)
It  is striking how much the co-optation of the piquetero movements through the Kirchner
governments resembled the co-optation of the trade unions through the peronist governments
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during the 1940s and 1950s. In both processes social policy played a central role. Like it was the
case with the social  health  insurances  during the 1940s,  the social  movements were not just
rewarded with social policy measures in favour of the social class they were originating from,
but by giving the leaders of these movements direct  control  over the administration of these
social programmes. The more the respective leader was willing to support the government, the
more was he favoured in the distribution of social benefits.  In  turn, the distribution of these
social  benefits  within  the  organisation  consolidated  the  intra-organisational  position  of  the
respective piquetero leader.  Like in the case of the trade unions, the government has thereby
promoted a personalistic style of leadership, which gave the leaders a certain autonomy from
their  rank  and  file  and  made  their  “cooperation”  more  flexible.  A  look  at  Argentinean
newspapers, independently of their political line, shows how pronounced this personalism indeed
was. Firstly,  the names of piquetero leaders such as Luis  D'Elía,  Edgardo Depetri  or Emilio
Pérsico have been much more often mentioned than the actual names of the organisations they
represented. And secondly, when newspapers referred to these social movements, they usually
wrote Edgardo  Depetri's  “Frente  Transversal”  or  Emilio Pérsico's  “Movimiento Evita”.  As a
consequence, the names of the leaders of these organisations were more commonly known than
those of the organisations themselves. So, for example, has Emilio Pérsico been named in 827
articles in the newspaper La Nación between the 1st of January 2006 and the 22nd of December
2010, while the movement he leads has only been named in 435 articles during the same period.
The way in which social policies were used to co-opt the leaders of the piquetero movements
created,  similar  to  what  happened  with the  social  health  insurances  in  the case  of  the  trade
unions, strong personal interests of the leaders in the control over these policies, which, however,
was not necessarily in the interest of the poor. Paradoxically, the establishment of the control
over the distribution of social benefits created little incentives for piquetero leaders to prioritise
the introduction of universal benefits for all needy persons, as this would basically have meant
the loss of one of the main pillars of their personal economic and political power. Furthermore,
the  establishment  of  such  a  clientelistic  relationship  motivated  the  government  to  avoid  the
introduction of universal programmes, as these would not serve any more for co-optation tactics.
Like the peronist governments during the 1940s and 1950s, Kirchner combined the co-optation
of  existing  organisations  with  promoting  the  creation  of  new  structures,  while  oppositional
groups were pushed back through (legally) repressive means, as well as the discrimination in the
assignation  of  social  benefits.  Although  this  strategy  allowed  government  loyal  piquetero
organisations to capture new affiliates, like it also had happened with the trade unions during the
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1940s and 1950s, they were losing important parts of their independence and of the capacity to
effectively defend the interests of informal labour.
While the piquetero movement lost the strength and unity that it had achieved during the years
of crisis(Svampa 2008: 18/22), the majority fraction of the trade union movement, the CGT, was
able to increase its unity and its power resources after 2002. In 1997, the more combative MTA
current had de facto left the CGT(McGuire 1997: 232/233), which was formalised in 2000 with
the formation of the so called CGT-disidente. Yet, in 2004 the two CGT's reunited again, which
brought  the  former  MTA-leader  Hugo  Moyano  to  the  top  of  the  confederation.
(Campione/Rajland 2006: 317/318) At the same time, the Kirchner governments, in contrast to
the PJ governments of the 1990s, assigned bigger importance to the traditional alliance between
the PJ and the CGT.(Svampa 2008: 28) The CGT leader Hugo Moyano ascended during the last
years  into  the  leadership  of  the  PJ,  becoming  the  party's  vice-president.  Under  these
circumstances, attempts to reform the inequitable system of social health insurances were not to
be expected, as this would have threatened the vital trade union support to the government.
Contrariwise, the more progressive trade union confederation, the CTA, has been confronted
with internal discussions, and ultimately open disputes, about the CTA's positioning with regard
to the government.(Campione/Rajland 2006: 318) In the moment of writing this text the CTA is
breaking  apart  due  to  the  differences  between  one  sector  that  supports  the  government  and
another which is opposing it.(Página 12 12th of December 2010) As will be seen later, the split of
the confederation is partly the result of the government's co-optation tactics, and again social
policies played a decisive role. However, in the more  democratic CTA this strategy was pursued
in a quite different way and was not linked to the social health insurance system. 
The CGT achieved frequent and direct dialogue with the governments of Néstor and Christina
Kirchner,  which  also  included  the  discussion  of  the  CGT's  social  policy  demands.  These
meetings were often followed by increases of the family allowances, the minimum wage, tax
exemptions for well earning workers, and so on. The CGT and the government have also been
discussing the assumption of debts of the social health insurances through the state and increases
of the income assessment threshold for employer contributions to increase the revenue of the
health insurances, or at least to avoid the reduction of these due to inflation. With regard to the
pension  system  the  CGT  demanded  benefit  level  increases  and  the  re-introduction  of  an
automatic indexation mechanism, which had been abolished during the 1990s. The CGT was
also in favour  of the renationalisation.  Already before the government  implemented the first
steps towards a stronger  role of the state in the system, such as the facilitation of affiliates'
possibility to change from the private to the public pension scheme, the CGT had proposed such
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measures.  Overall,  the  CGT  has  been  relatively  successful  with  many  of  its  social  policy
demands.(e.g. La Nación 23rd of November 2004, 6th of April 2006, 22nd of August 2006, 11th of
August  2008,  11th of  September  2008,  20th of  September  2008, El  Clarín  2nd of  May 2009)
However, virtually all of these demands were concentrated on incrementing the expenditure on
the  traditional  social  insurance  systems.  They  did  not  pursue  their  adaptation  towards  an
inclusion of the big number of poor and informal workers that had been excluded from these
systems due to the long-standing deterioration of the labour market. 
The CTA, although it also supported many of the CGT demands, prioritised to pressure for
the introduction of non-contributory universal social rights, explicitly aiming at the inclusion of
all those excluded from the social insurance systems.(e.g. La Nación 26th of April 2004, 4th of
September  2006,  12th of  December  2008)  Until  the  electoral  defeat  in  the  2009  legislative
elections, these demands had little success in influencing the government's social policy agenda. 
The  pension  reform trends  during  the  2000s  have  certainly  been  influenced  by  the  new
distribution of power resources. While the strongest proponents of the regressive and privatising
reforms  during  the  1990s,  namely  the  international  financial  institutions  and  the  national
financial sector, have been politically weakened through the economic crisis in 2001/2002 and
2008/2009, the adversaries of these reforms, namely the organisations of informal and formal
labour  have  been  recuperating  strength.  The  Kirchner  governments  have  furthermore  been
depending on the support from the trade unions and the poor sectors, in elections as well as on
the streets.  Besides  these incentives for the government  to bring pension policies on a more
egalitarian path again, the broader political context provided a kind of window of opportunity,
which largely allowed to effect these reforms with reduced political costs, while being able to
harvest the full political benefits. As has been described in 2.2., the Menem government had
abolished the automatic indexation of public pensions during the 1990s in a context of virtually
no  inflation.  However,  (moderate)  inflation  returned  after  the  devaluation  of  the  currency.
Considering the absence of automatic indexation rules,   the government was required to actively
raise pension levels if these were not to lose their real value. The Kirchner government has been
raising pension levels, however, increasing the minimum pension significantly above inflation
levels, while incrementing the higher pension benefits rather below inflation level. In this sense,
the government was able to redistribute pension expenditure from the better off to the poorer
pensioners without having to actively legislate pension level reductions for anyone. The higher
pension levels were basically cut automatically by inflation, whereby the government certainly
avoided being blamed in the same way as if it would have legislated pension cuts. At the same
time it could claim credits for the frequent and significant increases of the minimum pension. 
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In the long run, however, the lack of automatic indexation rules led to discontent among all
those who had received pensions above the minimum. A high number of legal processes was
initiated  by  pensioners  who demanded  adequate  pension  indexation,  seeing  it  as  their  right
because the famous article 14bis of the constitution theoretically guaranteed the indexation of
pensions.  The diffusion of legal  claims as  a  form of  exerting political  influence  on pension
policies was supported by an extensive net of pensioners associations which had spread around
the country since the 1970s, and which not only organised social activities but also provided
legal advice and helped to coordinate potential claimants with each other.(Smulovitz 2008: 297)
Moreover, several parties of the fragmented opposition104 put the topic on their agenda.(Página
12 13th of August  2006) Other  oppositional  parties soon joined the chorus in demand for a
mechanism of pension indexation, which was also actively supported by the CTA.(Página 12
15th of November 2006) In 2007, the supreme court decided in the case of Mr Badaro, that he
had  the  right  to  pension  benefit  indexation  linked  to  the  general  evolution  of  wages.  This
decision boosted the initiation of thousands of new claims.105 In 2008, the government finally
gave  in  to  these  demands  and  reintroduced  rules  for  the  indexation  of  pension  and  family
allowance benefits.(Arza 2009: 16/17)
Although  the  expansion  of  pension  coverage  was  largely  based  on  temporally  restricted
measures, it implied an important progress towards adapting the welfare state to the needs of
those who had been excluded from the formal labour market for prolonged periods. On the one
side,  this measure brought  about the possibility for  the government to increase their support
among important parts of the elderly and their families. On the other side, the measure implied
significant  fiscal  costs.  Yet,  also  in  this  respect  the  circumstances  proved  extraordinarily
favourable. As has been argued before, the distribution of power resources has been favourable
for  the  renationalisation  of  the  pension  system  during  the  2000s.  First,  the  government
transferred certain groups from the private to the public system and finally renationalised the
whole system. According to Camila Arza(2009: 13), the additional revenue of the public system,
resulting  from  the  incorporation  of  contributors  from the  private  scheme,  became  the  main
source for financing the expansion of coverage through the “pension inclusion plan”. By this
means,  the government  was able to  claim the credits  for  the extension of  coverage  without
having to face immediately the fiscal costs of the measure. 
104 So, for example, the centre-left Socialist Party(Partido Socialista) and the ARI, as well as the traditional centre
party UCR.
105 In 2008 nearly 4,800 new legal claims were initiated each month.(Arza 2009: 16)
215
In  technical  terms  the  renationalisation  of  the  pension  system  did  not  produce  bigger
difficulties, as the public pay-as-you-go system already existed.(Arza 2009: 19) Due to the fact
that the benefits of the private scheme did not comply with the expectations of the privatisation
period,  and  increasingly  fell  behind  those  of  the  public  scheme,  little  resistance  against  a
renationalisation was to be expected from contributors. The government even promised that no
one would receive lower benefits from the public pension system than he or she would have
received if he or she had remained affiliated to the private system. While the additional revenue
originating from the transferred  contributors  largely financed  the expansion of  coverage,  the
nationalisation  of  the  assets  accumulated  on  the  individual  pension  capitalisation  accounts
constituted another benign result for the government.(Mesa-Lago 2009: 18/19) In the context of
a global financial crisis during 2009, the government exerted influence on the management of the
transferred  assets,  the  so  called  pension  sustainability  fund(FGS),  so  that  an  increasing
proportion would be invested in anti-cyclical “productive and infrastructure projects”.(El Clarín
30th of November 2008) Parts of the transferred money from the pension funds was therefore
given as credits at very low interest rates. So, for example, between May and September 2009,
several  public energy companies  received loans of more than two billion Argentine pesos at
LIBOR106 rate  plus  five  additional  percentage  points.(López  Alfaro/ANSES  2009:  27)  The
LIBOR  rate  for  a  12  month  loan  was  only  1.5  %  in  July  2009.
(http://www.wsjprimerate.us/libor/libor_rates_history.htm opened  27th  of  October  2010)
Considering the five  percentage  points  additional  interests,  the total  annual  interest  rate  was
around 6.5 %. However, the inflation averaged about 15 %(IPEC Database) during 2009, which
meant  that  the  so  called  pension  sustainability  fund(FGS)  lost  money by  lending  to  public
enterprises.  In  September  2009,  already  around  6  %  of  the  FGS  assets  were  invested  in
“productive  and infrastructure  projects”.(López  Alfaro/ANSES 2009: 13)  By this  means,  the
FGS  subsidised  public  infrastructure  programmes,  which  would  otherwise  have  required
financing  from  the  government’s  budget.  The  deterioration  of  the  economic  outlook  in  the
context  of  the  global  financial  crisis,  and  the perception  of  an urgent  need to  stimulate the
economy,  may  explain  the  velocity  with  which  the  government  implemented  the
renationalisation.  This seems even more reasonable  when it  is  considered that  in  2009 were
legislative elections. 
Nevertheless,  the 2009 legislative elections resulted in a harsh defeat  for the government,
which had been undertaking a politically costly confrontation with the powerful  agricultural
producers and the biggest media enterprises during the preceding two years. In contrast to the
106 LIBOR = London Interbank Offered Interest Rate.
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PJJHD programme in 2002, the introduction of the “Argentina Works” programme and the so
called “Universal  Child Allowance” during 2009 were not a response to massive protests of
social movements, but the reaction to the dramatic electoral defeat in the legislative elections. As
has been argued in 2.2., the Universal Child Allowance can be considered as a small but decisive
step in the direction of welfare state adaptation, as it guarantees for the first time a genuine social
right  to  a  cash  transfer  for  poor  families  that  fulfil  certain  requirements.  Hitherto  all  social
assistance programmes have been of discretionary nature and served ideally for vote-for-favour
electoral strategies. Why then has the government reacted to the electoral defeat by introducing a
programme that poses severe limitations to the clientelistic distribution of social benefits? 
Since the CTA had initiated a massive campaign in the early 2000s, the majority of the parties
of the opposition107 gradually joined the demand for a universal child allowance.(e.g. La Nación
13th of September 2004, 14th of October 2007, 22nd of October 2009) By implementing it the
government probably tried to take the wind out of the opposition’s sails. The extension of a
social right that already existed for most middle class families, furthermore served to invalidate
the  widespread  critique  from the  media  regarding  the  clientelistic  practices  associated  with
anterior social assistance programmes. Yet, another very pragmatic reason made the extension of
child allowances  attractive for the government.  As has been described in 2.2., the Argentine
child allowance system forms part of the social insurance system and is not financed by general
taxes. The social insurances system, except the social health insurances, is administrated by the
ANSES (National Social Security Administration). As has been mentioned before, via the FGS,
the  ANSES  administrated  enormous  resources,  around  10  %  of  the  GDP,  that  had  been
transferred  from the  nationalised  pension capitalisation accounts.  However,  due  to  a  certain
institutional autonomy of the ANSES, the government had only restricted access to these funds.
As the child allowances were responsibility of the ANSES, the costs of an extension of the child
allowance system could be easier financed through the FGS assets than other social assistance
programmes.  Since  late  2009,  the  returns  of  the  FGS  have  been  used  to  finance  the  costs
originating from the Universal Child Allowance. Gasparini and Cruces(2010: 20) estimated these
at about 1 % of the GDP per year. This move allowed the government to expand social spending
without having to use money from the national budget. Indeed, the contrary was the case: as the
so called Universal Child Allowance was replacing other national income transfer programmes,
which had  hitherto  been financed  by the national  budget,  the government  even increased  its
fiscal  scope.(El  Clarín   14th of  May  2010)  While  the  government  immediately  benefited
politically from the expansion of social expenditure and the extension of its fiscal scope, without
107 UCR, Partido Socialista, Proyecto Sur, Coalición Cívica.
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having to recur to politically costly steps, such as tax increases, the fiscal costs of these actions
were not going to arise until several years later.(Mesa-Lago 2009: 29/30) 
The second social assistance programme that the government implemented shortly after the
electoral  defeat,  the  so  called  Argentina  Works Programme,  can  rather  be considered  as  an
extreme  form  of  welfare  state  clientelism.  A  big  share  of  the  benefits  was  handed  out  to
government friendly piquetero organisations, and another big part was going to local patronage
networks of the government party.  Interestingly the programme was not result but origin of a
wave of  piqutero protests.  This had to do with the fact  that  the government  was mobilising
support for the 2011 presidential  campaign of Néstor Kirchner.  For this purpose the benefits
were distributed among those social movements that were disposed to support this campaign,
which, however, most of the left-leaning piquetero organisations were not willing to do. As a
consequence  these  organisations  were  strongly  disadvantaged  in  the  repartition  of  benefits,
which led to massive protests and road blockades. Hundreds of articles in El Clarín, La Nación,
Página 12 and other newspapers document the political  negotiation processes  between social
movements and the government that took place in the months after the announcement of the
programme.  In  simplified  terms,  the  piquetero  movement  was  divided  into  two  blocs.  One
disposed to support the government and to negotiate the distribution of the benefits, and a second
one opposed to the government trying to obtain the control over a share of the 100,000 benefits
through  the  confrontation  of  the  government  with  protest  actions.  Both  groups  have  been
involved in numerous meetings with the ministry of social development led by the sister-in-law
of the president.  However,  the first  bloc has  been clearly  favoured  by the government.  The
conflict  showed that  the fragmentation of the piquetero movement was about more than just
support  or  opposition  to  the  government.  Within  each  bloc,  the  different  groups,  or  more
precisely  their  leaders,  pursued  the  maximum amount  of  benefits  for  his  or  her  respective
organisation,  although  reaching  this  goal  was  very likely  in  detriment  of  other  unemployed
organisations. Therefore, within each bloc social movement leaders were competing about the
control over benefits, which enabled the government to apply divide and rule and co-optation
tactics  even more efficiently.  The two social  movements  most  favoured in  the repartition of
benefits were the Movimiento Evita, which was given the control over between 15,000108 and
30,000109 benefits, and the Frente Transversal Nacional y Popular with over 5,000110 benefits.
Shortly after the repartition of the benefits, the Movimiento Evita led by Emilio Pérsico flooded
108  La Nación 14th of February 2010.
109  La Nación 3rd of September 2010.
110  La Nación 14th of February 2010.
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the agglomeration of Buenos Aires, in which over a quarter of the Argentinean population lives,
with posters campaigning for Néstor Kirchner's 2011 presidential candidacy. The money spent
on the workfare programme was not only co-opting voters by handing out benefits to them, but a
part of it was probably directly invested in campaigning.(e.g. El Clarín 9th of November 2009,
28th of May 2010, La Nación 14th of FebRúary 2010, 24th of March 2010, 3rd of September 2010,
Página 12 4th of November 2009, 2nd of FebRúary 2010)
The  organisation  which  received  the  second  biggest  number  of  benefits,  the  Frente
Transversal Nacional y Popular led by Edgardo Depetri, had not only been a loyal supporter of
the Kirchner governments since its foundation, but formed part of the CTA, which gave it an
additional  strategic importance for the government.  As has been mentioned before,  the CTA
allowed, in contrast to the CGT, the direct affiliation of unemployed and informal workers, so
that most of the members of the Frente Transversal Nacional y Popular were also members of the
CTA.  These  affiliates  were  entitled  to  participate  in  the  election  of  the  CTA  leadership.
Traditionally, the CTA emphasised its independence from the government. Yet, in 2006, for the
first  time  an  internal  current  of  the  CTA  that  supported  the  Kirchner  government  won  the
leadership elections.(El Clarín 11th of November 2006) In the following elections in September
2010,  the  re-election  of  the  government  friendly  CTA  leader  Hugo  Yasky  seemed  to  be
uncertain. In this context, the Argentina Works Programme constituted a useful instrument to
influence the union elections in favour of the government friendly list of Hugo Yasky. There
have been accusations that, with the help of the Frente Transversal Nacional y Popular and other
government loyal piquetero organisations within the CTA, the government had affiliated around
23,000 recipients of the Argentina Works Programme to the trade union confederation, who were
indicated to vote for the list of Hugo Yasky.(La Nación 1st of August 2010) Nevertheless, the
oppositional list led by Pablo Micheli won the elections with an advantage of around 18,000
votes. Shortly after the declaration of Micheli's victory,  the government loyal  sector deplored
that there had been irregularities in several  electoral  districts. This motivated the ministry of
labour to use its ample prerogatives to intervene into the conflict  prolonging the mandate of
Hugo Yasky.(El Clarín 2nd of November 2010) The government had good reasons to do so, as
Pablo Micheli announced short time after the elections that he intended to organise a general
strike  against  the  government,  among  others  demanding  higher  wage  replacement  rates  for
pensions and changes in the system of family allowances.(El Clarín 3rd of October 2010) 
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d) The interplay of co-optive welfare state politics, power resources and
welfare state adaptation failure
The evolution of the distribution of power resources had important impact on the failure of
welfare state adaptation. In the long run, capital has been the social force that benefited most
from the shifts in the distribution of power resources after 1975, and at the same time, it has also
been the social force with strong interest in avoiding effective welfare state adaptation. Although
the poor were able to somewhat increase their scarce power resources, the weakening of formal
labour has been so profound that  the interests of capital  were able to increasingly shape the
governments'  policy  agendas.  Nevertheless,  assuming  a  mechanic  translation  of  increasing
economico-political  power  of  capital  into  welfare  state  adaptation  failure  would  be  a
simplification of a complexer relationship. 
Social forces are not homogeneous and have a wide range of interests, of which some may
rank higher  than social  policy.  So, for  example,  has  been shown that  the implementation of
economic policy reform, certainly a higher priority for capital than social policy reform, required
concessions  of  diverse  nature  to  avoid  trade  union  resistance  that  would  finally  turn  out
economically and politically more costly for employers than the expectable benefits from the
reform itself. Some of these concessions were related to social policy, as for example with regard
to  the  social  insurance  system.  The  necessity  to  make  concessions  would  have  potentially
enabled formal and informal labour to make some progress towards welfare state adaptation.
However, the co-optive dynamics of the Argentine welfare state politics hampered the effective
transmission  of  working  class  interests  into  pressure  towards  welfare  state  adaptation.  The
personalistic organisation of leadership in the majority of the trade unions, and increasingly also
in  piquetero  organisations,  provided  incentives  for  leaders  to  ultimately  prioritise  personal
interests over group interests. This vulnerability to co-optation tactics not only weakened the
effective power resources of formal and informal labour, in the sense that it posed a clear threat
to the unity of the respective social forces, it also had impact on the kind of demands that were
made with regard to social policy reform. While the majority of trade union leaders focussed on
the preservation of their control over an inefficient and inequitable health insurance system that
was increasingly less satisfactory for the majority of the working class, many of the piquetero
leaders seemed often to care more about obtaining the biggest share of social benefits of certain
social  policy programmes,  than about the introduction of real  social  rights,  which ultimately
would have left them without control over the repartition of social benefits. In this sense, the
failure of welfare state adaptation must be seen not only in the context of increasing influence of
employers  and  international  creditors  over  the  social  policy  agendas  of  the  Argentine
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governments, but also with regard to the fact that the “rules of the game” provided trade union
and social movement leaders with incentives to demand and defend particularistic rather than
universal social policy. 
Besides the long-term structural transformation of the Argentine capitalism and its negative
effects on working class power, also the strategical decisions of the social forces were important
determinants of the evolution of the distribution of power resources. The lack of cohesion within
the social forces of formal and informal labour, as well as the failure to construct an alliance
between the two, decisively contributed to the vast defeat of the interests of the subordinated
classes. Nevertheless, also the unity of capital, which has been represented through a multitude
of employer associations and institutions defending the interests of foreign creditors, has varied
over  time.  The  two  'waves'  of  neoliberal  adjustment,  during  the  military  government  and
Menem's presidency, coincided with periods of, at least initially, relative consensus among the
most powerful employers and creditors about the direction that economic policy should take.
During these periods also social policy reform headed strongest towards the interests of capital.
In  contrast,  the  rather  heterodox strategies  of  the  governments  during  the  1980s  and  2000s
coincide with a lack of consensus between the different economic sectors. In face of a dispute
about the direction of economic policy, capital was less able to impose their interests in the area
of social policy. This temporary weakness of capital was furthermore reinforced by the economic
crises that hit Argentina during the early 1980s and 2000s, which led to a widespread public
rejection  of  excessive  employer/creditor  influence  over  public  policy.  These  situations
potentially provided windows of opportunity for welfare state adaptation. However, due to the
reasons  discussed before,  the organisations  of  formal  and informal  labour  did not use these
opportunities. When the Alfonsín government proposed the adaptation of the healthcare system
against  the  protest  of  the employers,  trade  unions were  opposing rather  than supporting the
initiative. The organisations of the poor only reached more strength from the second half of the
1990s on. The relative unity of these organisations during the crisis 2001/2002 enabled them to
significantly  influence  social  assistance  policies  in  that  moment.  The  massiveness  of  their
protests  was  becoming  politically  and  economically  more  costly  than  conceding,  although
reluctantly, some limited social rights to the poor. However, the organisations of the poor, and
particularly the cooperation between them, proved too weak to induce a lasting structural change
in the Argentine welfare state. The successful co-optation of several important piquetero leaders
through the governments of Néstor and Christina Kirchner, as well as the current breakage of the
CTA, which had constituted an important support for the piquetero movement, have ultimately
reversed much of the piquetero success story between the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
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Nevertheless,  in  2009 the  first  income transfer  programme for  poor  families  with  rights
character  has  been established after  the electoral  defeat  of  the government  in  the legislative
elections.  It  seems  that  for  the  first  time  since  the  return  to  democracy  in  1983,  electoral
processes have motivated a government to implement a social right for a group that constituted
between one quarter and one half of the population during the last one and a half decades. While
this chapter has mainly concentrated on the relation between organisational power resources and
welfare state adaptation failure,  the next two chapters will  shed more light  on why electoral
processes were not effective in transmitting the interests of vast parts of the society with regard
to welfare state adaptation into the policy agendas of the governments. 
3.4 Democracy, power and welfare state adaptation failure in
Argentina
Giuliano Bonoli(2006: 16 – 25) has recently argued, with respect to industrialised countries,
that  the would-be beneficiaries  of  an adaptation of  the  welfare  state  to the new social  risks
stemming from post-industrialisation  processes  have  been  usually  relatively  weak  groups  in
political terms. They have commonly been little organised and either relatively small electoral
constituencies with little relation to each other, or, when they constituted a big group, such as
women, the provision of protection against new social risks may not have been the decisive issue
for the electoral decision of many of them. In contrast to Bonoli's observations in the western
world, the groups affected by 'new social risks' in Argentina have been significantly broader, and
as has been argued in the last chapter, these groups were not dispersed across classes but largely
concentrated among the lower and middle income strata.  Most individuals and/or families of
these strata have been affected by a lack of protection against several of these social risks at the
same time, such as unemployment, precarious employment, lack of access to health and pension
insurance entitlements, no access to child or elderly care provision, and so on. During the last 15
years,  averagely  13.6  %  of  the  economically  active  population  have  been  affected  by
unemployment  and  further  13.2  % by involuntary underemployment.  39.3 % of  all  salaried
workers and around 50 % of the whole working population have not been registered with social
insurances.  In  2001,  48.1  %  of  the  population  had  no  health  insurance  coverage.(INDEC
database, SEDLAC database, Beccaria/Groisman 2009a: 110/133, see 2.1. for more detail) These
numbers indicate the enormous size of the population that would have benefited from welfare
state adaptation. While formal workers enjoyed a certain protection through the social insurance
systems, the decrease in job stability, the dramatic decline of average wages and the lack of any
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effective insurance against unemployment led to a situation in which also an ample majority of
the formal wage earners had, theoretically, a strong interest in welfare state adaptation. In the
context of a malfunctioning labour market, all those uncovered social risks suffered by informal
labour  constituted  indeed  very  real  and  direct  threats  to  the  average  formal  worker.  The
enormous rise in inequality after 1975 has increasingly polarised the society into a minority that
disposed over sufficient income to rely on the social insurance system, and to self-insure against
uncovered  risks  such  as  unemployment,  while  for  a  majority  the  social  protection  provided
through social insurances became increasingly inaccessible, insufficient and/or unstable. During
2003, the peak of inequality in Argentina's recent history, 60 % of the population disposed over
only 22.3 % of the national income.(SEDLAC database) In this context, the question of welfare
state  adaptation has  been  unavoidably intertwined  with the  question  about  the  redistributive
character  of  the  welfare  state.  In  a  society in  which  incomes  have  become highly  unequal,
adequate rights to social protection for the whole population have become by no other means
possible than by increasing the redistributive character of the welfare state with regard to both
financing and spending. This is especially true when we consider that in Argentina the overall
tax burden, as a percentage of the income, has been higher for the poorest 10 % of the society
than for  the richest  10 %.(Sabaini/Santiere 1993:  171) Due to the intimate relation between
welfare  state  adaptation  and  the redistributive conflict,  interests  with  regard  to  welfare  state
adaptation are very much related to social classes in Argentina. 
All in all, the discussed points suggest, in contrast to what Giuliano Bonoli finds with respect
to industrialised countries, that the would-be beneficiaries of welfare state adaptation constituted
a very broad and quite coherent group. Furthermore, the vital importance of this issue for most
parts  of  the  affected  population  allows  to  assume  that  positions  regarding  welfare  state
adaptation  have  strong  impact  on  voters'  electoral  decisions.  All  these  characteristics
theoretically suggest that the electoral power of the would-be beneficiaries has been everything
else than weak.
During  the  19th century  the  debate  about  democracy  was,  among  others,  about  the
“redistributional  thesis”,  which  assumed that  the  introduction  of  majority  rule  and  universal
suffrage  would  lead  to  greater  social  equality.(Ippolito-O'Donnell  2007:  10)  The  discussion
about the validity of this thesis, and about the question under what circumstances this thesis can
be considered valid and under what not, is until today an important concern of social sciences.
Huber et al (2006: 948/949) argued in a study that examined, inter alia, the relation between
democracy and inequality in  18 Latin  American  and Caribbean countries  between 1970 and
2000: 
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“There are strong theoretical reasons to expect that the length of a country's
democratic experience is associated with lower inequality(Rueschemeyer et al.
1992: 10). [...] The most effective channels for underprivileged groups into the
political decision-making process are political parties, because the poor lack
the connections and funds to influence decision makers directly.”
After multiple regressions with a high number of control variables, the authors conclude that
long periods of democracy had significant negative effects on inequality, that is, democracy is
associated with lower rates of inequality in Latin America.111 Moreover, the authors found strong
empirical  evidence  for  that  the  progressiveness  of  social  expenditure  in  Latin  America  is
significantly  related  to  the  length  of  a  country's  democratic  experience.(Huber  et  al  2006:
957/958) 
 Also  in  the  Argentinean  case  it  could  be  assumed,  that  in  a  democratic  context  a  big
constituency  with  a  high  preference  for  welfare  state  adaptation  should  have  favoured  the
implementation of policies that headed in this direction. This could happen, for example, in the
form of a shift of votes towards 'new' parties that make the topic one of their central issues, or by
pushing 'old'  parties  towards  incorporating welfare  state  adaptation into their  campaigns  and
policy agendas in order to preserve their power or to win elections.
 Nevertheless, since the return to democracy in 1983, electoral power has seemingly not been
able  to  induce  welfare  state  adaptation. The  findings  of  Evelyne  Huber  et  al(2006)  may
contribute to an explanation of the regressive character of the Argentinean welfare state during
the 1980s, after about thirty years of military rule and restricted democracy. However, as has
been  shown  in  chapter  2.2.,  the  return  to  democracy  in  1983  has  not  really  increased  the
progressiveness of the welfare state during the following three decades.  Why has democracy,
despite the plausible expectations, not led to welfare state adaptation?
There seem to be several reasons for the fact that the Argentine democracy did not work as
well for its poorer citizens as the theoretical arguments recently brought forward would suggest.
Frederick Solt(2008: 58) finds in an empiric international comparative study, that economic
inequality is significantly negatively related to the participation of the lower income groups in
elections and politics in general. A study of Darío Canton and Jorge Raul Jorrat, based on the
111 According to the authors, democracy enables left and centre-left parties to gain strength, which hence favours the
implementation of more progressive policies. The effect of democracy is therefore indirect, operating vía political
parties.(Huber et al 2006: 958)
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Argentine presidential elections between 1983 and 1999, shows that persons with low levels of
education, which applies to most poorer Argentine citizens, are significantly more often non-
voters  than  persons  with  higher  education.(Canton/Jorrat  2003:  194)  In  this  sense,  the
historically high levels of inequality in Argentina, and the skyrocketing of these to even much
higher  values  after  1975,  have  plausibly  been  among  the  reasons  why  democracy  has  not
triggered welfare state adaptation. 
“The  declining  political  engagement  of  nonaffluent  citizens  with  rising
inequality  suggests  that  issues  on  which  a  consensus  exists  among  richer
individuals,  such  as  redistribution,  become increasingly unlikely even  to  be
debated within the political process regardless of whether poorer citizens would
care  to  raise them. (...)  Greater  economic inequality increasingly stacks  the
deck  of  democracy  in  favor  of  the  richest  citizens,  and  as  a  result,  most
everyone else is  more  likely to conclude that  politics  is  simply not a game
worth playing.“(Solt 2008: 57/58) 
The evidence from Frederick Solt's research not only helps to explain the lower participation
of  welfare  state  adaptation  would-be  beneficiaries  in  politics,  but  also  contributes  to  an
understanding of why the main parties of the Argentine political system did not make lower
classes'  interests  with  regard  to  social  and  taxation policies  part  of  the political  competition
among  them.  Neither  of  the  traditionally  two  biggest  parties  incorporated  significant  steps
towards welfare state adaptation in its political platform. During the 1990s, a new centre-left
party called FREPASO had some electoral  success.  Even though the FREPASO had slightly
more  progressive  stances  than  the  other  two parties,  also  this  party  did  not  propose  bigger
changes in social policy.(McGuire 1997: 249 – 251) Moreover, its electoral success was mainly
based on middle class voters who switched from the UCR to the FREPASO, but the majority of
the working class and the poor vote remained with the PJ, which, at that time was implementing
social policy reforms that exaggerated the problems of social exclusion and regressiveness.(De
Riz 1996: 133 – 136, Escudero 2001: 84, Nolte 1996: 38) How, then, has the PJ been able to
capture  the vote  of  a majority  of   the would-be welfare  state  adaptation beneficiaries  while
grossly acting against their social policy interests? 
Valeria  Brusco  et  al(2004:  75)  argued  that  voter  behaviour  does  usually not  change over
night. The long tradition of peronist voting among the poor, and the working class in general, has
consolidated a kind of peronist identity among these groups, and it can be assumed that it takes
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time for this to change. James McGuire(1997: 208) argues that the 'populist' leadership style of
Carlos Menem was popular among the poor. The fact  that he turned up at many of the high
society parties shown in television, that he publicly raced cars and played tennis in the middle of
the night, according to James McGuire, brought Menem considerable popularity among working
class and poorer voters. This may seem contradictory at the first view, however, comparable
phenomena  are  known  from  other  countries  as  well.  European  extreme  right  parties,  often
labelled populist as well, made significant inroads into the working class constituencies with
similar tactics of personalistic leadership and omnipresence in media. Particularly successful in
attracting lower class votes was for example the Austrian rightist Jörg Haider, who also used to
pop up at high society events and to present himself as the sporty smart guy.(e.g. Sully 1997:
199) 
Furthermore,  parties  often  try  to  mobilise  voters  in  their  favour  via  their  relations  with
organised interest groups. Politicians “may distribute targeted geographic benefits—“pork”—in
the  hopes  of  winning  votes  from  certain  constituencies.“(Weitz-Shapiro  2009:  1) Peronist
candidates have repeatedly recurred on mobilising union and piquetero leader support in order to
improve their electoral chances.(e.g. De Riz 2008, McGuire 1997, Svampa 2008) Usually we
would assume that through the distribution of so called “pork”, the interests of the rank and files
of  these  organisations  enter,  to  a  certain  degree,  into  the  policy  agenda  of  the  respective
candidate. Yet, as has been amply described in the last chapter, in Argentina pork favoured the
personal interests of union and piquetero leaders more than the interests of their rank and files, so
that it has not constituted an efficient mechanism for transmitting the social policy interests of
the poor and the working class into the platform of the PJ.  
As  Guillermo  O'Donnell(2009:  8)  has  argued,  the  Argentine  democracy  is  far  less
institutionalised  than  most  of  the  democracies  in  the  industrialised  world.  The  weakness  of
formal institutions, which usually allow a certain degree of democratic control, transparency and
accountability, is compensated by the strength of informal institutions that pervade most areas of
the Argentine political system. In contrast to the former, the latter are characterised by the virtual
absence of control mechanisms, transparency or accountability. In the following, I will argue that
the  nature  of  the  informal  institutions  associated  with  the  Argentine  democracy  has  further
weakened the capacity of the would-be beneficiaries of welfare state adaptation to use their votes
in  order  to  promote  their  long-term interests.  At  the  same  time,  these  informal  institutions
provided strong incentives for governments to avoid welfare state adaptation.
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a) Political clientelism and welfare state adaptation
One of the expressions of this lack of institutionalisation is 'political clientelism'. What is well
known in industrialised countries is the use of social policy (promises) as “pork”. While the use
of  “pork” is  usually assumed to be impersonal,  that  is  politicians  promise favours  to  bigger
groups and hope to get votes in exchange, political clientelism bases on a personal and direct
exchange of vote or other support for favour. The distributed favour has thereby often the form
of some kind of social policy benefit. 
“Clientelism represents the distribution of resources (or promise of) by political
office  holders  or  political  candidates  in  exchange  for  political  support,
primarily – although not exclusively – in the form of the vote."(Gay 1990: 648)
Due to the direct nature of the exchange, and the often vital dependence of the usually poor
clients  on  the  distributed  goods  or  benefits,  clientelism constitutes  “a  relationship  based  on
political subordination in exchange for material rewards.“(Fox 1994: 153) 
The use of clientelist practices  for the distribution of welfare state benefits  in developing
countries, and particularly in Latin America, has received considerable academic interest over
the  last  decade.  Scholars  have  examined  questions  such  as:  What  role  plays  welfare  state
clientelism in parties’ electoral strategies?(Levitski 2001) How does clientelism impact on the
quality  of  democracy?(Ippolito-O'Donnell  2007)  How  does  clientelism  operate  and  how  do
clients perceive it?(Auyero 2000) How effective is vote-buying?(Brusco et al 2004) Which party
benefits most from clientelism?(Brusco et al 2004, Lodola 2005) Under what circumstances does
clientelism work best?(Weitz-Shapiro 2009) 
All these studies contributed enormously to the understanding of clientelism. In this text I will
try to approximate two more questions: What effect has welfare clientelism on the welfare state
itself? How does clientelism affect the chances for welfare state adaptation? 
Before we come to analyse the political effects of clientelism, a short description of how it
operates  in  Argentina  may be  useful.  The  following  description  largely  builds  on  the  field
research of Javier Auyero(2000: 61 – 74). 
Political parties have brokers in poor areas, the so called “punteros”, who have the function to
provide political support for the party, or single candidates, in exchange for benefits of different
kinds, including social policy benefits. The traditionally high levels of party affiliation allowed
the  parties  to  maintain  a  dense  net  of  so  called  “basic  units”(unidades  básicas)  in  poor
neighbourhoods.  According to Detlef Nolte(1996: 32), in 1994, the PJ had about 3.9 million
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members and the UCR 2.8 million. The PJ membership alone constituted about 11.4 % of the
entire  Argentinean  population  in  that  year.(INDEC  database  for  population  numbers)  Both
parties have used clientelistic practices in the past and both possess sizeable clientelist networks.
(Weitz-Shapiro 2009: 15) Nevertheless, virtually all authors on the topic agree that the PJ has the
strongest  presence in poor neighbourhoods.(e.g.  Auyero 2000, Brusco et al 2004: 79, Weitz-
Shapiro 2009: 15) In face of the lack of social protection for most of the residents of these poor
areas, people were traditionally accustomed to rely on social networks, such as the family and
friends,  in situations  of need.  However,  the long-standing deterioration of the labour market
made it more and more difficult for these social networks to persist. If nobody in a family, or
very few in a broader social network, has any kind of labour market income, the possibilities of
mutual  help  become  restricted.  In  this  context,  the  repartition  of  useful  information,  social
benefits, medicine, food, and even jobs through local political party brokers became increasingly
important for the survival strategies of slum dwellers. Over time, these brokers usually establish
a close relationship with an inner circle of supporters. Initially, 'clients' receive smaller benefits
such as food boxes or simple construction materials. By showing their loyalty and support to the
party and the broker over prolonged periods, 'clients' enhance their chances of receiving more
valuable social benefits, such as the inscription to a cash transfer programme or even a job at the
municipality.  The hopes associated  with this  kind of  'social  mobility'  within the clientelistic
structures reinforces the incentives for the 'clients' to put real effort into the political support,
which consists not only in voting for the party,  but also attending rallies for their candidates,
convincing others to come as well, and so on. The brokers themselves usually pursue their own
political careers and try therefore to accumulate as much influence and power as possible. The
monopoly that  these  brokers  hold over  the  distribution  of  much needed  goods  and  benefits
secures  voluntary  compliance  of  the  recipients.  The  unequal  balance  of  power  between  the
broker,  who  is  free  to  give  or  decline  a  favour,  and  the  client,  whose  survival  depends
importantly on the broker's decision, creates a de facto relationship of domination. According to
Javier Auyero(2000: 74), the “inner circle”, with which party brokers have close personal ties, is
limited to a small proportion of the potential electorate of the poor areas. Only with the inner
circle the brokers hold direct relations of political domination. Considering these circles alone
the electoral effects of clientelist social assistance policies appear significant but limited. Yet, the
inner circles of the brokers also serve as intermediaries to reach a broader group of people. Many
of the members of the inner circle  may develop similar clientelist relationships with persons
outside the inner circle. According to Javier Auyero's  research(2000: 64/74), Villa Paraíso, a
slum in the agglomeration of Buenos Aires with about 7000 potential voters, counts with five
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brokers of the peronist party. The most influential of these five brokers controls an inner circle of
over one hundred persons. If  we consider that the effective electoral  participation among the
poor is significantly lower than in the rest of the population112, the results from Auyero's research
suggest  that  the five peronist  brokers  have a direct  relationship of  political  domination with
probably more than 10 % of the voting slum dwellers. However, many of the members of these
inner circles hand out clientelist “favours” to an even broader audience. Although the PJ is the
party  with  the  strongest  presence  in  the  poor  areas,  other  parties  have  similar  clientelistic
networks as well. The party brokers are furthermore not the only clientelist structure in the poor
areas.  So,  for  example,  has  the  so  called  “Life  Programme”(Plan  Vida)  in  the  Province  of
Buenos Aires, established a network of thousands of women, the so called “manzaneras”, that
distributed milk and eggs in the block of houses they were living in.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 239/240)
On the 27th of January 1997, the Argentinean newspaper “El Clarín” described the manzaneras
as “a female structure for social action that responds – unconditionally – to the governor Eduardo
Duhalde’s wife and which has turned into a central component of the electoral machinery”113.
Brusco et al.(2004) examined the effectiveness of vote-buying, which constitutes only one aspect
of political clientelism, with close to 2000 surveys during 2001 and 2002. They found indeed,
that  vote-buying was of significant  effectiveness and reached a significant  share of the poor
population. 45 % of the low income respondents stated that they would turn to a local party
operative if the head of his or her household lost his or her job, and more than 20 % had done so
in the previous years.(Brusco et al 2004: 70) Although the secret ballot does theoretically not
allow brokers to control whether a 'client' voted for the right candidate or  not, the surveys of
Brusco et al(2004: 72) show that a much higher proportion of those low income respondents who
received a “favour” voted for the party of the broker than of the rest of the poor respondents. The
authors  also  found  empiric  evidence  for  the  hypothesis  that  “voters  comply  because  they
anticipate that, should they not comply, they would be cut off from the flow of minor payoffs in
the future.“114(Brusco et al 2004: 76)  
112 Formally Argentina has compulsory voting. However, Darío Canton and Jorge Raúl Jorrat(2003: 199) argue that
compulsory vote is not particularly enforced any more.
113 Original text in Spanish: “(...)una estructura femenina de acción social que responde -incondicionalmente- a la
esposa del gobernador Eduardo Duhalde y que se ha transformado en un engranaje fundamental de la maquinaria
electoral(...)”.
114 For a description of strategies used by party brokers in poor areas to guess whether a client voted for the right
party or not, see Brusco et al (2004).
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“Our study tends to confirm the view that, by redoubling its clientelist efforts,
peronism retained the support of many voters who were hurt by the neoliberal
shift.”(Brusco et al 2004: 83)
Clientelistic networks can be considered „informal and essentially undemocratic institutions“.
(Ippolito-O'Donnell2007:  10)  The  political  requirements  that  party  brokers  impose  on  poor
citizens  seriously  affect  their  autonomous  organisational  capacity,  thereby  “limiting  the
opportunities of poor citizens to deliberate, participate collectively, and make their voices truly
heard in the political process.“(Ippolito-O'Donnell2007: 21) Clientelism moreover deters poorer
citizens from using their votes in accordance with their policy interests. This way it hampers, if
not impedes, the transmission of their interests in welfare state adaptation into the agendas of the
governments. At the same time that it weakens the power resources of an important part of the
would-be beneficiaries of welfare state adaptation,  clientelism provides significant incentives
for politicians to avoid steps in this direction. Clientelistic electoral strategies require high levels
of inequality and poverty, and provide therefore incentives for politicians who depend on these
to  avoid  redistributive  measures.(Medina/Stokes  2002:  3/17)  Moreover,  it  is  the  scarcity  of
resources  that  puts  political  brokers  in  conditions  to  establish  political  domination  over  the
benefit  recipients.  If  there are not enough social  benefits  for all  the needy,  the poor have to
compete for those available by complying with the requirements of the brokers.  By means of
this,  clientelistic  political  patterns  of  social  assistance  do  not  only  provide  incentives  for
governments  to  keep  spending  on  this  area  limited,  it  does  also  provide  incentives  to
systematically  avoid  the  establishment  of  any genuine  right  to  social  assistance,  no  matter
whether  universal  or  means-tested,  as  any kind of  social  right  would limit  the  discretionary
power necessary to establish the clientelistic relationship that subordinates the poor. 
The use of clientelism has been an important  constant during all  democratic  governments
since the return to democracy. This coincides with a noteworthy continuity with regard to central
characteristics  of  social  assistance  and  unemployment  protection  policies. Until  2009  all
governments avoided the introduction of any genuine right to social assistance. The number of
benefits was always arbitrarily restricted and coverage therefore limited. The selection criteria
always left enough space for discretion. Virtually all social assistance programmes were either
directly executed through politicians or party structures, or through welfare state administrations
that  had  been  throughout  penetrated  by  party  supporters.  Control  mechanisms,  where  they
existed,  were  not  effective.  Social  assistance  programmes  were  usually  very  short-lived  and
highly fragmented,  which  made an  effective  control  through  the  public  very  difficult.  Each
230
government  replaced  the  programmes  of  the  former  government,  or  at  least  replaced  the
administration. All presidents and governors reserved themselves high levels of direct control
over the area in charge of assistance policies. The articles 17 to 21 of the decree 292/95 even
transferred  the  complete  responsibility  for  non-contributory  pensions115 from  the  relatively
autonomous  “National  Administration  of  Social  Security”(Administración  Nacional  de  la
Seguridad Social/ANSES) to the “Secretariat of Social Development”(Secretaría de Desarrollo
Social), which was directly under control of the president and which constituted a key instance in
the  clientelistic  game.(Lo  Vuolo  1998b:  237/238,  Repetto  2003:  28/29,  see  also  2.2.  and
subchapter b) in this chapter)
The introduction of the so called “Universal Child Allowance” in 2009 can be considered a
discontinuity  in  several  aspects.  Although,  as  has  been  described  in  2.2.,  the  programme
concedes very small benefits and excludes many poor, it constitutes an important breakage with
former social assistance programmes in the sense that it concedes a (means-tested) social right to
the  poor.  Moreover,  the  programme  is  administrated  through  the  national  social  security
administration  (ANSES),  which  is  a  considerably  more  transparent,  autonomous  and
institutionalised  entity  than  those  that  had  been  in  charge  of  former  social  assistance
programmes. How, then, can the introduction of the so called Universal Child Allowance in 2009
be explained?  
Rebecca  Weitz-Shapiro(2009:  2)  brought  an  until  recently  little  analysed  aspect  into  the
debate about political clientelism: the political costs of clientelism. She rightly argues, that by
focussing exclusively on the effects of clientelism on the poor voters' decisions, and hence the
political  benefits  of  clientelism,  other  important  aspects  that  determine  the  incentives  for
politicians  to  use  clientelistic  policies  have  often  been  left  aside.  Most  importantly,  Weitz-
Shapiro(2009: 3/4) finds that clientelist practices can have significant negative effects on the
support from middle class voters. For many middle class voters clientelistic and discretionary
practices are signs for the inefficiency of the government. Moreover, clientelism is rejected for
moral  reasons,  as it  is  perceived as a kind of corruption that  undermines  the values  and the
functioning of democracy. Similar reasons plausibly affect the decisions of poor voters who are
not  perceiving clientelistic  handouts.  On this  basis,  it  can  be  assumed that  the  reduction  of
poverty and unemployment since 2002, mainly due to the recovery of the labour market, has
decreased the political benefits of clientelism and raised the political costs of it. The clear-cut
115 These contain all means-tested social assistance pensions: Pensions for advanced age according to law 13.478
(1948), Non-contributory invalidity pension according to law 18.910 (1970), and pensions for mothers with seven or
more children according to law 23.746 (1989). 
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electoral  defeat  of  the  governement  in  the  legislative  elections  may  have  convinced  the
government  that  it  had  to  do  something  to  reinforce  its  support  among  the  poor,  however,
without alienating middle-class voters. As child allowances have been received by most of the
middle class families, the extension of this right to the poor was easy to legitimise in front of
these. Nevertheless, if we look again at figure 1 in the introduction, we see that, although poverty
has declined after 2002, it still remains at levels comparable to those of the 1990s. What then is
the difference to the 1990s? The political costs of clientelism during the 1990s seem to have
been lower for several reasons. As has been argued before, none of the main parties of the 1990s
proposed  alternatives  to  the  clientelist  character  of  social  assistance  and  unemployment
protection policies, while during the 2000s important parts of the opposition, mainly left and
centre-left  parties  that  emerged  from  the  breakdown  of  the  party  system  after  2001/2002,
proposed the introduction of more universal measures, and particularly a universalisation of the
child allowance system. This fact  has improved the electoral  options of formal and informal
labour and thereby increased their possibilities to use their votes as a “power tool” to transmit
their  social  policy interests  into  the  parliamentary  debate.  Furthermore,  clientelism has  only
received media attention from the late 1990s on. Without public knowledge about clientelism,
and  without  the  presence  of  a  debate  about  these  practices,  the  political  costs  of  clientelist
practices have been significantly lower during the 1990s. Figure 45 shows on the basis of the two
biggest Argentine newspapers, El Clarín and La Nación, that the media attention to clientelism
has only become stronger in the late 1990s, and has been especially high during election years116
in the 2000s.
116 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009.
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Overall,  it  seems  that  the  context  has  slightly  improved  informal  and  formal  labour's
possibilities to use their electoral power in favour of welfare adaptation during the last years. Of
course, this has also to be seen in relation to the shifts of organisational power resources,  as
discussed  in  3.3.,  and  of  changes  in  the  ideology(widespread  perceptions)  prevailing  in  the
society,  as will be discussed in 3.5.. The piquetero movement is good example for how these
issues hang together.  The rise of the organisational  power of informal  labour in form of the
piquetero organisations has allowed them to make their rejection of the clientelistic repartition of
social assistance benefits through political brokers public.(e.g. El Clarín 10th of November 2000,
15th of February 2002, La Nación 24th of June 2002) Thereby they contributed to the increasing
presence of the issue in the media and hence influenced also the public perception of it, which
had ultimately impacts on the electoral importance of the issue.
b) Personalised leadership and its effects on the politics of the welfare state
The peronist Party (PJ), which governed during nearly 20 of the 27 years since the return to
democracy, can be considered a labour based mass party. A majority of their members, as well as
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Elaborated by the author. Sources: www.clarin.com, www.lanacion.com.ar.
* Inlcudes printed edition and online edition.
** Includes only the online edition.
Figure 45: Number of articles in the newspapers La Nación and El 
Clarín that mention the word "clientelismo"(clientelism)
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voters, comes from working class and/or poor backgrounds. In 1993, the party had 3.85 million
members  and  a  membership-to-vote  ratio  of  impressing  54.2  %.(Levitsky  2001:  1  –  12)
Considering the massiveness of the party membership, and the high proportion of lower class
affiliates, it would be reasonable to assume that party internal processes were likely to lead to a
programmatic incorporation of welfare state adaptation. However, this has hardly happened. 
In  this  subchapter  I  will  argue  that  the  low institutionalisation  of  the  Argentine  political
system  in  general,  and  of  the  PJ  party  in  particular,  have  significantly  contributed  to  the
concentration  of  power  on  very few political  leaders.  This  concentration  of  power,  in  turn,
hampered the adoption of programmatic steps towards welfare state adaptation, as those who
have been most interested in such policies were mainly to be found at lower government levels
and at the rank and file of the PJ.
The last subchapter has described the relationship between party brokers and their 'clients' in
poor neighbourhoods. As you might have guessed, the local party brokers are not at the top of
the hierarchy  of  the  clientelistic  system.  The income and the political  power  of  the  brokers
themselves  depends  usually  on  mayors  or  councilmen  at  the  municipal  level,  who  hold
discretionary power over the distribution of a certain quantity of social benefits, food, jobs, and
so on.(Auyero 2000: 74) These local political leaders, in turn, depend largely on provincial or
federal  ministries  or  secretariats,  which  also  have  ample  discretionary  power  in  distributing
resources. Since  the  1990s,  the  relations  between  the  mayors  and  the  national  level  have
increasingly become direct, while the provinces, although not in all cases, by trend lost influence
as  intermediaries.(e.g.  Página  12  9th of  April  1998)  Generally,  the  dependency  of  lower
government  levels  on  the  discretionary  distribution  power  of  the  national  government  has
increased significantly during the 1990s. The decentralisation of the public health and education
systems during the early 1990s, and the increasing responsibility of municipalities with regard to
social  assistance and unemployment  protection policies,  has significantly increased the fiscal
responsibilities  of  the  lower  government  levels.  However,  the  municipal  and  provincial
governments' share of the overall tax revenue has decreased during the last decades. In 1980 the
municipalities disposed over about 3 % of the total tax revenue and were responsible for around
4 % of the public expenditure. The provinces disposed of 19 % of the tax revenue and effected
25  %  of  the  expenditure.  In  2000,  the  provinces  accounted  for  40  %  of  the  total  public
expenditure and the municipalities for 7 %. Yet, the provinces’ and municipalities’ shares of the
total tax revenue decreased to 17 % and 3 % respectively.(Cetrángolo/Gatto 2002: 6) Due to the
lack  of  clear  institutionalised  rules  for  the  necessary  transfer  of  resources  from the  central
government,  provincial  and  municipal  financial  capacities  to  finance  their  responsibilities
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increasingly depended on bilateral negotiations with the central government. For the latter, these
negotiations have become a powerful tool for disciplining governors and mayors.(Cravacuore
2007: 43, Lo Vuolo 1998b: 200, Repetto/Moro 2004: 172) 
Finally,  the  ministries  or  secretariats  responsible  for  the majority  of  the  social  assistance
programmes, which have been most commonly used for clientelistic practices(Lo Vuolo 1998b:
239), both on national as well as on provincial level, have been under very direct control of the
chief of the government, in other words the president or the respective governor.117 The control
over  no  other  ministry  or  secretariat  seems  to  have  imported  so  much  to  presidents  and
governors.  Four  of  six  presidents  since  1983118 appointed  close  family  members  to  central
positions of the social assistance apparatus.(Frederic/Masson 2006: 13/14, La Nación 21st of May
2003, 4th  of  June  2009,  www.chicheduhalde.com.ar,  www.desarrollosocial.gov.ar,
http://www.politicassociales.gov.ar/institucional.html)  Other  important  positions  in  the  social
assistance  administration  were  usually  occupied  with  close  and  trustworthy  allies  of  the
president.(e.g. Página 12 19th FebRúary 2002, 8th of December 2007, La Nación 19th FebRúary
2002) This  may have  to  do with the  fact  that  the clientelistic  hand out  of  social  assistance
programmes did not only serve to give officiating parties advantages over oppositional parties,
but  also  to  fight  out  party  internal  competitions  about  the  leadership.  In  these  internal
competitions it was of particular interest of the presidents to secure the loyalty of those cabinet
members who possessed control over resources that served to discipline lower party leaders and
government levels. Apparently, presidents saw this loyalty best guaranteed by appointing close
family members on top of the ministry of social development, or in the case of the Alfonsín
government,  on  top  of  the  biggest  social  assistance  programme,  the  so  called  National
Alimentary  Programme.119 The  ability  to  distribute  the  limited  number  of  benefits  in  a
discretionary way among the different municipalities, which were furthermore highly dependent
on resource transfers  from the national level, has been an ideal  instrument to build up party
internal power and to negotiate support for political projects and or candidateships.(e.g. Página
12 9th of April 1998) For the local party leaders the assignation of social assistance resources was
not a minor issue.  Marcelo  Nazareno et  al(2006: 78 – 80) found in an quantitative analysis,
117 See e.g.:  Lo Vuolo 1998b: 237/238 for the national Secretariat of Social Development during the 1990s, or the
Province of Buenos Aires Law 11.097, Art. 1 for the “Provincial Family and Human Development Council”.
118 I have not considered the interim presidents Ramon Puerta, Adolfo Rodríguez Sáa and Eduardo Camaño, as these
have only been presidents for a few days each.
119 Enrique Nosiglia,  who  has been a loyal  political friend and supporter of president  Raúl  Alfonsín for over a
decade, and who had been renown for his discreetness towards the media, was appointed executive president of the
“National  Alimentary Programme”.(Página 12 8th of December 2007)  One of the president’s  brothers,  Fernando
Alfonsín, was appointed executive vicepresident of the programme.(La Nación 4th of June 2009)
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including over one thousand municipalities during 1998 and 1999, that the quantity of “Work
Programme” benefits assigned to a mayor significantly affected his chances of being re-elected. 
The top-down dynamics of the relationship between different government levels strengthened
also the party internal dominance of the president and the close government circle around him.
This dominance has been furthermore exacerbated by a very low degree of institutionalisation of
the peronist party. 
“The PJ is a mass-based party, but its mass organization is fluid and informal,
rather than bureaucratic,  and its internal rules and procedures  are contested,
widely manipulated, and often ignored.”(Levitsky 2001: 7)
While the discretionary power of the central government with regard to the distribution of
vital  resources  among lower government  levels provided little incentives for  challenging the
national  government,  the  weak  party  structures  also  provided  few  opportunities  to  do  so.
(Levitsky 2001: 21)
Officially, the 110 seat national council was the highest body in the PJ. Of the 110 members
of the board 17 corresponded to the union branch, 10 to the women branch and 10 to the youth
branch. All 37 members were usually hand picked by party notables. 24 seats corresponded to
the  provincial  party  leaders.  The  remaining  49  were  supposed  to  be  elected  by  the  party
members, which, however, did not happen in practice as the party elite usually proposed a single
list of 49 candidates and declared that a membership vote would not be necessary. In face of the
lack of working democratic structures, the rank and file of the party had little influence over the
party  leadership,  neither  regarding  its  composition  nor  with  respect  to  its  political  course.
(McGuire 1997: 246 – 255) In practice it were the office holders that dominated the party. As the
party lacked an institutionalised inner live and routinised career paths, the careers of ambitious
peronists depended largely on their relations to office holding party leaders, who disposed over
key patronage resources.(Levitsky 2001: 14) Due to the before discussed hierarchy among office
holders, the power was largely concentrated on the president during periods of PJ presidency. 
Also the party's legislators had important incentives to subordinate to the government, which
was de facto dominating the party apparatus. Argentina has an electoral system with closed party
lists, so that the respective legislator's chances to be re-elected in the next elections decisively
depends on his or her inalterable position on the party’s list. In turn, the party leadership largely
determines the order of the party lists. Therefore, the vote by closed list constituted an important
instrument for the disciplining of legislators, as these had to fear to lose their seats in the next
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elections if they did not cooperate sufficiently with the government. With the help of these party
internal power resources, Menem, for example, marginalised the role of critical trade unionists in
the party,  which can be observed in the rapid decline of trade unionists in the PJ bloc in the
chamber  of  deputies.(Goldin  1997:  174,  Levitsky  2001:  20,  McGuire  1997:  246  –  255)
Moreover, the extensive possibilities to legislate by emergency decree, may have reinforced PJ
legislators' conviction that by opposing the government they had much to lose but little win.(see
3.1.) 
The high de facto concentration of power on very few party leaders left very little possibilities
for  the rank and file  to influence the policy agenda of the party.  Local  politicians,  who are
commonly  assumed to  be  closest  to  the  positions  of  the  rank  and  file,  were  indeed  highly
dependent on their relationships to office holding party bosses. At the same time, the clientelistic
structures described in the last subchapter allowed them to enforce support from a considerable
part of the poor members without having to defend their interests. In practice,  the PJ is very
much a top-down hierarchy, in which dependency on the rank and file is low, while dependency
on the upper ranks is high. In this context, the possibilities for an emergence of opposing inner
party forces around issues such as welfare state adaptation were very limited. This may explain
why  the  PJ  has  not  incorporated  significant  steps  towards  welfare  state  adaptation  into  its
platform, despite the fact that an ample majority of the  membership would benefit from it.
c) Power and welfare state adaptation failure in a weakly institutionalised
democracy
This subchapter has started with the widespread argument that democracy increases the power
resources of lower classes due to their numerical advantage. Departing from this assumption, the
chances for steps towards welfare state adaptation seemed to have improved with the return to
democracy. If we look at the evolution of social spending and social policy legislation analysed
in chapter 2.2., we can see that the return to democracy indeed coincided with some changes in
the  trends.  The  difference  was  particularly  pronounced regarding  social  assistance  and
unemployment protection expenditure. The military government radically cut down expenditure
on  this  area,  while  the  opposite  was  the  case  during  the  democratic  period.  However,  the
expenditure on this area increased far slower than the number of persons depending on it, so that
the per person expenditure continued to decline.  Also the trends in the overall  size of public
social expenditure have been contrarian. The military government reduced social spending as a
share of the GDP, while the democratic governments increased it over the long run. All in all,
democracy seems to have made a difference. Nevertheless, the regressiveness of the financing
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and spending of, and the access to, social protection has been preserved, which led in practice,
considering the socio-economic changes within the society,  to a deteriorating capacity of the
welfare state to respond to the needs of the majority of the population. It seems that the return to
democracy has rather limited the pace with which a wealthy minority was able to remodel the
welfare state according to their interests, than that it allowed the increasingly poor majority to
shape the welfare state towards their interests.120 
The  considerable  breach  between  the  expectations  associated  with  democracy  and  the
disillusioning  outcomes  in  social  terms  can  be  better  understood  if   authoritarianism  and
democracy are not treated as a binary distinction, but as two extremes between which there are
indefinite intermediate points. There are indefinite different forms of democracy as well as of
authoritarianism, and the line of distinction is sometimes blurry.  Democracies can be more or
less  democratic,  as  well  as  authoritarian  systems  can  be  more  or  less  authoritarian.  So,  for
example,  has  Argentina  made  several  experiences  between  1958  and  1976  that  have  been
classified restricted or authoritarian democracy.  In  this sense,  it  is  important  to note that  the
quality  of  democracy  can  vary  significantly  along  several  lines.  Although  the  Argentine
democracy after 1983 did not face the same restrictions that former democratic experiences were
confronted  with,  such  as  the  prohibition  of  peronism and  the  recurrent  intervention  of  the
military, it has been far from leading to the political equality of its citizens for several reasons. 
Frederick Solt's(2008) very interesting research has shown that economic inequality is highly
related  to  political  inequality,  also  in  well  institutionalised  democracies.  In  this  sense,  the
stunning levels of economic inequality in the Argentinean society have constituted a significant
obstacle  for  the attainment  of  political  power of  the would-be beneficiaries  of  welfare  state
adaptation.  The  persistence,  or  even  exacerbation,  of  social  exclusion  largely  enabled  the
preservation of the political  exclusion of big parts  of the lower classes despite the return to
democracy. 
The  depressing  effect  on  the  quality  of  democracy  exerted  by  economic  inequality  is  a
phenomenon very valid also for highly institutionalised democracies.(Solt 2008) In Argentina,
however, this political disadvantage of the lower income strata was furthermore reinforced by a
weakness of formal institutions and a consequent strength of informal institutions.121 The nature
120Of course I am speaking in very simplified terms here. The analysis in 2.2. shows, that what  has been a very
unsatisfying policy balance in the long run, is constituted of backs and forths during the 27 years since the return of
democracy.
121Depending on the nature of a formal institution, it is, of course, also possible that a formal institution supresses the
influence  of  poorer  citizens.  However,  formal  democratic  institutions  are  usually  designed  to  contradict  not  to
strongly,  or at least to obviously,  the idea of political quality.  In contrast,  the informal institutions operating in
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of these informal institutions importantly reduced the power resources of poorer citizens and
increased the influence of the economic elites.
So, for example, has political clientelism importantly contributed to impede the transmission
of  the  poors'  interests via  electoral  processes into  steps  towards  welfare  state  adaptation.
Clientelism significantly reduced the free choice of those who have been depending on the 'help'
handed  out  through  clientelistic  party  networks.(Ippolito-O'Donnell  2007:  15  –  17)  By  this
means, the recipients of the poor vote, particularly the PJ party, reached a higher autonomy from
the real electoral preferences of the poor. In turn, their autonomy from the preferences of middle
and upper class voters has not been increased through such mechanisms. By this means,  the
political subordination of considerable parts of the poor through clientelistic networks provided
incentives for  politicians to concentrate  mainly on responding to the interests  of middle and
upper classes, which were more likely, and more able, to electorally punish governments. In this
sense, Jorge Andrés Gallego and Rafal Raciborski(2008: 20) argue that clientelism “becomes an
important strategy used by one class for the perpetuation of a favorable division of surplus“. In
other words, clientelism contributes to preserve inequality in democratic contexts, and as has
been argued in this chapter, it did so, among others, by hampering welfare state adaptation. The
low institutionalisation of the political system, and of the PJ party in particular, further increased
the autonomy of incumbent governments from lower government levels and their own rank and
files. In turn, the increased autonomy of political leaders from their electoral and partisan bases
reduced the capacity of subaltern classes to exert influence on the political course of the leaders
through  democratic  processes,  which  would  theoretically  give  them a  numerical  advantage,
while the lack of control mechanisms, accountability and transparency enhanced the possibilities
of upper classes to strengthen their channels of direct influence, which are, rather than linked to
the quantitative importance of the upper class vote, based on lobbying, personal relations, co-
optation, (illegal) payments, and so on.  
Finally,  the  findings  of  this  subchapter  suggest  that  not  democracy  was  ineffective  in
propelling welfare state adaptation, but that it was the low quality of the Argentine democracy,
or in other words the lack of democracy122, which particularly disadvantaged important parts of
the  would-be  beneficiaries  and  strengthened  those  opposed  to  it,  and  thereby  created
unfavourable conditions for social policy progress via democratic processes.
Argentina can hardly be presented in a way that would allow to qualify them as promoters of democratic political
equality. 
122As has been argued ealier, also the weakness of trade union internal democracy and the personalistic style of
leadership in many piquetero organisations forms part of this lack of democracy.
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3.5 The role of ideology: neoliberalism and welfare state adaptation
failure
As has been argued in the theoretical discussion at the beginning of this chapter (see 3.1.),
shifting prevalences in perceptions and ideas can have important influence on social policy.(e.g.
Béland  2005,  Bleses/Seeleib-Kaiser  2004,  Deacon  1998,  2000,  2002a,  2002b,  2003,  Ferrera
2008,  Palier  2001,  Starke  2006)  Many authors  have  focussed  on  changes  in  the  prevailing
perceptions with regard to particular aspects of the welfare state. So, for example, have authors
argued that family policies have been increasingly perceived as important during the last decades
in Germany(Bleses/Seeleib-Kaiser 2004) and Europe in general(Ferrera 2008). Alan Deacon(e.g.
1998)  has  argued  that  the  perceptions  with  regard  to  the  right  balance  between  rights  and
obligations of the individual has changed, and so on. Daniel Béland(2005) emphasised that ideas
and  perceptions  with regard  to  specific  aspects  of  the  welfare  state  are  usually  not  entirely
independent  from  each  other,  but  form  part  of  a  broader  ideological  framework.  In  this
subchapter  I  will  argue  that,  and  also how,  the shift  towards  the  prevalence  of  a  neoliberal
ideological  framework  during the military dictatorship and the 1990s negatively affected the
chances for welfare state adaptation, and even contributed to the implementation of significant
steps backwards. I will start the argument with a brief discussion of some essential features of
neoliberalism and its relationship to social policy. Hence, the politics and the political economy
of the Argentine neoliberalism will be analysed, so that the reader attains an understanding of
why neoliberalism has come to prominence in Argentina since the mid 1970s, and of why it has
dominated public policy more during the military dictatorship and the 1990s than it has during
most of the 1980s and the 2000s. Finally, it will be argued that neoliberalism decisively impacted
on  the  politics  of  welfare  state  adaptation  failure  by  defining  the  ground  on  which  the
mainstream parties competed, by influencing voter preferences, and even by framing attitudes of
trade union leaders.
Due  to  the  many  differences  between  neoliberal  policy  agendas  in  different  countries,
scholars  have  been  debating whether  there  is  one neoliberal  ideology.(e.g.  Demirovic  2006,
Hackworth/Moriah 2006, Peck/Tickell 2002) So, for example, has Alex Demirovic(2006: 14)
argued that  neoliberalism is not a coherent set  of ideas, while  Jason Hackworth and Abigail
Moriah(2006: 514) find that there exists a kind of ideal-type neoliberalism, which is politically
influential  across  the globe.  Jamie  Peck  and  Adam Tickell(2002:  388)  argue  that  “adequate
conceptualizations [of neoliberalism,  remark of the author] must be attentive to both the local
peculiarities and the generic features of neoliberalism.“ While neoliberalism has taken different
240
forms under different local contexts, „it also exists as an extralocal regime of rules and routines,
pressures and penalties.“(Peck/Tickell 2002: 392) In accordance with Peck/Tickell(2002: 392)
and Hackworth/Moriah(2006: 523), I find that there is a set of ideas that follow a common logic
and that could be described as the core of neoliberalism. These core ideas have become globally
influential, and some of them have been particularly successful in shaping social policy agendas.
Spatial  and  historical  differences  can  be  explained  through  different  contexts,  as  the
implementation of neoliberal ideas is subject to political processes with no predefined outcomes.
In the Argentinean case, for example, the neoliberal policies of the military government and of
the Menem government have not been identical. They have both been classified neoliberal, as,
despite the differences, they were motivated by a similar set of ideas. In this sense, neoliberalism
has  been  more  successful  in  providing the  logics  for,  and  in  determining  the  directions  of,
processes of restructuring, than it has been in triggering uniform outcomes.(Peck/Tickell 2002:
383)
As  this  work  has  not  the  purpose  to  provide  an  ample  discussion  of  the  nature  of
neoliberalism, I will focus now on those core elements of neoliberalism that have provided the
underlying logics of social policy reform in Argentina during the military dictatorship and the
Menem and De la Rúa governments. 
A central feature of neoliberal thinking is that it “promotes and normalizes a 'growth-first'
approach”.(Peck/Tickell 2002: 394) As has been alluded earlier, the growth-first doctrine can be
observed,  for  example,  in  the  fact  that  during  the  neoliberal  governments,  the  ministries  of
economy, in cooperation with representatives of the private economy and creditors, elaborated
social policy reforms rather than the ministries of social security or health, which had usually
closer  ties  to  trade  unions  or  professionals  of  the  health  sector.(Alonso  2007:  162)  In  this
context, social policy was increasingly considered a lower priority, and the main preoccupation
shifted from the question whether the welfare state provided adequate social protection or not to
whether the welfare state was hampering economic growth or not. 
A  second  feature  of  neoliberalism  is  that  it  renders  “issues  of  redistribution  and  social
investment as antagonistic to the overriding objectives of economic development.“(Peck/Tickell
2002:  394)  The  rather  keynesian  logics  of  the  import  substitution  industrialisation  model
suggested that sate-provided and redistributive social protection had benign effects on economic
growth. As lower income groups use bigger shares of their incomes for consumption than higher
income groups do, redistributive measures were perceived to contribute to a strengthening of the
national  demand,  and  thereby  to  create  a  market  for  the  country's  industries.(Riesco/Draibe
2007b:  47)  In  contrast,  neoliberalism is  less  concerned  with the demand-side.  By focussing
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mainly on the supply-side of the economy, neoliberalism assigns central importance to saving,
which ultimately is supposed to trigger higher rates of investment. While higher income groups
are averagely using smaller shares of their income for consumption, they are saving bigger parts
of it. Therefore, the neoliberal logics assume that it is rather a regressive distribution of incomes
that triggers economic growth. Furthermore, from the perspective of neoliberal sociology, higher
inequality provides  incentives  for  the  economic  activity of  individuals,  hence  improving  the
labour supply as well.  From this perspective a redistributive welfare state hampers economic
growth. In coincidence with this logic, both the military government and the governments during
the  1990s  significantly  increased  the  regressiveness  of  the  welfare  state. Moreover,  the
privatisation of the pension system explicitly pursued the strengthening of the financial market
by replacing a demand increasing pay-as-you-system with a saving based capitalisation system.
(Lo  Vuolo  1998b:  222)  Yet,  exacerbating  the  regressive  character  of  the  welfare  state  was
diametrically contradicting any form of welfare state adaptation. 
A third 'chief goal' of neoliberalism is “to minimize the state and return power to the private
market.“(Hackworth/Moriah  2006:  525) As  a  market-driven  logic(Sekler  2009:  62),
neoliberalism puts stark emphasis on the privatisation of social services and/or the introduction
of market mechanisms into these.(Riesco/Draibe 2007b: 51) The underlying conviction is that
the market is the most efficient way for providing services and allocating resources. 
„Neoliberalism  rests  on  a  pervasive  naturalization  of  market  logics,
justifying on the grounds of efficiency and even “fairness” their installation
as the dominant metrics of policy evaluation.“(Peck/Tickell 2002: 394)
While social policy was a long time based on the idea of compensating for the lack of social
conciousness of the market, neoliberalism aims at remodelling the welfare state in a way that it
becomes itself part of the market. Being part of the market, the welfare state loses its capacity to
countervail the malign social effects of it. Neoliberal agendas often combine the introduction of
market  mechanisms  with  the  decentralisation  of  the  respective  social  services,  whereby
responsibilities  are  in  most  cases  transferred  without  an  adequate  transfer  of  resources.
(Peck/Tickell 2002: 386) The Argentine military dictatorship and the governments during the
1990s  both  pursued  a  minimisation  of  the  role  of  the  state  in,  and  a  decentralisation  and
marketisation of, the welfare state. Considering that the social exclusion and poverty of big parts
of  the Argentine  population originated  in  the market,  the  marketisation of  the welfare  state
largely implied a setback with regard to adapting social policy. 
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A fourth key element of neoliberalism, with important consequences for the welfare state, is
the  particular  interpretation  of  the  relationship  between  globalisation  and  social  policy.
According to this interpretation, countries have no other choice than to compete with each other
about being the most attractive business location.(Brand 2005: 9) In  face of this competition,
expensive welfare states, and particularly high tax and contribution rates for employers and high
income earners, are seen to be no longer feasible, as these would supposedly trigger an exodus of
capital, production and the “best brains”. Moreover, welfare states should avoid to create upward
pressures  on wages.  Therefore,  'de-commodification',  that  is  the independence  of  individuals
from the market, must be minimised so that the forces of  offer and  demand can work without
'artificial'  distortion  in  the  labour  market and  determine  adequate  wage  levels.  The  military
dictatorship and the Menem and De la Rúa governments in fact  massively reduced employer
contributions to the social insurance system. Retrenchment that mostly hit the weakest (formal)
wage earners was the counter part of these reductions.123 With regard to de-commodification and
the  taxation  of  high  incomes,  little  reform  was  necessary  as  the  Argentine  welfare  state
historically provided very little independence from paid work, and high incomes were lower
taxed124 than low ones. The 'competitive' welfare state in the neoliberal sense was diametrically
contradicting the necessities  of  big parts  of  the population stemming from the long-standing
deterioration of the labour market.
The described elements are by no means a complete characterisation of neoliberalism, yet,
they have been those elements that have strongest shaped neoliberal social policy agendas in
Argentina, and arguably in many other countries as well. 
In contrast, the first democratic government during the 1980s and the governments after the
2001/2002 crisis pursued economic and social policy agendas that differed considerably from the
neoliberal approach. Although the Alfonsín government during the 1980s initially showed some
intentions to partially return to the import substitution industrialisation model, neither of these
governments applied coherently keynesian approaches, nor were they able or willing to return to
the pre-1976 ISI model. In accordance with the definition of Joachim Becker et al (2009: 7), I
classified the social and economic policy approaches of these governments as heterodox, in the
sense that they differed from the neoliberal orthodoxy in that they generally ascribed a bigger
role to state regulation of, and intervention in, the market. At the same time these approaches
123So, for example, the quasi dismantlement of child allowances during the military dictatoship, or the exclusion
from any pension entitlement of big parts of the low earners by the 1993 reform, as these were usually not able to
accumulate 30 years of contributions.(See 2.2.)
124Considering  also  the  social  insurance  contributions,  the  value  added  tax  and  all  other  forms  of  taxation.
(Sabaini/Santiere 1993: 171)
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allowed more egalitarian forms social policy reform. So, for example, did these governments
show significant effort for high rates of pension coverage and an egalitarian benefit structure.
Also  did  these  governments  undertake  no  attempts  of  privatisation,  marketisation  or
decentralisation of social services. The opposite was the case. So, for instance, attempted the
Alfonsín government during the 1980s to increase the role of the state in the semi-public health
insurance  system,  and the present  government  of  Christina  Kirchner  even  renationalised  the
privatised part  of  the  pension system.  These  governments  made some significant  progresses
towards welfare state adaptation, although it must be said that also these largely avoided the
introduction of social rights for poor and unemployed citizens below pension age. As has been
argued in the former chapters, the latter has most likely to do with political reasons.  
a) Political economy and politics of the Argentine neoliberalism
The decline of keynesianism, respectively fordism or developmentalism, and the ascendency
of neoliberalsim fell together with the emergence of the so called stagflation crises during the
1970s. Since then, it has increasingly become an allegedly apolitical common sense that the old
model had been exhausted and cannot  be revived.  However,  this apolitical  understanding of
shifts in the prevailing development model is unable to explain much of what came afterwards.
During  the  last  decades,  countries  following  neoliberal  policy  prescriptions  have  often
experienced more dramatic crises than those experienced during the 1970s. Nevertheless, and in
contrast  to  what  happened  during  the  1970s  with  keynesian  thinking,  the  dominance  of
neoliberal interpretations seemed often not to suffer from these crisis experiences. Although in
some cases crises led to temporary returns to more keynesian approaches, in many cases crises
were used to justify a deepening of the neoliberal approach, based on the argument that these
crises  had been the result  of  not  being neoliberal  enough.  Crises  seem to open windows of
opportunity  for  changes  in  the  prevalence  of  ideologies,  yet,  reducing  the  ascendency  of
neoliberalism to a mechanic logic, based on the argument that the crisis of the former model
required exactly this solution, is a gross simplification. Ideological shifts are not independent
from political  issues,  such  as  interest  conflicts  and  power  relations.  So,  for  example,  Alex
Demirovic(2006:  13/14) pointed  out  that  neoliberalism  did  not  suddenly  appear  in  the  mid
1970s, but had already been promoted for decades by groups of liberals in order to revive liberal
economic thinking. Among others, think tanks played an important role in effectively providing
neoliberal  ideas  in  the right  moments,  that  is  when politicians  and  the public  were  open to
solutions other than the keynesian ones, which were perceived to be in crisis.(Hackworth/Moriah
2006: 523) Moreover,  neoliberalism has been favoured by sectors of the economy that  have
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become  increasingly  powerful,  particularly  the  financial  sector.(e.g.  Huber  1996:  161,
Olsen/O'Connor 1998: 21) As a consequence of the increasing prevalence of neoliberal thinking
among the governments and the leading technocratic circles of economic science of the most
powerful  countries,  neoliberal  “premises  also established the ground rules for  global  lending
agencies“(Peck/Tickell 2002: 380), which accelerated the spreading of neoliberalism across the
globe.
In the following, I will attempt a brief overview over the politics and the political economy of
the Argentine neoliberalism, which will contribute to an understanding of why the “ideological
environment” has  been less favourabe for  welfare state  adaptation during some periods,  and
more so during others.
As has been shown in 3.2., the ISI model, and with it the rather keynesian style of economic
policies, had not been supported by all powerful actors in the Argentine politics. The devolpment
model  clearly  counted  with  the  support  of  the  majority  of  the  population,  which  found  its
expression  in  the  long-standing  electoral  dominance  of  peronism.  Yet,  recurrent  military
governments, which tried with limited success to implement liberal  economic policy agendas
between  1955  and  1972,  were  the  political  expression  of  its  powerful  enemies.  While  the
organisations  of labour and the national  small  and medium size industries supported the ISI
model,  the  powerful  organisations  of  the  landowners  and  the  financial  sector  were  fiercly
opposing  it.  As  described  in  3.2.,  the  most  concentrated  and  internationalised  parts  of  the
industrial capital in the country had been oscilating between tacitly accepting the ISI strategy, as
long  as  this  seemed  favourable  for  their  business  scopes,  and  joining  the  alliance  of  the
proponents of a liberal agenda. 
Towards the mid 1970s, the alliance supporting the ISI model had been decisively weakened.
On the one hand, this can be related to structural changes in the Argentine political economy.
While it were primarily the national small and medium size industries that supported the ISI
model, the trend during the decades preceding the end of ISI was pointing towards an increasing
concentration and internationalisation of the industrial capital in the country.125 In 1958, the 100
biggest  industrial  companies accounted for 16.7 % of the industrial GDP. A bit more than a
decade later(1970 - 1972), they accounted already for 23.5 % of it. While in 1957, 36 of the 97
biggest industrial companies were foreign companies, it were 72 out of the 100 biggest in 1971.
(Azpiazu et al 1976: 590 – 593) At the same time, the financial sector was increasingly gaining
125The big national, foreign or transnational companies were much more inclined to support the dissolution of the ISI
model, as they were more dependent on imports and more capable of exporting, than the majority of the small or
medium size national industrial companies.  Furthermore, they had strong interest  in an financial opening of the
country in order to become able to transfer bigger parts of their profits into their home countries.
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weight,  which  found  its  expression  in  the  foundation  of  the  anti-peronist  financial  sector
association ADEBA in 1972.(Svampa 2005: 112) In other words, the economic power shifted
increasingly to those sectors that supported the adoption of a neoliberal agenda.(Azpiazu et al
1976: 612)  
On  the  other  hand,  the  alliance  between  labour  and  the  national  industrial  sector  was
increasingly plagued by internal conflicts during the mid 1970s. While the peronist government
started with a “social  pact” between the two social  forces,  towards 1975 the CGT, the trade
union confederation, and the CGE, the ISI supporting employer association, were increasingly
disagreeing about the economic course, and ultimately about the distribution of income between
capital and labour. In face of a high fiscal deficit, ascending inflation and a persistent liquidation
of the country's  currency reserves, the minister of economy Celestino Rodrigo from the right
wing of the peronist party implemented a largely neoliberally influenced adjustment programme,
which contained among others a devaluation of the currency, a massive rise of the tariffs for
public  services  and  a  de  facto  reduction  of  the  real  wages.  The  design  of  the  programme
stemmed less from Rodrigo himself than from one of his officials called Ricardo Zinn, who had
close relations with the anti-peronist employer  fractions and later occupied important posts in
the military government. However, the massive resistance of trade unions impeded the decline of
real wages and led to Rodrigo's resignation. What started as an attempt to shift economic policies
towards a more liberal agenda ended up giving the trade unions unprecedented control over the
direction of economic policies. This, in turn, deepened the frictions within the ISI supporting
alliance and increased the conviction among those parts of the employer sector that supported a
neoliberal turn that such a policy change was hardly feasible in a democratic context. Rising
numbers of employers  deflected from the CGE and joined the anti-government  lockouts that
were  initiated  by  the  liberal  employer  organisations  united  in  the  powerful  anti-peronist
multisectorial employers' assembly APEGE.(Rougier/Fiszbein 2006: 94 – 108) 
The neoliberal turn was finally implemented after the coup d'etat in March 1976 by a violent
military  government126 that  counted  with  the  support  of  most  parts  of  the  employer  sector,
particularily from the financial, commercial and agricultural sectors.(Chossudovsky 1977: 631 –
633, Svampa 2005: 107, Birle 1996: 212) In contrast to what happened a few years later in the
United Kingdom and the United States, the neoliberalisation of public policy did not find the
support  of  the  majority  of  the  population  in  Argentina.  As  it  was  the  case  in  Chile,  the
implementation of these policies required a repressive military regime. 
126This dictatorship killed about 30.000 real and supposed political enemies. 
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While  the  first  neoliberal  experience  in  Argentina  did  not  count  with  the  support  of  a
majority, it neither counted with a stability comparable to that of the Pinochet regime in Chile.
Despite violent repressions, the Argentine trade unions remained comparatively strong.(Marshall
2006:  5)  Furthermore,  the  neoliberal  project  increasingly  faced  inner  conflicts  between  the
industrial and the agricultural  sector on the one side, who saw their interests violated by the
increasing overvaluation of the currency,  and the financial  and comercial  sector on the other
side,  who benfited  from this  exchange  rate  policy.(McGuire  1997: 175) In  the context of  a
profound financial crisis and the clear-cut defeat in the Falkland war the military government
had to cede power.  
With the return to democracy, the preferences of the majority of the voters became again a
decisive variable in the determination of the economic course of  the government.  While the
neoliberal agenda did not count with the support of a majority at its initiation, the financial crisis
and  the  general  discreditation  of  the  repressive  and  bellicose  military  government  probably
enhanced this rejection of neoliberalism. Under these circumstances, the  Alfonsín government
attempted  to  implement  a  rather  national  market  focussed  development  strategy,  against  the
resistance of big parts of the employer sector.(Birle 1996: 212/213) The electoral success of the
Alfonsín government in the 1985 legislative elections, can be seen as a manifestation of popular
support to the shortly before announced heterodox economic policy programme “Plan Austral”.
(Munck 1987: 109, Svampa 2005: 25) 
Although initially successful,  the  Plan Austral  was  not  able to  produce  lasting  economic
stability. During 1987 the inflation began to rise steeply again and economic growth decreased
rapidly, reaching negative values from 1988 on. At the same time, employer sectors launched
systematic  campaigns  to  promote  neoliberal  adjustment  policies.(Svampa  2005:  31,  see  also
chapter  2.1.)  Different  employer  associations,  and particularly  the  financial  sector,  sustained
influential  neoliberal think  tanks,  such  as  the  “Mediterranean  Foundation”(Fundación
Mediterránea), the “Centre for Macroeconomic Studies”(Centro de Estudios Macroeconomicos)
and  the  “Foundation  for  Latin  American  Economic  Research”(Fundación  de  Investigaciones
Económicas Latinoamericanas), which were able to attract famous Argentinean economists and
to increasingly attain  a dominant  role in the interpretation of  the roots of the crisis  and the
supposed solution to it.(Svampa 2005: 112 – 115) The lobbying and the public and economic
pressures  deployed  by the employers,  this  time also supported by the international  financial
institutions,  which  reached  considerable  influence  since  the  military  dictatorship  had
accumulated vast amounts of foreign debt, seemed to be successful and the Alfonsín government
tried to shift towards more orthodox policies.(Basualdo 2001: 51, Goldin 1997: 124) 
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Nevertheless,  the  peronist  opposition and  the trade  union movement  were  largely able  to
block the implementation of such a policy shift.(Basualdo 2001: 51) The inflationary problems
and the recessive economy were not completely self-made, but stemmed to a considerable part
from the enormous amount of inherited foreign debts127 and the steep increase in international
interest rates during the 1980s, which had already led to the insolvency of Mexico a view years
earlier. In  March  1988,  the  government  was  forced  to  cease  the  payment  of  interests  to
commercial  banks  that  held  public  debt.  However,  in  1989  the  USA  and  the  international
financial  institutions  were  neither  disposed anymore to  tolerate  this measure  nor  to  offer  an
acceptable solution.(Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998: 129/138/139/192) This implied that the Argentine
government  urgently  needed  dollars  to  be  able  to  make the corresponding interest  and debt
service payments. Yet, big agricultural exporters, most notably Bunge y Born, one of the biggest
Argentinean companies, stopped selling dollars to the central bank. As a consequence, on the 6 th
of February 1989 the dollar reserves of the central bank were virtually running out. Under these
circumstances, and in a situation of high economic uncertainty, Argentineans tried to buy dollars
wherever  they  could,  initiating  a  spiralling  down  of  the  exchange  rate,  and  consequently  a
skyrocketing of inflation.(McGuire 1997: 215) According to the Menem loyal trade union leader
Luis Barrionuevo(citado por Basualdo 2001: 58), the Bunge y Born conglomerate, at the time
that it fuelled the process of hyperinflation, supported Carlos Menem’s electoral campaign with a
700,000 dollar donation. Interestingly, short time later the first two ministers of economy of the
newly  elected  Menem  government  will  be  representatives  of  the  Bunge  y  Born  company.
(Basualdo 2001: 58/59) In this sense, the hyperinflation crisis that finally put an end to heterodox
social and economic policy in Argentina, was not exclusively the result of government policies,
but importantly fuelled by parts of  the exporting employer  sector,  the international  financial
institutions  and  the  governments  of  the  creditor  countries.  Nevertheless,  the  international
financial institutions and the employer sector will be the ones to shape the neoliberal agenda of
the  1990s,  while  the  crisis  of  1989 will  be  widely  related  to  the  heterodox  policies  of  the
Alfonsín government.(McGuire 1997: 216) 
Under these circumstances, Carlos Menem of the peronist party won the 1989 presidential
elections, and Raul Alfonsín decided to hand over the presidency a few months before the actual
end of his term. Simultaneously, the latter agreed to support the “Law of State Reform”(Ley de
Reforma de Estado) and the “Law of Economic Emergency”(Ley de Emergencia Económica),
127There are serious doubts about  the legitimacy of these debts,  considering that the military  government  which
accumulated the debt had no democratic legitimisation and did not use it to the benefit of the Argentine population
who since then has to pay the interests and service payments of the debt. 
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which endowed the Menem government with ample powers to introduce profound changes in the
economic course of the country.(Lo Vuolo 1998b: 210) Despite Menem's traditionally populist
anti-adjustment electoral campaign, he quickly made a stunning about-face. With the support of
the international financial  institutions and the employer  associations, his government adopted
one of the most  profound neoliberal  adjustment agendas of the continent.(Goldin 1997: 123,
Levitsky 2001: 2, Lo Vuolo 1998b: 189/245)
In contrast to Argentina's first neoliberal experience, neoliberalism became “a commonsense
of  the times“(Peck/Tickell  2002:  381)  in  the  aftermath  of  the  hyperinflation  crisis.  In  other
words, neoliberalism attained, at least temporarily, sustainability in a democratic context. During
the 1990s there  existed a consensus among all  significant  political  parties about  the lack of
alternatives to neoliberal policies.(Nolte 1996: 24)  The strong politisation of inflation had the
depolitisation  of  unemployment  as  counterpart.  Vast  parts  of  the  society  agreed  that  price
stability  was  more  important  than  any  other  objective.(Lo  Vuolo  1998b:  247/248)  The
hyperinflation experience furthermore increased the acceptance of profound spending cuts, even
among those who were  directly affected.  The success  of  the so called convertibility plan in
diminishing inflation consolidated this consensus.(McGuire 1997: 237, Nolte 1996: 38)
As it was the case during the initiation phase of the first neoliberal  experience under the
military dictatorship, the employer sector and the sector of international creditors were relatively
united around the support  for the governments agenda. Certainly,  the convertibility exchange
rate regime was rather less favourable for producers of internationally tradeable goods and more
so for commercial activities, service providers, foreign creditors and the financial sector. Yet, the
wholesale privatisation of state enterprises, and the high levels of corruption associated with this
process,  allowed an  immense  transfer  of  state  resources  into  private  property.  Many of  the
beneficiaries  were  national  industrial  conglomerates,  and hence producers  of  tradable goods,
such as the Techint group, which, for instance, bought 80 % of the shares of a hitherto state-
owned steel plant for 152 million dollars, although the plant was first valued at 2 billion dollars.
(McGuire 1997: 220) By this means, and considering that most smaller producers had much
more problems in coping with the international  competition in  the context of an overvalued
currency,  the economic  programme initiated during the Menem government  allowed the big
national industrial conglomerates to become the winners of the rapid concentration of capital that
took place in this sector. Yet, towards the end of the 1990s the sectors producing tradeable goods
were increasingly feeling the disadvantages of the exchange rate regime. This had also to do with
the  fact  that  the  privatisation  process  had  largely  been  completed.  Moreover,  the  Brazilian
currency  devaluation  effected  in  1999  considerably  increased  the  competitive  disadvantage
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resulting  from  the  overvalued  peso,  as  the  much  bigger  economy  of  the  immediately
neighbouring country had become virtually overnight a significantly cheaper industrial location.
The  financial,  commercial,  service  and  creditor  sectors,  however,  continued  to  have  strong
interests  in  the preservation  of  the convertibility regime.  In  this  sense,  the  interest  conflicts
within the economic elite were less about neoliberalism as such than about the peculiar type of
neoliberal  world  market  integration.  Nevertheless,  the  divergence  of  particular  interests  was
weakening the capacity of the economic elite as a whole to uphold a comprehensive neoliberal
logic, as the different sectors were increasingly prioritising the use of their channels of political
influence for their particular interests in the exchange rate question or other issues of regulation.
(Basualdo 2001:  85 – 101) At the same time, as World Value Survey data from Argentina clealy
shows, neoliberalism was rapidly losing support in the population128, and anti-neoliberal protests,
such as of the piquetero organisations and the CTA, were increasingly entering the public space.
(See also 3.3.) The increasing rejection of neoliberalism in the population must be seen in the
context  of  a  steep  downward  social  mobility  of  the  majority  of  the  population  during  the
1990s129, which contrasted diametrically with the initial promises of wealth for all. The long-
standing economic recession that began in late 1998 and recently culminated in 2001/2002 was
further contributing to these trends. 
The  peak  of  the  economic  crisis  marked  a  new  point  of  inflection.  While  in  1991
neoliberalism seemed to wake big hopes among the majority of the population and was accepted
by virtually all big parties, it had reached widespread negative connotations by 2002, and the
ultimately  successful  presidential  candidate  of  the  2003  elections  based  his  campaign  on  a
strongly  anti-neoliberal  rhetoric.(La  Nación  22nd  of  April  2003)  Sonia  Draibe  and  Manuel
Riesco(2007a: 1) furthermore argued that since the late 1990s the influence of neoliberal ideas
has been reduced in most of Latin America. Several left and centre-left governments came to
power, which have been, at least in their rhetoric, critical towards neoliberalism.(Svampa 2008:
19) In the literature the roll back of parts of the neoliberal logic in Latin America during the last
decade has often been associated with the emergence of a so called “Neo-Structuralism”.(e.g.
Kirby 2003:  90)  In  Argentina  the divergence  from neoliberal  prescriptions  is  clearly  visibly
along several lines. So, for example, did the governments regularly intervene into the market by
fixing maximum prices and minimum wages, by  renationalising several privatised companies,
128See next part of this chapter for more detail.
129Data from the SEDLAC database shows that only the two richest deciles could increase their incomes as a share
of  the  GDP  between  1991  and  2001,  while  the  8  remaining  deciles  (=80%  of  the  population)  experienced  a
decreasing participation in the country's wealth.
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by subsidising services like public transport, by renationalising the pension system and using
part of the accumulated capital for countercyclical measures, and so forth. 
The  Argentine  case  seems  to  validate  Alex  Demirovic's(2006:  14)  argument  that
neoliberalism  is  not  capable  of  attaining  a  lasting  hegemonic  status,  as  it  makes  to  little
compromises that would allow the consolidation of a consensus among a sufficiently large part
of the society in the long run. On the other hand, Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell(2002: 380) argue
that in the USA and the UK neoliberalism has shown a high level of adaptive capacity, and that,
at least in these two cases, the capacity of neoliberalism to sustain a hegemonic position has been
underestimated.  What  can be said,  is  that  the Argentine neoliberalism of  the 1990s was too
aggressive and too rapidly too harmful for the majority of the population as to retain its position
as  the  prevailing  common  sense.  Nevertheless,  parts  of  the  neoliberal  logic,  without  being
officially recognised, survived the ideological shift.
b) The neoliberal politics of welfare state adaptation failure
The relationship between politics and neoliberalism must be understood as a mutual one. The
last  part  of  this  chapter  has  argued  that  the  predominance  of  neoliberalism has  been,  to  an
important degree, a result of politics. At the same time, neoliberalism „shapes the environments,
contexts, and frameworks within which political-economic and socioinstitutional restructuring
takes place.“(Peck/Tickell 2002: 400) This part will analyse how neoliberalism has shaped the
politics of welfare state adaptation failure.
Analysing the neoliberal policies in the USA and the United Kingdom, Jamie Peck and Adam
Tickell(2002: 384) found that two neoliberal phases can be distinguished. The first  phase has
been described as “rollback neoliberalism”. During this phase the new neoliberal government cut
old keynesian institutions and begins to deregulate markets. Later, neoliberal governments in the
USA and the UK went over to a second phase, called “roll-out neoliberalism”, during which they
focused  more  on  the  construction  and  consolidation  of  new  neoliberal  institutions  and
regulations. Neoliberal social policy in Argentina fits surprisingly well into this categorisation.
The neoliberal dictatorship, representing the phase of “rollback neoliberalism”, cut down overall
social expenditure as a share of the GDP by over 24 % and reduced employer social insurance
contribution rates to less than a half. Expenditure on family allowances,  public health, social
assistance and unemployment protection was so dramatically reduced that it can be spoken of a
virtual dismantlement.(Vargas de Flood 2006: 188, DAGPyPS 2010, Barbeito/Lo Vuolo 1998:
337) The 1990s represent the second phase, the so called “roll-out neoliberalism”, during which
the governments were actively pursuing the construction and regulation of markets, or at least
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market like competitive spaces, in the health and pension insurance sector. Furthermore, from
the second half of the 1990s, the government introduced so called “workfare” or “welfare to
work” approaches in social  assistance and unemployment protection policies, which aimed at
improving the labour supply and thereby at avoiding upward pressures on wage levels. 
Yet, despite comparable policy evolutions in the USA, UK and Argentina, the political cycle
was significantly different in the latter case. While in the USA and UK democratically elected
governments implemented both phases, Argentina was a dictatorship during the first phase. In
the two industrialised countries the passing from one phase to the other was gradual, precipitated
through comparatively minor crises.(Peck/Tickell 2002: 384 – 390) In Argentina,  in contrast,
“rollback  neoliberalism” ended  with a  major  economic  and political  crisis  that  triggered  the
return to democracy, and in face of a lack of majority support for neoliberalism, also a transitory
phase of several years of heterodox economic and social policy. 
During the phase of  “rollback  neoliberalism”,  the governments  of  all  three countries  saw
welfare state retrenchment “not as a necessary evil but as a necessary good”(Pierson 1994: 1).
Yet,  while  for  the  former  the  spread  of  neoliberal  views  and  perceptions  throughout  the
electorate of their countries was of key importance for the political viability of these reforms, the
Argentine  military  government  was  little  worried  about  majorities.  Neoliberal  social  policy
reform during the military dictatorship was guided by neoliberal  prescriptions, but was made
politically  viable  mainly  through  repressive  military  and  economic  power,  not  through  the
prevalence of a neoliberal common sense in the population. 
In contrast, the regressive welfare state reforms during the 1990s, which seriously infringed
the 'objective'  interests of the majority of the population, owed big parts of its political, and
particularly electoral,  viability to the dominance  of a neoliberal  common sense that  virtually
constituted the ground on which politics took place.(e.g. Lloyd-Sherlock 2005: 1896, Lo Vuolo
1998b: 205)  
The fact  that  all  significant  parties  agreed  about  the lack  of  alternatives  to  neoliberalism
implied that political competition was not about whether to implement neoliberal reforms or not,
but rather about the specific design of the neoliberal reforms.(Nolte 1996: 24) This may partly
explain why the coalition government between 1999 and 2001, which included the centre-left
FREPASO party,  continued with the neoliberal course of the former peronist government and
did  not  make  any  attempts  towards  adapting  the  welfare  state  to  the  social  needs  of  an
increasingly unequal and poverty-ridden post-industrial society. 
Neoliberal thinking also penetrated the ranks of the trade unions and thereby contributed to
the avoidance of stronger trade union resistance to the regressive social policy reforms. Already
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during the late 1980s a group of 15 trade union leaders, including some of the biggest unions,
showed  support  for  neoliberal  policies.(McGuire  1997:  204/214)  During  the  early  1990s
influential trade union leaders repeatedly expressed their neoliberal believes: 
“In the view of José Pedraza of the railway workers, Menem's reforms were
necessary  because  'there  was  no  other  way  for  the  country  to  escape  the
profound  crisis  in  which  we  found  ourselves.'  According  to  Carlos  West
Ocampo of the private hospital  workers,  'the wage is  directly related to the
gross domestic product, to the capacity to produce, to the capacity to export, to
the capacity to create wealth.'  In  the opinion of José Rodríguez of the auto
workers, 'if there is stability, if there is investment, if we're privatizing, if the
companies can do business, that's when living conditions will improve.' Oscar
Lescano of the light and power workers even argued that the welfare of the
country demanded a reduction of union power: 'Perón gave us everything, and
successive Justicialist[Peronist] governments allowed us excessive influence. ...
we went beyond ourselves in the use of power and now we're paying the price,
including  before  society,  which  doesn't  approve  of  many  of  our  stances.'
“(McGuire 1997: 234)
In the preceding chapters, I have several times used the expressions 'objective interests' or
'theoretical interests'. So, for example, have I assumed that an informal worker with little chances
to accumulate 30 years of pension system contributions has an 'objective interest' in eligibility
criteria that allow the retirement also with less years of contribution. However, in practice it is
'subjective interests'  what counts in politics.  And being so, it  is  possible that  people support
policies that infringe their 'objective interests' because they believe that there would simply be no
alternative. People may also believe that a measure would be to their favour, although it later
turns out that it was not. Neoliberalism has been stunningly capable of shaping (many) people's
perceptions. The neoliberal argumentation has often been about indirect positive effects. So, for
example, has been argued that reducing social spending will induce economic growth and hence
enable the poor to find (better) jobs soon, and by this means contribute to the well-being of the
same poor person that is going to receive less social policy support from the state. In the moment
of  showing support  or  opposition to  policies,  for  instance  through voting for  or  against  the
government, it counts what people perceive to be in their interests. Although most Argentineans
were  going  to  lose  in  the  neoliberal  experience  of  the  1990s,  and  particularly  through  the
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regressive remodelling of the welfare state, data from the World Value Survey shows that an
ample majority of the population initially shared the central neoliberal believes that guided social
policy reform during that decade.
Elaborated by the author. Source: World Value Survey, http://www.wvsevsdb.com/ .
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130 Original question of the World Value Survey:
“Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means
you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right;
and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. Sentences: Incomes should be
made more equal vs We need larger income differences as incentives“
For the figure, the answers 5 and 6 have been considered as an expression of neutrality.
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Figure 46: Public opinion with regard to income inequalities
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Elaborated by the author. Source: World Value Survey, http://www.wvsevsdb.com/ .131
131 Original question of the World Value Survey:
“Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means
you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right;
and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. Sentences: Private ownership
of business should be increased vs Government ownership of business should be increased“
For the figure, the answers 5 and 6 have been considered as an expression of neutrality.
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Figure 47: Public opinion with regard to private vs state 
ownership of business 
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Elaborated by the author. Source: World Value Survey, http://www.wvsevsdb.com/ .132
Figure  46  shows  that  an  ample  majority  of  the  population  supported  a  rise  in  income
inequalities during the early 1990s,  as this was considered to provide positive incentives for
individuals.  Basically the same argument was one of the central  justifications of the pension
reform.  Supposedly  the  old  system  was  too  egalitarian  and  did  therefore  provide  too  little
incentives for workers to contribute to the system. While the available data suggests that the
problem was  that  lower  skilled  workers  were  increasingly  excluded  from the  formal  labour
market, and thereby from contributing to the pension system, the neoliberal reformers argued
successfully that informality was mainly a result of the “perverse incentives” that the permissive
and egalitarian eligibility criteria allegedly provided.(Arza 2009: 7, Goldberg/Lo Vuolo 2006:
84, see also 2.1.) The impressive public approval of this logic must be seen in the context of the
experience with the hyperinflation crisis. On the one hand, the example shows that politics and
132 Original question of the World Value Survey:
“Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means
you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right;
and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. Sentences: People should
take more responsibility to provide for themselves vs The government should take more responsibility to ensure that
everyone is provided for“ 
For the figure, the answers 5 and 6 have been considered as an expression of neutrality.
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Figure 48: Public opinion with regard to government vs individual 
responsibility
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power play a decisive role in shifts  of the prevailing ideology.  Figure 1(in the introduction)
showed that  during the hyperinflation the poverty rate shot up to nearly 40 %, although the
unemployment rate remained at  values significantly below the 10 % line.(see also 2.1.) This
means that poverty was mainly triggered by skyrocketing income inequalities in face of the high
inflation. So, without taking political factors into account, such as the persistent promotion of
neoliberal ideas as the only viable alternative through the economic elite, international financial
institutions and a variety of think tanks,  there are not many reason why people should have
“learned” from the hyperinflation crisis that larger income inequalities are a benign thing. On the
other hand, the introduction of the convertibility exchange rate system in 1991, the year of the
first  survey,  had  virtually  overnight  reduced  inflation  to  low  values.  Considering  that
unemployment had increased only modestly during the inflation crisis, the stabilisation of prices
implied that important parts of those who temporarily fell into poverty were able to recover the
value of their income with the reduction of inflation. About half of the poverty rate in figure 1
can be explained through groups from the middle income strata, that fell temporarily into poverty
but had not been structurally excluded from the (formal) labour market.(Svampa 2008: 27) These
groups experienced the early years of the neoliberal decade as an opportunity for upward social
mobility that enabled them to return to their pre-crisis position in the social stratification and to
distinguish themselves from the rest of the poor that had already before belonged to the lower
income strata and that suffered structural exclusion from the wealth of the society. This initial
stabilisation through the convertibility plan very likely contributed to the ample support for rises
in  income  inequality,  also  among  lower  middle-class  groups  and  formal  workers,  as  many
possibly  believed  to  have  real  chances  to  be  among  the  winners  of  this  differentiation  of
incomes. Who believed this, in turn, had much reason to support the neoliberal social policy
agenda of the government, as it was largely going to award the winners and to punish the losers.
Nevertheless, the reality was another. The new mode of accumulation of the neoliberal decade,
and the lack of social protection for the weaker  parts of the society,  triggered a gradual  but
massive descent of ample parts of these groups into poverty. In contrast to the experience with
the hyperinflation crisis, this time the poverty had become a structural problem for most of them,
and the likeliness of a quick return to social inclusion was low.(Kessler/Espinoza 2003: 38) 
The figures 47 and 48 indicate that during the early 1990s a majority also supported a slim
state, an extension of the private market economy and a greater 'individual responsibility'. The
prevalence of such ideas provided a particularly favourable context for the partial privatisation of
the pension system and  the  introduction of  market  mechanisms  into the health  care  system.
While reforms of this kind have often been associated with political  costs, the World Value
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Survey data suggests that during the early 1990s the Argentine government was very likely even
able to politically capitalise through the privatisation and/or marketisation of  parts of the welfare
state.
Nevertheless, data from the World Value Survey disaggregated by self-defined social class
affiliation and educational level shows that neoliberalism has never been omnipotent in shaping
the subjective perceptions of interests. The data shows that those social groups that were going to
be most negatively affected by the neoliberal social and economic policy reforms, namely the
poorer and less educated strata, showed the highest rates of rejection of the consulted neoliberal
values. The wealthier and better educated, the more likely it was that the respective person was
going to win in the neoliberal experience, and the bigger was also the support for the consulted
neoliberal values. If we remember what has been argued in the preceding chapters, we see that
those  who  strongest  rejected  neoliberalism  were  precisely  the  groups  that  faced  serious
disadvantages with regard to the participation in the Argentine political system. 
  As  Alex  Demirovic(2006:  19) denotes,  neoliberalism  has  often  been  propagated  as  a
philosophy that aims at the wealth of the society as a whole. In accordance with this argument, it
is likely that the initial approval of the neoliberal social policy agenda had also to do with the
fact that it was repeatedly justified as being ultimately beneficial for all members of the society.
Many outcomes of privatising and/or marketising social policy reforms are, in contrast to most
reforms within state-led systems, not clearly predictable for the future, as they basically depend
on the  evolution  of  the  economy,  the  returns  of  the  effected  investments,  and  so  forth.  As
Stephen  Kay(2000:  18)  argued,  this  enabled  the  Argentine  government  to  “claim credit  for
policy outcomes that will not occur until a future date”. At the same time, the government was
claiming credits  for  alleged  social  policy outcomes that  were  diametrically  contradicting the
reality. The social policy reform paper(CEA-FIEL 1995) of the Argentine Employers Council
(CEA) and the neoliberal think tank Foundation for Latin American Economic Research (FIEL),
which reads like the blueprint for the reform intentions of the governments between 1989 and
2001,  impresses  with what  could be  best  described  as  orwellian  “double  speak”.  While the
document permanently criticises the inequity of the old social protection systems and assures that
reforms should be preoccupied with promoting more equity, virtually all of the proposals in this
paper aimed at making the social protection systems even more regressive. Another example for
the intentions to obfuscate the regressive character of social policy reform during the 1990s was
the rhetoric  about a supposed targeting of social  expenditure on the poorest  members of the
society.(e.g. Cortés/Marshall 1999: 206 – 211, Lo Vuolo 1998b: 237) However, the expenditure
analysis in 2.2. proves that social expenditure, rather than being targeted on the poor, was indeed
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increasingly concentrated on the well off. The increase of social assistance expenditure clearly
lacked behind the increase in the number of poor and unemployed persons, which implied that,
de facto, social expenditure per poor or unemployed person was decreasing during most of the
1990s. At the same time, the marketisation and the increased regressive and exclusiveness of
social programmes that  consumed over ten times the amount of resources between 1989 and
2001,  namely  the  health  and  pension  insurances,  led  to  an  increasing  concentration  of  the
majority of the social expenditure on the better off.(Calculated on the basis of DAGPyPS 2010)
Walter  Korpi  and  Joakim Palme(1998)  found  in  an  international  comparison  among OECD
countries, that indeed those countries which strongest “targeted” their social expenditure on the
poor, were paradoxically at the same time those countries whose welfare states least diminished
inequality levels. This paradox has to do with the fact that the welfare states with the highest
degrees  of  targeting,  possessed simultaneously the smallest  overall  redistributive budgets.  In
other words, while countries like Sweden may have little social expenditure that is specifically
targeted on the poor, nearly all areas of the welfare state redistribute income from the better off
to the less well off, including also weaker non-poor sectors. If we look at the Argentinean social
policy reforms during the neoliberal governments of the 1990s, we see that their core was the
reduction  of  the  overall  redistributive  budget,  by  eliminating  big  part  of  the  already  scarce
solidarity elements in health and pension insurance, rather than the targeting on the poor.
Besides  national  actors  like  employer  associations  and  related  think  tanks,  also  the
international  financial  institutions  put  considerable  effort  in  promoting  their  versions  of  an
“equitable and sustainable” approach to welfare state reform. So, for example, was the World
Bank a key promoter of the health care reform of the 1990s.(Alonso 2207: 165, Lloyd-Sherlock
2005: 1894, Lo Vuolo 1998b: 233) Also the IMF pressured for a complete opening of the health
insurance  market  to  private  insurers.(e.g.  La  Nación  11th of  April  1998)  Armando
Barrientos(2007:  423) notes  that  the  “World Bank has  invested  a large  amount of  financial,
political and intellectual capital in the reform of pension systems in Latin America”. Influential
World Bank(1994) documents like “Adverting the Old Age Crisis. Policies to Protect the Old
and  Promote Growth” show that  the World Bank’s  concern with pension reform during the
1990s was centrally motivated by the aim of extending neoliberal  adjustment policies  to the
pension systems. Ten years later, a World Bank assessment study, conducted by senior pension
economists  of  the  bank,  concluded  that  the  World  Bank’s  pension  reform agenda  has  been
impressively influential in Latin America, emphasising that “no other region has taken it more
seriously than has Latin America”(Gill/Packard/Yermo 2005: 1). While hitherto the International
Labour Organisation(ILO)  occupied a central  role in external  pension policy advice in Latin
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America, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, two powerful proponents
of pension system privatisation, increasingly replaced the influence of the ILO during the 1990s.
(Kay 2000:  7)  The example  shows how the power  shifts  associated  with the ascendency of
neoliberalism on the international level effectively contributed to neoliberal social policy reform
in Argentina. Neoliberalism not only shaped the national context within which the politics of the
welfare state were taking place,  but also the international  context.(e.g.  Cortes/Marshall 1999:
195 – 201) 
Already a few years later, and despite high rates of economic growth, the social reality began
to diverge so strongly from the promise of wealth for all, that notwithstanding the efforts of the
government, the neoliberal think tanks, the international financial institutions and the employer
organisations, the public support for neoliberal social policies began to erode. As the figures 46 –
48 indicate, from the late 1990s on, core neoliberal concepts were rejected by a majority of the
population. Since the crisis in 2001/2002, the international  financial institutions have become
largely discredited in the eyes of the Argentinean public. 
In  particular  the  partial  privatisation  of  the  pension  system,  which  constituted  the  most
important social policy reform project of the 1990s, lost rapidly support in the population, as the
outcomes proved to be everything else than beneficial for the majority of future pensioners. The
private pension system was hardly able to fulfil any of the neoliberal illusions about high returns,
efficiency and equity that had been used to justify the privatisation. The deep crisis around the
beginning of the new millennium even created doubts about the sustainability of the system.
(Arza  2009:  6)  The  privatised  system  did  not  lead  to  a  decrease  of  informal  employment.
Contrariwise, as has been shown in 2.2., the number of low income affiliates fell dramatically.
The so called political risks133 related to public pension systems have not been reduced, as bad
administrators  simply converted  into bad regulators.(e.g.  Arza 2009, Kay 2009, Calvo et  al.
2010) As has been shown in 2.2., instead of promoting equity,  the pension reform induced a
rapid rise in pension benefit inequalities and severely declining coverage. Instead of increasing
the  efficiency,  the  private  system  created  stunningly  high  administration  costs.  After  1994,
private  pension  funds'  administration  costs  constituted  between  15.6  % and  37.8  %  of  the
revenues, while the administration costs of the public system only oscillated between 1.4 % and
2.4 %134.(Arza 2009: 8/32) The public support for the private pension scheme decreased even
133Political risk refers in this matter mainly to the inefficient or inadequate governance of pension systems.
134 It has to be considered that the public system contains some hidden administration costs like services provided by
other  state  entities  or  the  free  use  of  public  administrative  buildings,  which  are  not  included  in  this  numbers.
However, also taking these costs into consideration the administrative costs are far lower in the public system than
in the private  sector.  This has mainly to  do with  the reduced economics of scale  and the high expenditure for
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more when it  finally turned out  that  the private pension entitlements  would in  average  lack
behind public system pensions.(e.g. Página 12 31st of August 2004, La Nación 26th of September
2004) Also the majority of the parties in the fragmented opposition were increasingly sceptical
of the private pension scheme.(El Clarín 22nd of November 2008)
The increasing rejection of neoliberal ideas, and the discreditation of those actors that had
most forcefully promoted neoliberal social policy reform, namely the financial sector and the
international financial institutions, opened opportunities and created (electoral) incentives for the
government  to  change  the  social  policy  course.  On  this  background,  social  policy  reform,
particularly in the field of pension policies, was able to reverse big parts of the setbacks of the
1990s and to progress with regard to welfare state adaptation.
advertisement that are common in the private branch.(Arza 2009: 8)
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4 CONCLUSIONS
The central  question that  motivated and guided  this  political  science  study has  been  why
Argentine politics failed to adapt the welfare state to the new constellation of social risks and
needs  that  stemmed  from  the  profound  transformation  of  the  labour  market  after  the
abandonment of the import substitution industrialisation model.
On the basis of empiric data this text has shown that the transformations of the Argentine
labour market since the abandonment of the ISI strategy have seriously limited the effectiveness
of  the  Argentine  welfare  state.  Unemployment  and  informal  employment  have  expanded
strongly,  income inequalities have risen steeply,  and work histories have become increasingly
unstable. The institutional design of the Argentinean informal-corporatist welfare state in force
during the mid 1970s has proven particularly incapable of protecting against  the social  risks
stemming  from  these  labour  market  changes.  The  strong  emphasis  on  the  social  insurance
principle,  the  largely  regressive  character  of  both  financing  and  spending  of  the  Argentine
welfare state, and the lack of social protection schemes for unemployed workers and working-
poor were going to reproduce the negative social consequences of the deterioration of the labour
market rather than to countervail them. Furthermore, the increasing participation of women in
the labour market was requiring solutions to the problem of the incompatibility of family and
work in face of the limited provision of child and elderly care services. For all these reasons,
active social policy reform would have been necessary to adapt the Argentine welfare state to the
new constellation of social risks. 
However,  as  the  extensive  analysis  of  the  evolution  of  social  spending  disaggregated  by
program and the changes in the social policy legislation has shown, the Argentine welfare state
has not been adapted adequately to these changes in the underlying society. 
Despite  the  massive  expansion  of  unemployment  and  precarious  employment,  social
protection against  these social  risks has remained very weak,  both in terms of coverage  and
quality. Health care  policies have even deteriorated the capacity of the welfare state to respond
to the social consequences of labour market deterioration. Firstly, social health expenditure has
been redistributed in favour of the semi-public social health insurance system and in detriment of
the universal public system. At the same time, however, a growing share of the population had
no access to health insurance coverage and had therefore to rely on an increasingly underfunded
system of public hospitals. And secondly, the reform of the social health insurance system during
the  1990s  has  further  reduced  the  scarce  solidarity  within  the  system,  so  that  rising  wage
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differences within the formal labour market led increasingly to inequalities regarding the quality
of health insurance coverage. Family policy reform has also tended to exacerbate the inadequacy
of the welfare state, at least until late 2009. Public child and elderly care provision is until today
very limited, so that work and family continue to be hard to combine. This is especially true for
the  poorer  sectors  of  the  society,  who cannot  afford  private  care  services.  Furthermore,  the
available data shows that poor families are also disadvantaged with regard to the access to the
scarce publicly provided care services. Until 2009, family allowance expenditure as a share of
the GDP was considerably lower than it was during the mid 1970s. This has contributed to the
over-proportional rise in child poverty.  However, in 2009, an important inequity of the child
allowance system was removed. While before child allowances were only paid to workers of the
formal sector, since late 2009 also unemployed and informal workers with children receive the
benefit. Pension policies have been most responsive to the deterioration of the labour market.
Despite rising unemployment, informal employment, and income inequalities within the working
age population, pension coverage rates are today very high and the inequality between benefits is
low. Therefore,  the poverty risk is significantly lower for the elderly than for any other age
group. Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that the favourable indicators of the pension system
are virtually all the result of temporary measures. If no lasting changes are implemented, these
indicators will deteriorate again.
The dramatic rise in the poverty rate from about 5 % of the population during the mid 1970s
to over 50 % during the peak of the crisis in 2002 shows how ineffective the Argentine welfare
state has been in protecting the population against the basic social risks. Although the poverty
rate has decreased during the last years due to the recuperation of the labour market, it was still
about four times higher during 2009 than in 1975. The failure of the Argentine social policy has
thereby  been  twofold.  On  the  one  hand,  it  was  unable  to  respond  to  the  labour  market
transformations  in  order  to  avoid the  transmission of  labour market  deterioration into rising
poverty rates. On the other hand, the relationship between labour markets and social policy is
essentially a mutual one. Welfare states are affected by labour market changes, but the latter are
also affected by the former. Esping-Andersen(1990: 221) rightly pointed out, that “labor markets
derive much of their logic from how they are embedded in the institutional framework of social
policy”. When welfare states guarantee minimum incomes in order to avoid that unemployment
triggers poverty,  they also avoid that wages in the labour market fall below the poverty line.
When welfare states guarantee decent health, child and elderly care provision to all its citizens,
they also expand employment in these sectors.  Contrariwise,  a lack of social protection may
force people to enter the labour market that would not do so voluntarily. So, for example, has
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been mentioned in chapter 2.2. that the decrease in pension coverage during the 1990s led to an
increase in the labour market participation of the elderly. Figure 6 in 2.1. shows that during the
1990s the economically active population grew significantly, while simultaneously the working
population was decreasing. The lack of social protection certainly contributed to this paradox, as
in face of a lack of income, family members that may otherwise not have looked for work, such
as  the  elderly  or  students,  were  entering  the  labour  market  in  the  hope  to  become  able  to
contribute to the well-being of the family.  This,  in turn,  increased even more the imbalance
between labour force offer and demand, which hence resulted in additional downward pressures
on wages and exacerbated thereby the problem of the working-poor. 
The failure of welfare state adaptation consequently favoured the increasing concentration of
the societal wealth in two ways. On the one hand, welfare state adaptation would have required
more progressive financing and spending in order to include all those who had little possibility to
pay contribution rates but urgently needed access to social protection. The failure of welfare state
adaptation  therefore  relieved  the  winners  of  the  process  of  income  concentration  from  a
redistributive burden. At the same time, welfare state adaptation would have interfered into the
distribution of incomes that the labour market generates in the first place. Also this interference
would have favoured lower income groups. In this sense, welfare state adaptation in Argentina
has been very much part of a distributive and redistributive question with important impacts on
the division of income between capital and labour.
This indicates that welfare state adaptation, from a political perspective, has been more than
just  the sum of a number  of  interests  of  particular  groups,  such as  pensioners,  unemployed,
women, formal workers, informal workers, families, and so on. As has been argued in 3.2. and
3.3.,  the would-be  beneficiaries  of  welfare  state  adaptation were  not  loose  groups  dispersed
throughout the society, but very much concentrated in what Argentine authors often called the
“clases populares”(e.g. O'Donnell 1977, Svampa 2005), which include the working class and the
poor. Families or individuals from these social classes usually faced a lack of social protection
against several social risks. A low income family was very likely to be affected by informal
employment or unemployed, often faced exclusion from the health insurance system, its working
members had hardly any chance to attain pension entitlements135,  and its access to child and
elderly care services was highly restricted. 
135This  is  true  if  the  rules  of  the  pension  system  enacted  with  the  1993  reform are  considered.  As  has  been
mentioned,  the  temporary  measures  of  the  so  called „pension inclusion  plan“  improved  the  access  to  pension
entitlements for low income groups, yet, not lastingly.
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As has been argued, the Argentine social structure and the mode of accumulation during most
of the post-ISI period indicate that interests with regard to welfare state adaptation diverged very
much  between  social  classes.  While  upper  income  groups,  and  particularly  employers  that
depended  little  on  lower  class  consumption,  had  strong  interests  in  avoiding  welfare  state
adaptation,  the  increasingly  poor  majority  of  the  population  would  have  benefited  from  it.
Between 1992 and 2009, 50 % of the population disposed in average over only 18 % of the
national income, while the richest 10 % of the population concentrated 36.2 % of it.(SEDLAC
database) 
On this  basis,  this  text  has  argued  that  an  analysis  of  welfare  state  adaptation  failure  in
Argentina has centrally to take the distribution of power resources between social classes into
consideration.  In  this  sense,  the  power  resources  theory,  which  focusses  particularly  on  the
distribution of power resources between working class and employers, importantly contributed to
the  theoretical  framework  of  this  study.  Power  resources  theorists  have  argued  that  strong
working classes considerably influence the size and the shape of the welfare state in favour of
the economically weaker sectors of the society.(e.g. Korpi 1983, 1998, 2006,  Esping-Andersen
1990) One of  the strengths  of  the  power  resources  theory has been  the  ability to  carry  out
quantitative  time-series  cross-sectional  comparisons  to  provide  empirical  evidence  for  the
relation  between  working  class  power  and  the  size  and  shape  of  the  welfare  state.  Yet,
quantitative comparisons require comparable indicators. It has usually been assumed that strong
labour  parties(e.g.  Esping-Andersen  1990,  Huber/Ragin/Stephens  1993)  or  strong  trade
unions(e.g.  Rothstein  1998)  reflect  strong  working  classes.  Hence,  power  resources  theory
studies have measured working class power mainly as the cabinet and parliament shares of these
parties  or  the  degree  of  unionisation.  However,  the  Argentinean  case  suggests  that  the
concentration on these indicators can be too narrow in some cases as to adequately reflect the
real  distribution of power resources. In  Argentina unionisation rates have remained relatively
high since the abandonment of the ISI strategy, and a labour-based, although not left, party has
governed during 20 of 27 years of democracy. Nevertheless, labour interests have been clearly
on the defence since then. The findings of this text with regard to the Argentinean case seem
thereby not to be isolated. The social democratic governments of Gerhard Schröder in Germany
or Tony Blair in the United Kingdom are examples for that labour party governments are also in
other countries not necessarily a good indicator for strong working class influence over social
policy  anymore.  Both  governments  have  pursued  welfare  state  reforms  that  considerably
stronger  reflected  business  interests  than  working  class  interests.(Bundesregierung  2003,
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Department of Social Security 1998) Olsen and O'Connor(1998: 21) have argued in this regard
that: 
“In  the  new,  more  global  environment,  financial  capital,  transnational
corporations, and other actors play a significantly greater role in determining
what is desirable, or even possible, with little if any regard for 'strong' national
labour movements.”(Olsen/O'Connor 1998: 21)
This case study has provided the opportunity to examine empirically and theoretically the
power relations that contextualised the failure of welfare state adaptation in Argentina, which
may  contribute  in  some  way  to  refine  the  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  the
distribution of power resources and the politics of welfare state adaptation in a non-OECD but
nevertheless post-industrial context. I have argued that the specifics of the Argentinean case in
particular,  but  also  the  abandonment  of  national  market  oriented  and  broadly  Keynesian
development  strategies  in  general,  have  reinforced  the  value  and  fruitfulness  of  broader
perspectives on power in order to explain welfare state development. Therefore, this work has
also dealt with the importance of institutions in a wider sense, as these are essential to understand
why neither the return to democracy nor the high degree of unionisation or the dominance of a
labour-based party have  provided the numerically  strong group  of  would-be beneficiaries  of
welfare state adaptation with sufficient power resources to propel social policy reform in their
favour. Another aspect considered important has been ideological power, in the sense that the
prevalence  of  neoliberal  ways  of  interpreting  the  reality  has  contributed  to  the  widespread
perception that welfare state adaptation would be harmful for the economy and not feasible in the
context of global competition. An understanding of the institutional and ideological framework
within which the politics of welfare state adaptation took place contributes not only to better
capture  the  relations  of  power  between  the  different  interests,  but  also  helps  to  understand
important patterns of political behaviour of the main actors involved in it.
 The chapter 3.2. has examined important aspects of the historical legacy of the Argentine
welfare state, as many of the formal and informal institutions that shaped the political dynamics
of social policy adaptation failure stem from the period prior to the period of study. It has been
argued that the consolidation of a largely insurance based and little redistributive welfare state
has to be seen in the context of the ISI model and the incorporation of the labour movement into
the  peronist  cross-class  alliance  with  a  sector  of  the  national  industrial  capital.  For  the
industrialists in this alliance a social insurance based form of organising the welfare state was an
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acceptable  solution,  as  it  preserved  status  differences  and  contained  relatively  little
redistribution. At the same time,  the long-standingly benign labour market context limited the
advantages for the labour movement that would have stemmed from more universalistic forms of
social protection. However, even more important for an explanation of the trade union support
for this kind of welfare state was the fact  that trade union leaders were conceded considerable
power  resources with  the  control  over  the  health  insurance  system.  Social  inclusion  and
redistributive aims were hence mainly pursued outside the welfare state through wage bargaining
and full employment policies. Although the dissolution of the ISI model since the mid 1970s
coincided  with  a  deterioration  of  the  labour  market,  which  implied  that  the  chosen  social
protection model became increasingly ineffective and disadvantageous for the working class, the
trade unions rather pressured for the preservation of the system than a progressive reform of it.
This pattern of political behaviour of the trade union elites becomes understandable when it is
considered  that  the  control  over  the  health  insurances  constituted  an  important  resource  of
personal  power.  As the progressive  health  care  reforms  that  were  proposed by governments
during the 1970s and 1980s foresaw a greater role of the state in the system in order to organise
it in a more universalistic, equitable, and efficient way, the trade union leaders opposed these
fiercely.  This confirms the argument  that  policy legacies  create resistance against  egalitarian
reforms among privileged groups.(Huber/Ragin/Stephens 1993: 722) Usually trade union leaders
and their rank and files are seen as one interest group. However, this text has argued that the
peronisation of  the  trade  union movement  during the  1940s and  1950s has  created  strongly
hierarchic  and  largely  undemocratic  trade  union  bureaucracies,  which  enabled  trade  union
leaders to attain high levels of autonomy from their rank and files. On this basis, trade union
leaders developed personal interests that were not necessarily reflecting working class interests,
even sometimes clearly contradicting these.  The preservation of  the health  insurance  system
privileged the trade union leaders, but was increasingly disadvantageous for a majority of their
rank and files. The lack of internal democracy made trade union leaders little sensible for the
changing social policy interests of their social bases. Furthermore, those who had the strongest
interest  in  welfare  state  adaptation,  namely unemployed  and  informal  workers,  were  largely
excluded  from  trade  union  affiliation.  The  peronisation  of  the  trade  union  movement  had
moreover pushed back the influence of socialist and communist ideas, which  would  arguably
have favoured stronger  solidarity with the unemployed  and informal  workers  for  ideological
reasons. In this context, welfare state adaptation constituted at best a low priority for the majority
of the trade union leaders. The high level of autonomy that trade union leaders attained from
their rank and files was contrasted with the high dependence that characterised their relation with
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the state. In contrast to the former, the state was endowed with ample faculties to discipline and
to  co-opt  trade  union  leaders.  This  particular  structure  of  the  Argentine  trade  union  system
largely explains why, despite high degrees of unionisation, trade unions constituted ineffective
instruments for the transmission of the interests of the would-be beneficiaries of welfare state
adaptation into political pressure. 
The “path-dependency” has been considerably weaker with regard to the pension system in
which the trade unions had considerably less influence.  In  the face of the weakening of the
overall  trade  union  power  that  resulted  from  the  de-industrialisation  process  and  the  rising
unemployment  and  informal  employment  rates,  trade  union leaders  concentrated  their  social
policy efforts on the preservation of the health insurance system in detriment of other social
policy  areas.  While  in  western  countries  pension  insurances  are  considered  to  create
extraordinarily strong vested interests due to the attainment of rights that reflect the contributions
effected over many years,  the recurrent crises and the reiterated changes in the real values of
pensions through inflationary bursts seem to have prevented the consolidation of comparably
strong vested interests in Argentina. While health insurance reform attempts were only able to
implement  limited  changes  to  the  system,  the  pension  system  underwent  several  profound
reforms since 1975. This allowed both a regressive remodelling of the system during the 1990s
and largely egalitarian pension policies during the 1980s and 2000s. 
As has been argued in 3.3., the defence of the exclusionary health insurance system, and the
low priority that trade union leaders assigned to welfare state adaptation in general, impeded the
formation  of  a  strategic  (social  policy)  alliance  between  formal  labour,  which  was  mainly
represented through the trade unions, and informal and unemployed labour, which constituted a
rapidly growing group that gave origin to a multitude of mostly local social movements. This
division of the would-be beneficiaries of welfare state adaptation further weakened their power
resources.  Only since the late 1990s and early 2000s the social  movements of  the poor and
informal  workers,  together  with  the  progressive  minority  fraction  of  the  trade  union
movement(the  CTA),  reached  considerable  mobilisational  strength  in  favour  of  progressive
social policy reforms. Yet, after 2003 the peronist governments of Néstor and Christina Kirchner
had ample success in applying co-optation and divide and rule tactics towards these.
The detailed analysis of this text has thereby shown that high degrees of unionisation do not
necessarily imply strong working class influence on social policy. The Argentine case suggests
that the institutional characteristics of the trade union system, as well as the role of trade unions
and their leaders in the administration of social policy programmes, may have decisive impact on
whether and how strongly trade unions favour progressive welfare state reform.
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The abandonment of the ISI strategy and the structural changes in the Argentine economy
furthermore  strengthened  those  social  forces  that  were  interested  in  avoiding  welfare  state
adaptation. While during the ISI period those employers that focussed on the national market had
a certain interest in social policies that were sustaining and stabilising consumption, the abrupt
opening  of  the  economy implied  that  most  of  them increasingly  saw  in  the  costs  of  such
programmes,  and  in  the  potential  effects  of  these  on  the  wage  levels,  an  obstacle  to  their
competitiveness. Furthermore, the accumulation of enormous amounts of foreign debt through
the  military  government  shifted  power  to  international  creditors,  particularly  international
financial institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development
Bank. The regressive neoliberal social policy reforms of the military dictatorship(1976 – 1983)
and the democratic governments of the 1990s, which exacerbated the incapability of the welfare
state to respond to the social risks stemming from labour market deterioration, largely reflected
the interests of the most powerful employers and international creditors. While the former have
been actively involved in the policy making processes during both periods, the latter became
mainly influential during the 1990s. 
Power resources theory studies usually concentrated exclusively on analysing the effects of
working class power on the welfare state. This study, however, suggests that a closer look at the
employer sector can contribute importantly to an understanding of social policy development.
Through  the  increasing  concentration  of  incomes,  and  the  possibilities  that  emerged  for
employers through the opening of the boarders for the flows of capital and goods, employers
have become more powerful in influencing social policy despite continuously high degrees of
unionisation and a  electorally  strong  labour-based  party.  Furthermore,  the  concentration  and
transnationalisation  processes  in  the  economy have  reduced  the  disposition of  employers  to
tolerate progressive social policies that tend to strengthen consumption, and have increased their
preference  for  little  redistributive  market  oriented  social  policy  arrangements  that  rather
strengthen financial markets than consumption. 
During the military government(1976 – 1983), the most powerful employer sectors were able
to impose many of their political aims, also in social policy, against the interests of the majority
of  the population. The coup d'etat  of  March 1976 had the support  of  most of the employer
associations.  Representatives  of  several  of  these  associations  occupied  central  posts  in  the
military government. In face of the incapability to impose their interests under democratic rule,
the  power  of the economic elite found its  expression in a repressive military regime.  In  the
context of an absence of elections and the prohibition and suppression of most of the activities of
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the  labour  movement,  the  would-be  beneficiaries  of  welfare  state  adaptation  had  only  very
limited possibilities to exercise political influence on the social policy course of the government. 
Yet, also the return to democracy in 1983, and the end of repression against the trade union
movement, did not lead to a process of welfare state adaptation. As has been argued in 3.2. and
3.3.,  the majority  of  the  trade  unions proved  to  be relatively ineffective  instruments  for  the
representation of the social policy interests of the working class and the poor. Nevertheless, the
fact  that  a  large  share  of  the  potential  electorate  would  have  benefited  from  welfare  state
adaptation allows to assume that their electoral power should have favoured the implementation
of such policies in the long run. In practice, however, the Argentine political system severely
hampered the possibilities of big parts of the often poor would-be beneficiaries of welfare state
adaptation to take advantage of their numerical strength in order to promote their social policy
interests. In  accordance with the findings of Frederick Solt(2008) it has been shown that the
social  exclusion  experienced  by  many  of  the  would-be  beneficiaries  led  also  to  a  political
exclusion, which has been reflected in their considerably lower participation in elections and
other forms of political participation. Important parts of the very poor furthermore depended on
clientelistic  networks  of  political  parties,  particularly  of  the  PJ.  As  has  been  argued,  the
mechanisms of political clientelism implied a political subordination of the poor in the sense that
they  hampered  the  poors'  capacities  of  autonomous  organisation  and  directed  their  political
support, and ultimately their votes, to parties that did not promote their interests. At the same
time,  the  viability  of  clientelistic  practices  required  the  persistent  social  exclusion  of  the
“clients”, so that these practices created significant incentives for politicians not to establish any
genuine social right for the poor, as this would have basically impeded the further use of social
assistance  programmes  for  vote-for-favour  strategies.  Moreover,  the  extensive  use  of  such
strategies provided politicians with relatively high autonomy from the real  preferences of the
poor,  as  the  mobilisation  of  the  political  support  from  many  of  them  did  not  rest  on  the
representation of their interests but on the discretionary awarding of (vital) “favours”. 
The institutional  setting of  the Argentine  political  system in general,  and  the PJ  party in
particular, further increased this autonomy and resulted in practice in a strong concentration of
political  power on very view leaders  on top of  the state and the PJ party.  The PJ  has been
governing during nearly 20 of 27 years since the return to democracy. One of the consequences
of  the high concentration  of  power was that  the rank and file  of  the PJ,  which came in its
majority  from  working  class  and/or  poor  backgrounds,  possessed  little  possibilities  of
influencing the government's social policy agenda. The weakness of party structures, the lack of
party internal democracy, and the high dependence of lower party levels on the party leadership
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made the emergence of oppositional party internal  forces around topics such as welfare state
adaptation relatively unlikely. The party internal concentration of power was reinforced through
the  weak  institutionalisation  of  the  link  between  different  government  levels,  which  led  in
practice to a strong dependence of lower government levels on the central government. While the
poor and working class majority in the rank and file lacked institutional mechanisms that would
have allowed them to take advantage of their numerical strength, the lack of institutionalisation
and  accountability,  and  the  high  concentration  of  power  favoured  the  direct  channels  of
influence,  such  as  lobbying  and  personal  relations,  that  were  open  mainly  for  those  who
possessed economic power. In this sense, the formal and informal institutions of the Argentine
political system seriously disadvantaged important parts of the would-be beneficiaries of welfare
state adaptation, while they strengthened the influence of those who were opposing it.
The Argentine case indicates  thereby that  for  a better understanding of the way in which
different social interests are capable of influencing social policy in democratic systems, it can be
fruitful  to  look  at  the  wider  institutional  framework.  Particularly  in  comparably  young  and
weakly institutionalised political systems such as in Argentina, it seems important to examine
also the informal institutional rules, which often contradict the legal rules, but which in practice
determine to an important degree the dynamics of the politics of the welfare state. This wider
institutional framework is not neutral, but expresses to a certain degree the (past) relations of
power, at the same time that it interferes in the contemporary distribution of power resources and
influences  the political  behaviour of  the actors  involved in  welfare  state  politics.  The wider
institutional framework within which the Argentine politics of social policy took place during the
last 35 years has been unfavourable for welfare state adaptation on both dimensions. It interfered
in the distribution of power resources  in detriment of those who would have benefited from
welfare state adaptation, as well as it provided incentives for politicians and trade union leaders
not to promote reforms in this direction.
This study has furthermore found that the politics of welfare state adaptation have not only
been framed by institutions, but also by prevalent ideologies. The social policy trends identified
in 2.2.  show that  during the military government  and the  governments  of  the 1990s,  which
largely  followed  neoliberal  logics,  the  welfare  state  was  rendered  even  less  capable  of
responding  to  the  social  risks  stemming  from  labour  market  deterioration.  Welfare  state
adaptation would have required  reforms  that  were considered  harmful  for  the economy,  and
ultimately  for  the  society  as  a  whole,  from the  neoliberal  perspective.  While  welfare  state
adaptation  would have  required  more  inclusive  and  progressive  social  policy,  the neoliberal
logics suggested that the regressiveness of the welfare state provided work incentives and that it
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favoured investment. While welfare state adaptation would have required that the state interfered
into the distribution of wealth generated by the market, the neoliberal logics suggested that the
welfare state  itself  should become a part  of this market.  The neoliberal  interpretation of  the
relation between globalisation and social policy furthermore suggested that a progressive welfare
state was not viable anymore in a competitive world. 
Like the institutional framework, also the ideological framework of welfare state politics can
be considered to a certain degree result of power relations and politics, at the same time that it
interferes into the distribution of power and influences the political behaviour of the different
actors. It has been shown that the rise of the Argentine neoliberalism can be linked to structural
changes  in  the  economy  that  concentrated  economic  and  political  power  on  sectors  that
supported the neoliberal reorientation of public policy, while the social forces supporting the ISI
model have been weakened. Particularly important for the Argentinean case have thereby been
the  increasing  economic  weight  of  the  financial  sector,  the  growing  concentration  and
internationalisation of the industrial capital, the strong concentration of land in the hands of an
economically  liberal  oriented  oligarchy,  and  from the  1980s  on,  the strong  influence  of  the
international financial institutions due to the high foreign debt of Argentina. While during the
military  dictatorship  a  neoliberal  reorientation  of  social  policy  was  enforced  through
authoritarian  and  repressive  means,  during  the  (early)  1990s  neoliberal  thinking  became
dominant throughout the society. 
Although the Argentine neoliberalism turned out to favour only the interests of a relatively
small wealthy minority, data from the World Value Survey has shown that an ample majority of
the Argentine population supported the neoliberal ideas that guided social policy reform during
the 1990s. During that decade, all mainstream parties agreed that there was no alternative to
neoliberal policies. Even many of the most powerful trade union leaders supported the neoliberal
course of the government, stating publicly their convictions that these would ultimately be to the
benefit of everyone, or that they simply saw no viable alternative. In this sense, neoliberalism
has been shaping public perceptions in a highly unfavourable way for welfare state adaptation.
While the data about the social structure of the Argentine society indicates that a majority would
have  benefited  from  welfare  state  adaptation,  the  World  Value  Survey  data  indicates  that
subjectively many of them perceived the opposite to be true, or that welfare state adaptation,
although desirable, was not feasible. The World Value Survey data, however, also shows that
this  dominance  of  neoliberal  thinking was vanishing as  the negative  social  consequences  of
neoliberalism became more and more evident. The increasing rejection of neoliberal thinking
during the 2000s coincided with a change in the direction of social policy. While the neoliberal
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governments  between  1976 – 1983 and  1989 – 2001 implemented significant  setbacks  with
regard to welfare state adaptation, the heterodox governments of the 1980s and 2000s progressed
with this regard and partly reversed the setbacks of the preceding governments. 
This work was able to show with the help of empiric data that the prevalence of neoliberal
thinking had decisive negative impact on the chances for progressive welfare state reform in
Argentina. The role of ideology contributes thereby to an understanding of why social policy was
fundamentally  in  line  with  business  interests  during  the  1990s,  despite  high  degrees  of
unionisation and a labour-based party in the government. The abrupt shift of the labour-based PJ
party from traditionally rather  state-oriented  positions  to  a  profoundly neoliberal  agenda has
thereby been facilitated by the before described weakness of party internal institutions which
provided a small group of leaders with high autonomy from the rank and file.136 
Since 2002, the ideological framework seems to have provided more favourable conditions
for  welfare  state  adaptation.  In  addition,  since  the  late  1990s  the  social  movements  of  the
unemployed  and  informal  workers  have  developed  considerable  mobilisational  power.  The
recuperation of the labour market since 2003 has moreover increased the power of the trade
unions.  During  the  last  years,  several  of  the  rather  left  oppositional  parties  have  proposed
progressive social policy measures. In this context, some progress towards an adaptation of the
welfare state has been made. Particularly the expansion of pension coverage and the extension of
the child allowance system can be considered significant steps forward. 
Nevertheless, several of the conditions that proved to be unfavourable for an adaptation of the
welfare state in the past, continue to persist at the moment of writing this text. The institutional
setting  of  the  Argentine  political  system,  and  particularly  many of  the  informal  institutions
associated with it,  continue to politically disadvantage parts of the would-be beneficiaries of
welfare state  adaptation.  Also the trade union system continues to show a persistent  lack of
democracy,  and  the trade union leaders  of  the majority fraction (CGT) seem still  not  to be
disposed to  accept  a  reform of the inequitable,  inefficient  and exclusionary health insurance
system. At the same time, the more progressive minority fraction (CTA), which in contrast to the
CGT actively promoted steps towards welfare state adaptation, has ultimately been weakened
due to internal conflicts. These internal conflicts seem to be linked to the co-optation and divide
and rule strategies of the peronist government, which actively intervened into internal processes
of the CTA in favour of the government friendly wing of the confederation. The impressive co-
136According to Christine Trampusch(2005:  77 – 90 , 2008: 165 – 172) the adoption of a largely neoliberal social
policy  agenda  by  the  German  social  democratic  party  during  the  early  2000s  also coincided  with  a  certain
autonomisation of the party elite from the rank and file.
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optive capacity of the peronist government has also increasingly affected the social movements
of the unemployed and informal workers, which seriously puts the autonomy of several of these
organisations into question.
The improvement of the labour market context during the last years has somewhat increased
the  effectiveness  of  the  Argentine  social  insurance  system again.  Nevertheless,  as  has  been
shown in 2.1., severe problems with precarious informal employment, and to a lesser degree with
unemployment,  continue  to  persist.  Furthermore,  the  recuperation  did  not  benefit all  social
groups  equally.  Particularly the poorest  of  the poor have been left  behind.  The Argentinean
economists Corina Rodríguez Enríquez and María Fernanda Reyes(2006: 7) estimated that  it
would take  several  decades  until  the formal  labour market  would have completely absorbed
unemployment and informal employment, even in the unlikely case that growth rates continued
at the current(2006) level. Therefore, welfare state adaptation continues to be an issue of high
social importance for ample parts of the society. Moreover, inclusive social rights are needed
also in benign labour market contexts. If we want to take human rights seriously, nobody should
be condemned to poverty,  no matter why he or she cannot or want not participate in the paid
labour market. Furthermore, as this work suggests, a right to social inclusion can be expected to
considerably improve the quality  of  democracy,  as  social  human rights  and political  human
rights can hardly be separated in the real world.
It is the big hope of the author of this text, that the arguments brought forward in this study
contribute in some way to a better political understanding of why welfare state adaptation largely
failed during the last 35 years  in Argentina. This may ultimately help to find ways of problem
solution  for  the  future.  In  the  eyes  of  the  author,  one of  the central  findings  has  been  that
progressive  welfare  state  reform  seems  to  be  most  likely  when  lower  classes  reach
empowerment.  However,  empowerment  does  not  only  require  high  levels  of  affiliation  to
political parties, unions, and social movements, which would be the case in Argentina, but it
requires structures that allow real democratic participation in order to make these organisations
effective instruments for the representation of their interests. 
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Abstract
This case study examines the politics of failed welfare state adaptation in the context of
profound labour market transformations since the abandonment of the Import Substitution
Industrialisation(ISI) strategy in Argentina. 
During the recent years, a growing political science literature has emerged that focusses on
social policy adaptation processes in post-industrialising societies. The underlying finding of this
literature is that in most OECD countries, post-industrialisation processes have caused important
changes in the constellation of the prevalent social risks. Most of these changes were strongly
related to transformations of the labour market. So, for example, has the number of long-term
unemployed increased in the majority of the countries, work histories have become more
unstable, precarious employment has expanded, and female labour market participation has
risen. In most cases, these changes required an adaptation of the respective welfare states in
order to guarantee adequate levels of social protection. However, the way in, and the extent to,
which social policy reforms during the last decades have been responsive to these changes varied
significantly between countries. On this background, political scientists as well as social policy
researchers of other disciplines have studied the politics of welfare state adaptation in order to
find explanations for this variance and to identify the determinants  adaptation processes.
Until now the literature on this topic is virtually restricted to OECD countries. Nevertheless,
there are relatively advanced welfare states outside the OECD that have been  confronted with
comparable processes of labour market transformation during the last decades. On the basis of a
wide range of empiric data, this case study shows that since the abandonment of the ISI strategy
during the mid 1970s, Argentina has experienced a profound transformation of the labour
market, which comprised strong rises in unemployment, precarious (informal) employment, and
income inequalities, as well as increasingly unstable work histories. Female employment rates
have increased strongly since then. These labour market transformations posed severe challenges
for the effectiveness of the Argentine welfare state, which had virtually been designed for a
dominantly male breadwinner full employment labour market. On the basis of a detailed analysis
of disaggregated spending data and social policy legislation between 1975 and 2010, this study
shows that Argentina constitutes an extreme case of welfare state adaptation failure. Firstly, the
transformation, respectively the deterioration, of the Argentine labour market has been
extraordinarily profound. Secondly, the specific institutional setting of the 'informal-corporatist'
Argentine welfare state during the mid 1970s was particularly incapable of coping with the
social consequences of the labour market changes that came afterwards. And thirdly, social
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policy reform after 1975 has hardly responded to these changes. The dramatic rise in poverty
rates from around 5 % in 1974 to a maximum of about 50 % in 2002 indicates, among others,
how ineffective the Argentine welfare state has been in protecting its citizens against the basic
social risks. 
On the basis of empiric data about the Argentine social and economic structure, this text
argues that the interests with regard to welfare state adaptation have been diverging largely along
class-lines since the abandonment of the ISI strategy. In contrast to so called pluralist
approaches, which emphasise the importance of multiple and rather fragmented interest groups
such as social policy constituencies of different programmes, this text argues that the majority of
working class and poor citizens would have benefited from welfare state adaptation rather
independently of the respective programme. On the other side, the redistributional requirements
of welfare state adaptation, as well as its potential labour market effects, conflicted strongly with
upper class/capital interests. In accordance with the power resources theory(PRT), this study
finds that the failure of welfare state adaptation over the long run has been contextualised, and
largely determined, by a shift in the distribution of power resources in favour of capital and in
detriment of labour since the mid 1970s. At the same time, this text argues that PRT's
concentration on working class power, and the indicators applied to measure it, provide a too
narrow perspective as to capture adequately the relations of power in Argentina. Furthermore,
social policy is not only determined by the relations of power between different actors, but also
by the political behaviour of these. By combining a PRT approach with a broader perspective on
power on the one hand, and institutionalist approaches on the other, this text seeks to deliver an
encompassing explanation of welfare state adaptation failure in Argentina. More than most PRT
studies, this text  examines the active role of employers' power, and considers besides
organizational and electoral also ideological power resources. 'Path-dependency theory' and
other rather institutionalist approaches to welfare state development have argued that institutions
and historical legacy have influence on the behaviour of the different social policy actors and
interfere in the distribution of power resources between them. This text argues, that in Argentina
they have done so in a way that proved highly unfavourable for the likeliness welfare state
adaptation. The once chosen social policy path and the formal and informal institutions of the
Argentine political system weakened the political power of the would-be beneficiaries of welfare
state adaptation and provided important incentives for politicians and trade union leaders not to
promote reforms in this direction. These incentives also contributed to the lack of cooperation
between the organisations of formal, informal and unemployed labour. 
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Kurzbeschreibung
Die vorliegende Fallstudie analysiert aus einer politikwissenschaftlichen Perspektive das
Ausbleiben anpassender Sozialstaatsreformen im Rahmen tiefgreifender Veränderungen auf dem
argentinischen Arbeitsmarkt seit der Aufgabe des Modells der Importsubstituierenden
Industrialisierung(ISI).
In den vergangenen Jahren ist eine wachsende Zahl politikwissenschaftlicher Studien
entstanden, welche sich explizit mit sozialstaatsanpassenden Reformprozessen in post-
industriellen Gesellschaften beschäftigen. Ausschlaggebend für diese Literatur ist die Erkenntnis,
dass Post-Industrialisierungsprozesse in den meisten OECD Ländern zu entscheidenden
Veränderungen bezüglich der von den Bevölkerungen erfahrenen sozialen Risiken führten. Der
Großteil dieser Veränderungen stand in unmittelbarem Zusammenhang mit Entwicklungen auf
dem Arbeitsmarkt. So zum Beispiel hat die Zahl der Langzeitarbeitslosen in den meisten
Ländern zugenommen. Arbeitslebensläufe sind tendenziell unstetiger und prekäre
Arbeitsverhältnisse häufiger geworden. Des Weiteren ist die Berufstätigkeit von Frauen deutlich
gestiegen. Diese Entwicklungen erforderten in den meisten Fällen eine Anpassung des
Sozialstaates, insofern dieser einen weiterhin auf die Bedürfnisse der Menschen abgestimmten
Sozialschutz bieten sollte. Jedoch hat die Sozialpolitik in verschiedenen Ländern auf sehr
unterschiedliche Weise, und in unterschiedlichem Umfang, auf diese Veränderungen reagiert.
Vor diesem Hintergrund haben Politikwissenschaftler, sowie Sozialpolitikforscher anderer
Disziplinen, die politischen Dynamiken der Prozesse der Sozialstaatsanpassung untersucht, mit
dem Ziel landesspezifische Unterschiede zu erklären und wesentliche Einflussfaktoren zu
identifizieren.
Bisher beschränkt sich die Literatur zu diesem Thema im Wesentlichen auf OECD Länder.
Jedoch existieren auch abseits der OECD relativ entwickelte Sozialstaaten, welche in den letzten
Jahrzehnten mit vergleichbaren Arbeitsmarktentwicklungen konfrontiert waren. Auf der Basis
von empirischen Daten zeigt diese Fallstudie, dass Argentinien seit der Aufgabe der ISI Strategie
Mitte der 1970er Jahre einen tiefgreifenden Wandel des Arbeitsmarktes erfuhr. Dieser Wandel
umfasste eine starke Zunahme von Arbeitslosigkeit und prekären (bzw. informellen)
Arbeitsverhältnissen, eine enorme Steigerung der Einkommensunterschiede, zunehmend
unstetige Arbeitslebensläufe, sowie einen Anstieg der Erwerbstätigkeit von Frauen. Da der
argentinische Sozialstaat stark auf einen größtenteils männlichen, von Vollbeschäftigung
geprägten Arbeitsmarkt ausgerichtet war, stellten die genannten Arbeitsmarktveränderungen
dessen Wirksamkeit in Frage. Mit Hilfe einer detaillierten Analyse disaggregierter
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Sozialausgabendaten, sowie der sozialpolitischen Gesetzgebung zwischen 1975 und 2010, zeigt
dieser Text, dass Argentinien einen extremen Fall von fehlender Sozialstaatsanpassung darstellt.
Erstens, der Wandel, bzw. die Verschlechterung, des argentinischen Arbeitsmarktes war
besonders tiefgreifend. Zweitens, der spezifische institutionelle Aufbau des argentinischen
Sozialstaates Mitte der 1970er Jahre war außerordentlich ungeeignet um Schutz gegen die
sozialen Folgen des Arbeitsmarktwandels zu bieten. Und drittens, die Sozialpolitik nach 1975
hat kaum auf diesen Wandel reagiert. Der dramatische Anstieg der Armutsrate von ca. 5 % in
1974 auf ein Maximum von ca. 50 % der Bevölkerung in 2002 zeigt, unter anderem, wie wenig
der argentinische Sozialstaat in der Lage war die Bevölkerung gegen grundlegende soziale
Risiken abzusichern.
Auf der Grundlage empirischer Daten bezüglich der argentinischen Sozial- und
Wirtschaftsstruktur argumentiert dieser Text, dass die sozialpolitischen Interessen seit der
Aufgabe des ISI Modells vorwiegend entlang sozialer Klassen auseinanderklafften. Im
Unterschied zu eher pluralistischen Ansätzen, welche die Bedeutung verschiedenster und meist
fragmentierter Interessengruppen - wie zum Beispiel den EmpfängerInnen verschiedener
Sozialleistungen - betonen, argumentiert diese Studie, dass die Mehrheit der ArbeiterInnenklasse
und der Armen in Argentinien relativ unabhängig vom jeweiligen Sozialprogramm von
anpassenden Reformen profitiert hätte. Jedoch standen der für eine Anpassung des Sozialstaates
notwendige höhere Grad gesellschaftlicher Umverteilung, sowie die potentiellen
Arbeitsmarkteinflüsse solcher Sozialpolitik, im Gegensatz zu den Interessen von
UnternehmerInnen, KapitaleignerInnen und SpitzenverdienerInnen. Im Einklang mit der
sogenannten Machtressourcentheorie(MRT) argumentiert dieser Text, dass das Ausbleiben von
Sozialstaatsanpassung langfristig im Kontext einer Machtverschiebung zu Gunsten der
UnternehmerInnen und KapitaleignerInnen, und zum Nachteil der ArbeiterInnenklasse und der
Armen, gesehen werden muss. Gleichzeitig zeigt diese Studie, dass die von der MRT meist
angewandte Fokussierung auf die politische Kraft der ArbeiterInnenklasse, sowie die meist zu
deren Messung verwendeten Indikatoren, eine zu enge Perspektive darstellen um die
Machtverhältnisse in Argentinien angemessen zu erfassen. Des Weiteren wird Sozialpolitik nicht
nur von den Kräfteverhältnissen zwischen verschiedenen AkteurInnen beeinflusst, sondern auch
von derem politischen Verhalten. Mittels der Kombination eines MRT Ansatzes mit einer
breiteren Perspektive auf politische Macht einerseits, und institutionalistischen Theorien
andererseits, versucht dieser Text eine umfassende politische Erklärung für das Ausbleiben von
Sozialstaatsanpassung in Argentinien zu geben. Mehr als MRT Studien dies herkömmlich tun,
untersucht diese Arbeit auch die aktive Rolle der UnternehmerInnen und KapitaleignerInnen in
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der Sozialpolitik, und bezieht neben organisatorischen und demokratischen auch ideologische
Machtressourcen mit ein. Theorien über die sogenannte „Pfadabhängigkeit“, sowie andere
institutionalistisch orientierte Ansätze zur Erklärung von Sozialpolitik, gehen davon aus, dass
Institutionen und politisches Erbe sowohl Einfluss auf das Verhalten verschiedener
sozialpolitischer AkteurInnen haben, sowie auf die Machtverteilung zwischen diesen. Diese
Fallstudie argumentiert, dass in Argentinien beide Einflüsse ungünstige Voraussetzungen für die
Wahrscheinlichkeit sozialstaatsanpassender Reformen darstellten. Der einst eingeschlagene
sozialpolitische Weg, und die formellen und informellen Institutionen des argentinischen
politischen Systems, schwächten die politischen Einflussmöglichkeiten der durch eine
Sozialstaatsanpassung potentiell Begünstigten, und schufen starke Anreize für PolitikerInnen
und GewerkschaftsführerInnen keine Reformen in diese Richtung zu verfolgen. Diese Anreize
trugen des Weiteren zur fehlenden Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Organisationen formeller,
informeller und arbeitsloser ArbeiterInnen bei.
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